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ABSTRACT  
Under the complex circumstances and the limited capacity in which the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) operates, the role of its prosecutor has been challenging. The ICC 
prosecutor cannot pursue all situations for investigation, and cases for prosecution. She has 
to be selective. Moreover, the individuals and the crimes over which the Court exercises its 
jurisdiction, and the present circumstances in which it operates raise political sensitivities that 
might undermine the ability of the Court to deliver its justice effectively. The ICC prosecutor 
faces a complex dilemma in negotiating a relationship between fealty to the law and the impact 
and possible benefits of political exigencies in delivering justice. It also raises the problem of 
the role of political considerations within the decision-making process. The exercise of 
discretion lies at the heart of these challenges, as the ICC’s Statute allows the prosecutor to 
exercise significant discretion.  
This thesis will explore and analyse the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor. It 
situates the development of the office historically by referring to the experiences of the War 
Crimes Tribunals after World War II and the two United Nations Tribunals of the 1990’s. 
Against this background, it examines the scope of discretion and the way the Prosecutor has 
exercised it. This thesis will suggest that there has been a tendency to overlook the necessity of 
distinguishing between various senses of discretion open to the prosecutor to exercise. In 
exploring the scope of discretion, the thesis will argue that there is wider range of discretion 
with different senses, available to the Prosecutor and that has been exercised by her, when 
applying legal thresholds. In assessing these legal thresholds, the focus will be on ‘sufficient 
gravity’ and ‘the interests of justice’. The thesis will suggest that the indeterminacy of the legal 
thresholds, such as ‘sufficient gravity’ is the space, which, in effect, allows decision-makers to 
exercise a wide range of discretion. The thesis refers to this discourse as legal interpretative 
discretion. This is to be distinguished from prosecutorial discretion, which is a different 
vi 
 
concept and allows decision-makers to consider extra-legal considerations, as the case with 
the term ‘interests of justice ’. An implication of the interpretation of the terms like ‘sufficient 
gravity’, is that the prosecutor can appear to possess almost unlimited power. In exploring the 
relationship between the two types of discretion the thesis will root the analysis within a close 
reading of examples of the investigations and prosecutions, and the scholarly literature. The 
thesis also discusses the relevance of political considerations within the decision-making 
process in the context of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It suggests that there need 
not be a conflict between the broad sense of justice as outlined in the Statute and political 
factors in giving effect to decisions.  The thesis engages with the repeated statements by 
prosecutors, which have denied the use of discretion and asserted a fealty to strict legalism. It 
suggests that beneath these statements lie a resource, discretion, which helps not hinders 
international criminal justice. 
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INTRODUCTION  
One of the most remarkable worldwide organisations that has been established since 
the United Nations (UN) is the International Criminal Court (ICC).1 As its earlier exemplars 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICC is a treaty-based court.2 However, unlike the 
UNSC Tribunals,3 set up on an ad hoc basis by the UN to deal with only specific situations, the 
ICC is a permanent court, with an international jurisdiction that may reach any state in the 
world.4 At the conclusion of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute of the Court was adopted 
in 1998, and began to function in 2002 when it received the sixty required ratifications.5 The 
preamble of the Rome Statute lays out the principal aim of the Court as ‘ending impunity’6 for 
those who commit the most serious violations of international criminal law, including war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.7 As such, the ICC is considered a court of last 
resort.8 It will only have jurisdiction when national judicial systems are unable or unwilling 
genuinely to deal with the given crimes.9 
                                                          
1 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2nd ed.) (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2012), Chapter VI. 
2 All previous international tribunals were either established in accordance to the agreement between several 
states to deal with specific situation, such as the Nuremberg Tribunal, or the SC resolutions, such as the ICTY 
and the ICTR. See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Court, Harvard Human rights journal, Vol. 10 (1997), 11- 62. 
3 For more detailed comparisons between these tribunals, see Morten Bergsmo, Catherine Cisse, and 
Christopher Staker, The Prosecutor of the International Tribunals: the Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, and the ICC Compared, in Louise Arbour, Albin Eser, Kai Ambos, and Andrew 
Sanders (eds.), The Prosecutor of Permanent International Criminal Court (Freiburg im Breisgau: 2000). 
4 For more information about the establishment of the Court see, William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (4th ed.) (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
5 At present, the Rome Statute has been signed by 139 states and ratified by 124 states.  
6 Paragraphs four and five of the Preamble of the Rome Statute aims at ‘the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’ and ‘to put an end to impunity’, respectively. 
7 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (3rd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). In relation to 
the crime of aggression, the Review Conference of Rome Statute held in Kampala on 11th June, 2010 provided 
that the Court shall exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after 1st January 2017, when States 
Parties make a decision for activating this jurisdiction. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court’s 
website at <http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression>.  
8 Article 17 of the ICC Statute creates the complementarity regime, where the ICC has jurisdiction, only when 
states are ‘unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’. 
9 See Article 17 of the Statute. 
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The Office of Prosecutor (OTP), and specifically the chief prosecutor, is one of the 
main bodies of the Court, which attracts much controversy and debate.10 Unlike the previous 
international tribunals, the ICC provides its prosecutor with an independent authority to launch 
the Court’s investigations and prosecutions.11 In addition to a complaint from the Security 
Council (SC) or referral by a State Party to the Rome Statute under Article 13 (a)(b), the 
prosecutor has also a proprio motu power under Article 15 to trigger the jurisdiction of the 
Court.12 Under Article 53 (1) (a)(b) and (2) (a)(b), the prosecutor is given a broad power to 
examine the satisfaction of the legal requirements of initiating investigation and prosecuting 
cases. Paragraphs (1)(c) and (2)(c) of the same article provide the prosecutor with a 
prosecutorial discretion not to initiate an investigation or proceed with a case. The matter of 
what sort of discretionary power the prosecutor has, under which basis the power is exercised, 
and the scope of this discretion stand at the heart of the examination of these requirements. 
These questions are crucial to be scrutinised and analysed for a better understanding of the 
concept of discretion within the ICC.  
The current discussion and analysis of the question of the ICC prosecutor’s discretion 
in the literature – in addition to the question of its scope13- has extensively focused on only one 
                                                          
10 Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters, and Cedric Ryngaert, International Prosecutors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012). For the purpose of this thesis, the term Prosecutor (with an upper case) refers to one of the Prosecutor 
of International Tribunals in person, depending on the context of the sentence. However, the term prosecutor 
(with a lower case) refers to the prosecutor in general. 
11 See Bergsmo, Cisse, and Staker, supra n. 3. 
12 Kaveri Vaid, Discretion Operationalized through Law: Proprio Motu Decision-Making at the International 
Criminal Court, Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2013), 359- 416. 
13 Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 32, Issue: 5, 2008, 1400- 1465. She discusses the scope of prosecutorial 
discretion in the context of examining gravity. See also, Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion 
before National Courts and International Tribunals, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3 (2005), 124- 
144, analysing the scope of prosecutorial discretion before national and international criminal tribunals, 
including the ICC. See also, Susana SáCouto and Katherine A. Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International 
Criminal Court, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 5 (2008), 807- 854, discussing the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion in the context of assessing ‘relative gravity’. See also, Ignaz Stegmiller, The Gravity 
Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Back and Forth in Lubanga and Ntaganda, International Criminal Law 
Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), 547- 565, discussing the scope of prosecutorial discretion in the context of 
assessing ‘relative gravity’. 
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sense of discretion, namely prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion has been the 
subject of extensive academic commentary and debate. In so doing, some have focused on the 
question of whether there should be criteria to govern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
This discussion is usually associated with the issue of the relevance of extra-legal factors. For 
example, in her much cited article, Allison Marston Danner argues that when exercising 
prosecutorial discretion, ‘the Prosecutor can best ensure the consistency and perceived fairness 
of his discretionary decision making through the consistent application of ex ante standards.’14 
She argues that publishing prosecutorial guidelines, which are rooted in a ‘good process’, will 
help to enhance the legitimacy of the Court, as they constrain this discretionary power.15 She 
suggests that the failure to promulgate these guidelines will risk credibility and legitimacy, 
which are fundamental to the success of the Court.16 Philippa Webb also calls for ‘a model of 
structured discretion’,17 where ex ante criteria should guide the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in the context of the assessment of ‘the interests of justice’. When analysing the 
criteria of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, James A. Goldston calls on ‘the OTP to set 
forth in broad terms the contours which guide its exercise of discretion, and/or delineate further 
the various factors which may come into play.’18 For the purpose of guiding the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, Brian D. Lepard offers ‘fundamental ethical principles’.19 Avril 
                                                          
14 Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2003), P. 538. 
15 Ibid, Pp. 536- 9, and 541. 
16 Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court and the Independent Counsel, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2003), P. 1656. 
17 Philippa Webb, The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion not to Proceed in the ‘Interests of Justice’, Criminal Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 50 (2005), P. 306. 
18 James A. Goldston, More Candour about Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, Issue: 2 (2010), P. 403. 
19 Brian D. Lepard, How should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise his or her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental 
Ethical Principles, John Marshall Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2010), Pp. 558- 564. 
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McDonald and Roelof Haveman call upon the Prosecutor to develop ‘guidelines’ to govern 
‘the decision either or not to initiate an investigation.’20 
Others have mainly focused on the relevance of political considerations within the 
decision-making process when exercising prosecutorial discretion. Here, whilst some of them 
argue for the favour of the possibility of including such considerations within the decision-
making process under certain conditions, others strictly argue for the non-inclusion, and 
irrelevance of such considerations. For example, Kenneth A. Rodman argues that the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion should be carried out in a broad way that considers ‘the political 
context in which international criminal law has to operate.’21 Matthew R. Brubacher also 
discusses the question of the relevance of ‘political factors’, and argues that such factors are 
necessary for ‘the success of the Court’, but within ‘a policy-based approach’ that justifies such 
a process.22 In addition, Alexander K.A. Greenawalt calls for a broader exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion where political considerations may be considered and within a 
pragmatic model he suggests, which aims at moderating the tension between legalisms’ 
aspirations and the realities of the work of the ICC.23 He argues that it is true that the ideal 
suggests that exercise of prosecutorial discretion should be guided by legal rules, ex ante 
guidelines, or guides of the Court’s judges.24 However, the plausibility of such appeal ‘depends 
                                                          
20 Avril McDonald and Roelof Haveman, Avril McDonald and Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial Discretion - Some 
Thoughts on ‘Objectifying’ the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion by the Prosecutor of the ICC: Expert 
consultation process on general issues relevant to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (15th April, 2003), P. 9, 
available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/consultations.php>. 
21 Kenneth A. Rodman, Is peace in the interests of justice? The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2009), P. 101. 
22 Matthew R. Brubacher, Prosecutorial Discretion within the International Criminal Court, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 2 (2004), 71- 95. 
23 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal 
Court, New York University Journal of International Law & Politics, Vol. 39 (2007), 583- 673. 
24 Ibid, P. 586. 
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on the adequacy of its underlying assumptions.’25 In the context of the ICC, such an account is 
not sufficient and a balance is needed between legalism and realism.  
The irrelevance of political factors is mainly presented by the Prosecutors and NGOs, 
who argue that prosecutors are merely to do law and that there is no place for political 
considerations within their decision-making process. The ICC Prosecutor has always declared 
that she only applies the law. Both Prosecutors of the ICC have denied the above suggestions 
by arguing that the current strategy of the prosecution is taken in accordance with the law. The 
Prosecutor’s statements indicate as if the law is clear and does not entail any discretionary 
fashion (legal interpretive discretion), and that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has no 
political dimensions (prosecutorial discretion). In her response to a question of the place of 
cases that have political indications, Fatou Bensouda answered, ‘[a]ll I can and will do is to 
apply the law in strict conformity with the Rome Statute’.26 Her predecessor, Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo regularly adopted the same stance in public statements: ‘my duty is to apply 
the law without political considerations’.27 He emphasised this stance several times.28 The 
                                                          
25 Ibid, P. 586. 
26 Aeyal Gross, ICC Prosecutor: Low-Ranking Israeli Soldiers, as well as Palestinians, could be Prosecuted for 
War Crimes, Haaretz (1st May, 2015), available at <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/.premium-1.654516> (Last Access: 2nd May, 2015).   
27 Statement delivered by Moreno-Ocampo, Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Address by Mr. Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Office of the Prosecutor (25th June, 2007), available at 
<http://www.icc 
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20
statements/statement/Pages/building%20a%20future%20on%20peace%20and%20justice%20%20%20address
%20by%20mr%20%20luis%20moreno%20ocampo%20%20p.aspx>.    
28 ‘I cannot adjust the law to the political interests. Those who manage political agenda have to respect the 
law.’ Moreno Ocampo’s answer to my own question about the application of Article 53 run via a webcast 
interaction. See this interview at: Webcast interview with ICC's former Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, 
International Bar Association (17th October, 2012), at 
<http://wcc.webeventservices.com/eventRegistration/console/EventConsoleMVC.jsp?&eventid=529206&sessi
onid=1&username=&partnerref=&format=fhvideo1&mobile=false&flashsupportedmobiledevice=false&helpce
nter=false&key=47F980F3BD93A69C4C205D63E8B92504&text_language_id=en&playerwidth=800&playerheig
ht=690&eventuserid=70917034&contenttype=A&mediametricsessionid=56952751&mediametricid=963054&u
sercd=70917034&mode=launch#> (Last Access: 10th October, 2012) (hereinafter: an Ocampo’s interview at 
International Bar Association). Also he said ‘This is not the ICC; the ICC is a judicial system’ Interview with Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Global Observatory (25th January 2012), 
at <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/197-interview-with-luis-moreno-ocampo-chief-
prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court.html> (Last Access: 10th October, 2012) (hereinafter: an 
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prosecutor informs us that her work is based on only law and has nothing to do with 
preferences, policies, and interests of states. Former ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour argues 
that ‘not only must the Prosecutor stand apart from such [political] considerations, he or she 
must stand above them, and be fully prepared without fear or favour to contradict them or to 
challenge political pressures which may seek to influence the course of justice.’29 In addition 
to this, Human Rights Watch (HRW) also strongly argue that ‘[t]he prosecutor should always 
attempt to steer clear of such politicization of his role, and should certainly not adopt a 
construction of "the interests of justice" that would favor such politicization.’30 
It is true that prosecutorial discretion is a central debate to be raised about the work of 
the prosecutor. However, discretion as exercised by the OTP has several levels of meaning. As 
will be analysed in Chapter Three, there may be a degree of discretion that might justifiably be 
exercised by decision-makers when applying legal categories. Such discretion may either result 
due to the indeterminate, ambiguous, or open-ended meaning of these legal norms, where no 
further legal rules or guiding factors exist to elucidate or define them. Professor H. L. A. Hart 
refers to this sense of discretion when he argues that an ‘open texture’ at the borderlines of 
legal rules is inevitable.31 He opines that legal rules cannot always solve all problems. The 
characterization of the legal rules of being ‘open-textured’ allows for a space of discretion to 
be followed. As Kent Greenawalt puts it, ‘since classification by human language cannot 
provide clear answers to each of the infinite variety of factual situations, some uncertainty 
                                                          
Ocampo’s interview at Global Observatory), also he said ‘re­inforcing hardliners is exactly the problem that the 
UN Security Council and the AU have to deal with, by having legal decisions respected. If not, they will promote 
the hardliners’, Interview: Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, The Africa Report, 21, September, 2011, at 
<http://www.theafricareport.com/200909213281793/news-analysis/interview-luis-moreno-ocampo-icc-
prosecutor.html> (Last Access: 10th October, 2012) (hereinafter: an Ocampo’s interview at the Africa Report).  
29 Louise Arbour, Keynote Speech at the International Conference on War Crimes Trials (8th November, 1998), 
cited in Rachel Kerr, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law Politics 
and Diplomacy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), P. 178. 
30 Human Rights Watch, The Meaning of ‘The Interests of Justice’ in Article 53 of the Rome Statute 
(1st June, 2005), P. 14, available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/06/01/meaning-interests-justice-article-
53-rome-statute>.    
31 H. L. A. Hart, the Concept of Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961), P. 125. 
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about the application of rules is unavoidable.’32 Thus, in applying the legal rules, Marisa 
Iglesias Vila argues, there will be a place for discretion to be exercised.33 
In the above sense of discretion and within the ICC, the existing literature has paid scant 
attention and made superficial reference to this sense of discretion and without analysis and 
explanation. William A. Schabas, for example, states that the legal criteria of initiating a 
proprio motu investigation ‘provide enormous space for highly discretionary determinations.’34 
Kaveri Vaid made reference to the possibility of exercising discretion when applying legal 
categories. In taking up this issue of the open-ended meaning of the gravity threshold issue, 
Vaid emphasises that the open-endedness and substantive flexibility of ‘sufficient gravity’ 
provide the prosecutor with ‘some degree of discretion.’35 She says that gravity is ‘an 
exceptionally flexible concept’ that is open for varied interpretations ‘in many different and 
plausible ways.’36 This type of discretion implicitly allows the prosecutor to choose among 
alternative interpretations. To her, indeterminacy of the concept gives the prosecutor a power 
to claim authority as to which correct interpretations will be taken when deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation or not. Therefore, ‘[s]uch interpretive autonomy, when coupled with 
the flexibility of the concept itself, strongly resembles discretion.’37 However, she does not 
provide a theoretical and legal context for this discretion. 
                                                          
32 Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Discretion: the Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (1975), P. 359. 
33 Marisa Iglesias Vila, Juridical Discretion and Judicial Positivism: the Substantive Criteria of Validity, Discretion 
and the Rule of Law, P. 135, available at 
<file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/prosecutorial%20discretion/discretionary/J_UDICIAL_DISCRETION_AND_JUDIC
IAL_POSITIVISM__THE.pdf>.     
34 Schabas, supra n. 4, P. 181. See also in general William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at 
the International Criminal Court, The John Marshall Law Review, Vol. 43, Issue: 3 (2010), Pp.548-9, arguing that 
political choices were made under the guise of legal criteria.  
35 Vaid, supra n. 12, Pp. 377 and 385. 
36 Ibid, P. 388. 
37 Ibid, P. 365. 
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In examining the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor, the thesis will, therefore, 
look at these two types of discretion available before the prosecutor and the Court. The first 
one is a conventional discretion and is called prosecutorial discretion. This discretion permits 
the prosecutor to exercise a choice having satisfied the legal requirements that the Statute 
requires for initiating an investigation or prosecuting a case. For this purpose, Article 53 (1)(c) 
and (2)(c), and Article 15 (1) and (3) will be fully examined. The Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) 
‘interests of justice’ provisions explicitly authorise the prosecutor to exercise such discretion. 
Luc Cote says this criterion has ‘yet to be defined in the sphere of international criminal law, 
where they are called upon to play an important role in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.’38 The Article 15 proprio motu power of the prosecutor may arguably permit the 
prosecutor to exercise prosecutorial discretion. However, this issue is highly contested, as will 
be discussed in Chapter One.  
The second type of discretion lies in applying the legal requirements (jurisdictional and 
admissible criteria, in particular ‘sufficient gravity’) that the Statute provides for initiating 
investigations or prosecuting cases. Before the prosecutor exercises prosecutorial discretion, 
she needs first to determine the satisfaction of these legal requirements. This thesis will 
establish that in applying these criteria, the ICC Prosecutor has, in effect, exercised a degree of 
discretion to interpret the satisfaction of these legal requirements. ‘Sufficient gravity’, as a legal 
filter by which to determine which situations and cases are admissible, is a key concern among 
the other criteria to the account of this thesis.39 Article 17 (1) (d) specifies that a case will not 
be admissible if it ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. This adds 
an additional complexity to the prosecutor’s policy commitment to concentrate only on the 
most serious crimes. In determining the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’, the Prosecutor in fact 
                                                          
38 Luc Cote, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, Issue: 1 (2005), P. 164. 
39 Chapter Four will fully discuss this sort of discretion. 
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deploys a strong degree of discretion to interpret ‘sufficient gravity’, as she has used different 
factors through different methods to interpret the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’ and pick up 
among the different interpretations. 
It is true that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which authorises the prosecutor 
to legitimately choose among worthy legally situations and cases, raise problems in relation to 
the consideration of political factors, in fact it is legal interpretive discretion that has been 
hidden into the interpretation of the legal requirements, which seems more problematic. Whilst 
it is often supposed the assessment of the legal thresholds should not involve the exercise of 
discretion, however, in practice it appears as if the Prosecutor had a choice to determine which 
situations or cases to be investigated or prosecuted upon applying these legal thresholds. 
Looking at the strong sense of discretion, exercised by the ICC Prosecutor to interpret 
‘sufficient gravity’, it seems as if that this practice is ultra vires as multiple interpretations – 
even opposite or contradictory – of this term have been equally reasonable and possible.  
The main contribution of this thesis is to emphasise the idea of the strong discretionary 
fashion that the ICC Prosecutor has used when interpreting the legal requirements of initiating 
investigations or proceeding with cases. There is a scant research done in this relation. What 
has been less recognised in the literature is the extent to which the ICC Prosecutor, who is 
obliged to apply complex legal requirements concerning jurisdiction and admissibility in the 
process of deciding whether to initiate investigations or prosecutions, is also necessarily 
engaged in interpretive legal discretion where formulations in the Statute are indeterminate in 
some way. In addition to this point, the discussion of this discretion is extensively followed by 
the discussion of prosecutorial discretion. In so doing, the thesis will address the question of 
the relevance of politics when exercising prosecutorial discretion. The thesis will argue that 
political influences/repercussions are unavoidable and even desirable. It will suggest a 
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framework in which reference to political influences/repercussions may legitimately be taken 
when exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
The controversies about the ICC prosecutor are of course connected to the exercise of 
discretion. Prosecutorial discretion, in particular, is the core concern of these controversies, as 
it may raise the charge of politicisation or bias. It is normally accepted that the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion involves a consideration of extra-legal factors. This in turn may raise 
the question of whether or in what circumstances political factors can also be taken into 
account. As will be fully explained, some argue that discretion in general constitutes a threat 
to the rule of law. Its exercise involves a choice, where decision-makers hold an area of 
autonomy to make decisions that may give due considerations to political factors, in particular, 
where guiding standards, factors, or principles of the exercise of this discretion are not available 
or just vague and open for more different interpretations. This arguable power the ICC 
prosecutor holds, which was the topic of a heated debate during the Rome Statute negotiations 
and the Rome Conference, pushed a considerable amount of the current literature to focus their 
studies on this particular aspect of discretion. What has been less recognised is that the 
prosecutor may also be able to consider these extra-legal factors, and potentially political ones, 
as long as a degree of discretion can be – and indeed has been – exercised when deploying 
discretion on the assessment of the legal categories. This is where these two senses of discretion 
converge and need to be identified.  
In practice, as I have noted, the ICC Prosecutor has always claimed that her decisions 
are based on the satisfaction of the legal requirements for initiating investigations or 
prosecuting cases. For example, in the Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, the 
OTP provides that ‘[w]ith respect to the situation in the Republic of Korea, and the situation 
on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, following thorough legal and factual 
assessments of each respective situation, the Office concluded that the statutory criteria for 
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initiation of an investigation under article 53(1) were not met.’40 This scenario pushes us to 
concentrate on the other sense of discretion that can be – and indeed has been exercised by the 
prosecutor – which raises the same potential dangers that the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion raises.  
Therefore, this thesis will investigate and analyse these two types of discretion. The 
aim of this thesis is to show the current controversies about the ICC Prosecutor are not only 
linked to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. There is a need to shed more light on the other 
sense of discretion that may be exercised by the prosecutor. Thus, providing a better 
understanding of the concept of discretion within the ICC Statute system will contribute to 
clarify why and how these controversies arise from the work of the ICC Prosecutor. By 
focusing on analysing legal interpretive discretion, the thesis aims at clarifying that the current 
charges of politicisation directed against the work of the Prosecutor might be due to the exercise 
of a degree of discretion when applying the legal rules, where no extra-legal factors, including 
political ones should be taken into account. These are legal thresholds, where a consistent 
application of these thresholds is at least needed, when they are indeterminate, as the case with 
‘sufficient gravity’. On the other end of the spectrum, the thesis aims at arguing that political 
effects/repercussions, are in the context of the current design of the Court unavoidable, and 
may be legitimately taken into account, when exercising prosecutorial discretion.  
This thesis then centres on two main research questions. The first question is what is 
the scope of discretion that has been exercised by the ICC Prosecutor? The second question is 
what implications does the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the ICC Prosecutor have on 
the administration of international criminal justice?  
                                                          
40 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014 (December, 2014), Para. 19, 
(hereinafter: Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014). 
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There have been charges of politicisation and bias of the work of the ICC Prosecutor. 
In particular, the accusation of the Court of being an anti-African tool, directed only against 
African states, is the most recurrent one. In addition, within situations, the Prosecutor has been 
accused of bias when selecting which cases to prosecute and which to ignore. Although the 
Court has potential global reach, it has opened investigations into ten situations and 23 cases,41 
all of which are from Africa. This state of affairs has prompted many commentators, scholars, 
and even states to accuse the ICC of being ‘an African court’.42 The African Union (AU), in 
particular, has launched an aggressive attack against the Court, in general, and the prosecutor, 
in particular, for targeting Africa. ‘What have we done to justify being an example to the world? 
Are there no worst countries, like Myanmar [Burma]?’43 This is a direct accusation of the Court 
of targeting Africa by the AU commission chairman, Jean Ping. He also says ‘[f]rankly 
speaking, we are not against the ICC. What we are against is Ocampo's justice.’44 Also, the 
then Chairman of the AU Commission said ‘we are not against international justice… it seems 
that Africa has become a laboratory to test the new international law’.45 The AU has kept 
calling for the deferral of cases, in particular taken against incumbent heads of state, raising 
political claims that the Prosecutor is showing bias46 against the African continent. In the words 
                                                          
41 See the official website of the Court at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx>.  
42 See Max du Plessis, Tiyanjana Maluwa and Annie O’Reilly, Africa and the International Criminal Court, a 
meeting held at Chatham House (30th May, 2013). See also Charles Chernor Jalloh, Regionalizing International 
Criminal Law? International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 20 (2009), 445- 499. 
43 See Farouk Chothia, Africa's Fatou Bensouda is New ICC Chief Prosecutor, BBC (12th December, 2011), 
available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16029121> (Last Access: 30th May, 2015).  
44 This was when Moreno-Ocampo was the Prosecutor at the time. See David Smith, New Chief Prosecutor 
Defends International Criminal Court, The Guardian (23rd May, 2012), available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/may/23/chief-prosecutor-international-criminal-court> (Last Access: 
30th May, 2015). See also African Union summit on ICC pullout over Ruto trial, BBC (20th September, 2013), 
available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24173557> (Last Access: 30th March, 2015), Rwanda is 
arguing that ‘international justice is becoming more and more a political matter.’ 
45 Vow to pursue Sudan over 'Crimes', BBC (27th September, 2008), available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7639046.stm> (Last Access: 8th April, 2015). 
46 Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army (Malta, Gutenberg 
Press, 2006), P. 99. A representative of the Acholi society who was interviewed by Allen stated ‘how can the 
ICC be impartial if it is only working on one side of the conflict?... government soldieries committed crimes, 
should we ignore it?’ 
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of Professor Mahmood Mamdani, it is ‘politicized justice.’47 This state of affairs pushed many 
commentators and international actors to accuse the Prosecutor of a political agenda when 
looking at the responsibility of the non-African states.48 This main charge that the ICC 
Prosecutor regularly receives and that is mostly linked to the exercise of discretion pushed me 
to analyse and examine how and where discretion is exercised by the ICC Prosecutor.  
As such, discretion is often seen as a threat to the rule of law.49 B. S. Chimni provides 
a common meaning for the concept, saying that ‘[t]he ‘rule of law’ signifies that all persons 
(natural or juridical), including organs of the state, should comply with laws adopted through 
prescribed constitutional procedures.’50 The ultimate aim of imposing this concept is to make 
people ruled by the law and abide the law. People should be governed by rule of law, but not 
by ‘rule of man’ where the power is exercised by an absolute ruler.51 Those who govern people 
should not apply the law to serve their own personal ends or to consider interests or orders of 
extraneous pressures.52 Rule of law here is seen then as a concept that prohibits the exercise of 
arbitrary power. Laws must be clear and legal orders must be governed by clear and general 
rules. As Richard A. Epstein points out, this generality should be understood in a way that 
makes the application of law predictable and fairly enforceable by decision-makers.53 The 
                                                          
47 Mahmood Mamdani, Darfur, ICC and the new humanitarian order: How the ICC’s “responsibility to protect” 
is being turned into an assertion of neocolonial domination, Pambazuka (17th September, 2008), available at 
<http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.php/comment/50568%20> (Last Access: 4th May, 2015).   
48 Jan Wouters and Kenneth Chan, Policies, not Politics: The Pursuit of Justice in Prosecutorial Strategy at the 
International Criminal Court, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, No. 95 (2012), Pp. 12- 14, arguing 
for example that Israel and Colombia have not been investigated by the Prosecutor. 
49 There are two major theories that regulate the concept of the rule of law, namely the thin theory and the 
thick theory. The former deals with the formal aspect of the concept, that is to say with the procedural 
requirement of exercising the authority by a state. The latter is related to substantive elements, such as justice 
and fairness. See generally, Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework, Public Law (1997), p. 467-487. 
50 B. S. Chimni, Legitimating the International Rule of Law, in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), P. 290. 
51 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 56 (2008), P. 
4, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081738>.  
52 Peter M. Shane, the Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 
Vol. 36 (2013), P. 21, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2284222>.  
53 Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, National Affairs, No. 7 (2011), P. 39, available at 
<http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20110317_Epstein.pdf>. 
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unexpected response that decision-makers can take would violate this principle. This 
immediately opposes the nature of discretion that may be conducted in a capricious way that 
makes it difficult for people to expect it. Discretion, Stanley de Smith and J. M. Evans note, 
means ‘a power to make a choice between alternative courses of action.’54 The idea of the 
exercise of discretion then involves the process of making a choice. Officials will then, as 
Wendy Lacey says, select between several various, but equally valid, courses of action.55 As 
there will be various courses of action, decisions resulting from the exercise of discretion may 
then involve different and even opposite outcomes. Whatever the sense of discretion we talk 
about, in the case of the absence of fixed legal rules (open-ended meanings), and the 
independent capacity officials hold to make choices, the gate is open for the abuse of this 
discretion. This process may involve consideration of extra-legal factors, personal aims, 
external pressures, or political influences. In fact, all these potentials are possible. Rule of law 
here then aims at preventing political advantages or deferential calculations to be considered 
when making a decision.56 In other words, laws should not be applied in an arbitrary manner. 
Officials must apply the law far from any extraneous pressures that may push the judges to 
make their decisions on considerations other than the law.  
The brief above presentation of some principles of the rule of law at least suggests that 
making a decision on the basis of irrelevant factors or reasons to obtain personal aims is a threat 
to this principle. Within international judicial systems, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
for example, constitutes more serious threat to the rule of law and its principles. Being exposed 
to external pressures, or able to impose personal ends are some fears that are often associated 
                                                          
54 Stanley de Smith and J. M. Evans, De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th ed.) (London, 
Steven and Sons Ltd, 1980), P. 278. 
55 Wendy Lacey, Judicial Discretion and Human Rights: Expanding the Role of International Law in the Domestic 
Sphere, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 5 (2004), P. 110. 
56 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)? Law and Philosophy, Vol. 
21, No. 2 (2002), P. 147. 
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with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In other words, the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion entails a potential of a noticeable degree of an arbitrary behavior that decision-
makers may follow. Carl E. Schneider presents several disadvantages that result from 
discretion. For example, discretion allows decision-makers to use their own subjective 
standards that ‘depart from the sources of [their] authority.’57 Decision-makers might use 
improper standards that were not initially intended by the law itself. This makes such decisions 
less legitimate to the ones that are based on rules. Another drawback mentioned by Schneider 
is that discretion opens the door for decision-makers to treat like cases differently. Rules, on 
the other hand, can be employed to avoid this problem as they allow treating like cases alike. 
In considering whether to initiate an investigation or prosecute a case, the prosecutor (also the 
judges) is highly engaged in political questions, as the Court works within a highly political 
environment. In making such decisions, it can be imagined that the prosecutor, for reasons such 
as the weak of enforcement mechanisms, and the cooperation’s problems, may be vulnerable 
to extraneous interventions or deferential considerations. Danner argues that   
The cases adjudicated by the ICC are infused with political implications and require 
sensitive decision making by those members of the Court—including the 
Prosecutor—who are vested with the discretion to exercise its powers. Because of the 
high stakes of its subject matter and the threat that its decisions can pose to powerful 
international interests, the ICC will inevitably be subject to charges that it is a purely 
political institution, remote from both the rule of law and the places where the crimes 
it adjudicates occur.58 
                                                          
57 Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View, in Hawkins K (ed.) The Uses of Discretion, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1992), P. 69. 
58 Danner, supra n. 14, P. 510. 
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It is within this domain where prosecutorial discretion and legal interpretive discretion 
may converge. It is important to identify that the exercise of any sense of discretion, in 
particular the case of the absence of guiding standards or factors, may involve engagement with 
political concerns. Whilst such political factors or considerations may be arguably taken in the 
course of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion alongside extra-legal factors, this should not 
be the case in the context of the exercise of legal interpretive discretion.  
As Hassan Jallow states, ‘[p]rosecutorial discretion is fundamental to the concept of the 
independence of the Prosecutor – the notion of independence is tied up with the concepts of 
fairness, incorruptibility, freedom from outside influences, decision-making based on evidence 
objectively assessed, and sound public interest principles.’59 However, these principles and 
cautions should not be mixed with the political dimensions, effects, and repercussions that the 
prosecutor unavoidably and desirably may consider. Although the character of independence, 
in essence, is meant to provide the prosecutor with discretion, this thesis suggests that these 
two values constitute two distinct sides of the same coin. This is an important distinction that 
needs to be identified. As the prosecutor is required to be independent within the judicial 
institution (prosecutorial independence), she also needs to remain flexible when drawing the 
strategy of the prosecution of the Court (prosecutorial discretion).60 To be independent is not 
to succumb to external factors, such as political pressure, coercion, or bribery. To be flexible 
is to be adaptable to the changing policies and interests that may require decision-makers to 
consider – i.e. political effects/repercussions (prosecutorial discretion). Carsten Stahn points to 
                                                          
59 Hassan Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 3, Issue: 1 (2005), P. 154. 
60 The idea of the independence of judges when using a discretionary power (this can be also applied to 
prosecutors) was asserted by Oscar Schachter when says that ‘[i]f the rules were so flexible as to afford 
complete discretion to the parties or judges, we would not have law or decisions based on law. We might have 
negotiation, bargaining, conciliation, or political fiat’, see Oscar Schacter, International Law in Theory and 
Practice: General Course in Public International Law (Martinus: Nijhoff, 1982), P. 34. See also in general 
Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 19, 
No. 1 (1971), 1- 58. 
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the independence value as a power that ‘help[s] the Prosecutor to withstand pressure and 
temper political interference by various extraneous actors in the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes.’61 Cote also distinguishes between these values, saying: 
[W]e have to distinguish between the political dimension of a decision from the political 
pressures exercised on the person who is making a decision. The former political 
component, which characterizes the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, may be 
acceptable while the latter is highly objectionable as it challenges the independence not 
only of the Prosecutor but of the whole judicial institution.62  
Whilst it may seem problematic to allow the prosecutor to exercise discretion in such 
an open-ended manner – in particular all state parties to the Court have raised their concerns 
about the prosecutor being a political agent, pursuing her own political agenda – a structured 
approach to such a process would help to ease this problem. Chapter Three will provide a 
framework that discusses ways to reduce the fear of a politicised prosecutor. The thesis adds 
another contribution by its emphasis on the importance of a structured approach to the exercise 
of discretion. This will be applied in the context of considering Article 53’s ‘the interests of 
justice’, as Chapter Five discusses. Briefly, the framework suggests that in the context of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the prosecutor can utilise extra-legal considerations as a 
tool to achieve a higher normative end of the process. The purpose of this framework is to 
ensure that the process by which the prosecutor gives weight to extra-legal considerations, 
including certain political ones, is taken in order to achieve the aim of the Court (achieving 
justice).  In the context of this thesis, justice (in its broad meaning) is a measure on which the 
validity of the exercise of discretion will be examined.63 For this reason, international criminal 
                                                          
61 Carsten Stahn, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years on, in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter 
(ed.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), P. 253. 
62 Supra n. 38, P. 171. 
63 The language of the Preamble of the ICC Statute refers to the necessity of delivering justice to victims in 
more than one paragraph. For example, ‘millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
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justice will be extended beyond retributive justice, as the Court undertakes and applies to 
include justice in its broad meaning.64 It is meant to be broad justice,65 as understood either by 
the Court or the relevant society in a certain situation, whichever is more achievable.66  
An understanding of these two senses of discretion would help to examine the rules 
approach67 that the prosecutor is invoking to justify her strategy. As will be shown in Chapter 
Five, the ICC Prosecutor has justified her decisions to strictly show her commitment that she 
is only applying law and that no reference has been made to non-legal factors. For example, 
the OTP on several occasions, including my interviews with members of staff of the OTP, have 
been more inclined to consider peace negotiations as outside the bounds of their discretionary 
decision-making according to the limits imposed by the Statute.68 The prosecutor does not seem 
                                                          
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,’ ‘that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished,’ and ‘to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators’. 
64 The thesis will argue that justice cannot be achieved only through the ICC. It will suggests that the 
prosecutor may be advised to refer to other sorts of mechanisms to achieve justice. This sort of justice will be 
framed by the relevant society who is suffering mass violation of human rights. As justice may take different 
forms, therefore, the meaning of justice that this research adopts is the broad one that is capable of 
encompassing all sorts of it. 
65 Justice, basically, has two meanings: broad and narrow. For the purposes of this research, the broad 
meaning will be taken, as it includes all types of justice. This is to encompass the other types of justice that 
may be demanded by a certain society that is experiencing violence, whether during the ongoing atrocities, or 
during the transitional period. In 2011, the UN defined the broad meaning of justice in its report, and 
enumerated the possible mechanisms that basically involve ‘both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, 
including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals. See 
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General, 
Secretary-General United Nations (2004), at <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-rule-of-law-
and-transitional-justice-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-societies-report-of-the-secretary-general/>.  
66 For more information about the potential sort of justice mechanism, see Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2000). Teitel referred to five main mechanisms that basically encompass all 
sorts of mechanisms: criminal justice, historical justice, reparatory justice, administrative justice, and 
constitutional justice. Also, Hayner did mention various ways by which countries can respond to past atrocities, 
such as: holding trials, truth commission, providing individuals access to security files, reparations, building 
memorials, lustration, making comprehensive reforms in all section of a state, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable 
Truths: Facing Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, Routledge: 2002), P. 12. 
67 Gross, supra n. 26, ‘All I can and will do is to apply the law in strict conformity with the Rome Statute’, Fatou 
Bensouda answered the interviewer. 
68 Several interviews I conducted between 12th and 14th March, 2013. In addition see, ‘What's clear for us is 
"interest of justice" is not the interest of peace or interest of security. That's a Security Council matter.’ Mr. 
Moreno-Ocampo’s discussion in an event held at the Council on Foreign Relations, see Stephen M. Schwebel, 
Pursuing International Justice: A Conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Council on Foreign Relations (4th 
February, 2010), available at <http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/pursuing-international-justice-conversation-
luis-moreno-ocampo/p34702> (Last Access: 6th May, 2015). Also, several interviews with members’ staff of the 
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interested in taking into account this factor as a basis on which to stop the proceedings. She is 
strictly committed to the rules as construed through a narrow reading of the Statute. Apart from 
the fact that international prosecutors use such a justification as a matter of mechanical 
approach to convince an audience that only the law is applied, it is important to elucidate that 
reference to extra-legal factors are normally accepted in the course of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. Cote points out that international prosecutors often tend to commit 
strictly to the rules.69 However, he suggests that the rhetorical denial ‘should not conceal the 
eminent political dimension of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly on the 
international scene, where conflicts are ongoing.’70 Goldston also argues that ‘powerful the 
aspiration for neutral principles, experience and common sense suggest that law can never be 
entirely divorced from its surrounding environment.’71 Therefore, I will argue that the 
rhetorical denial of political should refer to the exercise of legal interpretive discretion, but not 
prosecutorial discretion.  
Emphasising the importance of taking account of extra-legal factors within the 
decision-making process, the thesis will show the development of prosecutorial function of 
international criminal tribunals. It will show the multi-functional role that the international 
Prosecutors have started to play since the SC Tribunals. The circumstances in which these 
Tribunals work, in particular with the lack of several indispensable tools of conducting an 
effective justice all contributed to developing the role of the international prosecutor as a new 
international player within an international legal arena and international politics. This has 
pushed International Prosecutors to play various roles. I call this multiple functions of 
prosecution. When exercising prosecutorial discretion, the prosecutor would be encouraged, 
                                                          
OTP conducted on 12th and 14th of March, 2013. All staff stated to me that the peace-related issues has no 
regard when making a decision. 
69 See supra n. 38. 
70 Supra n. 38, P. 171.  
71 Goldston, supra n. 18, Pp. 386-7 
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under the current formulation of the structure of the ICC, to consider values other than justice. 
The analysis of Article 53’s ‘the interests of justice’ in Chapter Five and Six will show that the 
prosecutor may consider other values such as peace, security, stability, and the protection of 
victims. The Article 53 ‘interests of justice’, for example, allows the prosecutor to think about 
other values in case the ICC’s proceedings constitute an obstacle to a certain situation. The 
weakness of the enforcement mechanisms on which the Court was built, and the existence of 
such prosecutorial discretion would broaden the role of the contemporary international 
prosecutor to think differently than a domestic prosecutor. The political role of the ICC 
prosecutor and its effect on the administration of international criminal justice is vital on the 
international level. 
The International Prosecutors of the Military Tribunals, which worked within more 
secure and normal circumstances that were similar to domestic courts, had not played such a 
role. They exercised a classical role that aimed only at achieving justice without looking at the 
other values. Indeed, the need for considering values other than justice, such as peace, security, 
and stability, and ending conflicts have started with the establishment of the ad hoc SC 
Tribunal. These Tribunals worked within unstable, exceptional circumstances, war zones, and 
sometimes with the will of NATO (cooperation). Depending on these various circumstances, 
in practice the Prosecutors had to consider those values to protect in practice. Indeed, 
knowledge of political and military framework of situations and cases under the jurisdiction of 
the Court as well as the legal framework is a vital part of articulating the individual peculiarities 
of these situations and cases for providing a meaningful justice.   
The thesis has been influenced by the work of Martti Koskenniemi. His work is helpful 
in shedding light on the way in which international legal officials, and, for my purposes, the 
ICC Prosecutor, operate. Koskenniemi, in developing a theory of the structure of the legal 
discourses, places international legal officials at the centre of the legal discussion. In particular, 
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he suggests that there is a recurring pattern in which international legal decisions tend to be 
caught between utopian vision and apologist explanation. This binary approach helps to 
examine the controversies about the work of the ICC Prosecutor that has been posed to such 
binary positions. Therefore, the attempt to identify and explore the causes, and nature of the 
criticisms of the work the ICC Prosecutor will echo Koskenniemi’s thoughts.72 In 
Koskenniemi’s view, each principle or theory is surrounded by two opposite views; each of 
which is vulnerable to strong criticism, and vice versa. This approach can be manifested in the 
work of the ICC prosecutor, who is always exposed to recurring controversies and criticisms. 
Our focus will be on one recurring pattern: an apologist and utopian argument.73 This approach 
provides that each position has a valid and plausible criticism that might, in one way or another, 
undermine the given legal discourse that the prosecutor has taken, and vice versa.74 
Koskenniemi claims that this sort of dyad is inevitable.75 Koskenniemi’s insight about the 
conceptual oppositions76 helps us to assimilate why the prosecutor is always vulnerable to 
strong criticisms and accused of being politically-motivated. Although Koskenniemi’s 
approach was directed only to international law, the scope of the discussion of this thesis will 
be narrower than his approach. It will employ Koskenniemi’s approach in a broad and common 
sense to examine and analyse the questions of discretion throughout this thesis. His conceptual 
opposition’s approach helps us to understand why the activities of the prosecutor are posed to 
persistent controversies. Also, it can push us to be able to identify, if any, the problems that 
                                                          
72 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
73 This pattern will draw on Darryl Robinson’s thought who used Koskenniemi’s thoughts as a basis of his 
thesis, see Darryl Robinson, Inescapable Dyads: Why the ICC Cannot Win, Leiden Journal of International Law, 
Forthcoming, Queen's University Legal Research Paper No. 2015-016, Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2491187>. 
74 Supra n. 72, P. 16, 67, and 70. 
75 Ibid, P, 8, 9, 10, and 24. 
76 Ibid, Pp. 8- 9. 
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infect the given issue and find solutions to them. Accordingly, being familiar with the dyadic 
tensions, we will be able to discern and evaluate the problems. 
In addition, the analysis of the ICC prosecutor’s discretion will draw on the historical 
development of the exercise of discretion by the Prosecutors of the Military Tribunals and the 
Security Council Tribunals. This thesis will draw on the prosecutorial experience of these 
Tribunals and their lessons for the ICC. This will illuminate the discussion on the legal and 
policy criteria of the use of discretion and for providing the below framework. The historical 
analysis is a critical part of the analysis of discretion as it provides valuable lessons for the ICC 
prosecutor. In particular, the practice of those Tribunals has laid the foundations on which the 
ICC prosecutor can develop her prosecutorial functions in areas that have not been either well 
anchored (gravity) or even touched upon (the interests of justice). For example, the thesis 
follows a comparative approach between the ICC and the experience of the international 
tribunals due to the total absence of any case under the Court’s review, in particular, in relation 
to the analysis of ‘the interests of justice’. It is worth mentioning here that in addition to the 
limited scope of this thesis, the latter only focuses on these international tribunals due to the 
some similar circumstances and conditions that the ICC works in. in particular, the issues of 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms, police, and cooperation are common hurdles that shape 
the work of their prosecutors. There will be therefore no reference to the hybrid tribunals. 
The thesis will discuss and examine the above issues through six chapters. Chapter One 
is an introduction to the creation of the Court, its structure, and the discretionary power of the 
prosecutor. The chapter aims at providing the legal, administrative, and political contexts in 
which the Court works. This will show why the exercise of discretion becomes crucial in such 
a situation. The focus will then shift to the legal process of making a decision for initiating 
investigations or prosecuting cases. The chapter then will discuss a general question as to 
whether or not the prosecutor has discretion to initiate investigations or prosecute cases, 
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focusing on prosecutorial discretion. Chapter Two traces the historical development of the 
concept of prosecutorial discretion, from the Military Tribunals up to the SC Tribunals. The 
significance of the chapter is that it establishes the ground on which the discussion of the power 
of the ICC prosecutors will be compared and developed. This chapter aims at showing the 
broader role that the Prosecutors of the SC Tribunals played when exercising prosecutorial 
discretion. Since that time, we have begun to see how crucial the exercise of discretion is in 
the context of delivering international criminal justice. Chapter Three stakes out the theoretical 
ground on which the entire thesis is examined and analysed. The chapter explains and critically 
discusses the nature and the two senses of discretion. The goal of this chapter is to explain the 
legal and theoretical basis of the concept of discretion in its two senses. Then, the chapter will 
draw on thoughts of Koskenniemi to explain why the prosecutor’s decisions are subjected to 
recurrent criticisms.  
Chapter Four moves on to concentrate on the concept of gravity, as laid down within 
the ICC Statute. The chapter examines this criterion as a consideration when the prosecutor 
exercises legal interpretive discretion (legal gravity) and prosecutorial discretion (relative 
gravity). The chapter concentrates on showing legal interpretive discretion that has been 
exercised by the ICC Prosecutor when applying ‘sufficient gravity’, as a legally admissible 
criterion. This chapter seeks to examine and analyse legal interpretive discretion in the sense 
that it can be distinguished from the conventional sense of discretion, namely prosecutorial 
discretion. However, the chapter will show how close each sense of these senses are where the 
dangers of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be also the case in the context of the 
exercise of legal interpretive discretion. Chapter Five entirely focuses on prosecutorial 
discretion and analyses the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’ provisions that authorises the 
prosecutor to use this power. The chapter mainly aims at showing the broader role that the ICC 
prosecutor may and should play when exercising her prosecutorial discretion. Chapter Six of 
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the thesis takes as a case study the Darfur situation. The chapter examines the applicability of 
the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’ provisions to this situation, by focusing on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. This chapter also aims at showing the multi-function roles that the 
current international Prosecutor can play in administrating international criminal justice, and 
how this should be done. The conclusion will deal with two main issues. First, that the ICC 
Prosecutor needs to be consistent when interpreting the term ‘sufficient gravity’ in the context 
of the exercise of legal interpretive discretion. Second, that the ICC Prosecutor should play a 
more active role when delivering justice in a sense that she may consider different values, such 
as peace, security, stability, and ending conflicts when exercising prosecutorial discretion.  
Methodology and Scope of the Research 
In order to answer the first question of this thesis the scope of discretion that the ICC 
prosecutor may exercise, the thesis took a conceptual analysis of the concept of discretion, as 
laid down in the literature of the concept of discretion, which shows that there are two senses 
of discretion. I placed this analysis within the practice of the ICC Prosecutor to examine 
whether the latter has exercised these two senses of discretion. In addition to the exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, it was found that the Prosecutor also deployed a strong discretion 
when assessing ‘sufficient gravity’, to which I call legal interpretive discretion. For this 
purpose, Chapter Four examined almost all decisions where the admissible legal requirement 
for initiating investigations or prosecuting cases of ‘sufficient gravity’ were analysed. This was 
supplemented by an initial analysis of the practice of the Prosecutors of the SC Tribunals, 
which showed that such a sense of discretion was also undertaken. On the question of the role 
of the ICC Prosecutor, I followed a comparative approach to find what roles the ICC Prosecutor 
could/should play, and whether certain political considerations are desirable and taken within 
the decision-making process. Therefore, I depended on the analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
SC Tribunals to be compared with what and how should have the ICC Prosecutor done in 
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similar circumstances. For this purposes, Chapters Five and Six used two case studies (Uganda 
and Darfur) to analyse the concept of prosecutorial discretion. As has been noted, the thesis 
also draws broadly on Koskenniemi’s thoughts about the way his binaries inflect international 
legal discourses. Koskenniemi suggests that that ‘legal arguments within court… are constantly 
patterned into familiar relations of association and opposition.’77 I will also engage with Darryl 
Robinson and his critique of the utopian and apologist binaries.78 The purpose of the theoretical 
framework is to explain why the ICC Prosecutor may face criticisms for every single decision 
she makes, in particular the ones taken on the basis of the involvement of discretion.  
I analyse the existing primary sources as legal texts, the ICC Prosecutor’s decisions, 
other international Prosecutors’ decisions, and policy documents of the OTP. Secondary 
sources will be largely involved to analyse the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor. This 
analysis was used to examine the theory and practice of the exercise of discretion and its effects 
on the legitimacy of the prosecutor and effectiveness of her policy of prosecution. The thesis 
moves from the general to the particular by selecting several examples that resulted from the 
practice of the discretionary power in the selection of situations to investigate and cases to 
prosecute. 
The research is primarily a library-based project, which was carried out in the British 
Library, UEL’s library, British Library of Political and Economic Science, and the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies’ library. The library-based approach is also supplemented by semi-
structured interviews, conducted with three members of staff of the Office of the Prosecution 
of the ICC, during the middle stage of conducting this research in March 2013.79 The 
communication office of the Court told me that I could formally meet up to two staff of the 
                                                          
77 Supra n. 72, P. 69. 
78 Supra n. 73. 
79 See the appendix for some questions that were used with the staff. 
26 
 
OTP. However, I managed to meet four staff of the Court. The other two interviews were 
conducted informally, and without a signed approval letter, as interviewees told me that there 
was no need for this procedure. All of them asked me not to publish their names. The 
interviewees are: the Head of the International Relations Task Force of the OTP, a senior 
Appeal Counsel, a trial lawyer, and a prosecutor during the trial stage. Each interview took 
around one hour. The purpose of choosing this method was to support the qualitative approach 
of this project, as it is used indicatively and in a limited way to analyse the conformity with the 
aforementioned data.80 These methods are relevant to this project, as the latter looks at the 
quality of decisions the prosecutor makes as well as the decision-making process within the 
Office.  
In presenting and analysing the ICC Prosecutor’s functions, the thesis uses an 
interdisciplinary approach, based on a descriptive and critical analysis.81 International law, 
international politics, international criminal law, and history are used to examine the theoretical 
basis and exercise of discretion. A descriptive approach is used to situate the discretionary 
power within its historical and legal background. A critical approach, in particular, is crucial 
in this thesis, as the analysis of the decisions, policy papers, statements of the ICC Prosecutor 
constitute the key basis of dealing with the issues this thesis raises. This approach helps to 
identify several problems that result from the exercise of discretion, depending on 
interdisciplinary perspectives. The broad discretion that is conferred on the Prosecutor led her 
to face several criticisms for using it in a way that justified preferred courses and strategies. 
Koskenniemi’s thoughts were found suggestively helpful in this critical approach, as 
                                                          
80 Zina O'Leary, The essential guide to doing your research project (London, Sage, 2010). 
81 Supra n. 50, Pp. 295- 300. See also generally, Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, Bal Sokhi-Bulley, and Alexandra 
Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2011). 
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Koskenniemi himself used a critical approach to analyse the views of realism, positivism, and 
liberalism in dealing with international legal discourses.  
The project further uses individual and institutional approaches to examine discretion. 
Whilst the first one is used to examine the work of Prosecutors Moreno-Ocampo and Bensouda, 
the second is used to examine the work of the prosecutor of the ICC, as a body within a judicial 
institution.   
The scope of this thesis is limited horizontally and vertically. Vertically, the thesis 
focuses mainly on the development of the concept of discretionary prosecution under the law 
and policy of the International Prosecutors of the two Military Tribunals: Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, the SC Tribunals, and the ICC. This particular focus is due to the development of the 
concept of the discretionary prosecution that resulted from the experience of these Tribunals. 
In addition, these Tribunals cover all types of international tribunals: a self-established 
institution, outcomes of SC’s decisions, and a treaty-based institution. Horizontally, the thesis 
concentrates only on the discretionary discourse in its theoretical, historical, and legal contexts.  
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This chapter sets out the background of the system of the ICC. It is divided into two 
main parts. The first part focuses on the Court as such. It considers aspects of the drafting 
history of the ICC Statute and the environment in which the Court works. The last section will 
outline the significance of the exercise of discretion and its role. The second part of this chapter 
concentrates on the ICC Prosecutor. It will outline the record of negotiations of the power of 
the ICC prosecutor, and then it will outline the stages through which the prosecutor makes an 
investigatory and prosecutorial decision. Finally, it will discuss prosecutorial discretion in 
terms of referrals and a proprio motu power during both investigation and prosecution stages. 
1.1. The International Criminal Court’s Overview 
1.1.1. Drafting the Statute 
The Statute was adopted by 120 votes in favour, 7 against, and 21 abstentions on 17th 
July, 1998. And after further minor amendments, it entered into force on 1 July 2002,82 when 
it obtained the 60 required ratifications for the Statute’s entry into force.83 Article 21 provides 
that The Rome Statute (128 Articles)84, Elements of Crimes,85 and the Rules of Procedures and 
Evidence (RPE)86 are the main legal tools the Court shall apply in the first place. In addition, 
the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor,87 and the regular policy documents88 are the 
policy tools of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). It potentially has international jurisdiction.89 
                                                          
82 Lee, Introduction: The Rome Conference and its Contribution to International Law, in Roy S. Lee (ed.) The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute - Issues, Negotiations and Results (Boston, 
Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
83 Schabas, supra n. 4. 
84 The Rome Statute (Entered into Force on 1st July, 2002). 
85 Rules of the Elements of Crimes (Adopted during the Kampala Conference, 2010). 
86 Rules of Procedures and Evidence (Adopted by the ASP, 3- 10 September, 2002). 
87 Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor (Entered into Force on 23rd April, 2009). 
88 See ICC, OTP, Policies and Strategies, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%2
0strategies/Pages/documents.aspx>.  
89 The ICC Statute allows the SC to refer situations in any state to the Court, including those that are not parties 
to the Statute in accordance with Article 13 (b). Also, the Statute provides states not parties to the Court an 
opportunity to refer their own situations to the Court, if they accept the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance 
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It is an independent entity and is not a part of the UN.90 Currently, some 124 states have ratified 
the Rome Statute,91 where the African States make up the largest bloc of signatories to the 
Statute.92  
Article 5 of the Statute enumerates the ratione materiae jurisdiction and provides that 
the Court exercises jurisdiction over the specific crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and aggression.93 The Court only exercises its jurisdiction over nationals of states 
parties to the Court, nationals of states which are referred to the Court by a SC’s resolution, or 
those of states which voluntarily accept the Court’s jurisdiction. In relation to ratione temporis 
jurisdiction, the Court’s jurisdiction ‘is a prospective institution.’94 Its jurisdiction extends back 
only to July, 2002, the date of the entry into force of the Rome Statute. In relation to the new 
parties to the Statute, this jurisdiction starts on the date of their ratification of the Statute, unless 
they accept the Court’s jurisdiction since its entry into force, in 2002, as Article 11 of the 
Statute provides.   
The creation of the ICC was the culmination of efforts to create an international 
criminal justice system that began at the end of the First World War. When World War I ended, 
the Versailles Peace Conference, led by the Allies, established the Commission on the 
                                                          
with Article 12 (2). Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court may extend to cover any state in the world, whether 
party to the Statute or not. 
90 There is agreement between the two organisations that organises the relationship between them, see 
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (Entered 
into Force, 4th October, 2004). 
91 Of the 123, 34 are African States, 27 are from Latin American and Caribbean States, 25 from Western Europe 
and other states, 19 are from Asia-Pacific States, and 18 are from Eastern Europe. 
92 34 African States, 19 Asia-Pacific States, 18 Eastern European States, 27 Latin American and Caribbean 
States, and 25 Western European States. See, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, at the official website of 
the Court, at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.as
px>.  
93 The Review Conference of Rome Statute held in Kampala on 11th June, 2010 provided that the Court shall 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after 1 January 2017, when States Parties makes a 
decision for activating this jurisdiction. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court’s website at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression>.   
94 Schabas, supra n. 4, P. 69. 
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Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties.95 The 
commission recommended96 that an international court should be created to try ‘[a]ll persons 
belonging to enemy countries’ of the War.97 However, this was not put into effect. In 1937, and 
as requested by the Council of League, the Secretary-General organised the International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism.98 In this Conference, two conventions were 
adopted, namely a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism and a 
Convention for the Creation of an international criminal court. These conventions never entered 
into force due to the outbreak of World War II. After the end of the War, and as will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, the critical development of this attempt was the creation of the two 
International Military Tribunals. Further, a significant development took place in 1948 when 
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued Resolution 260, adopting the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.99 Article VI of the 
Resolution provided that people who are charged with genocide ‘shall be tried by a competent 
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction’. In this Resolution, the UNGA called the International 
Law Commission (ILC) ‘to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international 
judicial organ for the trials of persons charged with genocide.’100 When the ILC made its 
recommendation, the UNGA established a Committee to prepare a proposal for the court.101 In 
                                                          
95 See Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1920), 
available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2187841.pdf?_=1459509279604>.  
96 Ibid, Para. 3, P. 124, providing ‘That each Allied and Associated Government adopt such legislation as may be 
necessary to support the jurisdiction of the  international court, and to assure the carrying out of its, sentences.’  
97 Ibid, P. 117. See footnote 270 in Chapter Two for more information about another attempt taken in relation 
to Kaiser. 
98 UN, Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction- Memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary-General, Question of international criminal jurisdiction, Doc: A/CN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949), Pp. 16-8. 
99 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 9 December, 1948, available at 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf>.  
100 History of the ICC, Coalition of the International Criminal Court, available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory> (Last Access: 13th February, 2016).  
101 Supra n. 82. 
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1953, the Committee completed its task and presented its final draft statute. In 1954, the UNGA 
decided to stop proceeding with this project until a definition could be given about the crime 
of aggression. 
The efforts of the ILC to create the court were dramatically impeded from 1954 to 1989 
due to the Cold War.102 The tension between East and West, as Schabas points out, made it 
impossible to proceed with the process of the establishment of an international criminal court, 
as each side was concerned that the other would use the Court as a tool to target them.103 
However, with the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the turmoil in Yugoslavia and 
later on in Rwanda, the creation of two UN ad hoc tribunals to deal with atrocities, underlined 
the advantages of a permanent international criminal court.  
In 1989, the UNGA resumed its work and asked the ILC to complete the draft. In 1994, 
the ILC completed its task and submitted the Draft Statute to the UNGA.104 The latter decided 
in 1995 to create an Ad Hoc Committee to review this draft. This Committee convened several 
times in 1995 and discussed mainly administrative and substantive matters, without engaging 
in the negotiation or drafting.105 In December the same year, a Preparatory Committee was 
created to produce ‘a widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an international 
criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a conference of plenipotentiaries’.106 
After a comprehensive work done by the Preparatory Committee over three years, the UNGA 
then decided to organise the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
establishment of the ICC from June to July 1998, to be convened in Rome, Italy.107 This 
                                                          
102 See in general, Michael C. Davis, Wolfgand Dietrich, and Dieter Sepp, International Intervention in the Post-
Cold War: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 
103 Schabas, supra n. 4, Pp. 9- 10. 
104 See generally, Fanny Bendetti, Karine Bonneau, and John. L. Washburn, Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994- 1998 (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2014). 
105 UNGA, Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995). 
106 UNGA Resolution, A/RES/50/46, 11 Dec 1995, Para. 2, P. 2. See also supra n. 82, P. 3. 
107 General Assembly Resolution 160/52, Establishment of an International Criminal Court, United Nations 
General Assembly Official Record, Fifty Second Session, Supplement No. 32, A/52/32 (1997). 
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Conference brought together 168 state delegates and others who represented different 
international organisations – international bodies, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
ones.  
The Conference was preceded by six Preparatory Commission sessions to work on the 
Statute to be presented to the conference. Throughout these sessions, the ‘like-minded’ groups 
of states drawn from Europe, Latin American, and African countries promoted a strong 
independent court.108 The members of these groups, whether European, Latin, or African 
countries, ‘shared and agreed on a set of principles, arrived at in Rome, which expressed a 
detailed vision of the nature and values of the Court.’109 Some of these countries have 
experienced mass atrocities and crimes, and they strongly showed their commitment to creating 
such a court. They consisted of about 60 countries from around the world, except Asia. 
Countries such as Germany, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, and later on, United Kingdom and 
South Africa were the leaders of these groups.110 These groups played a strong role during the 
Preparatory Commission and Rome’s negotiations. In addition to these states, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) were also actively participating in these sessions.111 Their 
role was to coordinate the work of all NGOs, and provide advice for states on the legal issues, 
and also play a lobby activity on the Statute with the like-minded group. However, The Court 
remained without being ratified by the most powerful states in the world such as the U.S., 
China, Russia, and India. As David Davenport states, ‘[a]s a consequence, the U.S. and other 
                                                          
108 Canada, Australia, most of European States, and others were among this group.  
109 John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and International 
Lawmaking in the 21st Century, Pace International Law Review, Vol. 11, Issue: 2 (1999), Pp. 367-8. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Amnesty International was one of these NGOs. For more information, see supra n. 82, Pp. 13- 23. 
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major powers backed away from the Court and it became an institution with considerable 
power and independence on paper, but one that lacked sufficient support to be effective.’112  
1.1.2. Meaningful Justice and the Need for Prosecutorial Discretion 
International criminal law is still an emerging phenomenon. While it is much discussed 
in scholarly literature, its institutions, procedures and norms are, in fact, in an early stage of 
development. As a result, it often appears that the implementation of international criminal 
norms is applied in an irregular manner or never enforced. States are at the same time engaged 
in the creation of international criminal law and subject to it. This further complicates the 
picture as the only enforcement mechanisms are dependent on the will of states, either through 
unilateral or bilateral action or through the United Nations Security Council. As a consequence, 
the emergence of international criminal law takes place within a high political context. As 
Robert A. Friedlander notes, ‘[t]he difficulty with the theory of an international criminal law 
is that it represents a convergence of both public international legal norms and the international 
aspects of municipal criminal law.’113 Although international criminal law ‘is predicated upon 
analogies to domestic legal systems’,114 nonetheless, its viability is often compromised due to 
the lack of several essential features that make its domestic counter-parts effective and viable, 
such as the enforcement related-issues.  
The sub-discipline of international criminal law, in particular, the ICC suffers most 
from this problem. The draft Statute includes aspirations, which create high expectations that 
may appear difficult to be achieved. The preamble of the Statute outlines several ambitious 
                                                          
112 David Davenport, Happy Birthday International Criminal Court, Forbes (7th January, 2012), available at 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2012/07/01/happy-birthday-international-criminal-court/> 
(Last Access: 11th April, 2015). 
113 Robert A. Friedlander, The Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present-Day Inquiry, Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Issue: 1 (1983), P. 17, discussing the question of the existence of 
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114 Ibid, P. 17. 
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goals for the Court to achieve. Putting an end to the era of impunity, that most serious 
international criminals will be punished, calling for international peace and security, and that 
the role of the Court is complementary to national courts are some of these aims.115 These goals 
are global in nature. The potential global jurisdiction makes the function of the Court and the 
prosecutor highly complex. Whilst exercising its jurisdiction in ongoing conflicts, the Court 
has to be sensitive in balancing the different values contained in the Statute. Of course, peace, 
security, stability, and the protection of victims are some of these values that might be 
undermined with the intervention of the Court. As will be seen in Chapters Five and Six, the 
intervention of the ICC in Uganda and Sudan has raised several concerns about the peace 
process, security, stability, and the protection of victims.  
Similarly applicable, in relation to post-conflicts, the Court may exercise its function 
over a situation where a local justice mechanism is invoked by a given state, especially, when 
the latter appear more achievable, desirable and needed. In these situations, the need to 
establish a stable and settled state requires sensitive and more attention to the overarching 
common good than due considerations to the rights of victims. This state of affairs may make 
several non-prosecutorial approaches, such as negotiation and reconciliation processes, to play 
a decisive role in achieving justice and restoring peace. The potential impacts of the decision 
of investigation or prosecution may distract these processes and even constitute a threat to the 
stability of those countries. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, this scenario was experienced 
by the ICTY where the Prosecutor had to face challenges related to the peace negotiation in the 
region, in particular when it came to make a decision to indict Slobodan Milosevic on the eve 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement.    
                                                          
115 See the Preamble, Paras, 4, 5, and 10. 
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These challenges necessarily require the Court and, in particular, the prosecutor to 
reflect on these issues when making an investigatory or prosecutorial decision. As Judge Hans‐
Peter Kaul argues, the Court will remain ‘small and weak’ in the sense that the achievement of 
its high hopes might not be simply possible.116 In order for the prosecutor to articulate these 
concerns, a wide range of discretion is needed. As will be analysed in Chapters Four and Five, 
the drafter of the ICC Statute inserted several legal terms in the Statute that would appear to 
help the prosecutor exercise a comprehensive function to address the above concerns. In fact, 
the negotiators of the ICC draft Statute anticipated the nature of the problems that the Court 
and the prosecutor would likely face when conducting their functions. The insertion of these 
terms were the result of series of compromises between the participants of the draft Statute’s 
negotiations and Conference who were concerned about the different values that may clash 
when the prosecutor decides to investigate or prosecute.117 In particular the most substantive 
issues of the draft (Part 2 of the Statute) ‘were left for last minute political compromises’.118 
For these reasons, terms such as ‘the interests of justice’ and ‘the gravity of the crimes’ in 
Article 53 (1)(c)and (2)(c) are some ambiguous legal criteria that were inserted. These criteria 
would allow the prosecutor to deal with the questions of peace, security, reconciliation 
mechanisms, negotiations, stability, and the protection of victims. As Jan Wouters and Kenneth 
Chan note, ‘a philosophy of selective justice was adopted during the negotiations to weigh 
these competing interests and to develop a final product.’119 Article 53 (2)(c), Brubacher 
argues, requires the prosecutor to consider ‘the broader interests of the international 
                                                          
116 ICC, Key note by H.E. Judge Dr. jur. h. c. Hans­Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court –Current 
Challenges and Perspectives, Salzburg, Austria (8th August, 2011), P. 8, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/289b449a-347d-4360-a854-3b7d0a4b9f06/283740/010911salzburglawschool.pdf>, P. 13. 
117 These issues – compromises- will be dealt with in Chapter Five. 
118 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court’, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 32, Issue: 3 (1999), P. 458. 
119 Supra n. 48, P. 4. 
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community, including the potential political ramifications of an investigation on the political 
environment of the state over which he is exercising jurisdiction.’120  
Nonetheless, the basis on which the Court works makes the achievement of its 
institutional aims difficult. In fact, there are several constraints against which the Court 
functions. For example, in exercising its missions, the Court relies mainly on the limited 
financial resources it receives from its member states.121 This constraint forces the Prosecutor 
to make difficult decisions. ‘[F]or example, the Chief ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
announced, regarding Darfur, that she was provisionally "shifting resources to other urgent 
cases"’.122 In addition, the ICC is accountable to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and 
relies on states’ cooperation to enforce its decisions. As the Court has no police or coercive 
authority to force its decisions, it is entirely dependent on its members.123 As Mirjan A. 
Damaska argues, ‘[i]ts effectiveness will for the foreseeable future continue to depend on the 
fickle winds of the international political climate, and on the willingness of states and 
international organizations to provide it with assistance and support.’124 Where the states fail 
to cooperate with the Court, the latter can only make a finding to the ASP, or to the SC if the 
situation was referred by the SC.125 There is nothing else that can be done, if the relevant states 
do not cooperate. Quite apart from enforcement action, it is also dependent on the will of states 
when it comes to conducting its investigatory and prosecutorial functions. It has also no police 
                                                          
120 Brubacher, supra n. 22, P. 81. 
121 See, Financial Regulations and Rules, the ICC-ASP/7/5, adopted 21 November, 2008. The Court is funded by 
its member states, United Nations, and voluntary contributions. See the Rome Statute, Articles 115 and 115.  
122 Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia-Carrasco, At the ICC, there is no Deterrence without 
Resources, Open Democracy (10th June, 2015), available at 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mariana-rodr%C3%ADguezpareja-salvador-
herenciacarrasco/at-icc-there-is-no-deterrence-wit> (Last Access: 12th May, 2016). 
123 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 2, Issue: 2 (2004), P. 564, stating that, ‘the cooperation of states and international 
organizations is essential to the effective functioning of an international criminal institution.’ 
124 Mirjan R. Damaska, The International Criminal Court Between Aspiration and Achievement, UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 19 (2009), P. 32. 
125 Article 87 of the ICC Statute. 
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body that can force its decisions. As Antonio Cassese notes, it is a court ‘without arms and legs 
– it needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’126 
An example which illustrates the problem is the inaction of the South African 
Authorities when the President of Sudan visited the country to attend the 25th African Union 
Summit in June 2015. This was described as ‘shocking’ by Amnesty International.127 South 
Africa, which is a state party to the Statute, refused to arrest Al-Bashir and allowed him to 
leave the country safely. The total dependence of the Court on effective cooperation of states 
is a key obstacle to the effective functioning of the Court, in particular in relation to the issue 
of arrests. The hopes that the Court would bring an end to era of impunity are impeded by such 
an institutional weakness. As Judge Kaul points out, ‘no arrests, [means] no trials.’128 Whatever 
the position the ICC Prosecutor takes in relation to the Al-Bashir case, in fact, the system of 
cooperation that the Statute provides is not sufficient so the Prosecutor could manage to deliver 
justice.  
However, this weakness makes the exercise of prosecutorial discretion important. As 
will be discussed more in Chapters Five and Six, the South Africa scenario makes the Article 
53 (interests of justice) provisions crucial in terms of pushing the Prosecutor to think about 
other values and issues that pushed South Africa not to cooperate with the Court. The peace 
process, security, and achieving justice through other mechanisms in Uganda or Sudan may 
appear as incentive values that can be raised in relation to the consideration of ‘the interests of 
justice’ instead of a rigid commitment to the prosecutorial approach. 
                                                          
126 Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law, European Journal of International, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (1998), P. 13. 
127 South Africa: Allowing Al-Bashir to Evade Justice Shows Total Disregard for the Law, Amnesty International 
(15th June, 2015). 
128 Supra n. 116, P. 8.  
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It is interesting to reflect that such problems were not faced by the first venture in 
institutional international criminal law with the creation of the two International Military 
Tribunals at the end of World War II. As the Tribunals worked in the context of the occupation 
regimes, they existed in an environment which was much more akin to domestic courts than 
the ICC. Chapter Two examines the way in which the Prosecutors of the Military Tribunals 
conducted their functions within a more secure and stable system. The perpetrators were 
arrested and detailed by allied forces and the prosecution had access to documents and 
witnesses.129 As Jacob Katz Cogan points out, ‘cooperation was less of an issue because the 
Allies’ victory and political will secured access to the relevant evidence and witnesses.’130 As 
the thesis will demonstrate the conditions in which the ICC prosecutor acts are quite 
different.131  
A novel feature of the ICC is the principle of complementarity, for example, that was 
one of the fundamental questions that faced the drafters in relation to the role of the Court 
versus national judicial systems. The application of this principle has raised legal, procedural, 
and political challenges to the Court.132 During the draft debates and negotiations, there were 
two different views on this particular question. The majority was of the opinion of making the 
Court a court of last resort.133 However,134 some states shared different views and called for ‘a 
                                                          
129 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), Chapter 5. 
See also the first section of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
130 Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, the Yale Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 27 (2002), P. 121. 
131 The Military Tribunals were more like domestic courts in that the Allied Forces in Germany, the USA in 
Japan - provided a clear level of political control of the process. At the same time in the conditions surrender 
and occupation Germany and Japan were under military and security control of the countries. This meant that 
police inquiries, evidence taking by prosecutors took place in an environment that more resembles the 
conditions that domestic courts exist in. In particular, unlike the ICC, there was an important layer of officials 
and governments which took political responsibility for them. See Chapter Two of this thesis for more 
discussion about this issue. 
132 Supra n. 124, P. 24. See also Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: the Catalysing Effect 
of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
133 See generally, Report of Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, United 
Nations General Assembly Officials Records, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 22, A/50/22 (1995), Para. 47. 
134 Ibid, Paras. 29- 51. 
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greater role’ to be played by the Court in this relation.135 The result of these negotiations was 
a compromise ‘between national sovereignty and the Court’s jurisdiction’,136 where the Court 
could step in only when states are unable or unwilling to prosecute crimes under its jurisdiction. 
This final compromise was intended to respect both the principle of sovereignty137 that the duty 
and the power to prosecute such crimes lies first of all with national courts when states are able 
and willing to prosecute, and the principle of the rule of the law, when states are not.138  
In practice, it can be noted that the Court legally and practically has authority to impose 
the principle of the rule of law and, therefore, its criminal justice over nationals of states. It is 
the Court that has the final word in deciding whether or not states are able and willing to 
prosecute through their own national legal systems; if not, the Court uses its authority to impose 
the rule of law – by instituting investigations and/or prosecutions in its own right. Yet, any 
conclusion as to whether there is or has been a ‘genuine process of justice on a national level’, 
is, Anthony Kariuki argues, ‘both subjective and political.’139 The wording ‘genuinely to 
prosecute’ in Article 17 (1)(b), for example, is obscure. Initially, it appears to mean a non-
genuine prosecution, but not the quality of the procedures that led to that decision.140 In other 
words, if a state conducted a genuine investigation, but decided for a certain reason – 
                                                          
135 John T. Holmes, the Principle of Complementarity, in Roy S. K. Lee, The International Criminal Court: the 
Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague, Kluwer Law International), P. 42. 
136 Steven C. Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: the Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and Law, 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), P. 42. 
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140 For more discussion on this point, see Dr. Joshua N Aston and Vinay N. Paranjape, Admissibility and the 
International Criminal Court (27th February, 2013), available at 
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considering peace, security, or stability of its own state – not to prosecute, then according to 
the above wording, the outcome of the decision not to prosecute would still seem not genuine. 
A national prosecutor may conduct genuine procedures, but for different reasons, such as the 
lack of prima facie case, or for the interests of public, the prosecutor may decide not to 
prosecute. For example, Lenore F. Horton argues that ‘a truth commission arguably could 
constitute a "genuine investigation."’141 Although such a decision might be legitimate from the 
national judicial point of view, it might not be so by the ICC. The prosecutor may find such a 
case admissible, based on her interpretation of the national court’s decision that the latter 
masked its intention to make the case inadmissible.142 Whatever the real intention of the 
national procedures is, the Court in fact has the exclusive power to determine which institution 
will exercise its jurisdiction.143 
For example, in the situation of Libya, there were legal arguments about the 
admissibility of the cases of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, based on the 
fairness of the procedures-related issues.144 In these cases, the defence used two different 
grounds to challenge the admissibility’s procedures. As Stahn states,145 whilst the defence of 
                                                          
141 Lenore F. Horton, Prosecutorial Discretion before International Criminal Court and Prosecution of Justice: 
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the Libyan Government challenged the admissibility of the Court in order to exercise the 
jurisdiction themselves,146 the defence of the accused argued in favour of the admissibility of 
the cases before the Court.147 Whilst Pre-Trial Chamber I endorsed the Prosecutor’s decision 
about the admissibility of the Gaddafi case in respect to complementarity and rejected Libya’s 
challenge, the reverse happened in relation to the Al-Senussi case.148 Although the two sides 
claimed different views to be applicable, it is only the Court which decided whether or not the 
legal judicial system of Libya satisfies the willingness and ability requirements.  
In concluding this section, I have tried to show here that the circumstances in which the 
ICC functions make use of discretion by the prosecutor are quite important for providing 
meaningful justice, a justice that can be both accessible and attainable by the Court, or that is 
required by particularly affected communities when the Court does not seem able to deliver its 
own justice. The preamble of the ICC Statute emphasises the importance of the maintenance 
of several, but sometimes contradictory values such as peace, security, well-being of the world, 
putting an end to an era of impunity, and definitely justice that might be applied by national 
courts. In light of the above challenges, in seeking to achieve its criminal justice, the Court 
may not be able to achieve this end, and may, at the same time, undermine the other values that 
the Preamble declares. Further, one could notice that the achievement of justice is linked to the 
practical and political realities of the circumstances in which the Court works. This represents 
a challenge to the ICC prosecutor to achieve. Therefore, instead of undermining its own 
institutional goals, the Court through the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor, may play 
                                                          
146 Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, ICC-01/11-
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an important role in promoting these goals, if the prosecutor considers how justice can be better 
delivered. Providing the prosecutor with prosecutorial discretion either through the Article 53 
‘interests of justice’ or the proprio motu power, she will have a chance to provide a more 
effective and meaningful justice, as will be explained in Chapter Five. Therefore, the 
achievement of justice does not have to be delivered through the Court itself when these values 
are at stake. If justice can be ideally and better achieved by different mechanisms (for example, 
local mechanisms), then the exercise of prosecutorial discretion will be the mechanism for the 
prosecutor to do it.  
1.1.3. Court Structure  
The Court consists of six bodies: the Presidency, the OTP, the Registry, a Pre-Trial 
Division, a Trial-Division, and an Appeal Division.149 Within the judicial organs, there are 18 
judges who perform judicial functions. The Registry provides judicial and administrative 
support for all organs of the Court, including issues of victims, witnesses, and defence.150 It is 
headed by the Registrar.151 The Statute also provides another body, which is not an organ of 
the Court: the ASP.152 The latter is a separate body and has no judicial mandate, but it has 
legislative and administrative mandate. 
Like the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC has its own Office of the Prosecutor.153 The ICC 
Statute sets up the Office in more detail than the other tribunals. Under Article 42 (1), ‘[t]he 
Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court. … A member 
                                                          
149 Articles 34- 52 of the ICC Statute organise in detail the composition of administration of the Court.  
150 Article 43. 
151 Article 43 (2). 
152 See Article 112 of the ICC Statute for more details about the role of the ASP. 
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of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source’. Article 42 (1) also 
provides that the OTP is responsible for receiving information, referrals, and conducting 
investigations and prosecutions. Sub-paragraph (4) provides that the Prosecutor is to ‘be elected 
by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the Assembly of States Parties’. The same percentage 
of vote is needed to remove her according to Article 46 (2). The Prosecutor has more than one 
Deputy Prosecutor, who all must be drawn from different nationalities.154 The OTP is linked 
directly to four reporting units,155 and is comprised of three main divisions,156 which are 
responsible for three major stages: pre-investigation stage, investigation stage, and prosecution 
stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
154 Opening seven situations, issuing 22 arrest warrants (of which 5 arrested), and 9 summonses, putting 5 in 
the custody, and doing preliminary examinations in 9 situations (of which 2 situations were reported to be 
dismissed) are the total work were done by first Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. 
155 These are the Immediate Office of the Prosecutor, the Services Section, the Legal Advisory Section, and 
Executive Committee (ExCom). 
156 These are the Investigation Division, the Prosecution Division, and The Jurisdiction, Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division (JCCD). 
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1.2. The ICC Prosecutor 
1.2.1. Decision-Making Process of the Prosecutor 
 
 
 
Figure 1.157 
Status Situations proceeded to investigations and Trigger Preliminary 
Examination stage 
Rejected Situations 
Situations 1- Uganda (Jan, 2004), Self-Referral 
2- Democratic Republic of the Congo (April, 
2004), Self-Referral 
3- Central African Republic (Jan, 2005), Self-
Referral 
4- Darfur (Sudan) (March, 2005), The SC Referral 
5- Kenya (2010), Prosecutor Proprio Motu 
6- Libya (Feb, 2011), The SC Referral 
7- Côte d’Ivoire (Oct, 2011), Prosecutor Proprio 
Motu 
8- Mali (2012), Self-Referral 
9- Democratic Republic of the Congo II (Sep. 
2014) 
10 Central African Republic II (September, 2014), 
Self-Referral 
 
 
Colombia (June, 2004) 
Afghanistan (2007) 
Georgia (Aug. 2008) 
Guinea (Oct. 2009) 
Nigeria (Nov. 2010) 
Iraq (May, 2014) 
Ukraine (April, 2014) 
Palestine (Jan, 2015) 
 
Venezuela (Feb. 2006) 
Honduras (Nov. 2010) 
Republic of Korea 
(Dec. 2010) 
Comoros (July, 2013) 
 
Cases 23   
 
                                                          
157 See the official site of the ICC for update at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx>.  
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The prosecutor of the ICC is the engine of the Court. She is a principal actor within the 
Court, the first point where complaints are received, the tongue of the Court to the public, and 
is the principal administrator and strategist of justice of the ICC.158 The ICC prosecutor is 
endowed with investigative and prosecutorial functions.  
The power of the prosecutor was one of the most sensitive debates during the 
negotiations and drafting of the Rome Statute. The first draft of the Statute submitted in 1994 
by the UN’s ILC gave the prosecutor limited prosecutorial power, as the only trigger 
mechanisms were the SC or State Party referrals.159 Several members expressed their opinion 
that providing the prosecutor with a power to initiate proceedings on her own initiative (proprio 
motu power) was not desirable ‘at the present stage of development of the international legal 
system’.160 During the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995, some delegates paid 
attention to the limited role that the prosecutor was given and suggested that the prosecutor 
should be given a power to initiate proceedings on her own motion.161 In 1996, the call for 
proprio motu power was increased during the discussion of the Preparatory Committee. 
However, in the same year, some governments claimed that the international community as a 
whole was not prepared to grant the prosecutor such a serious power.162 They claimed that if 
the Court were to obtain widespread acceptance, then it would be desirable not to empower her 
with such a power.163 When the process was turned over to the Preparatory Committee, the 
                                                          
158 Reydams, Wouters, and Ryngaert, supra n. 10. 
159 Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the Prosecutor, in Roy S. Lee (ed.) The International Criminal 
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question of prosecutorial power divided the drafters into two groups. Both proponents and 
opponents of a strong prosecutor shared a common fear, which revolved around the idea of 
politicising the Court,164 which would undermine the impartiality and independence of the 
Court.165 Therefore, providing the prosecutor with discretion may render her political and, at 
the same time, depriving her of such a power may render the whole Court political, as it will 
be directed and controlled by States Parties and the Security Council. 
Opponents of the proprio motu power argued that the prosecutor could become a 
political actor, acting on the basis of their own assessment of the political circumstances and 
desiderata. This view was mainly supported by the US.166 It was based on a fear that the 
initiation of an investigation proprio motu would ‘encourage overwhelming the court with 
complaints and risk diversion of its resources, as well as embroil the court in controversy, 
political decision-making, and confusion’.167 It was further submitted that, as the Court cannot 
deal with all complaints, ‘he or she would have to decide on priorities, which would inevitably 
result in disappointment and challenges to his or her decisions.’168 Therefore, it was argued, 
the ability to initiate an investigation should be in the hands of states and the UNSC. In parallel, 
there was a concern that the prosecutor would work on the basis of priorities and would choose 
among many worthy situations, as the Court was practically and financially unable to 
                                                          
164 Danner, supra n. 14, P. 513. 
165 See Prosecutor Louise Arbour’s Statement to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Press Release, UNICTY, Prosecutor, The Hague (8th December, 1997), available at 
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investigate all of them.169 Providing the prosecutor with such a power would politicise the 
Court. 
The proponents argued, on the other hand, that restricting the power to initiate an 
investigation only to States Parties and the SC would politicise the Court in a different way, 
damaging the independence of the Court as well as the prosecutor.170 This view was mostly led 
by NGOs, which strongly argued for a more independent prosecutor who could better promote 
justice.171 For example, Amnesty International stated that as the Court is a judicial body, then 
the prosecutor should be given the required independence to investigate and prosecute.172 
Depriving the prosecutor of such a power and turning it over to political entities would 
politicise the Court. Their central justification was that the expansion of the power of the 
prosecutor to involve ex officio power to initiate investigations would uphold the independence 
and credibility of the prosecutor as well as the Court as a whole. They argued that the prosecutor 
‘would be able to function on behalf of the international community rather than on behalf of a 
particular complainant State or the Security Council.’173 States may be reluctant to refer their 
own situations for political reasons, as most governments are usually culprits.174 It was 
difficult, at the time, to expect that states would be encouraged to refer their own atrocities to 
the Court, particularly if those states were themselves involved in the given atrocities. The 
UNSC, it was argued, was also guided by political interests and more problematically by the 
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173 Supra n. 159, P. 178. 
174 The Palestine and Israel conflict could be one example, having accepted the jurisdiction of the Court by 
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veto system.175 Imminent political considerations were inherent in the decisions of the SC. 
Therefore, it was unacceptable to endow the SC with such a conclusive power. Both trigger 
mechanisms, therefore, might deliver selective justice, which would undermine the legitimacy 
and independence of the Court, as well as weakening the possibility of obtaining widespread 
ratifications of the Statute by states.     
At the conclusion of the Rome negotiations, it was finally agreed to provide the 
prosecutor with an independent power to initiate an investigation or prosecution.176 However, 
despite the sharp differentiation between the two sides, all agreed that providing the prosecutor 
with unfettered discretion would involve some danger. Therefore, all came to an agreement 
that this power would be under judicial control by the Pre-Trial Chamber at an early stage of 
the investigation.177 The Statute provides that the proprio motu decision of the prosecutor to 
initiate an investigation would be subject to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval. It was a 
compromise between the two sides. 
Under Article 42 (1) of the Statute, the OTP is ‘responsible for receiving referrals and 
any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining 
them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court.’178 This means that 
the OTP is the body which first receives notitia criminis.179 There are two avenues by which 
                                                          
175 We have seen how Russia has shown its already objection for any potential referral of the Syrian situation 
to the Court, see Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal Court, The 
Guardian (22nd May, 2014), available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russia-china-veto-
un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court> (Last Access: 2nd May, 2015).  
176 See Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing 
Landscapes of International Law, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2006), 243- 284. 
177 Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Peji, Article 15: Prosecutor, in Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (2nd ed.), (Oxford, Hart Publishing and 
Verlag, 2008), Pp. 359- 363.  
178 Generally, see Hector Olasolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005). 
179 See Giuliano Turone: Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in Antonio Cassese, Professor Paola Gaeta, and 
Mr. John R.W.D. Jones (eds.) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), Pp. 1138- 1179. 
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the jurisdiction of the Court can be triggered180: referrals and communications. These avenues 
provide three mechanisms that can trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. The first is state referral. 
This can be either from a State Party in accordance with Article 13 (a)181, or by non-state party 
according to Article 12 (3)182. The second is the UNSC referrals acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, as noted in Article 13 (b)183. The third avenue is potentially triggered by 
communication sent to the prosecutor when the prosecutor may choose to act proprio motu in 
accordance with Article 15 (1).184 However, this requires the prosecutor to seek authorisation 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber before opening an investigation.185 The ICC Statute, unlike the 
ICTY and ICTR, provides a wide range of channels to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court, 
thereby avoiding any shortcoming of limiting such power to the prosecutor. The expansion of 
the triggering mechanisms allows all actors, including individuals and NGOs, a unique 
opportunity to bring any situation or case to the attention of the Court via the communication 
channel. When making these decisions, the investigative and prosecutorial proceedings go 
through three stages.186 No time framework is set either by the Statute or the OTP for each of 
these stages. Before explaining these stages, it is important first to explain the main policy of 
prosecution the OTP has developed. 
Some of these are general policies of conducting investigation and prosecution, and 
some were put for specific legal criteria (gravity in its relative and legal senses, and ‘the 
interests of justice’). In general, the OTP adopted an exemplary prosecution when exercising 
her prosecutorial strategy. In this regard, the OTP issued several policy papers, from 2003 to 
                                                          
180 See generally, Schabas, supra n. 4, Chapter 3. 
181 The ICC has opened four situations: DRC, Uganda, CAR, and Mali following referrals from those states.  
182 The Prosecutor opened two situations proprio motu in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. 
183 The Court opened two situations: Darfur and Libya following Security Council referrals. 
184 The Prosecutor initiated a preliminary examination proprio motu in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Georgia. 
185 As was done with the situation with Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire; the Prosecutor signalled her intention to 
submit an authorisation request in relation to Georgia.  
186 Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedures (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), Pp. 216- 
252. 
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2013, to deal with these limitations.187 In a 2003 policy paper, it decided that ‘as a general rule, 
the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and 
resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or 
organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.’188 It also emphasised that the focus of 
prosecution will be on the most serious international crimes, as laid down in Article 5.189 These 
two policies have been reconfirmed in the 2010 and 2013 policy papers.190 As will be shown 
in the next chapter, this trend was already adopted by the previous international tribunals, 
which mainly concentrated on the major war criminals for the most serious international 
crimes, in particular the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals.191 This policy seems logical 
as those who bear the most reasonability represent ‘a high degree of culpability’, as Greenawalt 
points out.192 However, in certain necessary cases, the OTP ‘may go wider than high-ranking 
officers, if investigation of certain types of crimes or those officers lower down the chain of 
command is necessary for the whole case.’193 In relation to the other perpetrators, the OTP 
emphasised the importance of national justice systems to deal with them. The OTP adopted the 
policy of encouraging national judicial systems to undertake genuine investigations and 
prosecutions in relation to all international crimes, including the ones that come under its 
jurisdiction. In addition, as a general rule, the OTP developed general principles that will guide 
                                                          
187 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor (September, 
2003). 
188 Ibid, P. 7. 
189 Ibid, P. 6. See also, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Para. 48. 
190 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (October, 2010), Para. 103, 
(hereinafter: Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010). See also, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations 2013, Para. 103. 
191 See Chapter Two of this thesis for more information about the policy of the prosecution of the Military 
Tribunals and the SC Tribunals. 
192 Greenawalt, supra n. 23, P. 628. 
193 Supra n. 187, P. 7. 
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the preliminary examination process and the selection of situations and cases.194 These 
principles are independence, impartiality, and objectivity.  
In relation to the concept of gravity, the OTP provided that it would use ‘both 
quantitative and qualitative considerations based on the prevailing facts and circumstances.’195 
In relation to the assessment of ‘the interests of justice’, the OTP asserted that stopping the 
Court’s proceedings on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’ would be rare and exceptional as 
the priority will be given for investigations and prosecution.196 Also, it sets that the assessment 
of this criterion will be guided by the object and purpose of the Statute, in particular that the 
most serious crimes of international concern must not go unpunished.197 Lastly, it provides that 
there is a difference between ‘interests of justice’ and interests of peace, as the latter would be 
under the mission of other institutions such as the SC.198  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
194 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Paras. 25- 33, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 
2010, Paras. 33- 44, and Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2016, Paras. 12- 19. 
195 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010, Para. 70 and Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 
2013, Para. 61. 
196 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (September, 2007), P.1 (hereinafter 
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007). 
197 Ibid. 
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1.2.1.1. Preliminary Examination Stage 
Articles 15, 17, and 53 of the Statute deal this stage. The preliminary examination may 
be initiated by the OTP for all situations, which are triggered through referrals and 
communication.199 Not all situations will automatically enter the preliminary examination 
stage. If the source of the trigger is communication, here, and under Article 15 (2) the 
prosecutor analyses ‘the seriousness of the information received and may seek additional 
information from States, organs of the UN, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations and other reliable sources that are deemed appropriate.’200 At this early stage, the 
prosecutor will ‘analyse and verify the seriousness of information received, filter out 
information on crimes that are outside the jurisdiction of the Court and identify those that 
appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.’201 Only the latter set of situations will 
proceed to the preliminary examination stage. If the source of the trigger is referrals (states and 
the SC), there will be no need for conducting an initial assessment of the information received; 
such situations will automatically enter the stage of preliminary examination. Once these 
situations enter the preliminary examination stage, Article 53 (1) provides three legal criteria 
to be examined by the prosecutor for the purpose of whether or not to open an investigation.202 
As Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014 provides,  
Once a situation is thus identified, the factors set out in article 53(1) (a)-(c) of the Statute 
establishes the legal framework for a preliminary examination. It provides that, in order 
to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into 
the situation the Prosecutor shall consider: jurisdiction (temporal, either territorial or 
                                                          
199 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010. 
200 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, Para. 10. 
201 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Para. 78. 
202 Ibid, Para. 12. 
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personal, and material); admissibility (complementarity and gravity); and the interests 
of justice.203 
The first criterion is jurisdiction.204 This includes an assessment of whether the situation 
is within the temporal jurisdiction, ratione temporis, of the Court, meaning that the situation 
occurred after the entry into force of the Statute on 1st July 2002. The second element of 
jurisdiction is jurisdiction ratione materiae, also known as subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. 
whether the situation, more specifically potential cases within the situation, falls within the 
categories of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction according to the Statute: crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression. In addition, the alleged crime must 
have been committed within a territory of a state party to the Statute or by a national of it. The 
next test is admissibility, as provided in Article 17.205 This test is divided into two elements: 
gravity and complementarity. The potential cases in a given situation should be of ‘sufficient 
gravity’ to justify the prosecutor (and the Court) to take further action. In respect to 
complementarity, the situation must also satisfy the admissibility criterion that a national court 
is not willing and able to carry out a genuine investigation and prosecution. 
The last test is ‘the interests of justice’. This provision empowers the prosecutor to 
decide not to proceed with an investigation, when the latter would not serve ‘the interests of 
justice’. However, Article 53 (1)(c) requires the prosecutor at the same time to take into 
consideration two elements: the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims. When the 
OTP finishes the assessment of these criteria, an internal report will be forwarded to the 
prosecutor. 
At the conclusion of this stage, having examined the satisfaction of these requirements 
under ‘the reasonable basis to proceed’ test, the prosecutor either decides to open the 
                                                          
203 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, Para. 3. 
204 See Bergsmo, Cisse, and Staker, supra n. 3, P. 142. 
205 Ibid. 
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investigation or reject it. The latter sort of decision may be judicially reviewable as follows: if 
the prosecutor decides to reject a situation initiated by the SC or a state, then at the request of 
the latter and according to Article 53 (3)(a), the Pre-Trial Chamber may request the prosecutor 
to review her decision. However, if such a decision is only based on ‘the interests of justice’, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber may review the decision on its own initiative.206 In the latter case, 
another constraint is imposed on the power of the prosecutor, as the insistence of the prosecutor 
not to proceed on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’ will be only accepted when the Pre-Trial 
Chamber confirms it.207  
The situation is different when the prosecutor is operating under her proprio motu 
powers. It is solely her decision whether or not there is sufficient evidence to proceed, and this 
decision is not subject to judicial review. No party has locus standii to challenge the prosecutor. 
Stahn questions how a Chamber can ‘meaningfully exercise proprio motu powers of review 
over inaction under article 53, if the determination as to whether or not a decision not to 
prosecute has been taken is dependent on the initiative of the Prosecutor’.208 The prosecutor 
seems to have a broad discretion in this regard. The only duty that is imposed on the prosecutor 
in relation to those sort of decisions is to inform the providers of the information with her 
decision that that there is not ‘a reasonable basis for an investigation’, under Article 15 (6). 
However, if the prosecutor decides to initiate an investigation on the basis of her proprio motu 
power, first she has to submit an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorisation of an 
investigation according to Article 15 (3). It is noticeable that whilst the Court has a limited role 
in relation to situations that are referred by a state or the SC, it has a decisive role in determining 
whether to proceed with an investigation that is triggered by the prosecutor.  
 
                                                          
206 See Article 53 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
207 Ibid.  
208 Supra n. 61, P. 271. 
57 
 
1.2.1.2. Investigation Stage 
This stage is provided for under Articles 53 (2) (a-c), 54, and 58. If the prosecutor is 
satisfied that the Article 53 (1) (a)-(c) requirements are met, investigative proceedings may 
commence.209 According to Article 54, the prosecutor is responsible for evaluating all material 
that was collected, and analysing the evidence and information to identify the potential suspects 
who will be prosecuted. She will also question suspects, witnesses, and victims, under Article 
54 (1)(b). She may further seek cooperation of any state or organisation for the purposes of 
completing the investigation, under Article 54 (3) (c)(d). The role of the prosecutor at this stage 
is as a neutral and impartial body.210 Article 54 (1) (a) provides that the prosecutor shall 
‘investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.’ As Schabas points out, 
‘[s]uch a Prosecutor is rather more like the investigating magistrate or juge d’instruction of the 
continental legal system rather than the adversarial prosecuting attorney of the common law.’211 
‘Therefore, and notwithstanding the more adversarial design of proceedings before the Court, 
the Prosecutor should not solely collect evidence with the aim of securing a conviction’,212 
because she is not a partisan actor. Playing an objective role ‘to establish the truth’ is not only 
limited to the time prior to the confirmation of charges, as the Appeal Chamber confirmed in 
the Lubanga case.213 There is nothing in Article 54 that prohibits the prosecutor to exercise 
post-confirmation investigations. However, the majority of Trial Chamber V submitted that the 
prosecutor is expected ‘to have largely completed its investigation prior to the confirmation 
hearing’,214 and that such further investigations should pertain only ‘to evidence which the 
                                                          
209 See supra n. 179, P 1158. 
210 Schabas, supra n. 4, P. 261. 
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212 Karel De Meester, Article 54(1)(a): Commentary Rome Statute: Part 5, Case Matrix Network, available at 
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214 ICC, Trial Chamber, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai 
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Prosecution could not with reasonable diligence have discovered or obtained prior to 
confirmation.’215 
At the end of this process, the prosecutor will decide which cases to prosecute. Before 
making such a decision, Article 53 (2) asks the prosecutor to satisfy three criteria: the existence 
of ‘a sufficient legal [and] factual basis to seek a warrant or summons’ under Article 58; 
meeting the admissibility requirements laid out in Article 17 (gravity and complementarity), 
and finally that the prosecution of the case is not contrary to ‘the interests of justice’. However, 
Article 53 (2) (c) adds two further factors for the evaluation of ‘the interests of justice’: the age 
or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator and his or her role in the alleged crime.   
1.2.1.3. Prosecution Stage 
Upon the satisfaction of the above factors, the prosecutor may seek a warrant or 
summons from the Pre-Trial Chamber. There is no specific time in which the prosecutor needs 
to make the decision of prosecution. Article 58 (1) provides that the prosecutor can apply for 
an arrest warrant or summons ‘at any time after the initiation of an investigation.’ The 
prosecutor needs approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber to get the arrest warrant or summons 
issued.216 Article 61 (1) also obliges the prosecutor to send the charges to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to be confirmed before proceeding to the trial stage (confirmation of charges hearing). In 
determining the arrest warrant, ‘the Pre-Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, and that the arrest of the person is necessary.’217 The Pre-Trial Chamber plays a 
vital role before a case enters the trial stage. The selection process is, therefore, contingent not 
only on the satisfaction of the prosecutor but also on the Pre-Trial Chamber. The creation of 
the latter requirements, as Stahn argues, was an ‘institutional response to the establishment of 
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an independent Prosecutor.’218 Therefore, any flaw in this process reflects on the whole 
legitimacy of the Court and not only the prosecutor. One issue that has been engaged is the fact 
that neither the Statute nor the RPE indicate that the arrest warrant should be issued sealed. 
The ICC Prosecutors’ practice reflects this matter, as they issued the arrest warrant in two 
different ways, some were sealed, and others were unsealed.219 
1.2.2. The ICC Prosecutor’s Discretion   
The Rome Statute agreement on providing the ICC prosecutor with a proprio motu 
power occupied the centre of attention in debates about prosecutorial discretion. Around this 
power, major issues about the significance of prosecutorial discretion were brought into the 
foreground, both its benefits and its potential dangers. The installation of the prosecutor’s 
proprio motu powers and the surrounding safeguards in the form of review provisions, thus 
symbolised a key commitment of the ICC – whilst at the same time highlighting the potential 
dangers. Unlike her/his predecessors, the ICC prosecutor was empowered for the first time to 
identify situations to be investigated. As will be explored in Chapter Two, the international 
Prosecutors of the IMT had the power of selecting only the charges, whilst the Prosecutors of 
the SC ad hoc Tribunals had the power to prosecute cases and decide charges. The creators of 
those Tribunals had already selected the situations that were the subject of their jurisdiction.220 
With the establishment of the permanent international court, the prosecutor can initiate 
investigation into situations and prosecute cases. This is a new feature within international 
criminal justice. This unprecedented feature raises heated debates about whether the prosecutor 
has discretion to select these situations.  
                                                          
218 Supra n. 61, 265. 
219 For example, all arrest warrant issued against the DLR’s suspects were unsealed. However, the case against, 
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220 See William A. Schabas, Selecting Situations and Cases, in Stahn C (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), Pp. 368-9. 
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Yet at the same time, this left many residual issues relatively unexamined concerning 
the discretionary powers that the prosecutor holds under the Rome Statute. The question that 
can be raised here is the scope of the prosecutor’s discretionary power in respect to 
investigating situations (situational discretion), and prosecuting cases. Does the prosecutor 
enjoy the sort of discretion over decisions to prosecute that would be assumed or legislated in 
many domestic jurisdictions? The next section will discuss and analyse the scope of the 
conventional type of discretion known as prosecutorial discretion under the ICC Statute during 
the investigation and prosecution stages. In the context of the investigation stage, the discussion 
will start first with the Article 15 (1) and (3) proprio motu power,221 and then will discuss this 
issue in the context of referrals. These all will be followed by the discussion of the scope of the 
discretionary power during the prosecution stage.  
1.2.2.1. Investigation  
1.2.2.1.1 Proprio Motu Decisions: Article 15 (1) and (3) 
This is the article that gives the prosecutor an independent power to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu. Paragraph 1 says that ‘[t]he Prosecutor may initiate investigations 
proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ 
Paragraph 3 provides that ‘[i]f the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for 
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected.’ In the first 
paragraph, the term ‘may’ explicitly grants the prosecutor prosecutorial discretion to initiate a 
proprio motu investigation. However, Paragraph 3 raises a doubt about the extent of this 
discretion because the term ‘shall’ appears to oblige the prosecutor – if she concludes that there 
                                                          
221 Danner, supra n. 14, P. 518, stating that ‘[t]he debate over the role of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers 
was essentially a fight over the proper scope of the Prosecutor’s discretion—in particular, whether it should 
extend to the decision to initiate an investigation.’ 
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is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation – to submit an authorisation request to 
the PTC. Thus, Margaret deGuzman says the Statute ‘contains contradictory provisions 
concerning the extent of the Prosecutor’s discretion’.222 However, another interpretation can 
be offered, namely that Paragraph 3 contains one sentence that is divided into two parts. The 
first part is devoted to the process of making a proprio motu decision, whilst the second part 
tells the prosecutor what to do next upon making a decision of opening an investigation. The 
term ‘shall’ comes in the second part of the sentence, and on this interpretation, the mandatory 
language may mean to oblige the prosecutor to submit the application to the Chamber, but does 
not oblige her to proceed, as the structure of Paragraph 3 otherwise indicates. Unlike 
deGuzman’s argument that Article 15 is self-contradictory, this interpretation would make 
Article 15 seem consistent and, therefore, allow the prosecutor to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion to select among legally worthy equally situations. Schabas also notes that the 
Prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion when initiating a proprio motu investigation. He states 
that one of the major ‘changes to the draft of the ILC that appears in the final version of the 
Rome Statute is the recognition of discretion’223, including the power of the prosecutor to select 
which situation to be proprio motu initiated.  
Bearing in mind that these policy papers and practices of the Prosecutor do not 
determine the existence of prosecutorial discretionary power,224 the OTP consistently implies 
in its policy papers that no discretion exists, on the ground that Article 53 provides guided and 
adequate criteria to make a proprio motu decision. In the draft policy paper of 2010 on 
preliminary examination, the OTP did not address the question of discretion and asserted that 
the prosecutor is bound by the legal criteria of Article 53 when deciding whether to open an 
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investigation or not.225 For example, it states that ‘[i]f the State(s) concerned elects not to refer 
the situation, the Office remains prepared at all times to proceed proprio motu, as was done in 
the Kenya situation.’226 In its final version of the paper (2013), and in the context of initiating 
a proprio motu investigation, the OTP confirmed that ‘[i]f the Office is satisfied that all the 
criteria established by the Statute for this purpose are fulfilled, it has a legal duty to open an 
investigation into the situation.’227 Therefore, as Vaid argues, ‘[t]he Prosecutor thus does not 
claim [prosecutorial] discretion to decide whether or not to proceed once she determines a 
situation satisfies the requirements of article 53.’228  
In practice, the Prosecutor has initiated two proprio motu investigations in Kenya and 
Cote d’Ivoire. In its two applications to the Court for authorisation to proceed to open an 
investigation, the Prosecutor did not raise the issue of discretion.229 She just confirmed that the 
legal criteria of Article 53 were met.230 Further, the Prosecutor has declined to proceed proprio 
motu in relation to three situations: Iraq, Venezuela, and Palestine.231 The Prosecutor did not 
reach the question of discretion, as he rejected them on the basis of non-satisfaction of one of 
the legal criteria of Article 53, namely jurisdictional and admissible requirements.232 For 
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example, it rejected the Venezuela situation on the ground that the alleged crimes committed 
did not come within the jurisdiction of the Court.233  
The practice of judges in relation to the proprio motu selection of situations, namely 
Kenya234 and Cote d’Ivoire235, shows a considerable ‘reluctance to intervene in the exercise of 
discretion by the prosecutor in the selection of situations [Article 15].’236 In the context of the 
Kenya situation and in the authorisation decision, PTC II invoked the fear of politicised use of 
a proprio motu investigation by the prosecutor.237 This does involve the potential use of 
discretion in this regard. However, the Court did not examine the politicised-related dangers 
and confined to the examination of the classical criteria of jurisdiction, admissibility, and 
‘reasonable basis to proceed’ without mentioning the use of discretion, if any. This may 
indicate but does not definitely establish that the Court is implicitly inclined to accept 
prosecutorial discretion when it comes to the proprio motu investigations.  
1.2.2.1.2. Referrals 
In the context of a referral from the SC or a State Party to the Statute, commentators 
disagree as to whether or not the prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion at all. According to 
Hanna Kuczyńska, the commentators disagree about the question of discretion to initiate 
investigations. Whilst some of them rely on the principle of opportunism, claiming that the 
prosecutor has discretion, the others invoked the principle of legalism, arguing that the 
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prosecutor has no discretion.238 Among those who depend on the principle of opportunism is 
Schabas, who argues that ‘the crucial decision with respect to the selection of situations lies 
with the prosecutor. Without her agreement it is almost impossible for a prosecution to proceed, 
even if this is formally requested by a State Party or the Security Council.’239 He argues that 
the prosecutor has discretion in relation to the referred situations. Schabas says that whilst the 
early draft Statue (ILC 1994) did not provide the prosecutor with discretion to select 
situations,240 the final version of the Rome Statute provides the prosecutor a power to reject 
referred situations.241 To him, ‘the prosecutor is not at all bound to proceed on the basis of 
referrals’242 though the Statute and other Court instruments do not give any guidance as how 
this discretion is to be exercised and are quite ambiguous.243 However, he states that the 2013 
paper on preliminary examination does not emphasise the discretionary power in this regard.244 
Similarly, OTP Regulation 29, does not mention any discretion to reject a referred situation.245  
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240 UN, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session, Vol. II, Part: 
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241 Supra n. 220, P. 370. 
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Similarly to Schabas’s view,246 Susana SaCouto and Kathrine A. Cleary also opine that 
the prosecutor does have prosecutorial discretion even in referrals.247 The authors refer to an 
important idea to justify such prosecutorial discretion, which lies in the principle of the 
independence of the prosecutor.248 This could be a most logical basis on which the use of 
discretion can be justified. Article 42 (1) affirms the principle of prosecutorial independence 
of the prosecutor as a separate body from other bodies of the Court and also from other 
international entities, including states and international organisations (the SC).249 The degree 
of this independence determines the scope of discretion that the prosecutor can enjoy. As 
Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko states, the rationale of providing this independence to the prosecutor 
is to provide her a power ‘to exercise independent professional judgment and freedom to 
enforce the law without fear, favour or ill-will.’250 SaCouto and Cleary further make an 
important reference to what factors the prosecutor may consider when exercising prosecutorial 
discretion. ‘[P]ractical considerations such as the likelihood of apprehending a suspect or the 
availability of evidence, or strategic considerations such as a desire to shed light on the 
"complete landscape" of events that occurred within a particular situation-in another context’251 
are some factors, which may be taken into account in assessing discretionary gravity. This 
clarification is important to sustain and show in this thesis, as these authors confirm that extra-
legal considerations are to be considered in the context of the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Ignaz Stegmiller also argues that the prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion, but 
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only in relation to the evaluation of ‘the interests of justice’ provision, as just confirmed by the 
Court in the Comoros situation.252 In addition, Brubacher is also of the view that the prosecutor 
has prosecutorial discretion whatever the source of the trigger, arguing: ‘[i]n the ICC, 
prosecutorial discretion is implied by the fact that the Prosecutor is under no obligation to 
initiate proceedings once a situation has been referred to the OTP.’253 
Adherents of the principle of legalism, such as deGuzman, argue that the prosecutor 
has no discretion in relation to the referred situations.254 She provides several arguments to 
conclude that the prosecutor has no prosecutorial discretion to select among admissible 
situations. In particular, she argues that it would be inappropriate to provide the prosecutor 
with such a power when the SC refers a situation which it deemed a threat to international 
peace and security.255 Jens David Ohlin also argues that the prosecutor has no discretion when 
a situation is referred by the SC as opposed to ‘cases initiated proprio motu or by referral from 
state parties.’256 To him, the prosecutor is obliged to proceed with any situation that the SC 
deems a threat to international peace and security, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Morten 
Bergsmo and Jelena Pejic also note that once the legal requirements of initiating a referred 
situation are satisfied, the prosecutor is obliged to proceed.257  
1.2.2.2. Prosecution 
1.2.2.2.1. Selecting Cases 
There is a broad implicit and explicit agreement among commentators, and also the 
Court and the prosecutor that the prosecutor, has broad prosecutorial discretion to select among 
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legally admissible cases, without identifying any legal basis of such a power.258 For example, 
Schabas argues that ‘there is no pretence that all cases will be prosecuted.’259 In this regard, 
Moreno-Ocampo himself explicitly stated in 2006 that ‘it is not possible to prosecute all 
perpetrators or all crimes, which typically would number in the thousands. The investigation 
process must produce a limited number of particularly serious cases for presentation before the 
Court.’260 Once a situation meets the criteria of opening an investigation according to Article 
53 (1)(a-c), the prosecutor thereafter has a broad power of selecting potential cases to be 
prosecuted. This discretion is mainly based on practical considerations, where the Court has 
only limited capacity to prosecute only a few handful cases.261 The OTP has very recently 
published a new policy paper on case selection and prioritization, in which it clearly states that 
‘the Office has broad discretion in selecting individual cases for investigation and 
prosecution’.262  
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2.1. Introduction  
In order to understand the scope of the prosecutor’s powers, including discretion, it will 
be helpful to place the discussion in the context of the history of the international criminal 
prosecutors from the Military Tribunals to the SC Tribunals. The current investigatory and 
prosecutorial discretion of the ICC prosecutor has not been developed in a vacuum. In fact, the 
previous international tribunals have played a major role in articulating the discretionary 
functions and roles within the governing statuary instruments of the ICC.263 From the early 
practice of such international tribunals, there was no doubt that the selection of cases and 
charges were inevitable, given a high volume of cases. As Kuczyńska holds, the principle of 
expediency has predominately shaped the work of the international prosecutors – a principle, 
which means that ‘it is only for the prosecutor to decide which offences and offenders should 
be prosecuted and on which counts.’264  
The question of discretion, however, was different from one tribunal to another. As will 
be seen below, Ohlin holds that ‘the question of prosecutorial discretion was largely absent at 
Nuremberg’.265 Due to the occupation regime, the Allies were able to arrest and detain 
defendants in a similar manner to a national criminal justice system. This makes the situation 
clearly different to that which later pertains to the UN Tribunals and even more so the ICC. 
This state of affairs put the Allies in possession of masses of documents and other evidence. 
As a result of this situation, not much attention was raised about the use of discretion. The 
Prosecutors’ exercise of discretion was not conducted as a means to develop a certain aspect 
of prosecution. Criminal justice was the only classical value that the Prosecutors sought to 
maintain and promote. As Matthew Lippman states, ‘Lord Wright explained that the Allies, 
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like the police, were merely enforcing the law; their motive was ‘justice, not revenge’.266 The 
idea that the major war criminals were under the occupation of the Allies, to whom the 
international Prosecutors were responsible made the issues that might be raised about the 
exercise of discretion less significant.  
Discretion, however, was a central debate within the SC Tribunals. Although the 
Statutes of these Tribunals have not given much attention to discretion, in practice discretion 
proved to be the cornerstone of the development of the international prosecution at these 
Tribunals. With the absence of most of the above features that the Military Prosecutors enjoyed, 
the SC Prosecutors used their discretion in a more oriented way to achieve a meaningful justice. 
As will be discussed below, the Prosecutors were more concerned about several sensitive 
values, such as peace, and security where discretion was used as a tool to develop their 
prosecutorial strategy.267 The chapter will investigate to what extent discretion was employed 
by Prosecutors of the ad hoc Tribunals. It will show that law was not enough to achieve justice 
within the circumstances of these Tribunals where extra-legal considerations, including 
political effects/repercussions were essential in shaping the strategy of the prosecution. Andrew 
Ashworth refers to the essential link between law and social, political, and humanitarian reality, 
which appear on the international legal arena.268 This chapter aims to show how the role of the 
international prosecutors have been increasingly symbolised by the use of discretion. These 
new roles and powers of international actors have largely advanced and shaped international 
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criminal law in the sense that these judicial bodies constitute the heart of international criminal 
law.269 
The chapter will examine two main points. First, it will examine the historical 
development of the scope of the office of the international prosecutors. A theme will be the 
significance of prosecutorial independence. This chapter will show that the different 
circumstances in which each of the different institutions operated has shaped the office of the 
prosecutor. It will suggest, for example, that the IMTs offered little scope of prosecutorial 
discretion whereas this became an issue with the UN Tribunals. It is with the creation of the 
SC Tribunals the Prosecutor begun to face issues, such as peace, security, stability, and 
protection of victims, in discharging its main functions. The useful analysis of discretion and 
the role of the prosecutor will indicate the relationship between the political environment and 
the scope of discretion. The chapter lays the basis for developing the detailed arguments on the 
ICC that follows. Second, the chapter also seeks to subject some decisions of the Prosecutors 
to critical scrutiny in terms of criticisms that the international Prosecutors have received. In 
particular, it will focus on the dyadic fault-lines of criticisms that will be explained more in the 
next chapter.  
2.2. Post-World War II Tribunals 
The issue of how to handle German war criminals,270 including the major leading Nazis, 
was one of the most contentious debates that faced the Allies when the Second World War 
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concluded. Basically, the Allies contemplated three possible ways to deal with the defeated 
Germany.271 These were summary execution, an amnesty policy to be given to them, and a 
criminal prosecution. The sharp disagreements among the Allies made it difficult to choose 
among available options. America’s view was split into two main competing approaches: the 
criminal justice and denazification approaches.272 In 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt 
explicitly supported Morgenthau’s approach during the Quebec Conference and called for 
summary execution of the major criminals and a trial approach for the other war criminals.273 
However, as a result of a great deal of discussion within the US Administration and 
between the Allies, eventually the idea of criminal trials for all levels of the Nazi regime took 
shape. The result was the creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The 
main trial focused on the top of the Nazi party. By 1945, the Nazi party which was defined by 
the Charter as a ‘criminal organization’, had 8.5 million members which explains why the 
Nuremberg process was, to some extent, demonstrative. However, the main trial also raised the 
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question of how criminal responsibility in international situations was to be assessed. The scale 
of the Nazi party and its organization and the scale and depth of the atrocities committed across, 
Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East illustrated the problem of dealing with those who 
gave the orders, those who managed them, and those who carried them out. As we shall see, 
this issue has become a major concern for the UN Tribunals and the ICC itself.  
In 1945 the Allies began to find it difficult holding the Nazis to account.274 Based on 
the Moscow Declaration, the Four Major Allies gathered in London, in the summer of 1945, 
and issued a Charter for the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.275 The 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction was to try the key leaders of Nazi Germany who were active in the 
government, the military and the economy for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.276  
2.2.1. Prosecutor’s Powers under the Nuremberg Charter 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Charter design the powers of the Prosecutors. Article 14 states 
that each of the Four Powers appoint one Chief Prosecutor. Those Prosecutors are to act as a 
Committee. The Committee indeed had had broad selective decisions.277 Article 14 (b) 
provides the Committee with discretion ‘to settle the final designation of major war criminals 
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to be tried by the Tribunal’. Article 15 also provides the Chief Prosecutors with a discretionary 
power to individually prepare a list of indictments to be approved by the Committee. There 
was no need for obtaining approval from the Judges once the Chief Prosecutors filed 
indictments. Also, under Article 15 of the Charter, the Chief Prosecutors were in charge of 
‘investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence’. 
Although the Charter did not mention how the collection of evidence will be obtained, the 
Prosecutors relied on their Governments to locate and obtain evidence.      
Under the Nuremberg Charter, there was no judicial oversight of the work of the 
Prosecutor.278 Therefore, there was, Horton holds, ‘no right of appeal for abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion.’279 In fact, each of the Chief Prosecutors was under the control of his country. The 
Chief Prosecutor of the USA, Justice Robert Jackson, was responsible to Harry S. Truman, the 
President of the USA.280 Thus, it is true that whilst the Committee of the Prosecutors was an 
independent body within the Tribunal, the individual Chief Prosecutors were responsible to 
their governments. For example, the Soviet Union ordered its Prosecutor to claim that the Nazis 
were responsible for the Katyn Massacre.281  
The Charter of the Tribunal did not provide a particular list of criteria for the selection 
to either teams of Prosecutors. However, it was only the term ‘the major war criminals’ that 
was referred to in Articles 1 and 6 of the Charter that was provided as a criterion of the 
selection. In addition to this, Jo Stigen argues that having looked at ‘the final list of the 
defendants and the judgments… the gravity of the crime, the perpetrator’s role in the crime as 
well as his or her military rank or government position were important factors.’282 Stigen 
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concludes that these factors, to a large extent, correspond with the ones provided in Article 53 
of the Rome Statute. This is a great development that contributed to the promotion of the rules 
of international criminal justice. 
In practice, however, the process of the selection was conducted in a different way – 
the matter that makes use of discretion by the Prosecutors largely of little importance, if not 
even relevant.283 As Kuczyńska argues, ‘the decisions [of the selection] were taken by the 
governments of the victorious states.’284 The process of the selection of the defendants was 
considerably a political compromise, where the political decisions made by the governments 
simply selected who will be brought to the Tribunal. As Telford Taylor maintains, ‘the task of 
selecting the defendants was hastily and negligently discharged, mainly because no guiding 
principles of selection had been agreed on.’285 Justice Jackson also stated that ‘[t]he people at 
Potsdam… made this commitment to publish the list [of defendants] without consulting us.’286 
The most serious flaw in this process is that it began even before the Charter was agreed on.287 
As Bradley F. Smith holds, ‘the names were chosen before an indictment had been prepared 
and even before the Charter establishing the law on which some of them would be tried had 
been negotiated.’288 For example, the British team had already a list of defendants prepared in 
late June.289 The list consisted of the major representatives of the Nazi system, whereby ten 
people were selected. This list had been agreed upon fully later without any rejection by any 
delegate. On June 23 1945, the American team chose 16 defendants of those who best 
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represented the five organisations that were already chosen by the American team to be 
indicted.290  
Richard Overy argues that, it ‘was the product of a great many different strands of 
political argument’.291 The process of selection was not pure legal work, where several political 
strands were considered when the defendants were selected. For example, being known to the 
public was a major consideration on which the defendants were selected, as Prosecutor David 
Maxwell Fyfe reports.292 Also, it was noted that the Chief Prosecutors were heavily depended 
on ‘the symbolic role’ of the Nazi regime as a basis of the selection.293 For instance, Julius 
Streicher, Wilhelim Keitel (also Alfred Jodle), and Walther Funk represented three symbolic 
roles of the Nazi regime, which were anti-Semitism, militarism, capitalism, respectively.294 
The British team decided to include representatives of the dictatorship side of Germany such 
as Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick and the German Admiral and head of the German navy, 
Karl Doenitz.295 As Stigen points out, ‘[t]he selection of cases for prosecution before the IMT 
and IMTFE was far more politicised than before the subsequent international tribunals.’296 The 
process of the selection of the defendants seems to be ‘a series of compromises’.297 However, 
despite this political process, the policy of Jackson regarding the selection of offenders 
concentrated at the same time on the high-ranking leaders of Nazi Germany, including the 
organisations that represented the most powerful segment of Nazi society so the Tribunal could 
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put an end to any further atrocity.298 After the inclusion and exclusion of some names made to 
this list, a list of twenty-four defendants were ready to be presented to the Tribunal. 
As can be seen now, the Chief Prosecutors were independent of the other organs of the 
Tribunal, however they were ultimately responsible to their governments. Given this status, 
there were regular political interventions of the Allies who in practice had the final word ‘in 
the selection of defendant’.299 In terms of the selection of the defendants, the Prosecutors were 
simply given a task of seeking evidence to convict the chosen defendants. For example, as 
Schabas and deGuzman point out, intelligence agents were among the staff of the U.S. Chief 
Prosecutor whose role was to ensure that ‘high-ranking Nazis who had collaborated with the 
United States in the final months of the war were spared prosecution.’300 The Prosecutors did 
not exercise prosecutorial discretion in the process of the selection. Therefore, the issue of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the context of the selection of defendants was sidelined. 
In terms of charges, in fact the process of the selection by the Prosecutor were carried 
out on several occasions. For example, the charges of conspiracy of waging an aggressive war 
in Poland. Pursuing charges in respect to conspiracy to wage aggressive war was limited to 
specific instances of actions by the Axis powers because of a concern not to acknowledge or 
disclose evidence that ‘the Soviet Union was equally guilty in its attacks on Poland in 
September 1939’ – indeed, it was part of the same ‘conspiracy’ with German officials – and on 
Finland three months later’.301 Hence Jackson ensured that the documentary evidence showing 
the terms of the German-Soviet agreement of 1939 on Poland ‘was kept in the file and never 
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presented at Nuremberg.’302 The independence of the Prosecutor was violated, due to the 
pressure imposed by the Soviet Union on the Prosecutors to avoid raising such a concern.  
The case of American Admiral Chester Nimitz is another example.303 The latter was 
responsible for a similar incident in which German Admiral Donitz was indicted for waging 
unrestricted submarine warfare. However, as the American Admiral was also responsible for 
such an incident, he kindly confirmed the Donitz defense’s claims that this incident does not 
constitute a war crime.304 Nimitz’s admission of his conduct put the Court at a serious 
embarrassing point. The Allies had to accept the Donitz’s defense in order not to embarrass 
Nimitz. The arbitrary response of the Court led to a change the law and transformed this 
particular incident from illegal to legal. As David Luban argues, ‘it legalizes any crime 
committed by the vanquished provided the victor committed it as well.’305  It was not a rule of 
law, it was a rule of victory.306  
Therefore, it is hard to legitimise the process of the selection of charges on the basis of 
prosecutorial discretion, which in essence would allow the Chief Prosecutor to exercise a wide 
range of discretion to select among legally worthy cases. It is not prosecutorial discretion by 
which one could justify the process of the selection. The issue was much connected to 
                                                          
302 Supra n. 291, P. 19. 
303 See generally, supra n. 281. 
304 Ibid, Pp. 324-5. 
305 David Luban, The Legacy of Nuremberg, in Guenael Mettraux (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008), P 660. 
306 It is true that Donitz’s claims were found correct latter on, as the conventions of war were really changed, 
but the idea is the process of the trial in which the main priority was to shield the members of the Allies from 
putting under any trial. That was one of the flaws that pushed many people to raise the idea of victor’s justice. 
Waging an aggressive war was obviously problematic in the sense of the legal basis of the charge and the 
failure of the prosecuting teams to apply this charge fairly. Jackson’s team suggested putting the charge under 
a single heading of a conspiracy to wage such a war. This suggestion solved two problems. The first was to 
include all potential acts committed by the regime since they held the power. The second was to prevent the 
defendants to raise an obedience claim as a basis of avoiding the charge, because it was commanded by Hitler. 
Further to this, Jackson relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as a legal basis of such a charge, see Sheldon Glueck, 
The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (ed.), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 2008), Pp. 72- 119. The Treaty entered into force on 24th July, 1929. 
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prosecutorial independence of the Prosecutors that was blatantly violated by the consistent 
intervention of the Allies. As was established in Introduction of this thesis, there is a difference 
between the prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial independence. The only legitimate 
justification that can be made when making a selection is when it comes to prosecutorial 
discretion that the prosecutor exercises away from any external pressures. The external 
intervention or influence would just violate the independence of the prosecutor and this in turn 
cannot justify any decision a prosecutor makes under such pressure. 
In short, the question of prosecutorial discretion in Nuremberg did not raise much 
attention. The Chief Prosecutors were not independent, but rather they were representatives of 
their governments. This picture revealed the importance of the independence of a prosecutor. 
The process of selecting defendants or charges should only be exercised on the basis of 
prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, any external influence or pressure that involves this process 
would undermine prosecutorial independence and cannot justify any decision that is made on 
such political or external influences. The most significant aspect of this Tribunal is that it sets 
forth several criteria of the selection that have been embedded in the law of the subsequent 
international tribunals. The degree of the responsibility of the perpetrators, the gravity of the 
crimes, and the rank of the perpetrators are some important criteria that were identified for the 
selection process.  
2.2.2. The Power of the Prosecutor of the Tokyo Tribunal 
When the Nuremberg Trial was in operation, the world again witnessed the emergence 
of another military tribunal set up in Tokyo, in January 1946, by the efforts of the Allies for 
crimes committed by Japan.307 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
                                                          
307 For full discussion about this tribunal, see Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Military 
Tribunal - A Reappraisal (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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was another historic achievement towards prosecuting international criminals.308 General 
Douglas MacArthur was in charge of setting up the Tribunal by a mandate given by the Allies 
to put the Potsdam Declaration into effect.309 Principle 10 of the Declaration laid down the 
basic approach to be adopted in dealing with criminals; it provided that ‘stern justice shall be 
meted out to all criminals’.310 The designation of the Prosecutor’s body of the Tokyo Tribunal 
was almost the same as its counterpart the Nuremberg Tribunal. However, unlike the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, there was just one Chief Prosecutor, Josef Keenan,311 for this Tribunal. 
Under Article 8 (a) of the Charter, the Chief Prosecutor had the title of ‘Chief of Counsel’, and 
sub-paragraph (b) provided that each country of the Allies who were at war can appoint ‘an 
Associate Counsel’.312 There was no office of the staff to assist the Chief of Counsel.313 The 
Charter did not provide how the Chief of Counsel was to be appointed or removed. However, 
Keenan was appointed by the USA.314  
The strategy for proving the guilt of the defendants, which was adopted by Keenan, was 
different than that of Jackson’s reliance on documentary evidence in the Nuremberg trials. This 
was due to the policy taken by the Japanese leaders, who destroyed nearly all their military and 
                                                          
308 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), P. 44, Cryer stated that ‘[t]he main aspect of the trial was the 
focus on the crimes of against peace and conspiracy charges.’ 
309 See in general, supra n. 307.  
310 The Declaration was declared on 26, July 1945, and is available on < 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/potsdam.pdf>.  
311 Joseph Keenan was a USA Assistant Attorney General, and Director of the Criminal Division of the USA 
Department of Justice.  
312 Those countries were: Australia, China, France, India, the Netherland, New Zealand, the Philippines, the 
United Kingdom, the USA, and the USSR.  
313 Bergsmo, Cisse, and Staker, supra n. 3, Pp. 125-9. 
314 The other task of the Prosecutor such as the investigation, collecting and presenting evidence, the judicial 
oversight and other tasks were the same of the Nuremberg designation as was explained in the first section of 
this chapter. Ultimately, the Prosecutor indicted twenty-eight Japanese military and political offenders, 
charging them with conventional war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. Two 
defendants died during the trial, one was found unable for the trial because of his health condition, 16 persons 
were sentenced for life, 7 defendants were hanged, and 2 persons were sentenced for a short term. For more 
information, see Bergsmo, Cisse, and Staker, supra n. 3. 
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political documents which forced Kennan to rely mainly on oral testimony.315 The Charter itself 
was flexible enough to provide the Tribunal with the power of accepting any document it 
accepted to be of probative value, as Article 13 of the Charter provided.    
By a way of comparison, one can note that the strategy of the prosecution conducted 
by the Prosecutors of the Nuremberg Tribunal was more fair and consistent than its sibling the 
Tokyo Tribunal. ‘The selection of defendants was many times criticized as “arbitrary” and 
evaluated as “a process plagued by poor organization and consultation, and little information, 
knowledge and time.”’316 As was discussed above, the selection of the defendants focused on 
the top leaders of Nazi Germany, including heads of organisations that represented the most 
powerful segments of Nazi society.317 In the IMTFE, several top leaders were shielded and 
remained unprosecuted.318 The prosecutorial strategy of the IMTFE of choosing the alleged 
criminals, in fact, was not consistent and fair, a matter that pushed many people to raise the 
idea that the IMTFE is victor’s justice.319 The Chief of Counsel of the IMTFE did not prosecute 
two of the most responsible persons for crimes during the war, Emperor Hirohito of Japan and 
his uncle Prince Yasuhiko. Professor Herbert P. Bix argues, based on historical research, that 
the Emperor was responsible for acts of aggression by Japan from 1937 to 1945, as the latter 
act was under the total management and command of the Emperor.320 As a consequence, Judge 
Pal said that, ‘the trial was victor’s justice, and selective.’321 In addition, Judge Henry Bernard 
                                                          
315 See generally Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials 
(William Morrow and Company, 1987). 
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was also unhappy with the non-prosecution of the Emperor. He argued that the exercise of 
discretion in relation to the Emperor’s situation was ‘unacceptable’.322 He further added that 
the exercise of discretion should be conducted in an equal and justified manner. This is an 
important idea that shows the distinction between prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial 
independence. In this case, prosecutorial independence was violated, as the Allies pushed the 
Prosecutor to ignore the Emperor.323 Such a decision cannot then be justified on the basis of 
the exercise of discretion, due to the external influence.  
In addition to this case, the case of Members of Unit 731324 is another example. 
Although they were responsible for one of the most shocking crimes, which was the use of 
biological and chemical weapons against prisoners, as an experiment, they were not 
prosecuted.325 Robert Cryer maintains that ‘the evidence and suspects were available to the 
prosecuting States.’326 Even so, the Chief of Counsel decided not to prosecute them. Cryer 
harshly criticises the policy of the Chief of Counsel, stating that ‘[i]t is difficult to see this as 
anything other than an illegitimate use of discretion.’327 The idea that ‘stern justice shall be 
meted out to all war criminals’ did not include the biggest fish of those criminals.328 In other 
                                                          
322 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bernard, P. 19, cited in Robert Cryer, supra n. 308, P. 208. 
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words, the use of discretion was not built on any specific criteria and arbitrarily exercised. 
Again, prosecutorial independence was violated. 
However, if we look at these cases from a different point of view, we may come out 
with a different outcome. The following outcome can be undertaken only if the above decision 
of the Chief Prosecutor was adopted on the basis of prosecutorial discretion, and without any 
external pressures that undermine prosecutorial independence of the Prosecutor. Based on the 
latter imagination, the historical decision of the non-prosecution of the Emperor has laid down 
an early stone on which the idea of justice v. peace-building appeared. In fact, it would be a 
remarkable decision, if the Chief Prosecutor was trying to consider the impact of such a 
decision on restoring peace and achieving stability in the region.329 MacArthur, in particular, 
opposed the Australian suggestion of prosecuting the Emperor, when he opined explicitly that 
the administration of Japan would be smoother, in case they secured the cooperation of the 
Emperor instead of prosecuting him. That would secure at the same time the interests of justice, 
by securing stability in a defeated Japan. As will be more discussed in Chapter Five, this 
position, developed by Keenan, corresponds to the practice and legal texts, followed by the SC 
Tribunals (practice) and embedded arguably in the ICC Statute (the legal text), respectively. It 
is ‘the interests of justice’ and the debates over the impact of doing justice on peace and 
stability-related issues. Although this policy has paid attention to the idea of ‘the interests of 
justice’, nonetheless the problem remains in this case, as the Emperor and some other top 
leaders did not receive any sort of justice in its broad meaning.  
Cryer seems right in his argument about the illegitimate decision in relation to the case 
of the scientists of unit 731, as the United States wanted their research in exchange for 
immunity. In fact, such a decision in the context of such a shocking offence they allegedly 
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committed has nothing to do at all with moral, humanitarian, or legal excuses. It was pure 
political expediency. What I am trying to establish in this regard is that such a use of discretion 
cannot be justified on any legitimate basis, as no sort of justice was delivered. When we say 
that justice may be achieved without paying an account to political implications on the 
international legal arena, that does not mean that we give weight to such considerations to an 
extent that eliminates justice itself.  
2.3. Post-Cold War Tribunals 
In 1992, the SC returned to the spirit of Nuremberg in establishing the UN International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.330 In fact, there were two major factors that helped to reach 
that end. The first was the new political circumstances that emerged immediately after the end 
of the Cold War.331 The Cold War halted any possible cooperation between the major powers, 
and it was not until it was over that serious discussion of the role of international criminal law 
could resume. The dissolution of the Soviet Union reshaped the policy of the SC allowing it to 
discharge its duties more effectively in response to international problems, as the successor 
states to the Soviet Union agreed to respect fundamental principles of international law.332 
Because of these facts, the SC responded effectively to the adverse consequences of the 
conclusion of the Cold War, which resulted in wars in Yugoslavia. The second was the insistent 
efforts of the international community to promote the rule of law through the emerging idea at 
the time, the promotion of a new world order.333 This all encouraged the international 
community and, in particular, the SC to emphasise the ‘need to dispense international 
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justice’334 by establishing a permanent international criminal court. However, the media 
coverage of the atrocities that took place in Yugoslavia and Rwanda placed more pressures on 
the international community at stake to undertake their responsibility to end these atrocities, is 
also another factor.   
In response to major atrocities in those countries, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, established the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively.335 The Statutes of these tribunals 
set out the prosecutorial powers in much greater detail than the Post-War II tribunals. These 
Statutes give a clearer picture of the functions and duties of the prosecutor, whilst exercising 
her discretionary power, as well as the oversight imposed on it by other bodies of the Court. In 
fact, the last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a real legal revolution in advancing the 
role of the prosecutor and prosecutorial power within international criminal justice. This was 
an obvious feature of that decade, which witnessed the creation of three great tribunals: the 
ICTY, ICTR, and later the ICC, each of which bestows on the prosecutor a broad prosecutorial 
power.  
2.3.1. The Legal Framework of the Office of the Prosecutor under ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes 
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Article 16 (3) of the Statute states that ‘the Office of the Prosecutor shall be composed 
of a Prosecutor and such other qualified staff as may be required’.336 Rule 38 of the ICTY Rules 
of Procedures of Evidence (ICTY RPE) provides a Deputy Prosecutor to be also appointed.337 
The latter is appointed by the UN Secretary General.338 The OTP of the ICTY and ICTR 
consists of the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutor, and the investigators staff.    
Under Article 16 (1) of the ICTY Statute,339 the Prosecutor is ‘responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution’. Unlike the Military Tribunals, Paragraph (2) holds that ‘the 
Prosecutor shall act independently… [and] shall not seek or receive instructions from any 
Government or from any other source.’340 However, that does not mean that the prosecutor is 
not able to seek advice or assistance. In the case of the alleged crimes of NATO’s bombing in 
Yugoslavia, the Prosecutor sought legal expert advice regarding NATO’s responsibility.341 The 
idea of the independence of the Office of the Prosecution is a noticeable evolution achieved by 
the international community. As was explained above, the IMT and IMTFE’s prosecution 
teams were clearly composed of victorious Allies’ members who represented the final political 
compromises of the creation of those Tribunals.342 However and according to Article 16 (4), 
the prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR are not completely independent from any political shape, 
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as the Security Council, a political body, established the Tribunal and appointed the 
Prosecutors.343  
Article 18 (1) of the ICTY Statute provides that the prosecutors ‘shall initiate 
investigations ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source’. When 
receiving this information, ‘the Prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained 
and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed’ with a prosecution344 Similarly to 
Article 15 (3) of the ICC Statute (proprio motu power), in order to proceed with a prosecution, 
Article 18 (4) requires the prosecutor to satisfy that a prima facie case exists – a prima facie 
case means ‘that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a 
suspect has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.’345 Once the prosecutor 
satisfies herself that a prima facie case exists, Article 18 (4) provides that the prosecutor ‘shall 
prepare an indictment’. The language of the latter paragraph seems arguably mandatory as it 
says that the prosecutor ‘shall prepare an indictment’ [emphasis added].346 Unlike the 
Nuremberg Tribunal where the Chief Prosecutors did not have to submit the indictment to the 
Court for approval – as only the approval of the Committee was needed -,and so by General 
MacArthur in relation to the Tokyo Military Tribunal, Article 18 (4) requires the prosecutor to 
submit the indictment to the trial Chamber. Article 19 of the ICTY Statute provides that if the 
Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the prime facie threshold is met, then they shall dismiss it. 
Where an indictment has been confirmed by the Trial Chamber, Rule 50 of the ICTY RPE 
provides that the prosecutor needs permission from a relevant judge for any amendment.347  
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This means that the prosecutor can amend, remove, or change any charge, and even withdraw 
the indictment, as long as no confirmation has been issued by the Trial Chamber.348  
The absence of any judicial oversight or control is absolute in relation to the decision 
not to proceed with an investigation or proceed with a prosecution. The law here, in effect, 
allows the prosecutor to exercise an absolute power, which may have serious consequences. 
Making such decisions is limited to the prosecutor. The Statute makes them appear subjective, 
as the Statutes provide such a broad power, when it comes to the decision not to proceed with 
an investigation. In other words, the pure subjective dimensions of the decision not to open an 
investigation or proceed with a prosecution reveal the subjectivity of law-content in this 
regard.349 The next section will show how the lack of any sort of control by the Court on such 
decisions was problematic within the practice of the ICTR and, to a lesser extent, in the ICTY. 
In contrast, we have seen how the ICC Statute provides a stricter system, in which all decisions, 
including the positive and negative ones are reviewable and potentially controlled, except in 
that the negative proprio motu decisions are out of any control, unless decided solely on the 
basis of the ‘interests of justice’. As far as the Rwanda Tribunal is concerned, the legal frame 
is the same as that of the ICTY.350 
In relation to the scope of discretion, we need to distinguish between the decision to 
initiate an investigation and the decision to prosecute. In respect to the initiation of an 
investigation, although Article 18 (1)351 involves a mandatory language in relation to initiating 
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an investigation, indeed, the prosecutor has ‘full discretion’, as Stigen states.352 As the 
prosecutor is the only source of the legal requirement to investigate, this means, in effect, that 
the prosecutor is the only one who will assess the information received and, therefore, decides 
whether this information constitutes a ‘sufficient basis’ to proceed. Schabas made a similar 
argument in a similar situation in relation to the ICC prosecutor’s proprio motu power, saying 
that the prosecutor ‘shall proceed, but only after he has decided to do so in the exercise of his 
discretion under Article 15.’353 In addition, there is no judicial oversight over the decision of 
opening or closing an investigation the matter which makes the discretionary power of the 
prosecutor quite broad. Cote also emphasises that although the language of the Article seems 
mandatory and obliges the prosecutor to investigate once a prima facie case exists, ‘the courts 
have, in the last ten years, recognized a clear prosecutorial discretion as to the decision to 
investigate and to indict individuals.’354 Jallow also confirms that Article 17 (1) of the ICTR 
Statute, which is similar to Article 18 (1) of the ICTY Statute, allows the prosecutor to act ‘at 
his discretion.’355 
In relation to the decision to prosecute, prosecutorial discretion is more limited, 
compared to the investigatory decision. Article 18 (4) requires the prosecutor, upon finding a 
‘sufficient basis’ to proceed, to obtain approval from the Trial Chamber.356 However, this 
prosecutorial discretion is still broad as such. In the Čelebići case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
stated that ‘[i]t is beyond question that the Prosecutor has a broad discretion in relation to the 
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initiation of investigations and in the preparation of indictments.’357 In this case, and similarly 
to the situation in the ICC, the Judges made it clear that the Tribunal has limited resources and 
cannot prosecute all legally worthy cases.358 Schabas and deGuzman opine that the case law 
confirms that the prosecutor has ‘broad discretion’.359 In addition, Stigen holds that ‘the 
Prosecutor is, in reality, under no duty to proceed with a case whenever there is such a 
[sufficient] basis.’360 Judge Patricia M. Wald, with respect to the Jelisic Appeals Judgment also 
confirmed that it is the prosecutor who will decide which cases to be prosecuted and judges 
have no authority to intervene to examine the wisdom of such decisions. 361 In addition to these 
reasons, there is no judicial oversight of the decisions of the prosecutor to decline to proceed 
with a prosecution. However, it is only Nsereko who argues that Article 18 (4) involves a 
‘peremptory language [and] suggests a duty and not discretion on the part of the Prosecutors to 
indict.’362 To him, the ICTY is an ad hoc institution that was created ‘at great cost, specifically 
to try ‘serious violations’ or persons with ‘the greatest responsibility for serious violations’ of 
international humanitarian law.’363 
As can be seen, it is widely accepted that the prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion 
when assessing ‘sufficient basis’ for the purpose of initiating an investigation, and ‘a prima 
facie case’ for prosecuting a case. As was mentioned, in Celebici case, the Appeal Chamber 
explicitly stated that the Prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion ‘in relation to the initiation of 
investigations and in the preparation of indictments.’364 The Court established this sense of 
discretion on the basis of the limited resources of the Tribunal that prevented it from 
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prosecuting all cases that came under its jurisdiction. Therefore, upon the satisfaction of these 
legal categories, the Court has made it clear that the Prosecutor does not have to open an 
investigation or proceed with a prosecution. She can choose among these legally but equally 
valid cases for investigations and prosecutions. However, what has not been discussed in this 
regard is the process in which the Prosecutor decides that these legal requirements are not 
satisfied. In such a situation and as will be established in the next two chapters, in analysing 
these legal requirements the prosecutor has a broad capacity to interpret them and decide 
whether these legal categories are met. In so doing, the prosecutor could exercise another sense 
of discretion which results from the broad meaning of these legal requirements. Stigen notes 
that ‘sufficient basis’ is not defined by the Statute and provides more space for discretion (the 
same can be raised in relation to a ‘prima facie case’).365 The broad meaning of such criteria 
allows the prosecutor in effect to deploy her discretion through her independent capacity to 
interpret these legal criteria that might involve several interpretations, and yet even opposite 
that may allow the prosecutor to select among opposite outcomes. This observation is important 
to be raised here and employed to analyse and discuss how the ICC Prosecutor has exercised a 
strong sense of such discretion.  
The above analysis does not indicate that there is no limitation or control on the 
prosecutor’s discretion. In fact, there were several ways by which the Prosecutor’s discretion 
was limited and controlled. In 2002, the SC required the Tribunal to transfer intermediate and 
lower-level accused to national courts.366 Because of the existence of tens of thousands of 
perpetrators and the vast workload of the OTP of both Tribunals, the SC issued Resolution 
1503 on 28 August 2003, by which it established a Completion Strategy.367 The SC asked the 
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prosecutor to conclude all investigations by the end of 2004, and all trials by 2010.368 It also 
urged these Tribunals to concentrate only on the most serious crimes and send other crimes to 
be tried by national courts.369 As a consequence, Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE was adopted by 
the judges and imposed two further limitations on the prosecutor’s discretion, namely the 
gravity of the crimes and the level of the accused when making the transfer decisions. The 
prosecutor then had no discretion in relation to these cases and must transfer them to national 
courts. In this regard, it is important to mention here that such interference by the SC is not an 
infringement of the prosecutor’s independence, as the SC did not intervene ‘in the details of 
individual cases’.370 As a consequence, Jallow, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR, has adopted 
almost the same policy as in the Nuremberg Trial, in prosecuting high-profile perpetrators of 
crimes in Rwanda. Prosecutor Jallow decided to make the political, administrative, and military 
leaders the main targets of the prosecution.371 The then Prime Minister of Rwanda, cabinet 
ministers, local administrative leaders, and other military leaders, who participated in 
committing the crime of genocide, have been all prosecuted.372  
Further to this, on 26 March 2004, the SC issued Resolution 1534, which imposed a 
limitation on prosecutorial power of the prosecutor, when making a decision of whom to 
prosecute.373 The Resolution calls upon the prosecutor, when making indictments to 
‘concentrate on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes’, which 
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are under the jurisdiction of the Tribunals.374 This step is a development of the Charter of the 
Nuremberg, which required its Prosecutors only to concentrate on such persons and crimes, as 
outlined above. Following this amendment, the ICTY Judges also decided to control these 
decisions, and check whether or not the prosecutor targeted only the most responsible 
perpetrators.375 Accordingly, in April 2004, Rule 28 (a) of the ICTY RPE was amended in a 
way that put the prosecutor under the Judges’ oversight, when the prosecutor makes the 
decision to proceed with a prosecution.376 This rule empowers the President of the Tribunal to 
ask the Bureau to check whether or not the prosecutor indicted one or more of the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
However, the ICTR judges did not take the same step taken by their counterpart, as they 
believed that such an amendment would violate the Statute that asserted the independence of 
the prosecutor.377  
Another limitation is a general requirement. Article 21 (1) and 20 (1) of the ICTY and 
ICTR respectively provide a general principle that is well articulated within international legal 
justice. These Articles state that ‘all persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal’. 
These Articles require that the prosecutor cannot exercise her prosecutorial power in an unequal 
way.378 Thus, according to this principle, the selection of indictees, on the basis of religious, 
political, racial, ethnic, or any other discriminatory basis is not acceptable, as all persons are 
equal before the law. In the Prosecutor v. Delalic case,379 the Appeal Chamber asserted that 
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the Prosecutor is obliged to respect this principle, whilst exercising their prosecutorial power. 
‘It thus appears that the discretion of the prosecutor under both the ICTY and ICTR systems is 
only limited to the extent that it does not violate article 21(1) of the ICTY Statute’.380 Therefore, 
any violation of this principle means the judges will intervene in the prosecutor’s discretion as 
far as the defence can show that a certain decision is taken on a discriminatory basis. In the 
Ntakuritmana case, the Trial Chamber holds ‘that the Accused . . . must show that the 
Prosecutor’s decision to prosecute them or to continue their prosecution was based on 
impermissible motives, such as ethnicity or political affiliation, and that she failed to prosecute 
similarly situated suspects of different ethnicity or political affiliation.’381 In the Akayesu case, 
the Appeal Chamber of the ICTR holds that in order for the Tribunal to intervene in the 
prosecutor’s discretion, the evidence of discriminatory intent must be coupled with the 
evidence that the Prosecutor’s policy has a discriminatory effect, so that other similarly situated 
individuals of other ethnic or religious backgrounds were not prosecuted.’382 
2.3.2. Prosecutorial Discretion in Practice under the ICTY and the ICTR 
 Unlike the Nuremberg Trial, the commencement of the prosecution’s processes at the 
ICTY was extremely slow. One of the staff of the OTP stated that ‘as we began to work, it was 
apparent that we could not start, as they did at Nuremberg and Tokyo, with cases against the 
military and political leaders.’383 This matter can be attributed to shortcomings in designation 
of the bodies of the Tribunal, whereby the prosecutor was appointed one year after the 
appointment of the judges of the Tribunal, as if they were trying ‘to build a house from the roof 
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down’.384 Both Tribunals started with the prosecution of lower-level perpetrators, as opposed 
to the supposed perpetrators that the international community would have preferred to see – 
major war criminals, as in the case of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Approximately, half a century 
after the first trials by an international tribunal, Dragan Nicolic, who was a low-level member 
of the Bosnian Serb forces, was the first person to be indicted by the ICTY.385 Former Chief 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone made it clear that the reason for starting with such a person was 
not just the due application of law in accordance with the need for justice, but the credibility 
and survival of the Tribunal itself, to prove to the international community, in particular to 
victims, that the Tribunal was capable of delivering justice.386 Goldstone said, 
I had also been informed ahead of time that at least one indictment had to be issued 
before the November meeting in order to demonstrate that the system was working and 
that the tribunal was worthy of financial support … For that reason we issued our first 
indictment, against Dragan Nicolic, who despite the despicable nature of his alleged 
conduct, was a comparatively low-level member of the Bosnian Serb forces.387 
As we will see, the Prosecutor of the ICTY has largely considered several extra-legal 
factors when making a decision. In relation to the Nicolic case, he was already in custody in 
Germany who transferred him on to the ICTY: in other words, he was available for prosecution. 
In addition, ‘sufficient evidence’ was available against him.388 Goldstone justified the decision 
that although ‘he was a comparatively low-level member of the Bosnia Serb forces’,389 cases 
against such ‘small fish’ would provide a basis for building the cases against the top leaders.390 
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However, this policy was criticised by the judges, who called upon Goldstone to focus on the 
high-ranking military and political leaders and commanders.391  
In the Tadic case, ultimately the first ever indictee to appear at trial,392 was also 
considered to be a lower-level choice. The same above considerations were involved in respect 
to Tadic. As Cote argues, the decision taken against Tadic – the same can be argued in relation 
to Akayesu at the ICTR – was ‘the urgent need to prove to the international community that 
these first attempts at international justice after Nuremberg could work, rather than the relative 
importance of holding these specific men accountable for committing crimes in Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia.’393 The satisfaction of the prima facie case was not the key reason of 
prosecuting these perpetrators. In other cases, further extra-legal factors were considered by 
the Prosecutor. In the Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikiric and Others case, the prosecutor explicitly 
considered the resources available to him to conduct a fair trial, to withdraw the charges against 
them. In other cases, the Prosecutor also considered ‘the prospect for arresting the suspect, and 
the impact of the case on the resources of her Office.’394 
Having looked at the factors presented by Goldstone for indicting those small fish, we 
would notice that he manifestly justified his decisions to indict such perpetrators on the basis 
of a prima facie case. However, the calculation of the extra-legal factors was the key reason of 
making such decisions. In other words, such a calculation was considerably employed and 
taken, on the basis of the apologist bases, to give credibility to the effectiveness of the Tribunal 
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to secure its operation in the near future. What is of concern here is to set out the dual nature 
of such criteria (the prima facie case), which can be used to achieve both justice aims and other 
aims. These criteria involve a degree of subjectivism that renders the prosecutor flexible to 
seek a certain goal, as Goldstone did when wanted to prove to the international community that 
the Tribunal was in operation. This initial observation is important to be emphasised, as it 
shows how the application of the legal requirements can involve the exercise of discretion. The 
broad and open-meaning of such criteria would allow decision-makers in effect to exercise 
broad discretion to choose from different interpretations that a legal criterion may offer. 
However, this thesis will argue that the consideration of these extra-legal factors that can be 
shaped or associated with political effects or repercussions can be legitimately taken only with 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The application of the legal categories should be 
conducted on a consistent basis.  
The last thing to show here is that the position that Prosecutor Goldstone took received 
two opposite criticisms that raised the common charge of politicalisation. Targeting a small 
fish by a tribunal that was supposed to try only big fish was considered politically-motivated. 
The Prosecutor was more concerned about the normative demand in that the Tribunal is able 
to deliver justice.395 The Prosecutor was then seeking to prove a point. It was a utopian critique. 
On the other hand, the prosecutor was deemed again political as he was trying to please the 
founders of the Court as well as the international community that the Tribunal is in operation.396 
As Cote argues, the decision to target a small fish was not only based on the legal threshold, 
‘but also on arguably legitimate political considerations about the mandate of international 
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criminal justice and the survival of the new judicial institutions.’397 It was an apologist 
critique.398  
(RPF and NATO Cases) 
The practice of the SC Tribunals is indeed a continuation of the previous regime of 
selective enforcement of the law. The selectivity process is not as such wrong.399 It is a process 
that the international prosecutors have to use, as they are choosing from among a hundred, if 
not a thousand cases. However, the ultimate outcomes of this selectivity process necessarily 
have a certain impact on the legitimacy of the given judicial institution. This potential and 
serious problem appears, in particular, when a decision-maker targets one group of the given 
conflict and ignores the other. This happens when the latter group has an active role in the 
criminal activities. As was explained above, this would also be contrary to the well-established 
principle in international criminal justice that Articles 21 (1) and 20 (1) of the ICTY and ICTR 
also assert, on: ‘equality before law’. The Trial Chamber holds that the Prosecutor’s discretion 
‘is subject to the principle of equality before the law and to this requirement of non-
discrimination.400 In this context, the following paragraphs will analyse two case studies. 
The failure of the ICTR Prosecutors to prosecute members of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and its military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) – the Government side 
– is one example where the Prosecutor gave as his reason not to prosecute those members on 
the basis that he is still reviewing the evidence. Victor Peskin criticises Goldstone that there 
was significant evidence that confirms the RPF atrocities, citing the United Nations 
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Commission of Experts’ report.401 The report called for these alleged crimes to be investigated, 
submitting that:   
The Commission of Experts has concluded that there exist substantial grounds to 
conclude that mass murders, summary executions, breaches of international 
humanitarian law and crimes against humanity were also perpetrated by Tutsi elements 
against Hutu individuals and that allegations concerning these acts should be 
investigated further.402 
Peskin then describes the political calculations that played the essential consideration 
in the position of Goldstone and next Prosecutor Arbour, who thought about the suspension of 
the Government’s cooperation with the Tribunal403 and the serious intimidation that were to 
impose on the Tribunal’s investigators, in case if the investigation was opened against them,404 
respectively. 
This state of affairs continues with the appointment of Jallow. In 2009, and during his 
speech to the SC, he asserted that his ‘Office does not have an indictment that is ready in respect 
of these allegations [RPF] at this particular stage.’405 Such a response is already taken by then 
Prosecutor Goldstone when he justified his position not to prosecute the RPF on the basis of 
the lack of ‘prima facie evidence.’406 Former Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was the only 
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Prosecutor who had a real intent to investigate the alleged crimes committed by the members 
of the RPF and RPA. It was argued at one point that she was removed from her position, when 
she decided to embark on the investigations against them.407 Cryer also argues that her removal 
‘was because she refused to engage in selective enforcement, by insisting that investigations 
should go on into actions by the RPF’.408 Since the appointment of a separate Prosecutor for 
the Rwanda Tribunal in 2003, current Prosecutor Jallow has promised to proceed with the 
investigations against them, but nothing has been done so far. According to several sources, 
those members are accused of committing crimes against humanity and war crimes against 
Hutu, as a response to the genocide committed by them.409 Despite this, the ICTR has 
prosecuted only one side of the conflict and has totally ignored the alleged crimes committed 
by Tutsi led by the RPF.   
Jallow made it clear on several occasions that those members are still under his 
consideration, but says there is no prima facie evidence to prosecute any.410 However, in 2008, 
Jallow, for the first time, admitted that the RPF ‘had committed atrocities during the 1994 
genocide’, whereby 15 civilians were killed by the RPF’s soldiers.411 Later on, Jallow changed 
his policy, earlier based on the postponement of the prosecution of those members, to adopting 
a new policy that would help in one way or another to provide them with impunity. His new 
policy was based on the acceptance of the request of the Rwandan authorities to refer these 
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cases to the jurisdiction of the national court.412 He did so by describing the alleged crimes 
committed by the members of the RPF as simple murders, rather than war crimes. For this 
reason, the cases would be under the jurisdiction of Rwandan courts, although Jallow claimed 
that he would prosecute these cases if the Rwandan court did not prosecute them fairly. If the 
initial legal status of these acts is normal murders, then on what legal basis did Jallow make 
his promise to prosecute these crimes if the national courts failed to do so? In 2008, the 
Rwandan military court tried two senior officers (a major and brigadier general) and two other 
lower-level officers (captains) for those crimes. The senior officers were acquitted and the 
lower-level officers were sentenced to 8 years in jail, reduced on appeal to 5 years. Eventually, 
during his presentation to the SC in the summer of 2009, Jallow made it clear that he has no 
indictment prepared against those parties.413 
The de facto policy and the justification of Jallow in relation to the inaction of his Office 
to alleged crimes committed by the Government’s side were highly contentious. The perception 
of bias was the main common debate about Jallow’s policy. Akayesu himself was among those 
who criticised the Prosecutor for carrying out a one-sided policy, submitting in his Appeal:  
that the Tribunal is prosecuting only the “losers” in the Rwandan conflict by failing to 
prosecute the perpetrators of “crimes of extermination of the Hutu” who enjoy 
“complete immunity” from prosecution. He submits that such failure exhibits partiality 
in the punishment of crimes committed in Rwanda during the relevant period. He 
compares this to the contrary situation before ICTY where persons from “both camps”, 
including Croat leaders, have been prosecuted.414  
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Also, Amnesty International criticised Jallow for his failure to open investigations 
against the members of RPF and RPA, despite several investigations that indicate the 
responsibility of those members for committing crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal.415 These investigations, which were conducted by Amnesty International, showed 
that there was significant evidence that required the Prosecutor to make a case against the RPF, 
as they declared that ‘[e]vidence of crimes committed by the RPF in 1994 have been 
transmitted to the prosecutor’s office either in private and confidential communications, in 
publications of non-governmental organizations and other sources, or through depositions of 
its own expert witnesses in Arusha.’416 In the same report, Amnesty International stated that 
the national justice system was not efficient enough to deliver justice fairly and impartially.417 
As was shown above, the Prosecutor insisted that prima facie evidence is not available, and 
allowed the national courts to exercise its jurisdiction. More than that, the Prosecutor remained 
silent about his promise that he would bring these cases if the national court conducted the 
trials badly.  
The above analysis indicates strongly that the legal requirements may allow decision-
makers to find opposed outcomes/interpretations and, therefore, choose among these 
outcomes/interpretations. It also strongly suggests that the legal requirements have a dual 
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nature that in effect may allow officials to deploy their discretion through their independent 
capacity to find quite opposite interpretations and choose among them. As will be identified in 
the next chapter, this degree of discretion that can be exercised in such a case is significant. It 
may open a giant gate for politics and political bias to determine which decision should be 
selected. In other words, it seems as if the decision-makers have exercised prosecutorial 
discretion in the context of applying the legal thresholds, where discretion is not supposed to 
be involved. The above analysis shows two different arguments as to whether or not the 
investigation should be opened on the basis of the satisfaction of the legal requirements. This 
analysis strongly suggests that decision-makers should provide a detailed and public statement 
as to how the decision are made. Such a recommendation would minimise any doubt about the 
correctness of decisions. The reason for providing such statements is due to a point at which 
prosecutorial discretion and legal interpretive discretion (interpreting the legal thresholds) may 
converge. The exercise of the last sort of discretion has substantial consequences, as we have 
seen.   
Here we find once again the same recurring pattern of opposite criticisms raising the 
common charge of politically-based decision-making. The Prosecutor was accused of 
pandering to the Rwandan Government in order to secure cooperation from them.418 He feared 
the consequences of making a decision against them. The criticism here is that the Tribunal 
seeks too easy cases. This was an apologist critique. On the other hand, he was also accused of 
being political, as he was too utopian and took thereafter a position to prove a point to advance 
the profile of the Court and its ability to do justice by focusing on hard cases, cases that cannot 
be pursued or even may cause harm to other values.419 As Jeremy Rabkin argues, generally 
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international tribunals can only do ‘symbolic justice’ to some cases and that could be used to 
justify its inaction against the other cases that might be ‘too dangerous’420 to be pursued. This 
is a utopian critique. Obviously, one may notice how a single position the prosecutor may take 
might be encountered by opposite dyads, each has a plausible and credible argument against 
the other one.  
The same problem was raised with regard to the ICTY, where the Tribunal was accused 
of being politically motivated with respect to the decision of the Prosecutor not to open an 
investigation against NATO for crimes allegedly committed during its campaign against the 
Former Yugoslavia in 1999.421 The questions that will be discussed here are the assessment of 
the legality of this decision, and the discretionary power associated with making this decision. 
The then Chief Prosecutor, Del Ponte, after an extensive review of information she received 
about this matter, eventually decided not to open the investigation against NATO claiming:  
that there is no basis for opening an investigation into any of the allegations or into 
other incidents related to the NATO air campaign. Although some mistakes were made 
by NATO, the Prosecutor is satisfied that there was no deliberate targeting of civilians 
or unlawful military targets by NATO during the campaign.422 [emphasis added]   
Alongside some other reports made by several organisations,423 Del Ponte based this 
decision on a report delivered by a committee within the Office of the Prosecution set up by 
the first Prosecutor of the ICTY, Louise Arbour, to advise the Prosecutor, whether or not there 
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was sufficient evidence to proceed with the investigation.424 The report recommended the 
Prosecutor not to take any steps against NATO because ‘either the law is not sufficiently clear 
or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of sufficient evidence to substantiate 
charges against high level accused or against lower accused for particularly heinous 
offences’.425 Before analysing the Prosecutor’s decision, it is worth mentioning the valuable 
and innovative policy taken by Arbour and Del Ponte, who agreed to set up such a committee 
and, later on, published a report stating the reasoning that led to the decision not to proceed.426 
Under the Statute of the ICTY, the prosecutor does not have to take such steps. This kind of 
transparent approach helps to increase the credibility of the Tribunal and also to put a visible 
accountability on negative decisions – decision not to proceed with an investigation – which in 
the ad hoc tribunals vest in the prosecutor an absolute power of choice, as explained earlier in 
this chapter. Further to this, the division of the investigation phase into two parts, namely the 
collection of information and the investigation, was a unique step. This was later adopted by 
the ICC, which also imposed more judicial controls on the prosecutor, when acting proprio 
motu, who needs to get authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber before embarking on the 
second phase, opening an investigation. However, under the Statute of the ICTY, there is 
neither such a division nor any judicial control on the prosecutorial power of the prosecutor.  
To begin, the alleged crimes committed by NATO are under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal by virtue of Articles 1 and 3 of the Statute, as they were committed within the territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia, and in violation of the laws or customs of war, respectively.427 Going 
back to the report of the Committee, it raises several questions under international law and 
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doubts about the legality of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.428 Although the report was useful 
and correct on several issues it raised, such as the non-relevance of the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal to crimes against peace, nevertheless, it contains considerable flaws.429 The report 
provided two main reasons for advising the Prosecutor not to proceed with the investigation. 
The first was that ‘the law is not sufficiently clear.’430 In fact, within the international legal 
domain it is not uncommon to see often that the law is not clear in many aspects. As Natalino 
Ronzitti argues, ‘[d]ifficulties in interpretation are not a good excuse for not starting an 
investigation.’431 Therefore, it is quite odd to recommend that a court, whose main function is 
to interpret the law, not proceed with the investigation. This is an unacceptable excuse. The 
second reason was the difficulty of obtaining sufficient evidence to substantiate an indictment. 
Later, Del Ponte also stated that ‘it was impossible to investigate NATO, because NATO and 
its member states would not cooperate with us.’432 Yet, obtaining evidence is by its very nature 
difficult, especially in the context of ongoing conflict situations. Again, Ronzitti states that ‘this 
is no excuse for not commencing an investigation.’433 Providing such a reason should not have 
been adopted as a basis for making any decision because Article 18 (1) of the Statute requires 
the existence of sufficient evidence as a threshold and not the difficulty of obtaining it. These 
flaws are mainly linked, as Cryer434 and Anne-Sophie Massa435 argue, to the flaw in the 
methodology of the report to obtaining evidence: the reliance on NATO as the main source of 
information. Obviously, one cannot only take information about a certain incident from the 
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accused himself. The Prosecutor indeed assumed the correctness of the source of the 
information as a basis for making the decision, as was concluded by the Committee.436 As Cote 
states, it is doubtful that such a Report contributed to enhancing the Prosecutor’s credibility 
and to demonstrate her impartiality in the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion and her ability 
to take a clear and convincing decision in that case. 437 
In addition to the above concerns, doubts have been expressed about the assessment of 
the seriousness (gravity) of the alleged offences committed by NATO. By comparing this 
assessment with the other cases prosecuted by the OTP, the inconsistency is easily noticeable 
in the evaluation of the concept of seriousness (gravity). This argument was raised by Rachel 
Kerr, who makes a link between the refusal decision of prosecuting the NATO’s offences and 
the lack of seriousness of those alleged crimes.438 In relation to the NATO’s alleged crimes, in 
particular the assessment of the Djakovica Convoy’s incident, in which nearly 75 people were 
killed and 100 people were injured, the report did not consider this incident serious enough to 
be prosecuted.439 The same argument was also applied to the attack of NATO against Korisa 
village where approximately 87 people were killed and 60 others were injured.440 Needless to 
mention, the other incidents, such as the Chinese Embassy, the Yugoslavia TV broadcast, and 
the Bridge were all abandoned.441 These incidents imply that they are, to a large degree, serious. 
In contrast and in relation to the Macedonian National Liberation Army case, in which 5 people 
were killed and 5 other people were unlawfully detained for several hours, the Prosecutor 
opined that this incident was serious and, therefore, initiated the prosecution against them.442 
Clearly, this incident was less serious than the alleged offences in NATO case, by any 
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comparison. Thus, the question that can be raised is why did the Prosecutor not consider those 
incidents sufficiently grave?  
However, the report mainly relied upon the ground of the absence of the element of 
intent (mens rea), stating that the NATO campaign did not ‘aim at causing substantial civilian 
casualties’.443 It was concluded that in most incidents, either the NATO campaign did not 
intend to cause the damage or the incidents occurred by mistake.444 Depending on this report 
and other elements, the Prosecutor decided not to open the investigation against NATO and 
NATO countries.  
Before we evaluate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, we notice again the same 
recurring pattern of arguments that surround the work of the prosecutor. Criticisms accused the 
Prosecutor of sacrificing the concerns to bring justice for the alleged perpetrators of NATO 
and also for about 500 civilian deaths and about 1000 wounded, as a result of the bombs445 to 
political considerations. The underlying reason for making the decision was to shield NATO 
from the Tribunal’s reach. The decision appears to be politically-motivated, as the Prosecutor 
was too concerned about the potential influences, in particular losing the funding and future 
cooperation from NATO and NATO states. This is an apologist critique. The Prosecutor ‘did 
take into account external factors in coming to its decision.’446 In particular, Del Ponte 
promised to open the investigation against NATO, ‘when it (the Tribunal) would no longer be 
so dependent upon NATO’s support’.447 Indeed, she failed to utilise her discretionary power in 
a way that enables her to exercise meaningful justice to them. It is true that she first considered 
the extra-legal demands that the Tribunal needed, at the time when the Tribunal was in such a 
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need, yet she could again open the investigation against them later on, when the Tribunal did 
not rely on the NATO’s support. Nothing happened to bring justice to the alleged crimes 
committed by NATO.  
On the other hand, the decision to prosecute NATO would again appear political, as the 
prosecutor was accused of pursuing too high cases that aimed only at proving a point. This was 
too utopian. The Prosecutor was too concerned with bringing justice only to the parties of the 
conflict. The enormous criticisms that were directed against this decision indicate that the 
political considerations were the real reason of making such a decision. It was only issued to 
shield the powerful states from prosecution. Massa argues that there were several serious 
incidents should have been investigated, including ‘Operation Allies Force’, citing the 
recommendation of Cassese.448 Based on the flaws of the Committee’s report, and the merit of 
the NATO case to be investigated, she argues that the political considerations were aimed at 
protecting the NATO officials. She calls on the prosecutor to refrain ‘from taking political 
considerations into account and departing from the principle of equality.’449 In addition, Paolo 
Benvenuti also states that ‘the impression is given that the Prosecutor's intent has been, on the 
whole, to prevent investigations against NATO officials, and to hide herself behind the 
'technical opinion' of the Review Committee.’450 This calculation that the Prosecutor took into 
consideration rendered the decision political.  
If one thinks about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this decision, we would 
notice that the Prosecutor utilised ‘external factors’451 to achieve justice, however, only to the 
main parties to the conflict, whose crimes were unimaginable. Despite the above criticisms, the 
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decision not to prosecute NATO on the basis of extra-legal factors should not be 
underestimated.452 As was shown in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikiric and Others, it 
is well recognised (the Trial Chamber) that the prosecutor has broad prosecutorial discretion 
and, therefore, has a right to take extra-legal factors into her account, such as the resources 
available to her. The report of the Committee made an important conclusion about the difficulty 
of obtaining sufficient evidence by pursuing the NATO case. In such a scenario, 
conventionally, international prosecutors tend not to waste the resources of the tribunal in cases 
that they find difficult to pursue. Given the high potential volume of cases that may come under 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals, it is mandatory for the prosecutor to be selective. In 
this case, such a process would come under the power of the prosecutor to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion and, therefore, the decision can be justified on this basis. It is well 
known that the main aim of the NATO campaign was to stop the egregious violations of Serbs 
in Kosovo. The disastrous situation in the region, the unacceptable bloodshed, the urgent need 
to stop the violence at any cost, and the political environment in which the Tribunal was 
working all confer legitimacy on this decision. The efforts of the Prosecutor to obtain any 
evidence were all in vain, as it did not seem at the time that NATO would cooperate with the 
Office in terms of providing them any information about their bombs.453 Further to this, the 
fact that the Tribunal’s operation effectively relied on NATO cooperation led the Prosecutor to 
face a serious dilemma. For these reasons, she had to choose either to prosecute the alleged 
crimes of NATO, thereby, rendering the Office ‘incapable of continuing to investigate and 
prosecute’454 massive-scale crimes of the Serbs, or to accept the political environment, in which 
the Tribunal was working and, therefore, put an end to the vast atrocities that were taking place 
at the time. Thus, given the fact that the violence had to cease, the massive scale of atrocities 
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committed by the parties to the conflict in comparison to NATO’s crimes, the limited resources 
of the Tribunal, and political considerations, it seems that the decision was wise. This policy 
pushed the Tribunal to succeed at bringing justice to some offenders who bore the greatest 
responsibility for the crimes, in particular Milosevic, the Head of the Former Yugoslavia. 
However, the decision as such was not taken on the basis of the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. The decision was taken on the basis of the lack of the legal threshold that there was 
no sufficient evidence for initiating the investigation and, therefore, the above justification 
cannot be applicable to this particular decision.  
Two points can be concluded so far from the above arguments. The first point indicates 
that the Prosecutor considered several extra-legal factors, including the resources of the 
Tribunal in the context of applying the legal thresholds. Such a process can be imagined only 
in the context of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The second point refers to the 
dangerous convergence between prosecutorial discretion and legal interpretive discretion 
(applying the legal thresholds). The dual nature of the legal thresholds that often result due to 
the open-meaning of them allows officials to deploy a strong discretion that might reach to the 
level of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, where extra-legal factors and political 
consideration may be taken. If there was any chance that the above political considerations 
could be legitimately taken into the decision-making process, that, initially, should be carried 
out in the context of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, however, not applying the legal 
thresholds.455 The dual nature of the legal thresholds may allow officials to calculate political 
considerations to shape the final outcome of the decision. Del Ponte herself admits that the 
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availability of the legal justification for the decision (the non-availability of sufficient 
evidence) can be masked by underlining political considerations.456 
Even if we imagine that this decision was taken on the basis of prosecutorial discretion, 
the latter would appear abused. As was pointed out in the introduction, there should be a 
distinction between prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial independence. Any external 
pressures, in particular, the political ones, on the discretionary power of the prosecutor would 
violate prosecutorial independence and would appear an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The 
two above arguments about whether to initiate the investigation against NATO involve merit 
discussions. It was extremely difficult for the Prosecutor to obtain sufficient evidence from 
NATO. And it was doubtful whether the Prosecutor made the decision independently without 
any political pressures, imposed by NATO. As Cote argues, ‘[i]f a real investigation had been 
opened, it is very likely that the Prosecutor would have taken the same decision but without 
giving rise to an appearance of bias.’457 As finding a proper answer to this dilemma is 
sophisticated, Chapter Three will provide an approach in which the verification of such 
decisions can be measured. It is briefly to utlisie extra-legal tools, including political ones to 
achieve justice. The approach suggests that the involvement of political consideration within 
the decision-making process can be justified only when any sort of justice is delivered. In our 
example, no sort of justice was brought to bear on NATO. The Prosecutor could, for example, 
have delayed the decision of prosecuting NATO until the circumstances become ready for 
making such a decision. As was argued above, although de Ponte promised to reopen the 
investigation against NATO once new factors were brought to her attention, she never did it, 
and NATO’s officials went unprosecuted. Such a position may describe the exercise of 
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prosecutorial discretion as abused, as political considerations are taken into the account in the 
process.  
2.3.3. Prosecutorial Independence in Practice 
As was explained earlier in this chapter, in exercising her duties, the prosecutor is an 
independent body and should act independently. Article 16 (2) of the ICTY Statute458 requires 
the prosecutor, as a consequence, not to take instructions from any government or other source. 
Her decisions should be immune from any external pressures. Around two months after the 
cessation of the NATO bombing in Kosovo, Prosecutor of the ICTY Arbour exploited this 
situation and, accordingly, decided to indict Milosevic in summer 1999.459 Two months later, 
the successor Prosecutor, Del Ponte, put large pressures on the international community to 
secure the transfer of Milosevic to The Hague. Del Ponte kept urging the powerful countries to 
force Serbia to arrest Milosevic.460 Some would argue that powerful states influenced the 
decision and policy of the Prosecutor, in particular the timing of the indictment and the facilities 
provided for the Tribunal to issue the indictment against Milosevic (an apology critique). It 
was argued that ‘the United States and Britain were hurriedly handing over reams of satellite 
imagery, telephone intercepts, and other top-secret information to help the Prosecutor make the 
case against Milosevic’.461 What led people to accuse the Prosecutor of being politically-
motivated was the dramatic change of position of those states that previously pressed the 
Prosecutor not to indict him. However, this argument seems rather weak for two reasons.  
First, and as was argued elsewhere, prosecutorial independence needs to be 
distinguished from prosecutorial discretion the prosecutor enjoys. The fact that the prosecutor 
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is seeking the indictment and arrest of a war criminal is part of the task of the prosecutor. In 
order for her to carry out this task, the prosecutor may seek help from other entities to enforce 
her decisions. Gaining such facilitation from those states does not mean that she was influenced 
politically by other international actors. In other words, she retained her independence. Rather, 
it means that the prosecutor was using her discretion that allows her to give weight for extra-
legal factors, which is part of the discretionary power the prosecutor enjoys. This is not a matter 
of pleasing the interests of these countries (prosecutorial independence), but rather using the 
discretionary power that inherently allows her to calculate and benefit from extra-legal factors 
that allow her to please the interests of the Court (prosecutorial discretion).  
The second reason why the critique is weak is that the process of utilising extra-legal 
factors, including political effects within the decision-making process was, in this instance, 
evidently to achieve a higher normative end, which is justice. The indictment and the transfer 
of Milosevic to the Tribunal promotes the needs of justice and achieves the normative 
considerations by bringing justice to him as well as to the victims. By such a process, the 
Prosecutor managed to arrest Milosevic, decrease the level of violence, and bring justice to the 
victims and Milosevic. It was the discretionary power that conferred the Prosecutor the 
opportunity of having more choices to exercise a more effective and flexible strategy of 
prosecution. It also eased, to a large degree, the sharp criticisms that the Prosecutor used to 
receive. In short, the strategy has helped to avoid, to a large degree, the extent of the recurring 
pattern of criticism, as it managed to achieve the most of the prosecution’s strategy. This 
example significantly demonstrates how the prosecutor can use such a policy without herself 
being politically-motivated, and that the independence of the prosecutor remains inviolate. It 
simply shows that the process of the consideration of extra-legal accounts, including political 
effects within the decision-making process is a desirable process which the prosecutor can 
exercise to achieve a higher normative demand, which is justice. On the other hand, and as will 
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be argued in Chapter Three, the prosecutor is required to sustain a balance between being a 
body within the judicial institution (prosecutorial independence) and being flexible 
(prosecutorial discretion) when drawing the strategy of the prosecution of the Court. This 
balance reduces, and may even erase, the dilemma of being political, whichever position the 
prosecutor takes.  
The Čelebići case is another example.462 From the early start of the operation of the 
Tribunal, Goldstone revealed the priorities of his indictment policy when he was asked about 
the indictment of Milosevic in 1995. ‘If we get evidence, we’ll give priority to higher-ups’. 463 
The question here is did he fully commit to indict higher-up leaders? Did he indict all high-
ranking people from all parties to the conflict? The Čelebići case was an ideal example that 
raised several important issues with respect to exercising prosecutorial discretion and to 
answering these questions.464 In this case, the Prosecutor indicted a Bosnian Croat and three 
Bosnian Muslims in 1996. Those perpetrators were accused of committing war crimes in the 
Čelebići camp against Serbs. Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim high leader (the first president of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), allegedly known to have given the orders to those perpetrators in the 
Čelebići camp, was not indicted by the Prosecutor though the latter acknowledged that he had 
investigated him but eventually closed the investigation because of his death.465 In this case, 
the Prosecutor was accused of being politically motivated when he, first, failed to indict 
Izetbegovic, and second when he discriminatorily selected Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, and 
Zejnil Delalic as being Muslims.466 This case clarifies what is meant by the infringement of the 
                                                          
462 See The Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo, and Zejnil Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A. 
463 Cited in Bass, supra n. 273, P. 228. 
464 Supra n. 462. 
465 See an article written by Carl Savich, Celebici, available at: 
<http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/047.shtml> (Last Access: 12th February, 2012). 
466 See generally, Bass, supra n. 273, and see Robert M. Hayden, Biased ‘Justice:’ Humanrightsism and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 47 (1999), 549- 
573.  
116 
 
independence of the Prosecutor as a body within a judicial institution (prosecutorial 
independence) by a political pressure, which is unacceptable.  
Initially, it is difficult to understand why the Prosecutor did not indict Izetbegovic on 
the basis of command responsibility, as the Prosecutor managed to indict the perpetrators 
themselves (implementers). This matter runs counter to the policy of giving priority to indict 
high leaders that Goldstone himself declared, as stated above. Some people argued that the 
Prosecutor did not indict him because of the pressures imposed on him by the US and NATO 
countries which were radically opposed to any indictment of the high-profile Bosnian Muslim 
political and military leaders.467 Therefore, that was allegedly why Delalic was acquitted by 
the Tribunal, as he also was one of those high leaders. In fact, this alleged ‘real’ policy posed, 
to some extent, the Tribunal to be accused of being a show trial, as the Prosecutor failed to be 
consistent in his official policy of prosecution, a matter that affects the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal. Now, if this argument was true, then, this can be considered a violation of the 
independence of the Court as the determination of not indicting Izetbegovic was shaped by 
political bodies but not the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor would then be deemed to be pleasing 
the political interests of states. In addition, the higher normative account was not achieved. The 
experience of the ICTY Prosecutor has shown that the prosecutor could play more roles and, 
therefore, exercise multi-functions. The prosecutor could utilise her discretionary power to 
promote or deliver other values, such as security, stability, peace, and so on.  
2.4 Summary  
The fact that international tribunals work within a political environment requires the 
prosecutor to be given broad power to discharge her duties. Before making decisions, the 
prosecutor needs to think how to give effect to those decisions. This is without prejudicing the 
                                                          
467 See supra n. 465. 
117 
 
independence of the prosecutor and also the rule of law that the prosecutor needs to respect in 
a way that was explained in introduction. Then, the meaningful prosecutorial strategy would 
consolidate the legitimacy of the international prosecution of these tribunals and, therefore, the 
legitimacy of the whole tribunals.  
Three major developments can be found in the jurisprudence of the SC Tribunals. First, 
compared to the Military Tribunals, the selection powers of the SC ad hoc Tribunal Prosecutors 
have been increased, as they have had the power of selecting cases alongside the charges. 
However, and in a comparison with the Military Tribunals, the discretionary power has been 
reduced, as the Statutes of both Tribunals have imposed more restrictions on their discretionary 
powers. For example, the Prosecutors had to focus their prosecution on the high-ranking 
perpetrators. In so doing, the Trial Chamber has the right to review such decisions. This was a 
necessary development so the prosecutor can exercise the prosecutorial power more effectively 
on the one hand and without abusing her prosecutorial discretion on the other. Second, the SC’s 
tribunals have witnessed a new generation of prosecution, where the international prosecutors 
have more roles to play to provide meaningful justice. With the establishment of the SC 
Tribunals, the international prosecutors through the use of discretion are to consider values 
other than justice (for example, peace and stability). We have seen how Goldstone considered 
the peace value when exercising his discretion before deciding the most responsible 
perpetrators for the international crimes. It was also a first time on the international level the 
parties of the trials were subjected to an independent court.468  
The SC Tribunals, to a large extent, relied on the cooperation of states and 
organisations. However, the SC, itself the creator of the tribunals, did not play the role of the 
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police whenever the Tribunals were in need of such help. Therefore, the Prosecutors sometimes 
had to use their discretion to get the most of their prosecution, as the case was with the policy 
of Goldstone. The role that, for example, Goldstone exercised whilst presenting the Karadzic, 
Mladic, Milosevic and other cases showed that the international prosecutor has a vital role to 
consider other international values than justice. As was discussed, Goldstone has considered 
several values, such as peace, security, stability, the interests of victims, and also justice whilst 
conducting his power. It is true that the legal texts of the Statute of both Tribunals do not 
provide the prosecutor with such a power. Nonetheless, the broad power of discretion has let 
the prosecutors exercise these new mandates that we have not seen before. Sometimes, the 
Prosecutors were conducting their functions in a more normal way, whenever the SC and 
NATO cooperated with them. As will be shown in the next chapters, The ICC Prosecutor’s 
practice is a continuation of the SC ad hoc Tribunals Prosecutors’ practices. The broad 
discretion given to the ICC prosecutor, and authorising the prosecutor to consider ‘the interests 
of justice’, as laid down in Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) in effect allows her to play a prominent 
role in considering other values along justice. The new role the international prosecutor can 
play interprets, as will be seen throughout the next chapters, why and how the discretionary 
discourse is important for the success of the ICC.  
Third, the analysis and investigation of the decisions of the prosecutor show that there 
are persistent criticisms that surround them. The arguments that were raised about the 
Prosecutor’s decisions or policies of the prosecutor raise two opposite views, each of which is 
based on valid argumentation. As was explained earlier in this thesis, international criminal 
law is still an emerging project, and the norms, principles, and decisions that fall within this 
domain are subject to persistent criticisms. It is still full of contradictory mandates,469 which 
may open a gate for critical discussion about each. The next chapter will analyse and identify 
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dyadic sorts of arguments that surround the work of the prosecutor, based on the above analysis 
of the practice of the prosecutor. These arguments oppose one another and share one common 
charge for every position, which is the charge of politicisation. 
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3.1. The Prosecutor’s Discretionary Power between Law and Politics 
This chapter will provide an analysis of the concept of discretion and its relationship to 
the work of the prosecutor. This analysis will locate the issues concerning the prosecutor’s 
discretion within theoretical and political contexts. Fundamentally, the chapter aims at 
identifying a possible wide range of discretion that the ICC prosecutor may exercise when 
applying legal criteria. Decision-makers have ability to interpret the legal categories in a way 
that could lead them to reach different outcomes, and yet justified in legal terms. This sort of 
practice amounts to the level of the exercise of discretion, in particular when there is no clear 
legal basis for the choice made to select a particular interpretation. The danger of this practice 
lies in the ability of decision-makers to consider extra-legal factors or even political 
calculations to choose among different, but legally worthy possibilities. I call this sort of 
discretion: legal interpretive discretion, where there might converge with prosecutorial 
discretion. It is only the latter sort of discretion, where prosecutors can normally choose 
between legally worthy possibilities, and hence conventionally consider extra-legal factors, or 
arguably political effects/repercussions.  
The chapter will first identify the paradox within which the Court works and show why 
political effects or repercussions may be legitimately taken into account within the decision-
making process. Specifically, it will argue that the process of the consideration of political 
elements is both inevitable and desirable. Of course, such a process will be distinguished from 
the power of politics that affect the decision of the prosecutor as an external pressure or 
imposition. Then, the chapter will suggest a structure in which political considerations or 
repercussions may legitimately be considered by the prosecutor. The chapter will move to 
analyse the theoretical context of the concept of discretion. It will identify two senses of 
discretion that can be exercised by the prosecutor, namely prosecutorial discretion and what I 
call legal interpretive discretion. This discussion aims at identifying and asserting the second 
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type of discretion in the context of the ICC prosecutor’s work, as there is a quite superficial 
reference made to this sort of discretion in the current literature that extensively concentrated 
on analysing the first sort of discretion.  
There is a clear paradox where the prosecutor needs to reconcile the legalist aspirations 
on which the Court was built, and the imperatives of realism without which the prosecutor 
would not be able to achieve a meaningful justice.470 From the early start of the operation of 
the Court, Moreno-Ocampo realises that ‘there seems to be a paradox: the ICC is independent 
and interdependent at the same time. It cannot act alone. It will achieve efficiency only if it 
works closely with other members of the international community.’471 It is within this context 
that the Court works and that the prosecutor needs to reconcile.472  
Legalistic aspirations473 were meant to distance the ICC from the influence of 
politics.474 The extended debates of the influence of politics that surrounded the creation and 
work of the previous international tribunals, pushed the Rome Conference’s participants to 
create a court that is conducting legal processes and remains immune from outside political 
influences.475 The ICC was seen then as ‘a further step down the road from partiality to 
                                                          
470 Brubacher, supra n. 22, Pp. 71-2. See also Chapter One for more information about the meaning of 
‘meaningful justice’. 
471 Statement made at the ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC: Ceremony 
for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, The Peace Palace, The 
Hague, The Netherlands (16th June, 2003), P. 2 available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf>.    
472 Nerida Chazal, The International Criminal Court and Global Social Control: International Criminal Justice in 
Late Modernity (New York, Routledge, 2015), Introduction. 
473 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University Press, 1986), P. 1. 
474 Sibylle Scheipers, Negotiating sovereignty and human rights: International society and the International 
Criminal Court (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2009), Pp. 37- 60. 
475 Danner, supra n. 14, P. 515, arguing that ‘[f]or an institution that promises a more muscular enforcement of 
the human rights of individuals, making the Court subject to direct political control would have constituted a 
betrayal of fundamental principles. The Prosecutor’s ability to make individualized considerations based on 
law and justice, rather than the self-interest or sheer power of any particular state, transforms the Court from 
a political body festooned with the trappings of law to a legal institution with strong political undertones.’ 
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impartiality.’476 As was shown in Chapter One, providing the prosecutor with an independent 
power; the ability to initiate investigations or prosecute cases ex officio, was one of the main 
outcomes towards building a legal institution. The ICC prosecutor has a fundamental role – 
alongside the Court – to select which situations and cases will be the target of the Court. As 
Cassese earlier notes, ‘[t]he Prosecutor may thus bar any initiative of states or even any deferral 
by the Security Council which may prove politically motivated and contrary to the interests of 
justice.’477 This would strengthen due process and the rule of law. We have seen throughout 
the previous chapters that the Court aims to end the era of impunity. The idea was ‘that the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished.’478 Those who drafted the Statute aimed to make the Court apolitical.479 There is 
no place for political considerations to be taken during the Court’s proceedings.480 Only pure 
legal factors are to shape these proceedings.481 No political compromises, considerations or 
influences should engage in the work of this Court.482 For this reason, the current Prosecutor’s 
appeal to legitimacy is mainly linked to the Statute’s legal norms. The Prosecutor tries to obtain 
the perception of audiences by linking her decisions to pure legal rules and there is no place 
for any non-legal factor to be considered.483 
                                                          
476 Richard J. Goldstone and Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons from the International Criminal Tribunals, in Sarah B. 
Sewall and Carl Kaysen, The United States and the International Criminal Court: National Security and 
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Judicial or a Political Body? International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Issue: 2 (2003), 87- 150. 
483 There are legal, sociological, and moral meanings of legitimacy. Legal legitimacy is linked to legal norms, and 
decisions that are taken in accordance with those norms. It means ‘what really is legally or morally legitimate’, 
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Legitimacy and the Constitution’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, No. 6 (2005), P. 1851. 
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Technically, the ICC Prosecutor always asserts that her work is founded on pure legal 
bases. In her public statements, the Prosecutor seeks to confirm that her decisions were only 
taken on the basis of the legal requirements of the Statute. The public assertions that the role 
of the prosecutor is entirely governed by strict legal requirements have become common. These 
assertions imply that the prosecutor has no choice but is impelled to follow a legal imperative. 
The OTP regularly re-states in its policy documents that only a handful of situations and cases 
will be selected, and both Prosecutors have justified the decisions on strictly legal requirements 
of the Statute. This gives the impression that there was no choice to be made, and, therefore, 
that no extra-legal considerations, including political ones, have been taken into account within 
the decision-making process. Hence, all decisions were totally immune from any illicit factors. 
I call this a rhetorical denial of choice strategy. As one commentator has said it is as if they 
were ‘captives of some objective legal will.’484 
This stance is not a new feature of international criminal justice but was also marked in 
the UN Tribunals. For example, on the question of indicting Karadzic and Mladic, Goldstone 
said, ‘[t]he real lesson I learned from the Karadzic indictment is that prosecutors should not 
take any account of political considerations in issuing their charges. Apart from being 
professionally inappropriate, neither the prosecutors nor their advisors have the political 
expertise on which to base such decisions.’485 Indeed, Koskenniemi points out that decision-
makers are usually reluctant to announce to the public that legal rules or standards are simply 
indeterminate. Here, Koskenniemi states that ‘legal experts may themselves fail to take the 
                                                          
Sociological legitimacy refers to the perception of relevant audience to an institution, rules, or decisions. It 
means ‘what people think is legally or morally legitimate’, see Fallon, ibid, P. 1851. Moral legitimacy means the 
moral justification of an institution, rule, or decision, see Fallon, ibid, Pp. 1796- 7. 
484 Special thanks to my Director of Studies John Strawson, who helped me to find out this expression. 
485 Justice Richard, Comment: The Tribunal's Progress, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, No. 220 (12th 
May, 2001), available at <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/comment-tribunals-progress> (Last Access: 3rd 
November, 2015).  
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claims of determinacy and coherence all that seriously’.486 The ICC Prosecutors, in the course 
of justifying her decisions, portray them as if the legal requirements were determinate. In fact, 
this is a general policy decision-makers follow, as a technique to avoid being engaged in 
questions that usually arise from the indeterminate nature of international legal rules, which 
are highly contested.  
The strategy of rhetorical denial of choice is often used by the ICC Prosecutor in the 
context of the criticisms that she receives. For example, Bensouda denied that the Court is 
adopting selective justice in the sense that her Office is not deliberately targeting Africa. She 
said, ‘[a]gain and again we hear criticisms about our so-called focus on Africa and about the 
court being an African court, having an African bias. Anti-ICC elements have been working 
hard to discredit the court and to lobby for non-support and they are doing this, unfortunately, 
with complete disregard for legal arguments.’487 [emphasis added]. She focused on the legal 
satisfaction that led her to make her current decisions. In her response to a question of the place 
of cases that have political indications, Bensouda answered, ‘[a]ll I can and will do is to apply 
the law in strict conformity with the Rome Statute’.488 Moreno-Ocampo also showed the strict 
rule approach that he followed when making his decisions in the sense that the legal rules are 
clear enough that no extra-legal factors were taken into account. In his famous and regular 
expression, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo already established this denial when he said, ‘my duty 
is to apply the law without political considerations’.489 On the question of the application of 
Article 53, he said ‘I cannot adjust the law to the political interests. Those who manage political 
agenda have to respect the law’.490 
                                                          
486 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later, The European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), P. 8. 
487 Smith, supra n. 44.  
488 Gross, supra n. 26. 
489 See Moreno-Ocampo’s statement, supra n. 27. 
490 See Ocampo’s interview at International Bar Association supra n. 28. Also see Ocampo’s interview at Global 
Observatory, supra n. 28. Also see Ocampo’s interview at the Africa Report, supra n. 28. 
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However, when the Court has operated, this ideal does not seem as workable as the 
creators and joiners of the Court wished to see. The question that can be raised is, have the 
creators of the Court empowered the Court with all means necessary to maintain such a purely 
legally inspired institution? To what extent are the Court’s aspirations achievable and reliable, 
without considering political necessities/effects? As long as the prosecutor is actively seeking 
to promote the legitimacy of the Court by showing her commitment to the legal rules, is it true 
that the prosecutor does not consider political considerations when making her decisions? In 
particular, that legitimacy in the sociological sense, as Richard H. Fallon states, is linked to the 
beliefs of relevant audiences in that an institution or decision can obtain legitimacy when those 
audiences ‘regard[s] it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for reasons 
beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.’491  
The regular invocations for legalist principles on which the Court should conduct its 
missions using, for example, national legal systems as a standard against which the 
international criminal system is analysed is overestimated. An international legal institution 
lacks essential elements that their national counter-parts possess and that constitute the standard 
conditions of their success. This reality cannot be ignored when assessing international legal 
institutions. It was shown partly in Chapter One that several elements, such as enforcement 
mechanisms, cooperation, and the political compromises and environment in which the Court 
operates, shape the nature of the operation of this Court.492 The Court, indeed, is not able 
independently to carry out its mission without political effects or repercussions. The 
independence of the Court on the political will of states to force its decisions does not only 
undermine the invocation for a purely legalistic institution, but also the legitimacy of the whole 
institution. In seeking to achieve the Court’s goals, such as ending impunity and preventing 
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492 See generally, supra n. 124. 
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crimes, the Court will not be systematically and accessibly able to achieve so, without the 
availability of these essential tools, which are often affected by political dimensions. In addition 
to the lack of the basic tools of initiating legal proceedings away from any political influences, 
some key legal rules of the ICC Statute itself, as will be shown in next chapters, are either 
broadly formulated or vague. Such rules either allow the prosecutor in effect to consider 
political imperatives and circumstances, as in the situation with the Article 53 ‘interests of 
justice’. The latter formulation was based on a compromise agreed on by the drafters, which 
gave due considerations to legalist and realist orientations, allowing the prosecutor to consider 
these accounts.493 
The tension between legalism and realism was reflected earlier in the intense debates 
about the power of the prosecutor during the negotiation of the Rome Statute in 1998, as 
discussed in Chapter One. The two perceptions that reflect two opposed schools of political 
theory about the power of the prosecutor were particularly linked to the discretionary power 
and the exercise of this power. The main discussion of the prosecutor’s power during the Rome 
Conference revolved about preventing a politicised prosecutor. Now the Court has already 
begun its function, this ideal seems closer to fantasy.494 The extreme political environment in 
which the Court works, such as dealing with ongoing conflicts or countering the challenges 
around transitional justice, forces the prosecutor to consider these political contexts. The 
picture the Court is based on pushed the prosecutor to exercise additional functions. As 
                                                          
493 See the discussion of the compromises of providing the prosecutor with prosecutorial power in Chapter 
One of this thesis and also the discussion of ‘sufficient gravity’ in Chapter Four. 
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Greenawalt argues, ‘the ICC reflects a more complex reallocation of authority which confers 
upon the ICC Prosecutor additional political functions alongside increased legal authority.’495  
In addition to the indeterminate character of the legal standards embedded within the 
Statute, the prosecutor is pushed to deal with sensitive and political environments. In deciding 
on jurisdiction or admissibility, the prosecutor might be engaged in politics when making 
decisions. For example, on the question of jurisdiction, Moreno-Ocampo rejected the Palestine 
situation on the grounds that the Statute does not provide him with authority to determine ‘the 
term “State” within the meaning of article 12’.496 The OTP, therefore, said that the question of 
statehood was a matter that is either for the ASP of the Rome Statute or the UNGA to decide.497 
Amnesty International argued that this ‘decision opens the ICC to accusations of political bias 
and is inconsistent with the independence of the ICC.’498 They claimed that the Prosecutor 
could have referred the situation to the judges of the Court, instead of to political bodies, such 
as the ASP or the UN bodies, as the Statute clearly requires the prosecutor to do so.499 Schabas 
also argues that ‘the prosecutor was wrong to say he did not have the authority to make such a 
determination.’500 He submits that this issue under ‘Article 12 (3) is a legal question… [and] is 
jurisdictional fact.’501 The Prosecutor could have interpreted them in a way that allows him to 
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accept Palestine’s lodge, in turn leaving probably the Appeal Chamber, under Article 82 (1)(a) 
according to Kevin Jon Heller, to decide the issue in case the decision was appealed.502 The 
Prosecutor could let the judges have their final decision on the issue in question. However, 
even if the Prosecutor accepted this situation, such a decision again would be accused of being 
political. Davenport argues that the Court clearly has no jurisdiction and the context of this 
situation ‘is precisely the kind of politicization and over-reaching that was feared from an 
independent prosecutor.’503 The charge of politicisation seems inevitable whichever decision 
the prosecutor could take.  
Further, although the drafters of the Statute tried to avoid a politicised prosecutor, 
nonetheless, the current institutional design of the Court has staked the legitimacy of the Court 
on ‘contingent political criteria.’504 The Court still lacks several capacities, which makes 
political effects necessary to the success of the Court and the prosecutor. For example, The 
Court has no system of coercive enforcement.505 It totally depends on the political wills of 
states throughout all stages of its functions. Conducting investigations, collecting information 
and evidence, securing arrests, and bringing witnesses require a great deal of cooperation from 
states.506 As officials of states may be involved in the crimes for which the Court seeks 
investigation or prosecution, those states will only cooperate with the Court to an extent that 
they keep their officials protected. Therefore, the success of the Court will be contingent on 
political circumstances of a conflict that comes under its jurisdiction. In addition, the Court has 
limited resources that require the prosecutor to choose among equally legally admissible 
situations and cases.507 The OTP acknowledged the limited resources of the Court through 
                                                          
502 Heller, supra n. 499. 
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several documents, and confirmed that the Court ‘is an institution with limited resources.’508 
All these circumstances identify the political dimension that is inherently linked to the work of 
the prosecutor, as Cote points out.509  
The rhetorical denial of choice does not correspond with the inevitability of extra-legal 
factors as well as political effects of the decision taken. Brubacher argues that decisions must 
be both ‘compliant with objective legal criteria but capable of being implemented in a manner 
that adapts to the prevailing political and social context.’510 As was earlier analysed, these 
factors are an intrinsic part of the decision-making process. Norman Abrams argues that within 
the common law system, the prosecutor is envisaged with a broad discretion that enables her 
to deal ‘with individual cases to consider special facts and circumstances not taken into account 
by the applicable rules’511 [emphasis added]. Such an envisagement does not achieve its main 
aim, without the consideration of the individualised and detailed factors that surround a 
particular case. Therefore, why should not the prosecutor take into consideration political 
dimensions? Below, this chapter will explain how such a process should be taken into account 
and how it can be justified in the context of the multi-functional prosecutor, where due 
consideration should be given to political repercussions/effects such as peace, security, 
stability, and others alongside justice.  
In this regard, we should make a distinction between the rhetorical discourse the ICC 
Prosecutor has announced and the practical application of the legal rules the ICC Prosecutor 
has followed. As will be seen in Chapter Four, although the ICC Prosecutor is always 
committed in her public statements to show that no choice is made when applying the legal 
rules, the Prosecutor has exercised considerable discretion to interpret the term ‘sufficient 
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gravity’. In so doing, the Prosecutor has found out several interpretations as to what is meant 
by the term ‘sufficient gravity’, and, therefore, she chose from these interpretations. In selecting 
one of the possible interpretations of the term ‘sufficient gravity’, she simply justified her 
decisions on the basis of satisfying the legal requirements. In Chapter Two, it was established 
that the legal criteria have a dual function that can be used to achieve a specific end other than 
what a criterion was essentially meant to obtain. On this basis, what is legally determined 
(rhetoric) is not similar to what is in practice legally justified. Whatever the public 
justifications given for making certain decisions, this should be distinguished to what has been 
in practice. The justification of making a certain decision on the basis of a specific legal 
criterion can be indeed masked by underlying political considerations, as such a criterion may 
have dual nature. Cote argues that Del Ponte would likely have reached a similar decision not 
to prosecute NATO’s leaders, even if she had opened a real investigation against them. The 
indeterminate and open-ended meaning and the dual nature of these legal rules in effect can 
enable decision-makers to choose among the different available interpretations to reach a 
certain end.  
Before we analyse the concept of discretion, and its types within the ICC Statute, it is 
important to identify what is meant by the term political, which sense of political may be 
legitimately justified when considered by the prosecutor within her decision-making process, 
and under which sort of discretion that can be taken.  
3.3.1. The Prosecutor, Discretion, and the Political 
The recourse to political considerations, or the fact that some decisions of the 
prosecutor will have political repercussions, are not usually avoidable, and might even appear 
desirable. Whether or not such considerations should be taken into account is a matter of 
debate. However, the problem lies in the precise use of the term political. In this regard, it is 
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important to distinguish between the charge of political bias/motivation and the separate issue 
of political effects/repercussions.512 Whilst political in the first sense is not acceptable, and 
undermines the rule of law, the second sense is either unavoidable, or may appear desirable to 
achieve political aims of the judicial institution. This thesis argues that only the second set of 
considerations, in particular when associated with extra-legal factors may be legitimately 
justified in the course of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The next section, in turn, will 
explain the difference between the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and legal interpretive 
discretion, where only in the former use of discretion, political in its second sense may be 
legitimately taken.  
Political in the first sense, as Robinson points out, is a process in which decision-makers 
‘are not really doing law but rather using legal argumentation as a mere mask or pretext as they 
pursue their political (apologist or utopian) aims.’513 Liberal jurists deny the engagement of 
politics either in the administration or judicial process of international justice, as it constitutes 
a serious danger to the rule of law.514 Commentators and legal practitioners tend to insist on 
the role of politics at the stage of the creation of judicial institutions, and that no more political 
intervention can be taken after this stage. In other words, this political process should be 
separated from the action of international criminal justice. In his famous remarks on the IMT 
at Nuremberg, Judge Jackson affirmed that although the establishment of this Tribunal was 
political, however what followed was a judicial process, where he was responsible ‘to run the 
legal end of the prosecution.’515 Fred Mégret also points out that international criminal justice 
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133 
 
is ‘a phenomenon anchored in power yet simultaneously capable of transcending it.’516 
Therefore, politics should ideally be limited to the creation of such a judicial institution.  
Political, in this sense, might take different aspects and would constitute a violation of 
the rule of law and the independence of the prosecutor. For example, external pressures or 
influences on the prosecutors to take a specific decision is simply a mere political process and 
cannot be accepted under any circumstances, as it violates the independence of those 
prosecutors. The OTP also emphasises several times in its policy papers the irrelevance of this 
the political, providing that the ‘duty of independence goes beyond simply not seeking or acting 
on instructions. It also means that the selection process is not influenced by the presumed 
wishes of any external source’.517 As was shown in Chapter Two, the International Prosecutors 
of the Military Tribunals were, on several occasions, accused of taking orders from their 
governments to make their decisions. For example, Herman Goren argued that the Russian and 
French judges already received instruction to make the final judgment against him.518 This sort 
of political pressure is what is meant in this regard and cannot be justified. Regardless of the 
suitability of these allegations, it is within this context that any decision made on the basis of 
external pressures or influences is merely a political process and cannot be justified.   
Another example is the instrumentalisation of a court for achieving political ends. This 
also would violate the independence of the prosecutor and would make any decision undertaken 
on this basis political. This scenario can be undertaken by decision-makers themselves or 
imposed by an external body. A best example that can be given here to explain the 
instrumentalisation of a court is the Haymarket and Chicago trials, where the defendants were 
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prosecuted for their political oppositions to the military intervention of the U.S. in Vietnam.519 
The decision to prosecute those defendants aimed only at removing them from the political 
scene, based on partisan political aims. This sort of politics is not acceptable, as it deforms the 
law. As Gerry Simpson argues, officials in such cases are inappropriately distorting the legal 
rules.520 Therefore, this sort of politics is not acceptable and cannot be justified under any 
circumstances.  
Bias is another dangerous aspect of this sense of political. Following the indictment of 
the President of Sudan, the Court was consistently accused of being neo-colonially biased 
against Africa. This allegation became more consolidated when the Court kept targeting 
African states and rejecting the non-African ones, in particular, the British situation in Iraq. 
Although there is no specific evidence, Wouters and Chan argue, ‘suggest[s] that any of the 
Court’s investigations were wrongly initiated’,521 however, it seems not easy at all to remove 
this accusation from the work of the ICC Prosecutor. Macote Ambrozio argues that ‘it is 
reasonable to label the court as an institution of imperialists that is engaging in a campaign of 
disgracing African Leaders, and the continent on behalf of the West’s political and economic 
interests instead of in the name of justice for which it was meant to be.’522 He continues that 
‘[i]t would be hard to separate the ICC from the charge of neocolonialism behavior, especially 
at the time the court itself has engaged in the practices that are not different from colonialism 
in its selection of cases to prosecute.’523 This is political bias that has been seriously raised 
against the Prosecutor and seems now difficult to remove. As will be identified below, although 
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the Prosecutor justifies her decisions on a regular basis, taken against these African states, on 
the application of the legal categories and no consideration given to any non-legal factor, 
indeed the process of the application of these legal requirements as such may involve an 
exercise of discretion (legal interpretive discretion). This may allow the prosecutor to come up 
with different outcomes when interpreting these legal categories, in particular when law does 
not provide a clear basis for choosing a specific interpretation or that decision-makers fail to 
provide a reasonable basis for making the given interpretation. Here, it is true that the 
prosecutor justified her decisions on the basis of legal requirements, however, the open-ended 
meaning of these legal categories may allow her to achieve a political end to be biased against 
certain states or individuals. Therefore, if the prosecutor selects a particular interpretation that 
immunises some situations or cases from investigation or prosecution, without giving any sort 
of justice to take place, then this position may amount to the level of political bias. The 
accusation of the Court of being an African court might strongly be linked to the application 
of these legal requirements that in effect may provide the prosecutor with a capacity to exercise 
a space of discretion. As opposed to Wouters’ and Chan’s argument, the problem may lie in 
the very application of these legal requirements. These authors argue that the problem may lie 
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but not in the application of these legal rules when 
appropriately applied. This argument is not accurate enough. As will be shown in Chapter Four, 
the Prosecutor deployed her discretion when interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’, which is a legal 
threshold and adopted different interpretations for this term to make her decisions. The problem 
may be considerably linked then precisely with the use of space of discretion when applying 
these legal rules. 
Political, in its second sense (repercussions/effects), often arises as a consequence of 
making a choice within the law. When decision-makers interpret or apply the legal rules, this 
usually involves making a choice. The existence of this choice will likely have political 
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repercussions, or raise political effects. From the early start of the Court’s operation, McDonald 
and Haveman point out that, ‘[w]hile political considerations will be inescapable, the choices 
that are made in the early stages, and the reasons behind those choices, will set the tone for 
years to come and will strongly influence public perceptions of the Court and what it is for.’524 
Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner also assert that politics in various ways is ‘intertwined’ 
with the law, as well as Danielle E. Goldstone who emphasises that ‘political sensitivities are 
inevitable in the Prosecutor's own decision-making process.’525 As was shown in the example 
of the Palestine situation and consistent with the different views raised about the Prosecutor’s 
decision, the latter had a political repercussion that deemed the Court not neutral. Such 
accusation is not avoidable, as the law of this given situation entails choices, depending on the 
interpretations that this law involves. Law inherently involves choices.  
The political arrangements that accompany ongoing conflicts for the purpose of putting 
an end to the fight and reaching a peace deal could have a major effect on the decision of the 
prosecutor that cannot be ignored, let alone sorted out. As investigatory and prosecutorial 
decisions may have significant effects on peace negotiations, the prosecutor will have to 
consider those political effects. The ICC Statute itself through Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) 
requires the prosecutor to consider the effect of her potential proceedings on ‘the interests of 
justice’. In Chapter Five, it will be identified how Goldstone considered the peace process when 
he decided not to open the investigation against Milosevic on the eve of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. He delayed this decision to the time when the political scene in the region was 
                                                          
524 McDonald and Haveman, supra n. 20, P. 3. 
525 Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: the International Criminal Court in 
Uganda and Sudan, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2010), P. 943, stating that 
‘[d]epending on one's definition of politics, there are various ways in which the ICC is inextricably intertwined 
with politics. For instance, the Court was created by political decisions, it adjudicates crimes which are 
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enforcement of its decisions.’ Danielle E. Goldstone, Embracing Impasse: Admissibility, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the Lessons of Uganda for the International Criminal Court, Emory International Law Review, 
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ready for taking such a step. The consideration of such a political effect does not undermine 
the independence of the prosecutor. As Brubacher argues, ‘[t]he intervention by the OTP into 
ongoing disputes or post-conflict reconciliation processes requires the Prosecutor to consider 
the potential impact of an investigation or prosecution on the political process.’526 The 
prosecutor needs to be flexible when making a decision in such cases. The timing of 
indictments can have political implications that raise several concerns in relation to the 
meaningful justice approach that the ICC prosecutor follows. As Philipp Kastner suggests, 
‘[t]he ICC's commitment to bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice does not 
hold the OTP back from postponing the publication of indictments a few weeks or months in 
order to show itself politically sensitive and in line with the requirement of acting in accordance 
with the “interests of the victims,” as stipulated in article 53(1) (c) of the Rome Statute.’527 The 
timing of indictment is one important political consideration that raises several concerns in 
relation to the meaningful justice approach that the ICC prosecutor follows.  
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five, the prosecutor might need to weigh these 
political arrangements against other interests that might likely favour a different mechanism to 
the ICC. These interests might even perceive the ICC as a threat to destroy the given conflict-
resolution process. The ICC is not a typical response to all atrocities in this world. Other justice 
and non-justice mechanisms might be more relevant and applicable to situations, where the 
ICC may not be so. The institutional design on which the international community set the Court 
obliges the prosecutor to exercise several abnormal mandates that no normal prosecutor would 
deliver. For example, peace-related concerns should be typically outside the prosecutor’s 
function, as the latter is a body within a judicial institution. Such a consideration often involves 
political compromises the prosecutor should not take into account within her decision-making 
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process. Usually, it is abnormal that the prosecutor considers the value of peace when applying 
the law.  
However, how could the prosecutor respond in situations where the Court’s 
proceedings constitute a real obstacle to complete a certain peace negotiation and that such a 
process would put an end to atrocities and, therefore, save the lives of a large number of 
potential victims (Uganda situation)? How about if the given state opted for amnesty as a 
mechanism to deal with atrocities that this country faces (Uganda situation)?528 In addition, the 
prosecutor may also face moral questions in relation to international crimes that often result 
from a humanitarian intervention, as was the case with peace-keepers of the UN, or NATO. 
Such missions are often built on the humanitarian basis to stop serious international crimes that 
take place in a certain country. However, these interventions often result in further international 
crimes that could reach the attention of the ICC prosecutor (Sudan situation).529 The question 
here is how should the prosecutor deal with such a highly politically issue?  
These political considerations are often necessary to achieve a more effective strategy 
of prosecution. They may even appear indispensable to that effect. All these concerns raise the 
question of the place of the political considerations within the decision-making process that the 
prosecutor makes when exercising prosecutorial discretion. As will be discussed in the 
following chapters, the prosecutor does need to involve these concerns. The current prosecutor 
is left to her own devices and pushed into a political role, where reference to political 
considerations seem inevitable. The creators of this Court did not empower her with a necessary 
and independent capacity to exercise her mandates as the case with national courts. It is true 
                                                          
528 Chapter Five answers this question and shows the new mandates that the international prosecutor of the 
permanent Court plays. 
529 Sudan Accuses U.N. Peacekeepers of Killing Seven Civilians in Darfur, Reuters (27th April, 2015), available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-sudan-darfur-unamid-
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that although political considerations and effect are not relevant in the context of national 
judicial systems, things may appear different at the international level as was argued earlier in 
this chapter. Indeed, the strategy of prosecution and the mandate of the ICC prosecutor takes 
place in a broader context than a normal (national) prosecutor would hold. Therefore, why 
should not the prosecutor take such considerations within the decision-making process? To put 
it in a higher level, the prosecutor often has no choice to avoid such considerations.  
As Greenawalt argues, ‘[t]o the extent that such considerations form a part of the 
prosecutorial calculus, the evolution of the ICC assumes a different cast.’530 Seen in this 
context, consideration of political effects and consequences will remain a legitimate part of the 
decision-making of the prosecutor. This in turn also emphasises the multi-functional role the 
prosecutor is playing since the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals, who needs to consider 
several values whilst delivering justice. However, the line between these two sorts of political 
is not bright and not easily distinguished. For this reason, and consistent with the view of this 
thesis that the consideration of political effects/repercussions, alongside extra-legal factors, a 
structured approach is needed to maintain the distinction between these sorts of political and 
identify which and when such considerations would be legitimately justified.  
3.1.2. Structured Approach  
The approach provides that the prosecutor is to utilise extra-legal considerations, 
including the political ones of the given situation or case as a tool to achieve a higher 
normative end of the position. The higher normative aim is meant to be justice, as there are no 
unified global aims for the Court yet. The language of the Preamble of the ICC Statute refers 
to the importance of justice as a main aim the Court seeks to deliver. For example, ‘millions of 
children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
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conscience of humanity,’ ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished,’ and ‘to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators’. We take this aim531 as a measure on which the process will be verified, as it is 
the most common and prevalent aim that the Statute of the Court and the OTP has developed.532 
The achievement of justice here is meant to be whenever, wherever, and whatever is 
possible.533 It is meant to be a broad justice,534 as understood either by the Court or the relevant 
society of a certain situation, whichever is more achievable.535 This strategy is to be taken 
within the decision-making process by the prosecutor when exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
The approach would help to ease the tension or just end it depending on the given circumstances 
of the position in the question. This approach further means that the prosecutor may let other 
mechanisms (justice or non-justice) tackle the situation or case in question, as long as those 
mechanisms are better able to deliver justice.536 The decision-maker is considering the two 
                                                          
531 Justice can be delivered through different way. It does not have to be delivered by the ICC, as there are 
several mechanisms can undertake this mission, such hybrid, ad hoc, and national tribunals. For more 
information about these forms, see, Milena Sterio, Rethinking Amnesty, Denver Journal of International Law 
and Policy, Vol. 34 (2006), Pp. 374-9. See also, Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities after 
Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law? Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 38 (2007), 
251- 322. 
532 Maragret deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Issue: 2 (2012), 265- 320. 
533 The thesis will argue that justice cannot be achieved only through the ICC. It will suggest that the 
prosecutor may be advised to refer to other sorts of mechanisms to achieve justice. This sort of justice will be 
framed by the relevant society who is suffering mass violation of human rights. As justice may take different 
forms, therefore, the meaning of justice that this research adopts is the broad one that is capable of 
encompassing all sorts of it. 
534 Justice, basically, has two meanings: broad and narrow. For the purposes of this research, the broad 
meaning will be taken, as it includes all types of justice. This is to encompass the other types of justice that 
may be demanded by a certain society that is experiencing violence, whether during the ongoing atrocities, or 
during the transitional period. In 2011, the UN defined the broad meaning of justice in its report, and 
enumerated the possible mechanisms that basically involve ‘both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, 
including individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals. See 
supra n. 65, P. 9.  
535 For more information about the potential sort of justice mechanism, see Teitel, supra n. 66, Teitel referred 
to five main mechanisms that basically encompass all sorts of mechanisms: criminal justice, historical justice, 
reparatory justice, administrative justice, and constitutional justice. Also, Hayner did mention various ways by 
which countries can respond to past atrocities, such as: holding trials, truth commission, providing individuals 
access to security files, reparations, building memorials, Lustration, making comprehensive reforms in all 
section of a state, see Hayner, supra n. 66, P. 12. 
536 Chapter five of the thesis provides several conditions that the prosecutor needs to verify before deciding on 
the jurisdiction of the Court. These conditions are necessity, legitimacy, and the demands of victims.  
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pillars by moving from one to another by taking into account the aim of each. By considering 
extra-legal considerations, including the political ones, the prosecutor would help to show that 
her decision is able to be responsive to the changing behaviours, wills, and policies of states.537 
Therefore, the appearance of being utopian could be minimised, if not removed. And by 
seeking to achieve the higher normative aim, which is justice, the prosecutor could help show 
that her decision is not meant to serve political aims, as the aim of the process is built to reach 
justice. Therefore, the appearance of being apologist could be minimised, if not removed.  
Indeed, the process of the reconciliation of these pillars in the context of international 
legal orders is invoked by several academic pioneers. Cassese, for instance, ascertains that the 
process of the reconciliation between history and politics on the one hand and law on the other 
is a continuous modern theme.538 He asserts that the combination of these components (law, 
history, and politics) can be completed by using an interdisciplinary method. Cherif Bassiouni 
also clearly refers to the importance of the consideration of extra-legal accounts within the 
decision-making process. He said that these considerations ‘reflect values which cannot be 
underestimated, let alone ignored’.539 International criminal justice, as a system, does not only 
function within its legal parameters, ‘without consideration for other broader concerns’.540 
More than that, Bassiouni digs deeper into the issue when he says that 
It should be noted that there is nothing inherently incompatible between politically 
oriented goals and the achievement of the higher value of justice for the purposes of 
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538 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon 1986), P. 2. 
539 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, Virginia Journal of International Law, 
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advancing the common good and, in particular cases, advancing goals pertaining to 
other positive outcomes, such as peace and reconciliation.541 
This an interesting idea advanced by Bassiouni supporting the main idea of our 
approach that seeks to offer that the reconciliation of these two goals is under the power of the 
decision-maker (prosecutors) and, in so doing, the latter is not politically-motivated, as he or 
she uses such a balance to exercise a more efficient strategy to deliver his or her main mandates. 
By such a process, the decision-maker can demonstrate the content of the given legal discourse 
in a palpable manner. Brubacher also confirms that the strict rule-based approach the 
prosecutor follows does not help the success of the Court. He points out that the success of the 
Court:  
hinges on the ability of the Prosecutor to adopt a policy where his discretion to initiate 
investigations is determined not only on the criteria contained within the ICC Statute, 
but also on those factors necessary for the exercise of his prosecutorial functions. This 
latter set of considerations necessitate that the Prosecutor take into account the political 
factors pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the 
ability of the Court to engender sufficient state support.542 
This framework is also derived from analysing the jurisprudence of the Military and 
the SC Tribunals. As was critically discussed in the previous chapter, the Prosecutors of these 
Tribunals have used in practice this strategy to avoid the dual criticisms as much as possible, 
and they managed to put the higher normative aim, which is justice, in effect. We have also 
seen how Goldstone managed to achieve justice to Milosevic, decrease the level of violence,543 
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542 Brubacher, supra n. 22, P. 94. 
543 The NATO war in Kosovo changed the priorities of the war strategies, where Milosevic was considered to be 
an obstacle to the stability of the region, as he began to lose his power. Then, the political and military 
environment was ideal for the Prosecutor to indict him as “the interests of justice” were not at risk any more. 
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and keep the peace process in place,544 when he took the extra-legal considerations within the 
decision-making process.545 He used the postponement strategy as a way to complete the 
process successfully. There was a noticeable relationship between this strategy and the 
potential outcomes and results of the prosecutorial strategy. It was noticed that the above 
strategy helped the prosecutors to advance the efficiency of the prosecution and get the most 
of it. Thus, it was not only the above framework that helped to ease the tension between the 
apologia and utopian accusations, but it also led to a more effective strategy of the prosecution.  
The approach shows that this process does not render the prosecutor politically-
motivated, as my argument suggests that the process of the consideration of extra-legal 
considerations is a sort of tool that the prosecutor can use to reach a normative aim. Thus, the 
prosecutor does not consider those accounts to achieve political aims; instead it is only a 
strategy by which the prosecutor uses an instrument to reach normative ends, in particular given 
that a current international prosecutor has more roles to play when delivering justice.  
3.2. The Concept of Discretion  
Discretion, as George C. Christie states, is universally referred to as a choice.546 It is a 
power that allows decision-makers to choose between various courses of action. Where there 
is only one course of action to be taken, this is not an exercise of discretion. Rather, it is a legal 
duty that should be done. The exercise of discretion, De Smith and Evans argue, means that 
there is no one unique answer to the given problem.547 Legislators, when making rules, are 
usually impeded by a ‘relative ignorance of fact’ and a ‘relative indeterminacy of aim’, the 
matter that, Hart emphasises, makes the exercise of choice between the available alternatives 
                                                          
544 For more discussion about the strategy of prosecution conducted by Goldstone, supra n. 273, Pp. 227- 30. 
545 See the last section of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
546 George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 5 (1986), P. 747. 
547 Supra n. 54, P. 278. 
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desirable.548 Its existence is necessary, as law is either indeterminate or limited. Therefore, law-
makers often tends to give a space for the decision-makers to exercise discretion to deal with 
complex issues. Choice is then the key aspect of the exercise of discretion. As long as there is 
a space for decision-makers to make a choice within the legal order, this means that officials 
have discretion whatever the sort and scope of this discretion is. However, discretion is of 
different senses depending on ‘features of the context.’549 The exercise of discretion could take 
a sense of creating, weighing, or interpreting standards. Accordingly, their roles, scopes, and 
sources are varied from one sort to another, and from one legal system to another, as will be 
explained fully in the next sections.   
Discretion, Keith Hawkins points out, ‘is inevitable because the translation of rule into 
action, the process by which abstraction becomes actuality, involves people in interpretation 
and choice.’550 [emphasis added]. For the purpose of this thesis, this statement is important in 
that it refers to the dynamics of the operation of discretion. It either allows a decision-maker to 
choose among several available interpretations, where legal rules are interpreted, or to make 
choices, when these legal rules provide so. Each of these potentials is derived from a different 
sort of discretion that a legal order can involve. I call the first type legal interpretive discretion, 
whilst the second one is well known and is often administrative discretion: prosecutorial 
discretion. These two senses of discretion will be explored and analysed. In the context of the 
discretionary power of the ICC Prosecutor, the current literature has predominantly focused on 
the analysis and discussion of prosecutorial discretion. However, there is scarce reference 
made to the ability of the ICC prosecutor to exercise legal interpretive discretion when applying 
                                                          
548 Supra n. 31, Pp. 124-5. 
549 Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 35 (1967- 1968), P. 32, 
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the legal categories.551 This rare reference also has not examined this discretion as a sort that 
stands on its own. Therefore, this section will identify this discretion and reveal it as a sense 
that stands on its own. Also, the chapter will explore the conceptual aspects of these two senses 
of discretion and apply them to the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor. This explanation 
will draw on the useful presentation and discussion of discretion by Ronald Dworkin.552  
Dworkin distinguishes between strong discretion and weak discretion.553 This 
distinction between two types of discretion can be best applied to legal interpretive discretion 
and prosecutorial discretion. The strong discretion is exercised when there is no standard given 
by the law, and decision-makers are left to their own devices to create their own standards. 
This is a strong sense of discretion where decision-makers make decisions. The most cited 
example that Dworkin uses to explain this sort of discretion is ‘a sergeant has discretion who 
has been told to pick any five men for patrol he chooses’554. The sergeant is authorised to create 
his own standard on which those men will be selected. Weak discretion is exercised when the 
law already provides a standard and only asks decision-makers to apply it.555 For example, 
Dworkin explains, ‘the sergeant [is ordered] to take his five most experienced men on patrol’.556 
[emphasis is added.] The term ‘most experienced’ is the standard that is imposed on the 
decision-maker to apply.  
The strong sense of discretion represents the classical type of discretion, which is 
known as prosecutorial discretion, where decision-makers (prosecutors) use their own 
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standards to choose among legal worthy choices when applying the legal rules. In exercising 
the strong sense of discretion, decision-makers (prosecutors) may, as accepted normally, 
consider extra-legal considerations, and arguably political effects, to make their decision. The 
decision-makers will create their own criteria to be considered when selecting a legal worthy 
choice. However, the application of these legal rules and the standards created to guide these 
rules may themselves involve an exercise of discretion, in particular when the legal rules are 
indeterminate. The weak and strong senses of discretion can be applied to legal interpretive 
discretion, as the legal rule and standard are so indeterminate. In this case, therefore, decision-
makers are not supposed to consider extra-legal considerations, including strictly political ones, 
as the legal standard is given. These rules or standards could be interpreted in different ways 
or because, even the language is clear, there are underlying conflicts of doctrine or competing 
principles. Here, decision-makers are before several interpretations due to either the 
indeterminate character of legal rules or the conflicts between those principles or doctrines. 
This scenario allows decision-makers in effect to exercise legal interpretive discretion and 
choose among the different legal worthy interpretations.  
However, prosecutorial discretion does not appear only in the case of the non-
availability of standards.  Prosecutorial discretion can also be imagined in the weak sense, in 
particular when the law authorises decision-makers to use prosecutorial discretion, and 
provides at the same time a specific standard to be considered, as the situation with the Article 
53 ‘the interests of justice’. In the latter situation, the prosecutor is given prosecutorial 
discretion not to proceed with her investigation or prosecution, on the basis of that legal 
standard: ‘the interests of justice’. The prosecutor here is given a power to select among legally 
worthy situations or cases. At the same time, the weak versus strong senses of discretion does 
not mean that discretion in its weak sense is limited or of small degree. The degree of legal 
interpretive discretion could be wide as long as the given rule or standard is so indeterminate 
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or the competent legal principles or doctrines are strongly relevant for the given situation to be 
adopted. Normally, these rules or standards offer little guidance to their meaning or content the 
matter that provides the decision-makers substantial degree of discretion, when making a 
decision (same as to the indeterminate and competent principles and doctrines).557 In this case, 
discretion in its weak sense becomes wide so it allows decision-makers to exercise discretion 
‘in a very real sense.’558 
As can be seen now, both sorts of discretion involve choosing between legal worthy 
possibilities. However, consideration of extra-legal accounts or probably political effects 
should not be taken into account when exercising legal interpretive discretion. When decision-
makers choose a specific interpretation for the indeterminate legal rule, or choose among the 
competing doctrines or principles, here decision-makers should look for a specific legal 
argumentation to find a solution within law. For example, different statutory interpretations or 
arguments by analogy with some other area of law could be one legitimate way to select a 
particular interpretation. The problem may arise when decision-makers do not provide a clear 
basis of selecting a particular interpretation. So, the predicament is what basis can they find to 
make a choice between the possibilities? If the judges/lawyers can find some basis within law 
for deciding between the choices, then this is only relative indeterminacy aka weak discretion. 
If no legal basis of making a decision can be found, then the danger is that judges/lawyers will 
implicitly rely on some extra-legal considerations to make their decision. Hence, the great fear 
here is that politics will be the basis of making the decision. At this particular point, the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion and legal interpretive discretion may strongly converge and give 
rise to the accusation of political bias or motivation when making a decision. In other words, 
the exercise of legal interpretive discretion might be similar to the basis of exercising 
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prosecutorial discretion that runs outside the law, where decision-makers consider extra-legal 
factors, or even arguably political effects. As can be seen now, the exercise of legal interpretive 
discretion involves a serious risk of being politically-taken or conducted in a biased form. This 
means that in such situations, decision-makers have the ability to interpret the legal categories 
in such a way to reach different outcomes, and yet justified in legal terms. As was noted above, 
the accusation of the Court of being politically directed against only Africa can be linked to 
this particular dilemma of the interpretation of the legal categories, in particular gravity as an 
admissible legal requirement, as the latter is quite open-ended.  
3.2.1. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion means granting a power to a decision-holder to use her or his 
discretion in making certain decisions. D. J. Galligan calls this sort of discretion a ‘central 
sense’ where discretion is ‘an express grant of power conferred on officials where 
determination of the standards according to which powers to be exercised is left largely to 
them.’559 Hawkins refers to the same thing when he says ‘contemporary legal systems 
increasingly rely on express grants of authority to legal or administrative officials to attain 
broad legislative purposes.’560 Decision-holders here have a significant scope of power to settle 
the standards according to which the decision will be made. Once the legal categories have 
been satisfied, decision-makers will start exercising this discretion. This power, Galligan 
explains, is either granted or assumed.561 In addition, discretion can, Galligan continues, also 
be assumed by officials when it is departed ‘from legal rules for reason of justice, or from 
practical necessity or expediency.’562 As noted above, these standards are either provided by 
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the law, or created by decision-makers, and thereupon, Dworkin states, this puts discretion in 
its strong sense.  
In ICC terms, Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) explicitly grants the prosecutor a power to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion arguably in Article 15 (1) and (3), as was analysed in Chapter 
One.563 This Article explicitly authorises the prosecutor to use her prosecutorial power to reject 
any situations or cases that met the legal requirements, however, opening investigations or 
proceeding with prosecutions with them respectively ‘would not serve the interests of 
justice.’564 The Statute in this example provides a standard that the prosecutor should consider 
when exercising her prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor here is, therefore, exercising 
choice. She will pick up one or more of these legal worthy situations and cases. In deciding 
which cases to take to trial, the prosecutor selects which defendants to charge and what the 
charges shall be. As Kate Stith points out, ‘[i]n the context of the criminal law, to exercise 
discretion means, most simply, to decide not to investigate, prosecute, or punish to the full 
extent available under the law.’565  
As noted above, in addition to the fact that law may create these standards, the latter 
also may be created by officials. In the ICC terms, the OTP has created several standards as a 
way of controlling or guiding the use of discretion. Such standards usually function as 
limitations on this discretion as well as a guidance. As was explained in Chapter One and later 
in Chapter Four, the Prosecutor sets qualitative and quantitative factors to guide the 
determination of the gravity criterion. This is applied for the assessment of ‘relative gravity’ in 
the context of the exercise of discretion. Also, the Prosecutor sets ‘as a general rule, the Office 
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of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those 
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly 
responsible for those crimes.’566 Also, the OTP provides that the assessment of ‘the interests 
of justice’ is to be guided by the object and purpose of the Statute, in particular that the most 
serious crimes of international concern must not go unpunished.567 Most recently, the OTP has 
set up three standards to guide its exercise of prosecutorial discretion when selecting cases for 
investigation and prosecution, namely: ‘the gravity of the crimes, the degree of responsibility 
of the alleged perpetrators and the potential charges.’568  
The very main rationale of providing decision-makers with a power to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion is to allow decisions to be made in a context-sensitive manner taking 
account of the specific circumstances (individualised decision-making). The legal rules are 
largely indeterminate, inflexible, and controversial. They are not always suitable to cope with 
uncertainty and change. Joseph Raz emphasises that rules alone cannot cover or weigh all 
reasons for the conformity to the required action.569 Similarly, Stephanos Bibas argues that 
‘rules cannot capture every subtlety’.570 For such reasons, officials are empowered with 
discretion to take the reasonability of tackling some peculiarities of some individualised cases 
where only the prosecutor can identify. Abrams argues that within the common law system, 
the prosecutor is envisaged with a broad discretion that enables her to deal ‘with individual 
cases to consider special facts and circumstances not taken into account by the applicable 
rules.’571 [emphasis added]. For this reason and as John Bell puts it, this power will help to 
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provide ‘individualized justice’.572 In addition, Nsereko also argues that the rationale of giving 
prosecutorial discretion to prosecutors is because the latter is the only one who can ‘resolve the 
many issues that arise in the course of their work, as they cannot be resolved by hard and fast 
rules.’573 He says, for example, that in considering ‘the public interests’ of a certain case for 
prosecution, in fact it is only the prosecutor who can determine what these interests are. It is 
indeed a case-by-case basis that requires the prosecutor to exercise some discretion to identify 
the details of each case.  
For the above reason, it is normally accepted that the prosecutor would consider extra-
legal factors when evaluating situations for the purpose of opening an investigation or cases 
for a prosecution. In this regard, it is important to note that the standards created by the law or 
decision-makers should not be mixed with such extra-legal factors that may/should be taken 
into consideration by the prosecutor. The latter factors, Galligan points out, are ‘in nature of 
practical constraints… such as effectiveness and efficiency, the limitations on resources, 
organizational structures, and the moral attitudes of officials’.574 In the next chapters, we will 
see how these factors can play an important role in shaping the decision-making process of the 
prosecutor. Schabas, for example, points out that there was an allegation that the decision of 
choosing Thomas Lubanga to be prosecuted is an example of the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion where the consideration of the likelihood of arresting Lubanga was taken into 
account by the Prosecutor, as he was already in custody and that there was an allegation that 
he might be released soon at the time.575 Schabas continues, ‘[t]he impression remains that in 
the Lubanga case, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion had more to do with the fact that this 
was an accused who was accessible to a Court starved for trial work rather than any compelling 
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574 Supra n. 261, P. 30. 
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analysis based upon either gravity or complementarity.’576 Wouters and Chan also confirm that 
the consideration of extra-legal factors are to be exercised at stage of exercising prosecutorial 
discretion. They argue that ‘[i]t is, for instance, hard to deny that the ready co-operation of a 
self-referred State would not be a persuasive consideration for the Court.’577  
Prosecutorial discretion is an unlimited power, unless the law or other policy 
instruments impose limitations or/and controls. Outside the ICC, the extent of prosecutorial 
discretion is governed in accordance with the sort of legal system that is in operation. The civil 
law system and the common law govern the scope of, and level of control imposed over 
prosecutorial discretion in different ways. Whilst the number of cases that should be prosecuted 
reaches its maximum level within the civil law system, it is much lower within the common 
law system. The first is subsumed under the principle of legality (Legalitatsprinzip) where the 
prosecutor is required to initiate her proceedings against all worthy cases.578 The second is 
governed by the principle of expediency (Opportunitatsprinzip), where it is assumed the 
prosecutor will choose among legally worthy cases.579 The legality principle is derived from 
the classic German model, which requires a mandatory prosecution of all kinds of offences, 
although in practice the minor offences were excluded.580 The virtual absence of prosecutorial 
discretion here was to avoid any political or expedient influence on the decision-maker.581 
Therefore, the civil law system did not provide the prosecutor with wide discretion.582 We can 
see here that the sheer magnitude of discretion is at its lowest level (maximum 
prosecution/minimum discretion). However, the common law system adopts the expediency 
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principle that provides the prosecutor with more space of discretion to select among legally 
worthy cases – i. e. the proportion of cases prosecuted as compared to all those where 
prosecution is legally warranted – is higher (‘wider’) in common law than civil law 
jurisdictions – and far, far higher still in the ICC. 
In addition, there may be a supplementary control on the exercise of discretion. These 
limitations may be imposed through institutional review mechanisms. Within the mandatory 
system, prosecutorial discretion is limited and subject to close scrutiny to judicial control 
through an investigating judge (the inquisitorial system).583 By the way of contrast, 
prosecutorial discretion is very broad in the common law system, as there is less judicial 
oversight that is imposed on it (the adversary system).584 In this system, courts have limited 
judicial control over prosecutorial discretion, in particular when a prosecutor abuses – 
exercising her prosecutorial discretion – for example the principle of the rule of law.585 
The prosecutorial discretion system in the ICC is a hybrid of these two major legal 
models. For example, in terms of the degree of selectivity, the discretionary power of the ICC 
prosecutor is much closer to the common law system, as the prosecutor is not required to 
prosecute all legal worthy situations and cases, whilst it is much closer to the civil law system 
in terms of judicial control on discretion, as the ICC Statute empowers the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to exercise its control on several types of the prosecutor’s decisions, as was explained in 
Chapter One.  
3.2.2. Legal Interpretive Discretion 
Before the ICC prosecutor exercises prosecutorial discretion, as warranted in Article 53 
(1)(c) and (2)(c), the same Article first requires the prosecutor to consider two legal categories, 
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namely jurisdiction and admissibility in accordance with Paragraph (1)(a); (1) (b), and (2)(a); 
(2)(b). These two categories are legal requirements and do not provide the prosecutor with a 
power of discretion, as they constitute legal thresholds, below which the prosecutor cannot 
open investigations, or proceed with prosecutions. Generally speaking, international legal rules 
are largely indeterminate, flexible, and open-ended. These characteristics could make these 
rules open to several interpretations that might also lead to different outcomes. Legal rules 
might be applied in different ways by the same officials from time to time or different officials. 
In order to avoid conflicting or opposite outcomes, legal systems usually provide a mechanical 
approach (for example, the analogy approach, or citing relevant and recognisable principle) for 
decision-makers to find an internal legal basis on which legal rules will be interpreted without 
having to go outside the law. Such a process helps to ensure that the decisions were not reached 
on the basis of discretion, but a judgment. The problem might arise however, when officials do 
not provide a sufficient reason to show how the open-ended legal rule was interpreted and why 
a particular interpretation was chosen over the others, in particular, when the given legal rule 
is so indeterminate and the law does not provide any standard or factor to give any useful 
meaning to such rules. In this case, and as Galligan argues, decision-makers will ‘exercise a 
certain degree of discretion’.586 
I call this type of discretion legal interpretive discretion. Due to the indeterminate 
character of legal rules or standards, decision-makers will have a capacity to deploy their 
discretion to interpret the given legal rules. Such standards often, as Galligan points out, ‘leave 
room for variable interpretations.’587 This then should be distinguished from prosecutorial 
discretion. With legal interpretive discretion, the law does not provide decision-makers with a 
power of exercising discretion. This is only carried out in effect, where the indeterminacy of 
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the legal rules, their vague meanings and contents, and the lack of guiding factors allow 
decision-makers to exercise a degree of discretion.588 As Galligan points out, discretion may 
also be found in the application of standards to facts: ‘the decision as to whether a given 
situation falls within an authoritative standard often involves elements of judgment, opinion, 
and appreciation, such that reasonable persons may sometimes come to different conclusions 
each of which is itself reasonable’.589  
However, there is no agreement among scholars about legal interpretive discretion. 
Whilst some would argue that finding a particular interpretation to apply a rule of standard is 
ultimately determinable within the body of law, taking that in its widest sense, as Dworkin 
argues,590 others, such as Hart, would consider it to involve strong as well as weak discretion.591 
Several authors assert the extreme indeterminate nature of legal rules.592  These wider debates 
are beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, this thesis will show that a space of 
discretionary leeway has been exercised by the ICC prosecutor when interpreting ‘sufficient 
gravity’. As Galligan argues, ‘[i]t is hard to imagine a decision which does not involve some 
discretion, and yet clearly some instances of discretion are much wider than others.’593 
Koskenniemi, as will be discussed below, insists that there is a systematic indeterminacy 
running through the whole of international law and hence a high degree of discretion is 
involved.594  
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The exercise of legal interpretive discretion does not only result from the open-ended 
legal rules. Although some legal rules might appear somehow clearer, there might appear 
underlying conflicts of legal doctrine or competing principles that allow decision-makers to 
find different interpretations from which to choose. Koskenniemi’s position about the 
indeterminacy of international legal arguments corresponds to the dyadic conceptual 
analysis.595 To him, each topic is open to competing interpretations that, in turn, have been 
argued. Because there is no way within law of prioritising one over the other (indeed he argues 
that each presupposes the other in a vicious circle). It is exposed to a dyadic conceptual pattern 
that characterises this indeterminacy. He states that this dyadic pattern reflects conflicts about 
the meaning and application of international legal rules and doctrines.596 In so determining, in 
fact decision-makers are exercising a space of discretion.  
In ICC terms, Article 17 (1)(d) is a good example to illustrate legal interpretive 
discretion. The Statute here requires the prosecutor to examine ‘sufficient gravity’ of situations 
and cases to be admissible before the Court. Article 17 (1)(d) here provides a standard which 
is ‘sufficient gravity’ to be applied. The law does not provide any definition of ‘sufficient 
gravity’. As Vaid argues, the term is left open and has given the prosecutor a degree of 
interpretive flexibility and choice.597 Legal interpretive discretion of the prosecutor in this case 
is quite strong. Chapter Four of this thesis will discuss and analyse the issues around gravity in 
detail. Suffice it here to mention, in interpreting this rule, the ICC Prosecutor has resorted to 
various meanings, contents, and weights for this rule. In deploying her discretion on this legal 
category, the prosecutor has a strong legal interpretive discretion to choose which situations 
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and cases meet ‘sufficient gravity’. As was noted, Schabas also is of the view that the 
prosecutor exercises a degree of discretion when applying such legal thresholds.598 
3.3. Theoretical Framework 
3.3.1. The Dyadisicm of International Legal Discourses 
International criminal law is still an emerging regime within the field of international 
law.599 It is still at the stage of evolution. As Schabas argued, ‘international criminal law… is 
not yet 20 years old.’600 As the old and well established system of international law is marked 
by indeterminacy, the emerging international criminal law is even at a pre-indeterminacy stage. 
Therefore, general values, aims, principles and doctrines, or legal argumentations about them 
might contradict each other. The latter problem makes it natural that decision-makers’ 
decisions in this system are posed to opposite criticisms. International criminal law, as 
Robinson states, does not often comply with its fundamental principles and doctrines a matter 
that causes contradictory arguments about them.601 Peace versus justice, rules versus processes, 
sovereignty versus rule of law, idealism versus realism are some of these contradictory 
principles that judicial institutions need to settle and that often raise two plausible and valid 
arguments that run opposite to each other. These principles are usually embedded in the goals 
of some international institutions that set down its main priorities. However, these goals might 
contradict each other, as the situation with the preamble of the ICC Statute. The latter aims at 
promoting criminal justice and international peace and security at the same time. These two 
different aims might be used to criticise the prosecutor’s decision, when one of them falls in 
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conflict with the other one. The ICC prosecutor’s decision to investigate a situation or prosecute 
a case might be characterised ‘as both a positive tool that can end impunity and enforce human 
rights standards… and as a negative weapon that can amplify political struggles, reinforce 
geopolitical divides, and undermine national sovereignty.’602  
The decision that the prosecutor makes and touchs upon one of these issues can be 
easily criticised and, therefore, the prosecutor may face political accusations for the position 
she takes. The sorts of justice that should be delivered to a certain situation also might be in 
conflict. As Nerida Chazal points out, ‘[p]unitive and non-punitive approaches to criminal 
justice are also often contradictory and there is a clash between retributive and restorative 
paradigms’.603 Chapter Five of this thesis will fully discuss the contradictions that arise 
between the ICC as a potential mechanism to articulate conflicts under its jurisdiction, and 
other justice mechanisms that might also appear relevant to those conflicts.  
Such dyadic criticisms and controversies can also be seen in the work of the ICC 
prosecutor. These criticisms are based on opposite arguments for each position that the Court 
takes. This study will be confined only to a specific controversy around the question of the 
exercise of discretion. The latter question has raised inescapable patterns of a contradictory 
duplication. This criticism or controversy occurs in a recurring pattern. Each position has a 
valid and plausible criticism that criticises decision-makers’ decisions, and vice versa. 
Koskenniemi builds this dyadic thesis on the basis of the analysis of the structure of 
international legal arguments and refers to this pattern in his masterpiece of work and calls it 
‘conceptual oppositions’.604  
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The fault-line of dyadic arguments that infects those decisions is based on 
Koskenniemi’s thesis of utopia and apology’s criticisms.605 This thesis will concentrate on the 
discussion and analysis of the discretionary-based decisions in the context of the utopia and 
apology’s argumentations, as seen by Robinson.606 The utopian critique means that the given 
position is too close to principles, common interests, justice, or similar ideas, and that it is 
highly divorced from the states’ interests, wills, and policies. The apologist critique is that the 
position is too connected to the interests and policies of states, and that it is too far from the 
common interests and principles. The first one argues that the given position lacks any 
connection to groundedness. In other words, the adherents of this argument claim that making 
a decision that is not backed by an effective support, that is not anchored, or that is not realistic 
in a sense that it cannot be just enforced and may cause further problems is a mere utopian one. 
The second one argues that the given position is not principled and appeals to the immediate 
policies and interests of states. It is an apology. Whilst the first is too political, as it is too 
dependent on states’ policies (unprincipled), the second is also too political, as it simulates 
speculative utopias (unsupported or inefficient). In either case, the charge of political is the 
common point that both sides to the argument are raising. 
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In the ICC term, the prosecutor’s decisions are open to the allegations that they are 
politically motivated. The prosecutor is either too close to the reality of the given situation and 
pleases the policies and interests of states, or is too far from such a groundedness in reality to 
the extent the decision seems unconnected to power and is merely based on ideals. As you have 
these choices, this means that people can easily advance plausible and convincing arguments, 
based on inherent values embedded within international criminal law to argue against the 
choice made, as was discussed earlier this chapter.  
Consider, for example, a potential decision to open an investigation in the Syrian 
situation (supposing that the situation was referred by the SC referral). Such a decision, if made, 
would be criticised for being politically-motivated. The prosecutor would appear political, as 
the decision appeared as if it served a political agenda and ignored the normative yardsticks. 
As Richard Falk points out, the reaction of Russia – in using veto power to prevent the 
resolution of a referral of the Syrian situation to the Court – ‘reflects a view that the main 
motivations for such a resolution is … a propaganda move rather than as a genuine attempt to 
promote criminal justice.’607 Equally applicable, the same potential decision can be accused of 
being politically-taken, as it would be argued that the prosecutor tries to prove a point that she 
is doing justice, in the sense that the decision would remain unsupported or enforced. Needless 
to say that such a decision might undermine any chance for advancing the political resolution 
for putting an end to the ongoing conflict.608 As can be seen, the prosecutor would in both cases 
be accused of being political.609 The accusation of politicisation was already made even though 
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the prosecutor had not taken any position against the Syrian situation.610 The charge was 
already ready. Similarly applicable, most decisions that both Prosecutors have made before 
were countered by such a dyadic criticism, in particular the decision to indict the President of 
Sudan. In our example, whatever end the prosecutor aims to consider, she will be accused of 
being political.611 The recurrent pattern of this dyadicicm is based mainly on the valid and 
strong values; or aims, legal justifications, or principles that might contradict each other, as 
will be explained below.  
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4.1. Introduction  
Of all the controversies that have surrounded the ICC prosecutor’s decisions, most have 
– overtly or implicitly – turned around the question of gravity. The main aim of the 
establishment of the ICC, as stated in the Preamble to the ICC Statute, is to investigate and 
prosecute ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.612 
This is echoed in Article 1, which provides that the Court ‘shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern’. Article 5 in turn 
provides a list of those most serious crimes, which are crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, and aggression.613 The definitional or chapeau requirements of these crimes already 
entail elements of gravity; a further requirement was added in the case of war crimes.614 Thus, 
the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to already grave crimes. However, the founders 
of the Court decided to further limit the reach of the Court, and required an additional degree 
of gravity615 as a requirement of admissibility, to determine when the Court should exercise 
jurisdiction. Article 17 (1)(d) provides that the Court shall determine that ‘a case’ is 
inadmissible where it ‘is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’. (A case 
consists not only of the acts allegedly committed but also the alleged perpetrators of those acts.)  
It is the prosecutor who will make this decision in the first instance. According to the 
report on the first three years of the OTP’s activities, ‘although any crime falling within the 
                                                          
612 Preamble to the ICC Statute, Para. 9. The Preamble of the Court Statute provides that ‘most serious 
crimes…must not go unpunished’, paragraph 4. 
613 See the Review Conference of Rome Statute held in Kampala, supra n. 7. 
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jurisdiction of the Court is a serious matter, the Rome Statute… clearly foresees and requires 
an additional consideration of “gravity” whereby the Office must determine that a case is of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’616 Gravity is a basis of decision-making 
for the prosecutor at both investigation and prosecution stages. Article 53(1)(b) and (2)(b) 
require the prosecutor to determine admissibility of ‘the case’ at investigation and prosecution 
stages respectively, on the basis of Article 17.617 Pre-Trial Chamber II has held that the use of 
the term ‘case’ in Article 53(1)(b) means that even in assessing situations, the prosecutor must 
identify ‘one or more potential cases within the context of a situation’618 and that ‘potential 
case’ includes groups of persons or incidents ‘that are likely to be the focus of an investigation 
for the purpose of shaping the future case(s)’.619 
The term ‘sufficient gravity’ in Article 17(1)(d) arguably constitutes a notional 
threshold level below which the Court, as a matter of legal requirement, shall not deem ‘a case’ 
admissible.  However, Article 17 does not provide a definition of the term ‘sufficient gravity’. 
Although, as will be explored below, the prosecutor and the judges, respectively, have refined 
and defined the criterion, nonetheless the term ‘sufficient gravity’ remains quite contested 
especially in relation to Article 53(1)(b).620 Key questions surround the assessment of 
situational gravity (remembering that ‘a case’ here means potential cases (see above)).  Thus, 
it has been asked whether, in the context of Article 53(1)(b), the reference to Article 17(1)(d) 
is to be construed strictly legally or whether the overarching consideration by which the 
prosecutor is to determine whether there is a ‘reasonable basis’ to initiate an investigation, 
                                                          
616 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy (The Hague, 14th September, 2006), Para. 
2(b), P. 6. 
617 The decision of the prosecutor not to proceed with a situation or case is subject to the Court’s review, as 
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conditions the assessment of gravity.  If it is to be construed strictly legally, as deGuzman 
argues, it ‘follows that the gravity assessment under Article 53 (1) (b) is limited to the question 
whether the gravity threshold is met, according to clear and pre-set criteria’.621 Taking this as 
a threshold below which potential cases cannot be admitted might seem too exacting 
considering, for example, that it might be difficult to assess the level of seriousness at the stage 
of a preliminary examination. However if it is to be so regarded, it matters very strongly 
whether this threshold is set high or low (as the Chambers determines). The further question 
is, especially bearing in mind that Article 53(1) requires the prosecutor to determine whether 
there is a ‘reasonable basis’ to initiate an investigation, as Vaid questions, whether she ‘must 
only analyze a particular situation in isolation to determine whether it is sufficiently grave, or 
whether instead the Prosecutor must [or may] compare the gravity of one situation in relation 
to others potentially admissible before the Court’ (emphasis added).622 Following the argument 
that gravity in Article 53(1)(b) is a matter of strict legal requirement, commentators such as 
deGuzman have argued that it does not allow the Prosecutor to select between different 
situations.623 Vaid, contrary to deGuzman and Stegmiller, opines that it ‘remains uncertain is 
whether this additional threshold is absolute or relative’.624 However, considering the Comoros 
review decision, Vaid’s view in 2013 that ‘the Court has not yet clarified which standard should 
control’625 decisions, may have been superseded. Finally, it also needs to be remembered that 
‘‘sufficient gravity’ in Article 17 (1)(d) considered by reference to a case  (potential case) under 
                                                          
621 As argued by deGuzman, see deGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1403. See also Karel De Meester, Article 53: 
Commentary Rome Statute: Part 5, Case Matrix Network, available at 
<http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-rome-
statute/commentary-rome-statute-part-5/> (Last Access: 17th, July, 2016). See also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber, 
Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of Greece and the Kingdom 
of Cambodia: Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros to Review the Prosecutor’s Decision not to 
Initiate an Investigation, No.: ICC-01/13 (16th July, 2015), Para. 14 available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2015869.pdf>, ‘exacting legal requirement’ (hereinafter: Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber 
July, 2015). 
622 Vaid, supra n. 12, P 389. 
623 Meester, supra n. 212. He is also citing deGuzman’s argument, deGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1432. 
624 Vaid, supra n. 12, P 389. 
625 Ibid. 
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Article 53 (1)(b) pertains both to the criminal act of, and the role or rank of the perpetrator.’626 
This is important because the Chambers have also made some interventions as to admissibility 
in this respect, concerning ‘those most responsible’. 
In the sequence of issues that the prosecutor examines under Article 53(1)(b) in 
determining whether to open an investigation, she must consider whether legal requirements 
are met. This involves firstly being assured of jurisdiction taking into consideration 
complementarity, then moving to issues of admissibility including the test of gravity.627 In the 
short history of the Court, a number of potential situations have been excluded on the basis of 
jurisdiction and complementarity628 which narrows the number that have been assessed in 
terms of gravity. All situations where investigations have been opened must by definition have 
been construed as sufficiently grave; only Iraq and Comoros have been formally rejected by 
the prosecutor on this basis. Both decisions have been and remain highly controversial. The 
Prosecutor has been instructed to review its Comoros decision.629 How the Prosecutor interprets 
‘sufficient gravity’ under Article 53(1)(b), therefore, is highly consequential. 
Beyond this gravity threshold for admissibility, the ICC Prosecutor potentially has 
prosecutorial discretion to give priority to the situations and cases she considers most serious.  
Gravity has been identified by the Prosecutor as a crucial basis on which the OTP determines 
                                                          
626 Megumi Ochi, Gravity Threshold before the International Criminal Court: an Overview of the Court’s 
Practice, International Crimes Database, Brief 19 (2016), P. 13 
627 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Para. 42, ‘The Statute does not stipulate any mandatory 
sequence in the consideration of complementarity and gravity. The Prosecutor must be satisfied as to 
admissibility on both aspects before proceeding.’  
628 The Venezuela situation has been rejected by the Prosecutor on the basis of the temporal jurisdiction, as a 
considerable number of incidents were committed prior to 1st July, 2002 (quantitative method), see a Letter of 
Prosecutor of the ICC, 16 July 2003, P. 1.  
629 ICC, the Appeal Chamber, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, Decision on the 
admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to 
review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, No. ICC-01/13 OA (6th November, 2015), 
available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20965.PDF> (hereinafter: Comoros, Appeal 
Chamber, November 2015). 
167 
 
which situations or cases will be selected for investigation or prosecution.630 ‘Gravity is one of 
the most important criteria for the selection of our situations and cases’, declared Moreno-
Ocampo in 2005 and recently in 2016.631 
Many of the decisions that the prosecutor has justified on the basis of gravity have been 
criticised.632 In 2004-06, a cluster of decisions – Uganda (2004), DRC (2004), and Darfur 
(2005) Situations, Iraq (2006) – came under attack, some individually but also because, taken 
together they seemed to show a selective enforcement of norms. The decision in 2006 not to 
open an investigation into crimes allegedly committed by British soldiers during the Iraq war 
on the basis that the number of victims (4 to 12) did not meet the standard of gravity has been 
subject to serious criticisms. The Prosecutor sought to justify this by comparison with Northern 
Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur.633  
Yet in turn, the focus of the prosecution on solely one continent has provoked serious 
concern about the fairness of the Court that continues to undermine its legitimacy.634 ‘We 
Africans and the African Union are not against the International Criminal Court. That should 
be clear, …We are against Ocampo who is rendering justice with double standards. … Why 
not Argentina, why not Myanmar ... why not Iraq?’635 Since then, the new Prosecutor has 
opened a new preliminary examination of the Iraq situation636 and also other non-African 
                                                          
630 See Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 2016. 
631 Ibid. 
632 See also Schabas’s criticism of not opening investigation against the British soldiers having rejected it on the 
basis of gravity, see Schabas, supra n. 258, P. 741.  
633 Office of the Prosecutor, “Reply to Senders” included in Annex to Update on Communications Received by 
the Office of the Prosecutor: Iraq Response (10th February, 2006), Pp. 8-9, available at 
<http://iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf>, p 9. 
634 See Schabas, supra n. 258. See also Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor without Borders, 
World Affairs (Spring 2009), available at <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/case-closed-prosecutor-
without-borders> (Last Access: 9th December, 2012). 
635 Jean Ping, Chairman of the African Union Commission, ‘African Union accuses ICC prosecutor of bias’, 
Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-africa-icc-idAFJOE70T01R20110130> (Last Access: 15th 
February, 2015).  
636 The OTP states: ‘On 10 January 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor received a new communication from the 
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights ("ECCHR") together with the Public Interest Lawyers 
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situations, but such allegations of a disproportionate focus on Africa and corresponding pro-
Western bias continue, the latest example being the Prosecutor’s controversial decision not to 
open an investigation into the Comoros situation again partly on the basis of the small number 
of victims. This chapter will look at these and other instances of the Prosecutor’s invocation of 
gravity, especially where they have led to criticism of the Prosecutor.637 
The common charge is that they were politically based and politically biased.638 It is, 
indeed, the same dyadic pattern of criticism that surrounds the work of the prosecutor as has 
been identified and analysed in Chapter Three. These criticisms will be analysed through the 
lens of apology and utopia. The decision not to open an investigation of the crimes of the British 
soldiers in Iraq, and the decision to investigate only (or primarily) the rebels’ side in Uganda, 
both justified by the prosecutor in terms of gravity, were attacked for reflecting the interests of 
the powerful. When the prosecutor defends their focus on situations in Africa on the basis of 
gravity, they face accusations of neo-colonialism, institutional bias, and being a tool of Western 
                                                          
("PIL"), alleging the responsibility of officials of the United Kingdom for war crimes involving systematic 
detainee abuse in Iraq from 2003 until 2008. ... Based on an initial assessment of the information received, the 
10 January 2014 communication provides further information that was not available to the Office in 2006. In 
particular, the communication alleges a higher number of cases of ill-treatment of detainees and provides 
further details on the factual circumstances and the geographical and temporal scope of the alleged crimes. 
The Prosecutor will therefore conduct a preliminary examination …’ <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20r
ef/pe-ongoing/iraq/pages/iraq.aspx>. For comments, see Jill Reilly and Ian Drury, British Soldiers to be 
Investigated by International Criminal Court over Claims they Committed War Crimes in Iraq, DailyMail Online 
(13th May, 2014), available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2627228/BREAKING-NEWS-British-
soldiers-investigated-International-Criminal-Court-claims-committed-war-crimes-Iraq.html> (Last Access: 14th 
May, 2014). 
637 Also he was criticised for bringing lower scale of crimes to indict Lubanga, The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06/// Uganda LRA. 
638 See, ICC, A Tool to Recolonise Africa, New African (1st March, 2012), available at 
<http://newafricanmagazine.com/icc-a-tool-to-recolonise-africa/> (Last Access: 16th April, 2014), (reporting 
that the ICC is concentrating on Africa and ignoring the powerful states), see Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, 
Prosecuting the Powerful: Will Justice ever be Done? Institute for Security Studies (28th January, 2014), 
available at <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/prosecuting-the-powerful-will-justice-ever-be-done> (Last 
Access: 16th April, 2014) (Talking about the concentration of the Court over African states), see also The USA 
and the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International (11th November, 2007), available at 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/international-criminal-court/usa-icc> (Last Access: 
16th April, 2014).    
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imperialism, again an accusation that the prosecutors’ gravity-based justifications are mere 
apologetics.   
These accusations all presuppose that, in making these decisions, the Prosecutor could 
have chosen otherwise, in other words that he had some discretion. Choice opens the possibility 
of politically-based decision-making. In this light, what is striking about the prosecutor’s 
justifications of gravity-based decisions, whether in public statements or official documents, is 
the implication that these have in effect been driven entirely by substantive legal requirements, 
referring to the ‘standard’ of gravity or the ‘threshold requirements’ of the Statute (presumably 
referring to Article 17(1)(d) “sufficient gravity”). At the same time, the Prosecutor has 
identified gravity as a key factor in the selection of situations and cases, which seems to point 
towards prosecutorial discretion. Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) explicitly grants the prosecutor a 
power to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In other words, even when the legal requirements 
of initiating an investigation or proceeding with a case are satisfied, the prosecutor can still 
decline to proceed to open an investigation or bring a case against an individual if this would 
not serve ‘the interests of justice’. The ‘interests of justice’ provisions even specifically 
mention gravity. The Prosecutor, however, has not yet rejected any situation or case on the 
basis that the investigation or prosecution does not serve ‘the interests of justice’. Indeed in the 
2007 OTP policy document on the interests of justice, the Prosecutor emphasised that ‘the 
exercise of the Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) is exceptional in its 
nature and that there is a presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution wherever the 
criteria established in Article 53(1) (a) and (b) or Article 53(2)(a) and (b) have been met.’639 
                                                          
639 Introduction, P. 1. 
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Some  legal academic commentators640 have argued that in a number of these early 
decisions the prosecutor ‘conflated’ the gravity as an admissibility criterion (so-called ‘legal 
gravity’ or ‘absolute gravity’) with gravity as it would be weighed in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion (so-called ‘relative gravity’).641 This chapter will examine those 
debates below.  However, these debates are limited. In making the contrast between ‘legal 
gravity’ and ‘relative gravity’, these authors do not raise the question whether the gravity 
threshold laid down in Article 17 (1)(d) as a legal standard is itself subject to  discretionary 
interpretation. Here, it is a matter of legal interpretive discretion (see Chapter Three)642 rather 
than prosecutorial discretion. This chapter seeks to argue that the broad and open-ended 
meaning of the term ‘sufficient gravity’ in Article 17 (1)(d) has in effect permitted the 
prosecutor to apply it in a discretionary fashion. In support of this claim, I shall draw on a 
number of authors who emphasise that there is much discretionary scope attached to this 
standard of legal gravity. 
Running across all these debates is the issue of the Prosecutor’s lack of transparency. 
Especially in his early pronouncements, the Prosecutor offered very brief accounts of the 
reasoning leading to the decision. The form in which matters were put left it very unclear 
whether he was talking about applying the sufficient gravity criterion as such or was merely 
‘guided’ by it in exercising prosecutorial discretion. As time has gone by, information from the 
OTP on decisions has become more detailed. Arguably one reason for this is that the Prosecutor 
has sought to open two investigations proprio motu (Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire), which 
necessitates the Prosecutor to put his reasoning when applying to the Chambers for 
                                                          
640 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1429. Stegmiller, supra no. 13, Pp. 558-9. Also see SaCouta and Cleary, supra n. 
13, P. 851. Also see above discussion of conflicting interpretations. 
641 As the term ‘relative gravity’ is used by these commentators, at this point excluding the question whether 
sufficient gravity may itself be relative (see above and below for clarification). 
642 Special thanks to my supervisory team to help me to understand this sort of discretion, in particular my 
Director of Studies John Strawson. 
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authorisation to proceed to open an investigation. The extent to which these applications for 
authorisation are equally informative will be examined below.  Indeed, I shall claim that the 
‘breakthrough’ in openness can be identified in the Mali Article 53(1) report and, more widely, 
the decision of the OTP to issue reports when decisions are made under Articles 5. 
In discussing the dyadic tensions structuring criticism of the ICC prosecutor and the 
Court more widely, Robinson suggests that one strategic way that the prosecutor could reduce 
criticism is to be quite transparent in offering explanations when making the final decision, in 
particular when the prosecutor is in front of a high-profile situation such as the Iraq decision 
concerning British troops.643 However, he argues, more transparency and explanation will not 
ultimately lead to an escape from these dyadic criticisms:  
Transparency may offer many benefits, but escape from the dyads is not one of them. 
Transparency may help increase predictability and reduce outright misunderstandings 
(and thus may reduce those criticisms based in misunderstanding or unfamiliarity). 
But even if one’s approach is explained with perfect clarity, that approach will still be 
subject to legitimate apologia and utopia critiques.644 
Over a period of years,645 no doubt partly in reaction to the controversies around the 
early decisions, the Prosecutor began to develop a ‘methodology’ for assessing the gravity of 
crimes by reference to a set of factors, which started to emerge in 2006 (see section 4.3 below).  
Seemingly, these factors were intended both as an aid to interpreting Article 17(1)(d) and to 
provide guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, although this was not specified.  
The approach to perpetrators was articulated quite early (2003)646 in terms of ‘those most 
                                                          
643 Supra n. 73, P 23, ‘A common reaction is that you could escape or blunt such concerns by publishing your 
legal reasoning.’ 
644 Supra n. 73, P. 35. 
645 Schabas, supra n. 258, Pp. 736- 741. 
646 Policy Paper 2003, supra n. 187, P. 3. 
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responsible’. The way that the Prosecutor has set out their overall stance on these factors, and 
the ways that they have been deployed in particular instances, has also attracted criticism: far 
from clarifying and stabilising the meaning of gravity, factorial analysis has merely enhanced 
the Prosecutor’s discretion, especially in allowing the Prosecutor to pick and choose instances 
when qualitative factors will be deemed decisive. This chapter will pursue and develop this 
line of argument, that the prosecutor, when assessing these factors, should be more consistent 
when determining legal gravity, as understood under Article 17 (1)(d), and remain flexible 
when assessing relative gravity, as understood under Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c). A second 
(and related) line of criticism647 attributes the prosecutor’s Africa focus to the OTP’s 
commitment to one gravity factor: ‘the scale of the crimes’ has been used predominantly by 
the OTP. In developing this criticism, this chapter will explore how this focus raises doubts 
about the global character of the Court by limiting the reach of the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Court to cover, for example, all victims of different communities or societies.  
The Court Chambers have in turn adopted these factors (and at times, others) and 
criteria of responsibility, initially and most controversially in the Lubanga & Ntaganda cases, 
and subsequently, as will be examined below. Rulings by the Court Chambers on the meaning 
of ‘sufficient gravity’ (Article 17(1)(d) as invoked in Article 53(1)(b)  limit the legal 
interpretive discretion of the Prosecutor insofar as the Prosecutor will follow the Chamber’s 
interpretation. These decisions by the Court Chambers on gravity as an admissibility criterion 
can also raise higher or lower the legal threshold, which in turn has a significant impact on the 
entire conception of the role of the Court and the way that it is manifested in prosecutorial 
decisions.  The Lubanga & Ntaganda PTC 1 (2006)648 decision – the first judicial interpretation 
                                                          
647 See Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity under the Rome Statute, in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik 
(eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), Pp. 
1- 3. 
648 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo: Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation 
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of gravity – interpreted ‘sufficient gravity’ not only as requiring certain gravity factors in 
respect to criminal acts, but also specific characteristics of the perpetrators. In deeming these 
integral to the meaning of Article 17(1)(d) PTC I thus imposed a high legal gravity threshold, 
whilst curtailing not only the broad discretionary leeway that the Prosecutor was otherwise able 
to deploy in interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’, but also considerably eroding prosecutorial 
discretion in selecting potential cases. This was an early example of intra-institutional conflict 
between the Chambers and the Prosecutor as to the prosecutor’s sphere of discretion. However, 
the decision of PTC I was to a large extent neutralised by the Appeal Court. The Comoros 
review decision, in returning to these issues has ruled on the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’ in 
the context of Article 53, stating that Article 53 ‘paragraphs (a) and (b) require the application 
of exacting legal requirements’649 which would suggest that the prosecutor now has no leeway 
for interpretive discretion – except unlike previous analyses of ‘strict legal construal’ (see 
above). The PTC also seems to see this as compatible with comparative analysis in order to 
determine ‘sufficient gravity’.650 Unlike PTC in Lubanga & Ntaganda, however, PTC I in 
Comoros seeks to impose a low gravity threshold. At the same time, it has also specifically 
declared that the Prosecutor’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respect to investigating 
(referred) situations is limited to invoking the ‘interests of justice’ criteria in Article 53(1)(c). 
This will be explained below. 
This chapter is structured in three parts. The first part examines the broad debates 
around discretion, notably whether comparative analysis between situations can legitimately 
be undertaken under Article 17(1)(d), whether ‘extra-legal’ factors such as the limited 
resources of the Courts, and other practical considerations, can be taken into account, as these 
                                                          
of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No.: ICC-01/04-01/06, 24th 
February, 2006, Para. 42, (hereinafter: Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, February, 2006). This case is discussed 
below. 
649 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 14.  
650 Ibid, Para. 2. 
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have been  raised by legal academic commentators in the name of the distinction between legal 
gravity and ‘relative gravity’. The Prosecutor’s development of a factor-based methodology 
and how this in turn potentially enhances prosecutorial discretion will also be examined.  
The second part of the chapter looks at ‘Gravity in Practice’, and will analyse how the 
term ‘sufficient gravity’ has been interpreted and applied by the Prosecutor and the Court at 
the stage of initiating investigations and proceeding with prosecutions. It will show how the 
Prosecutor has interpreted ‘sufficient gravity’ relying on discretionary leeway afforded by the 
flexible and indeterminate character of this term, as laid down in Article 17 (1)(d) (legal 
interpretive discretion). More specifically, it will critically examine how the Prosecutor has 
utilised the ‘methodology’ of the factor-based analysis of gravity of crimes, focusing on the 
criticism that the ICC Prosecutor has selected different factors in different contexts to 
determine the legal gravity of situations and cases. The discussion of these situations and cases 
will concentrate also on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the criticism that the 
prosecutor has in effect been exercising prosecutorial discretion when considering gravity 
whilst presenting this as a purely legal exercise. The application of gravity factors by the 
prosecutor will also be examined from a critical perspective. It will be argued that the 
Prosecutor has been very committed to one factor when examining gravity, namely ‘the scale 
of the crimes’.  
The third part of the chapter interrogates the predominately quantitative approach that 
the prosecutor has implicitly relied on in assessing gravity. It will examine the arguments that 
the prosecutor should give more weight to qualitative factors. It will consider these issues 
closely as they have been decided and disputed in the Comoros situation. The latter situation 
will be analysed as case law and will review the question of discretion and the factorial analysis 
that this chapter discusses.  
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4.2. Gravity and Discretion 
Gravity has two different and distinct roles within the ICC regime. On the one hand, 
where gravity/seriousness is considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it would be 
an element – a very important element – as seen above, in selecting among legally worthy 
situations and cases (i.e. that satisfy jurisdictional and admissibility requirements). On the other 
hand, and, in fact, prior to that in the prosecutorial decision-making process, ‘sufficient gravity’ 
(Article 17(1)(d) functions as a legal threshold that imposes a standard of gravity higher than 
the already grave nature of the crimes that fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Whilst the first 
raises the question of when and how the prosecutor exercises prosecutorial discretion – and 
upon what basis of authority? –the second is frequently presented as involving no discretion at 
all. How does gravity figure in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as a selection filter? This 
has been discussed by many writers using the term ‘relative gravity’.  In fact, they are using 
the term in two different senses. First, ‘relative gravity’ can refer to making comparisons 
between the immediate situation or case and others, whether those that have already been 
decided upon in the past or among the range of possible options facing the prosecutor at any 
one time, considering whether the potential cases within a situation are relatively less grave or 
proceed on the basis that they are comparable or graver.  For example, in his explanation of the 
decision, Moreno-Ocampo stated that he selected the Ugandan rebels but not government 
forces because the alleged crimes committed by the former ‘were much more numerous and of 
much higher gravity than’651 the latter. Similarly, specific cases might be prioritised to take to 
trial on the basis of their relative gravity compared to other cases within the same situation. 
The OTP has said that ‘cases inside the situation are selected according to their gravity.’652   
                                                          
651 Statement by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo 14 October 2005, P. 3, available at <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2919856F-03E0-403F-A1A8-
D61D4F350A20/277305/Uganda_LMO_Speech_141020091.pdf>.  
652 Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra n. 616, P. 5. 
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As pointed out in section 4.1, in the absence of a clear judicial ruling, commentators 
have diverged as to whether this first sense of relative gravity may legitimately be considered 
under Article 53(1)(b), with the ‘conflation’ school of thought arguing that it definitely cannot.  
PTC I in Comoros seems to decree otherwise. However, all commentators are agreed that 
‘relative gravity’ in the second sense (see next paragraph) could not fall within the realm of 
assessing gravity in relation to Article 17(1)(d) under Article 53(1)(b).  
Second, ‘relative gravity’ is used to refer to weighing the gravity of potential cases 
within a situation, or cases to take to trial, against other factors, such as the limited resources 
of the ICC. As was shown in Chapter One, this particular limitation may be a sufficient reason 
for the prosecutor to allocate these resources elsewhere where if its gravity, relative to ‘other 
factors, such as practical considerations, including the likelihood of apprehending a suspect or 
the availability of evidence, or strategic considerations such as a desire to shed light on the 
"complete landscape" of events that occurred within a particular situation’653 does not warrant 
investigation or prosecution. 
Commentators on the early cases and situations have accused the prosecutor of 
'conflating' legal gravity and relative gravity (in both senses). They are insinuating that the 
Prosecutor assessed legal gravity through methods that they believe should have been used 
only for of relative gravity assessments. This raises a number of questions: 1) does the 
assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’ necessarily exclude making comparisons between potential 
cases in situations (relative gravity in the first sense)? Only the courts can give an answer to 
that (so far the Court ruled otherwise). 2) If these decisions are in fact an exercise in 
prosecutorial discretion, what discretion does the Prosecutor actually have in respect to 
investigating situations? This is especially important in respect to relative gravity in the second 
                                                          
653 SaCouto and Cleary, supra n. 13, p 814. 
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sense which includes reference to extra-legal factors. This will be examined in detail in the 
discussion below of the specific instances.   
As explored in Chapter One of this thesis, there are some conundrums as to the extent 
of prosecutorial discretion authorised by the Statute in relation to both proprio motu powers 
and referrals. These general concerns naturally also apply where ‘relative gravity’ is involved 
as a basis of selection. Thus several commentators, as well as the ICC Prosecutor, argue that 
the prosecutor’s discretion in respect to proprio motu investigations under Article 15 ceases 
once the legal criteria of jurisdiction and admissibility have been satisfied.654 At that point the 
prosecutor has no choice but to proceed: ‘the Statute compels her to seek authorization to open 
an investigation.’655 With respect to referrals, that argument has been put even more 
forcefully.656 
For those who believe that there is very little, if any, prosecutorial discretion to select 
situations once the legal criteria are satisfied, the ‘interests of justice’ provisions in Article 53 
(1)(c) and (2)(c) become especially important as the only recourse for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion whether or not to open an investigation. Stegmiller, for example, 
argues that gravity can be considered in a relative sense only in the context of ‘the interests of 
justice’.657 Gravity is specifically mentioned as a consideration in both Article 53 (1)(c) and 
(2)(c), which grant the prosecutor discretion not to proceed in relation to investigations and 
prosecutions respectively. It is broadly accepted that ‘gravity’ here must mean something 
different from Article17 (1)(d) itself. Certainly, what is referred to is the gravity of ‘the crime’ 
and not the case’, suggesting that only the severity of the offence is to be considered and not 
                                                          
654 See for example, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010, .Para. 76. See also, Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations 2013, Paras. 40 and 74. 
655 Vaid, supra n. 12, P. 363. 
656 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1410. Except that she argues that it would be covered by “reasonable basis”. 
657 Stegmiller, supra n. 13, P. 563. This is also the stance taken in (Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra 
n. 621, Para. 14). 
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the degree of responsibility of the perpetrator. Under these provisions, considerations of 
‘relative gravity’ would be appropriate and authorised.658 However, gravity is positioned 
differently in respect to investigations and prosecutions. In Article 53 (1)(c), empowering the 
prosecutor not to open a formal investigation even though the legal criteria of jurisdiction and 
admissibility are met, the phrasing counter-poses gravity of the crime (and the interests of 
victims) to the interests of justice: ‘Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests 
of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not 
serve the interests of justice’. This suggests that ‘the interests of justice’ is to be balanced 
against these factors as countervailing considerations, as further underlined by the term 
‘nonetheless’.659 On this basis, deGuzman believes that, with respect to investigations, there is 
no room for considerations of ‘relative gravity’ under the Article 53(1)(c). She argues that 
‘[r]eading the Prosecutor's discretion to consider relative gravity into the ‘‘interests of justice’’ 
provision strains the language of the Statute. The Statute’s use of the term ‘‘nonetheless’’ 
indicates gravity should not be considered an element of the interests of justice here, but rather 
a factor to be balanced against those interests, whatever they may be.’660 She advances this 
argument also on the basis that the drafters of the Statute – although the term ‘interests of 
justice’ was left ambiguous – would not accept that the determination of these interests to be 
made on the basis of ‘relative gravity judgments.661 Taking deGuzman’s arguments in this 
paper altogether, they had to claim that the Prosecutor has in effect no discretion with respect 
to situational gravity. Others, notably Stegmiller, do not find such a problem. However, he 
suggests that gravity can be considered in its relative sense under both Article 53 (1)(c) and 
(2)(c). When it comes to taking cases to trial, in Article 53(2)(c), gravity is clearly located as 
                                                          
658 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1413. 
659 Ibid, P. 1413. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid. 
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one of the circumstances that may be ‘taken into account’ in determining a prosecution is not 
in the interests of justice.662     
To summarise: for those early commentators who admonish the prosecutor for 
‘conflating’ (or eliding or being careless) ‘legal gravity ‘and ‘relative gravity’, Article 17 (1)(d) 
as considered under Article 53(1)(b) is ‘a purely legal admissibility test’663 and does not allow 
the prosecutor to exercise any sort of discretion not to proceed once the threshold of ‘sufficient 
gravity’ is met. Further, given that the interests of justice provisions have never been invoked 
as a basis not to proceed, the prosecutor in turn would have had a narrow compass of authority 
for the exercise of such prosecutorial discretion in de facto ‘relative gravity’ assessments. On 
the other hand, as deGuzman argues, this may be an issue more of form than substance664 and 
that the prosecutor may have discretion in the overall assessment of ‘reasonable basis’.665 Apart 
from anything else, it encompasses weighing the evidential value of the materials available on 
the alleged facts of what occurred. 
In discussing ‘legal gravity’ as a threshold admissibility criterion, writers such as 
deGuzman and Stegmiller tend to present it as if it had an absolute sense, by contrast to the 
evidently discretionary nature of ‘relative gravity’. Indeed, whilst recognising the discretionary 
element of other statutory criteria, such authors do not raise the question whether the gravity 
threshold laid down in Article 17 (1)(d) is itself subject to somewhat discretionary 
interpretations and that the Prosecutor’s interpretation of ‘sufficient gravity’ should also be 
interrogated. The very term ‘sufficient’ suggests subjective judgement whilst Schabas has 
                                                          
662 Article 53(2)(c) states: ‘A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his 
or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.’ 
663 Stegmiller, supra n. 13, P. 562. 
664 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, p 1414. 
665 Ibid, P. 1410. 
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remarked on the rather enigmatic notion of ‘gravity’ as a key example of the indeterminate 
nature of the statutory criteria: ‘‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice’, provide enormous space for 
highly discretionary determinations.’666 These analyses imply that the prosecutor’s decisions 
are discretionary depending on the broad leeway given by the broad and undefined term 
‘sufficient gravity’. 
What became Article 17(1)(d) in the final version of the Statute, was originally included 
under Article 35 in the 1994 Draft of the Statute.667 During the ILC debates on the 1994 Draft 
Statute, in fact, much of the discussion about gravity concerned the crimes to be included under 
subject-matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae). The question then was whether, for the purposes 
of the exercise of jurisdiction, a further gravity requirement should to be imposed as a matter 
of admissibility. There were some members of the Commission who opined that there was no 
such need, as ‘the relevant factors could be taken into account at the level of jurisdiction’.668 
In contrast, ‘[o]ther members argued that because the circumstances of particular cases could 
vary widely and [the statutory provision] could anyway be substantially clarified after the court 
assumed jurisdiction so that a power such as that contained in article 35 was necessary if the 
purposes indicated in the preamble were to be fulfilled.’669 At the conclusion of these 
discussions, the additional gravity threshold was retained within the Statute. However, there 
was little discussion offered to elaborate on the meaning of gravity. Indeed, two potentially 
conflicting rationales were offered.670 On the one hand, the rationale for the exclusion of 
                                                          
666 Schabas, supra n. 4, P. 181. 
667 Article 35 of the 1994 Draft provided that a case will not be admissible when it ‘Is not of such gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.’ 
668 The 1994 draft was the final draft prepared by the International Law Commission and presented to the 
UNGA along with a report on the final ILC drafting debates. Report of the[International Law] Commission to 
the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
United Nations, A/CN.4 SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2), Para.91, Art. 35, P. 52 available at 
<http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1994_v2_p2.pdf&lang=EFSRAC>. 
669 Ibid. 
670 The conflict can be seen notably in Pikis’s dissenting judgment in Lubanga /Ntaganda Appeal, paras 38-40, 
especially para 40, where he adopts the perspective of a national court. 
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insufficiently grave cases was made (as above) by reference to fulfilling the purposes indicated 
in the Preamble of the Statute.671 On the other hand, making reference to national jurisdictions, 
in one of the drafting meetings, it was argued that the international court should have ‘power 
to stay a prosecution on specified grounds, a power that existed in many national jurisdictions’ 
and should include the fact that the acts alleged were not of sufficient gravity to warrant trial 
at the international level’; otherwise, ‘the court might be swamped by peripheral complaints 
involving minor offenders, possibly in situations where the major offenders were going free’672 
away from the reach of the Court. Then, at the 1998 Rome Conference itself, the Chilean 
delegation asked for an explanation for the vague term ‘sufficient gravity’ in Article 15(d) as 
it then was, nonetheless, the draft negotiations proceeded without giving a sufficient attention 
to this particular debate.673 The legislative history then provided very limited clarification on 
the content of the term ‘sufficient gravity’. DeGuzman has noted the ‘constructive role’ played 
by the ‘failure to elaborate the meaning of gravity’ in enabling the Court's establishment and 
development by allowing “states to support the Court without having to share a vision of its 
role in the world”, bridging ‘human rights-promoting states and sovereignty-focused states’.  
The gravity threshold for admissibility in particular: 
… enabled the human rights-focused states to expand the lists of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity included in the Rome Statute compared to prior statutes. When 
sovereignty-focused states expressed concern over the inclusion of less serious types of 
                                                          
671 Supra n. 668, Para. 50. 
672 Report of the[International Law] Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-sixth session, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, United Nations A/CN.4/SER.A/1994  1 [Part 1] , which includes 
SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE2328th TO 2377th MEETINGS, 2330th meeting 4 May 1994, para 9, p 9. It is worth 
noting that the discussion continues (same paragraph): It was not sufficient for such considerations to be taken 
into account by the prosecutor since this would raise problems of accountability. 
673 United Nations, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June -17 July 1998 Official Records Volume II, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.II), P. 
215, available at <http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf>. 
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crimes, they were reassured that the gravity threshold would ensure that the Court 
exercises jurisdiction only over sufficiently serious instances of those crimes.674 
However, she notes elsewhere, ‘while gravity's ambiguity played a constructive role in 
enabling the establishment of the ICC, it has become increasingly problematic as the ICC has 
become operational.’675 
In taking up this issue of the ambiguity of the gravity threshold, Vaid emphasises that 
the open-endedness and substantive flexibility of ‘sufficient gravity’ provide the prosecutor 
with ‘some degree of discretion.’676 She says that gravity is of ‘an exceptionally flexible 
concept’ that is open for varied interpretations ‘in many different and plausible ways.’677 This 
type of discretion implicitly allows the prosecutor to choose among alternative interpretations. 
To her, indeterminacy of the concept gives the prosecutor a power to claim authority as to 
which correct interpretations will be taken when deciding whether to initiate an investigation 
or not.678 Therefore, ‘[s]uch interpretive autonomy, when coupled with the flexibility of the 
concept itself, strongly resembles discretion.’679 As will be explored and discussed below, the 
practice of the OTP in applying the term ‘sufficient gravity’ strongly suggests that the 
Prosecutor has been able to exercise a broad discretion, whilst remaining within the framework 
of the Statute. By contrast to prosecutorial discretion, which, explicitly permits and draws upon 
extra-legal factors, the prosecutor ‘has capitalized on the substantive flexibility of concepts 
                                                          
674 Margret M. deGuzman, How Serious are International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International 
Criminal Law, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 51, Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2012-13. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014987>, P. 34. 
675 Margret M. deGuzman, Gravity Rhetoric: The Good, The Bad, and The "Political", American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, Vol. 107, p 423. 
676 Vaid, supra n. 12, Pp. 377 and 385.   
677 Ibid, P. 388. 
678 Ibid. 
679 Ibid, P. 365. 
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such as gravity to find the necessary [legal interpretive] discretion within rather than outside 
the criteria established by article [17(1)(d)]’(emphasis added).680 The benefit is that: 
… adherence to pre-established standards and criteria has been often recognized as a 
factor relevant to the legitimacy of the resulting decisions, particularly with respect to 
prosecutors. … [Hence] the Prosecutor seems to attempt to embrace these elements of 
―good process.681 
In order to see precisely how the ‘the Prosecutor has leveraged the flexibility of the 
text’ – specifically ‘sufficient gravity’ – ‘to assert discretion within those criteria’,682 it is 
necessary to explore the factors developed by the Prosecutor in policy documents as a way of 
giving meaning to the concept of gravity. It is in the use and manipulation of those factors that 
the Prosecutor has been able to find and choose between alternative interpretations of the term 
‘sufficient gravity’. 
4.3. Gravity in OTP Documents and Statements 
Although the OTP tried to elucidate the meaning of gravity through several policy 
documents and statements, nonetheless, the term is left highly unspecified. Indeed, it is not 
clear whether these documents or statements were intended as specifications of additional 
elements that would raise the commission of already grave crimes up to the Article 17 (1)(d) 
requirement of ‘sufficient gravity’ or whether they were merely intended as policy statements 
guiding prosecutorial discretion in making selections. In a policy paper 2003, the OTP 
examined the meaning of the ‘gravity of a case’ and stated that ‘[t]he concept of gravity should 
not be exclusively attached to the act that constituted the crime but also to the degree of 
                                                          
680 Ibid, P. 383. 
681 Ibid, P. 383. 
682 Ibid, P. 385. 
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participation in its commission.’683 Outlining the OTP strategy of focusing ‘on those who bear 
the greatest responsibility, the paper emphasised that these would potentially be ‘leaders of the 
State or organisation’.684 This was reemphasised again in the paper issued in the same year. 
The strategy paper also notes, however, that ‘the Office of The Prosecutor may go wider than 
high-ranking officers, if investigation of certain types of crimes or those officers lower down 
the chain of command is necessary for the whole case.’685 Two years later, Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo identified two factors to be taken into consideration in assessing gravity of the crimes: 
numbers of persons killed or who were victims of other crimes, and the impact of the crimes.686 
In an unpublished draft policy paper on Criteria for selection of situations and cases 
2006, the OTP identified four factors relevant for the assessment of gravity.687 These factors 
were then all laid down in Regulation 29 (2) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 
(2009): 1- the scale of the crimes, 2- the nature of the crimes, 3- the manner of the commission 
of the crimes, and 4- the impact of the crimes.688 The OTP ‘left considerable space for 
flexibility, by leaving the balancing and weight of the individual criteria open to its independent 
assessment’.689 These factors are to be assessed independently, impartially, and objectively.690 
                                                          
683 Supra n. 187, P. 7. 
684 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the 
Prosecutor”: Referrals and Communications (September, 2003), P. 7. 
685 Ibid, P. 7. 
686 The ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court: Informal meeting of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (24th October, 2005), P. 6, 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-
CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_English.pdf>. 
687 Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 2006, the draft was not published but cited by many authors 
who have a copy of the draft, such as Margaret M. deGuzman, at supra n. 532. 
688 Regulation 29 of Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, entered into Force on 23rd 
April 2009. 
689 Supra n. 61, P. 268. 
690 Cited in deGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1459, in Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 2006. 
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These factors contain qualitative and quantitative measures.691 A more recent policy 
paper issued in 2013 elucidates these factors.692 ‘The scale of the crimes’ means the prosecutor 
will consider ‘the number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the damage caused by 
the crimes, in particular the bodily or psychological harm caused to the victims and their 
families, or their geographical or temporal spread (high intensity of the crimes over a brief 
period or low intensity of crimes over an extended period).’693 Fabricio Guariglia, a member 
of staff of the OTP, had earlier specified that the OTP considers ‘scale of the crimes’ in 
selecting which situations to investigate and crimes to prosecute.694 ‘The nature of the crimes695 
refers to the specific elements of each offence such as killings, rapes, and other crimes 
involving sexual or gender violence and crimes committed against children, persecution, or the 
imposition of conditions of life on a group calculated to bring about its destruction.’696 The 
Prosecutor referred to some particular crimes such as killing, rape, and child conscription in 
the DRC situation.697 The third factor is the manner of commission of the crimes, includes 
crimes that are directed against vulnerable people who cannot defend themselves, or those 
crimes that are committed by virtue of positions of the authority of the perpetrators that 
facilitate the commission of such crimes.698 The fourth factor is the impact of crimes,699 which 
has also been the subject of the legal deliberation in the Pre-Trial Chamber.700 In the Darfur 
                                                          
691 See further discussion of these factors in Stegmiller, supra n. 13, Pp. 560-1. 
692 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, P. 15. 
693 Ibid, P. 15. 
694 Fabricio Guariglia, The Selection of Cases by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (ed.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), P. 214. 
695 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1452. 
696 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Pp. 63. 
697 Supra n. 694, P. 214. 
698 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, P. 14. 
699 Ibid, P. 14. 
700 See in concurrence Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09- 
243-Red, 8 February 2010, paras. 31; ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Para. 188; ICC-02/11-14, Paras. 203-204. See also, 
Sudan: Prosecutor: "The attack on African Union Peacekeepers in Haskanita was an Attack on Millions of 
Civilians They had Come to Protect; We will Prosecute those Allegedly Responsible", Reliefweb (17th May, 
2009), at <http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-prosecutor-attack-african-union-peacekeepers-haskanita-
was-attack-millions> (Last Access: 20th May, 2016), stating that ‘parties are targeting those who came to help 
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situation, the Prosecutor referred to the gravity of the crimes committed against the members 
of the peace-keepers in Darfur and its serious impact on the large number of civilians who 
relied on the humanitarian aid and protection these forces provide.701 Also, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber stated in its decision with regard to the Lubanga case that ‘the social alarm’ is a 
relevant factor for the assessment of the gravity threshold, as Lubanga was charged for enlisting 
children, which warrants such alarm.702  
The OTP has made clear on several occasions that the consideration of these factors 
‘should be considered jointly; no fixed weight should be assigned to the criteria, but rather a 
judgment will have to be reached on the facts and circumstances of each situation.’703 Several 
questions, however, remain unanswered about how these factors should be evaluated, whether 
there is any hierarchy or a co-equal approach to be taken, or whether or not the existence of 
one or more than one factor is enough to determine the satisfaction of gravity in a certain 
situation or case. In practice, the Prosecutors have not been consistent about what they are 
trying to develop. In the next sections of this chapter, there will be a detailed discussion of how 
the OTP has applied these factors. Before we turn to this discussion, it is worth noting that 
recently the OTP declared in its latest policy paper that ‘gravity of the crimes’ is one criterion 
for the selection of cases.704 This criterion means that the prosecutor when selecting which 
cases to be prosecuted will focus on those most serious ones ‘that are of concern to the 
international community as a whole’. 
4.4. Gravity in Practice (2004- 2012) 
                                                          
civilians, the AU and UN Peacekeepers, the aid workers. Such attacks also …. have a direct impact on the 
delivery of vital services and thereby exacerbate the suffering of vulnerable groups.’  
701 Ibid. 
702 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, No.: ICC-
01/04-01/07, P. 47. See also Stegmiller, supra n. 13. 
703 Supra n. 260, P. 5. Also see supra n. 694, P. 214. 
704 Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 2016, Para. 34. 
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The following section will examine the earlier practice of the Court and the prosecutor 
of the application of gravity, before it moves to the most recent development. This section will 
trace this development chronologically. It will explore how the Prosecutors, in particular, and 
the Court, in general, applied gravity. The analysis of this practice will focus on Article 17 
(1)(d), as the Prosecutor has not yet rejected any situation or case on the basis of ‘relative 
gravity’, as understood under Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c). The discussion also will refer to the 
importance of the consideration of extra-legal factors, and will emphasise that such a 
consideration is a part of the assessment of relative gravity when the prosecutor only exercises 
prosecutorial discretion and not to be mixed with the assessment of legal gravity. It will also 
argue that the prosecutor should be more consistent when assessing ‘sufficient gravity’, as the 
current practice, followed by the Prosecutor and the Court, indicates that the development of 
this concept is highly messy.705  
4.4.1. Uganda (2004), DRC (2004), and Darfur (2005) Situations 
In his first report about the first three years’ activities of the OTP Moreno-Ocampo 
stated:  
After thorough analysis, the Office concluded that the situations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) and Northern Uganda were the gravest admissible 
situations under the jurisdiction of the Court. The situation in Darfur, the Sudan, 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council, also clearly met the gravity 
standard.706  
                                                          
705 Ignaz Stegmiller, Interpretative Gravity under the Rome Statute, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), P. 617, stating that the Court and the Prosecutor confused the use of the concept of 
gravity in its legal and relative senses. 
706 ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed during the First Years (June 2003- June 
2006), available at < http://www.iccnow.org/documents/3YearReport%20_06Sep14.pdf>. 
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In justifying his decision, Moreno-Ocampo based his decision to select the DRC, 
Uganda, and Darfur situations on the gravity criterion. The Prosecutor used the comparative 
method to determine ‘sufficient gravity’ of these situations (the first sense of relative gravity, 
as argued by the commentators). Here, the Prosecutor was accused of conflating situational 
‘relative gravity’ with legal gravity.707 It was submitted that the comparative approach indicates 
that the Prosecutor was using his prosecutorial discretion to select among ‘the gravest 
admissible situations’,708 whilst in fact he meant legal gravity as understood under Article 53 
(1)(b), where there is no room for prosecutorial discretion. In such assessment, deGuzman 
argues that the comparative method is not warranted by Article 17 (1)(d), as the latter requires 
instead a threshold.709 DeGuzman points out that Moreno-Ocampo justified his selection by 
virtue of ‘the Statute's gravity threshold for admissibility.’710  
On another occasion as well, the OTP stated that ‘[t]he Office identified the situations 
in the DRC, Uganda and Colombia as containing the gravest occurrence of crimes within its 
treaty jurisdiction.’711 Once again, Moreno-Ocampo was using the comparative approach to 
determine ‘sufficient gravity’ of those situations. 
In the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor used the comparative approach to conclude the 
gravity of this situation, as can be seen in the above report of the three first years of activities. 
In his second report to the SC, Moreno-Ocampo made a brief reference to gravity and stated 
that ‘the Office has collated as comprehensive a picture as possible of the crimes allegedly 
                                                          
707 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1429. 
708 Ibid, P. 1432. 
709 See for example another occasion in which the Prosecutor used the comparative method to conclude 
‘sufficient gravity’ of the Uganda situation, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010, Para. 57, stating 
that the Uganda situation was considered ‘as containing the gravest occurrence of crimes within its treaty 
jurisdiction.’ 
710 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1432. 
711 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2010, Para. 57. 
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committed in Darfur since 1 July 2002 .... From this over-all picture the Office has identified 
particularly grave events’.712 
Bearing in mind that the four factors of the June 2006 policy paper were not introduced 
yet by the OTP, what can be seen from these early uses of gravity is that the OTP considerably 
adopted the comparative approach to determine ‘sufficient gravity’ of those situations. As will 
be explained more in the Iraq situation, in using the comparative method, the Prosecutor 
primarily depended on the criterion of scale to determine the gravity of these situations, namely 
the relative number of victims was the measure of the assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’.713  
4.4.2. LRA Case (2005) 
Within the Uganda situation, the OTP investigated the alleged crimes committed by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Uganda People Defence Force (UPDF). Here, Moreno-
Ocampo indicted five members from the rebels’ groups (LRA) and zero members from the 
Government’s side (UPDF). He stated: 
In Uganda, the criterion for selection of the first case was gravity. We analyzed the 
gravity of all crimes in Northern Uganda committed by all groups -- the LRA, the 
UPDF and other forces. Our investigations indicated that the crimes committed by the 
LRA were of dramatically higher gravity. We therefore started with an investigation 
of the LRA.714 
                                                          
712 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council pursuant to UNSC 1593 (13th December, 2005), P. 2, available at 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2CFC1123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-
52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMO_UNSC_ReportB_En.pdf>.   
713 Supra n. 626, Pp. 4-5. 
714 Supra n. 686, P. 8. 
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Similarly to the above early uses of gravity, Moreno-Ocampo used the comparative 
method to determine the gravity of these cases.715 Critics such as Stegmiller and Sasana and 
Cleary accuse him of conflating ‘relative gravity’ with legal gravity.716 They point out that such 
a statement suggests that ‘the Prosecutor's choice to investigate and prosecute the conduct of 
the LRA prior to looking into the alleged crimes of the government was based on an exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, not as a result of the gravity requirement under Article 17(1)(d).’717 
In other words, as if both cases are legally admissible, but it is prosecutorial discretion that 
pushed the prosecutor to prosecute only rebels’ crimes, but not the Government’s side.  
The decision was also criticised as being political on the two sides of the argument. 
Moreno-Ocampo was criticised for appearing political, as he decided only to prosecute the 
rebels but not the Government.718 As one politician also said on the decision to concentrate 
investigations on the LRA, ‘the ICC has become Museveni’s political tool.’719 The latter 
criticism is commonly linked to the idea that Moreno-Ocampo himself encouraged the 
Government in Uganda to refer its own situation without the OTP intervention.720 The referral 
from the Government asked the OTP to look only at the crimes committed by the rebels’ side, 
although the Prosecutor stated that he will investigate all sides to the conflict.721 Uganda was 
                                                          
715 These are five LRA commanders: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen. 
716 Stegmiller, supra n. 13, P. 558.  See also SaCouto and Cleary, supra n. 13, P.851. 
717 SaCouto and Cleary, supra n. 13, P. 851. 
718 Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in Uganda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, Issue 3 (2008), P 42. Clark argued that the OTP failed to 
explain its strategy in Uganda in a way that help to defeat the massive criticisms that the OTP received of 
failing to initiate any case against the alleged crimes committed by the Government, and in particular by the 
UPDF. 
719 Cited in Clark, ibid, P.42. 
720 See more on this issue, The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC- 9 Years on: Analysis of the Prosecutorial 
Strategy and Policies of the Office of the Prosecutor (2003- 2011): Recommendations to the next Prosecutor, 
FIDH Paper, The International Federation for Human Rights (December 2011), P. 15, available at 
<http://fidh.org/en/international-justice/international-criminal-court-icc/The-Office-of-the-Prosecutor-of>. 
721 For more information about the tension in Uganda, see Adam Branch, Uganda's Civil War and the Politics of 
ICC Intervention, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 21, Issue, 02 (2007), Pp. 179- 198. 
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motivated by its own political interests, and they used the ICC approach to shield themselves 
from its justice. The Prosecutor then seems too political, as he was ‘too dependent on state 
policy’.722 This was an apologist critique.  
Equally applicable, the decision against only the rebels also (easy cases)723 looks 
politically taken, as the Prosecutor was seeking to prove a point that justice is in operation, 
though it was only partial justice.724 He did not give any attention to the other values that might 
be undermined, as the Prosecutor seeks to achieve only justice. Adrian Traylor criticises him 
for being ‘too insulated from the political considerations that are bound to be part of a State's 
referral of a situation.’725 This referral has been criticised by many commentators, as it does 
not ‘serve the interests of justice but also attempts to prolong the conflict and to keep the Acholi 
people of the north… weak.’726 The decision is unhelpful and unwise. It was a utopian critique.  
As can be seen now, the consideration of some extra-legal factors, such as securing the 
cooperation of the Government ‘for its [the OTP] continued presence in Uganda and its 
generally good relationship with key Ugandan officials’,727 and the political bias’ allegation 
indicate that the Prosecutor conducted a strong sense of discretion. This process has been 
completed by applying the legal criterion ‘sufficient gravity’, where the Prosecutor deployed 
his discretion over it. In so doing, the Prosecutor used the comparative method, relying 
primarily on the number of victims in this situation (scale). 
                                                          
722 Supra n. 72, P. 23. 
723 Easy cases means those cases that appear more likely to be prosecuted than others, and appear politically 
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727 Supra n. 718, P. 43. 
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4.4.3. Iraq Situation (February 2006) 
In this situation, Moreno-Ocampo was highly criticised for fallacious reasoning in the 
justification he provided for deciding not to open an investigation into the alleged crimes 
committed by the British soldiers in Iraq. He first examined the jurisdictional requirements, on 
the basis of the information available, and concluded that there was a reasonable basis to 
believe that British soldiers had committed crimes that fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
He declared that  
There was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within [personal and territorial] the 
jurisdiction of the Court had been committed, namely willful killing and inhuman 
treatment. The information available at this time supports a reasonable basis for an 
estimated 4 to 12 victims of willful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman 
treatment, totaling in all less than 20 persons. 
However, the Prosecutor then went on to state that, not only were the ICC specific 
gravity criteria for war crimes (Article 8(1) not met but also: 
… the general gravity requirement under Article 53(1)(b). The Office considers various 
factors in assessing gravity. A key consideration is the number of victims of particularly 
serious crimes, such as wilful killing or rape. The number of potential victims of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court in this situation – 4 to 12 victims of wilful killing 
and a limited number of victims of inhuman treatment – was of a different order than 
the number of victims found in other situations under investigation or analysis by the 
Office. It is worth bearing in mind that the OTP is currently investigating three 
situations involving long-running conflicts in Northern Uganda, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Darfur. Each of the three situations under investigation involves 
thousands of wilful killings as well as intentional and large-scale sexual violence and 
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abductions. Collectively, they have resulted in the displacement of more than 5 million 
people. Other situations under analysis also feature hundreds or thousands of such 
crimes. 
Taking into account all the considerations, the situation did not appear to meet 
the required threshold of the Statute.728 
Moreno-Ocampo explicitly said that ‘the situation did not appear to meet the required 
threshold of the Statute.’, yet almost in the same breath offers a justification based on 
comparisons with other situations and the relatively small number of victims in the Iraq 
situation compared to a large numbers of victims in Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Darfur situations. Whilst considerations of scale are relevant both to the 
assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’ as a legal threshold under Article 17(1)(d) and to 
prosecutorial discretion in selection situations, only the latter includes cross-situational 
comparison i.e. considerations of relative gravity (according to the above commentators).  
This ‘conflation’ has attracted criticisms from many commentators. Stegmiller points 
out that the Prosecutor faced criticisms in relation to this decision because he was not careful 
enough to distinguish between ‘gravity as an admissibility criterion or as a matter of 
prosecutorial (discretionary) selection.’729 DeGuzman again asserts in a more recent article that 
Moreno-Ocampo again conflated ‘relative gravity’ and legal gravity.730 She says that the 
Prosecutor assessed legal gravity as an admissibility criterion on the basis of the relatively 
small number of victims compared to the large number of victims in other situations.731 ‘Thus, 
the "threshold" was treated as a relative analysis based primarily on the number of victims in 
                                                          
728 Supra n. 633, Pp. 8-9.  
729 Stegmiller, supra n. 13, P. 595. 
730 Supra n. 532, P. 286. 
731 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1432. 
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[this] situation.’732 She emphasises that the term ‘sufficient gravity’, as laid down in Article 17 
(1)(d) requires a legal threshold, but not ‘a comparison’.733 However, deGuzman makes an 
important reference that the Prosecutor may deliberate this conflation as he may seek to hide 
his discretionary selection into the legal requirements of the Statute. This is the only indirect 
acknowledgement given by deGuzman that the assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’ may broadly 
involve discretionary-taken decision. Schabas also harshly criticises Moreno-Ocampo for 
taking such a decision, but for different reasons. He points out that the comparison of a large-
scale situation with one case within the Iraq situation was misused by the Prosecutor, as he 
‘was comparing apples with oranges.734 Such a poor comparison might cause a considerable 
damage to the legitimacy of the Court.735 In particular it suggests that the prosecutor is 
politically-motivated when it comes to pursue alleged crimes committed by powerful states 
(The British soldiers’ situation). 
Another point that can be raised in relation to the Iraq situation is that the decision of 
the Prosecutor not to proceed to open an investigation in this situation was harshly criticised 
for the same pattern of the dyadic arguments. The decision was criticised for being too 
deferential in that the Prosecutor was sacrificing his mandate to factors other than criminal 
justice. This was an apology critique. In a related context, ICC Watch states ‘that there is one 
so-called 'international law' for European and western countries, and their leaders, and another 
quite different legal standard for Third World nations.’736 The Prosecutor ‘refuses to even 
publicly account for why he will not investigate British politicians and military personnel.’737 
                                                          
732 Ibid, P. 1432. 
733 Ibid, P. 1432. 
734 Schabas, supra n. 258, P. 741. 
735 SaCouto and Cleary, supra n. 13, Pp. 813-4, arguing that ‘if the Prosecutor is not careful to distinguish 
between considerations of gravity for purposes of determining whether a situation or a case is admissible 
under Article 17 and considerations of gravity for purposes of determining which situations and cases will be 
investigated or prosecuted as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the public perception of the Court may 
suffer.’ 
736 Press Release, Why Won’t the ICC Move Against Tony Blair on War Crimes? ICC Watch (4th February, 2010) 
737 Ibid. 
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He was seen as too deferential to the powerful states, including the USA.738 Schabas discusses 
the political-motivation of the decision, in his recent article, citing a cable sent by Wikileaks, 
‘Ocampo has said that he was looking at the actions of British forces in Iraq- which… led a 
British ICTY prosecutor nearly to fall off his chair’, said a dispatch to Washington from one 
of the missions. ‘Privately, Ocampo has said that he wishes to dispose of Iraq issues (i.e. Not 
to investigate them.)’.’739 The legal argument of this view is that the Prosecutor failed to 
maintain the criminal justice mandate of the Court that is supposed to be applied to all states 
however powerful these are. That did not happen at the time.   
On the other hand, the decision was also criticised for being too imperious, as the 
Prosecutor is pursuing too high profiles and is trying only to prove a point that he is capable of 
achieving justice.740 He is then still political. It is just too far disconnected from the interests 
and policies of states that may easily render the decision incapable of being enforceable. In this 
regard, Davenport suggests that ‘[t]he new prosecutor should spend less time on highly visible 
and politicized cases and bring some cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity she can 
actually try and win.’741 The concentration on too high cases might only disturb other values 
on the ground. It is true that the dyadic arguments are manifested in this particular case, 
concerning its first and second moments respectively. However, the tension of this situation 
does not appear to be unresolvable, in particular since the British-Iraq war came to an end 
several years ago. The above concerns that might play a role in Moreno-Ocampo’s position 
                                                          
738 See generally, David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). 
739 William A. Schabas, The Banality of International Justice, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) P. 
5. 
740 Tim Murithi, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship? Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation Policy Brief, (8th March 2013), P. 6. Murithi stated that ‘the ICC has to 
acknowledge… that it is operating in an international political milieu- and that on occasion it would have to 
sequence its prosecutions to enable political reconciliation processes to run their course. This would require 
the ICC to step down from the artificial pedestal on which Ocampo placed it, asserting that it does not play 
politics- When in fact it has appeared that everything that it has done has been politically tainted.’  
741 Supra n. 112. 
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seem now unfounded. As was discussed in Chapter Two, Goldstone exercised a strategic plan 
before he indicted Karadzic, Mladic, and Milosevic. He considered several extra-legal factors 
within his decision-making process before he finally prosecuted them at different times. 
Indeed, several years later from Moreno-Ocampo’s decision, Prosecutor Bensouda 
responded to our suggestion – made in Chapter Two that the prosecutor should consider the 
circumstances that accompany in particular the political cases – and completed what Moreno-
Ocampo started. She reopened a preliminary examination on Iraq, following a new 
communication sent by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) 
and Public Interest Lawyers (PIL).742 The OTP states that ‘the communication alleges a higher 
number of cases of ill-treatment of detainees and provides further details on the factual 
circumstances and the geographical and temporal scope of the alleged crimes.’743 As Mark 
Kersten questions, ‘will Western officials responsible for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in Iraq finally be brought to justice?’744 This a decisive moment that all observers are 
waiting for to see how the prosecutor will respond to the 250-page dossier detailed allegations 
of beatings, electric shocks, mock executions, and sexual assault.745 
As can be seen (bearing in mind the four factors were not yet identified), the Prosecutor 
so far, is still consistent in his approach to conclude ‘sufficient gravity’, as he again used a 
quantitative approach (based on the comparative method) to assess the gravity of this situation. 
He did not use or even mention any qualitative measures. The Prosecutor linked the satisfaction 
                                                          
742 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement: Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
re-opens the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq (13th May, 2014), available at <https://www.icc-
cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014>.   
743 Ibid. 
744 Mark Kersten, The ICC and Iraq: “A Pinochet Moment?”, Muftah (27th May, 2014), available at 
<http://muftah.org/icc-iraq-pinochet-moment/#.Vfv2i_lViko> (Last Access: 18th September, 2015).  
745 See Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: The Responsibility 
of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee Abuse in Iraq from 2003-
2008, The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (submitted on 10th January, 2014), available at 
<file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/UKICC-Communication-2014-01-10_public.pdf>.     
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of gravity here only to the relative number of victims committed by the British soldiers. That 
was the measure for the Prosecutor to conclude that the situation was not sufficiently grave. 
This method of interpreting gravity suggests, but definitely does not establish, that scale, based 
on the comparative approach is a sufficient factor to determine the gravity of a situation. 
However, under the above charges of politicisation, it can be noticed that the Prosecutor 
deployed his discretion through his independent capacity to interpret the legal criterion 
‘sufficient gravity’ to come up with the decision not to investigate. That was a strong fashion 
of discretion exercised by applying this legal requirement.  
4.4.4. Lubanga and Ntaganda Cases (February 2006) 
In the DRC situation, the Lubanga and Ntaganda PTC I’s decision was the first judicial 
cases where the Chambers ruled on the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’ (Article 17 (1)(d)). For 
the purpose of assessing this gravity, the Chamber followed the literal, contextual, and 
teleological criteria as laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law 
of Treaties.746 As Ray Murphy points out, Article 21 of the Statute also is relevant in this 
regard.747 Based on the literal interpretation, the Chamber first made clear that the assessment 
of the admissibility of a case is mandatory and that there is no room for discretion.748 Moving 
to the contextual interpretation, the Chamber concluded that the application of the gravity 
threshold must be assessed at the investigation and prosecution stages, and that its decision 
only concerns the prosecution stage i.e., when the gravity threshold ‘applied to a case arising 
from the investigation of a situation.’749 Further to this, the Chamber created two features that 
                                                          
746 Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, February, 2006, supra n. 648, Para. 42. See also ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
Situation in the Democratic of the Congo: Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, 
Article 58, Annex II, No.: ICC-01/04-01/07, Para. 43. 
747 Article 21 provides ‘In the first place its Statute, Elements of the Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; (b) in the second place where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law’. Murphy, supra n. 246, P. 288. 
748 Congo, Pre-Trial Chamber, February, 2006, supra n. 648, Para. 43. 
749 Ibid, Para. 44. 
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render a particular conduct grave: 1- the conduct must be systematic or large scale, 2- and due 
consideration should be given to the social alarm that the conduct caused in the international 
community.750 Proceeding to the teleological interpretation, the Chamber found further that the 
additional gravity threshold of Article 17 (1)(d) is meant to maximise the deterrent effect of 
the Court, given the aims of the Court. Therefore, the Chamber decided that a further factor 
must be also considered, alongside the gravity of the relevant conducts, which is the case 
initiated ‘against the most senior leaders suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court’.751 PTC I considered that this additional factor contains 
three elements: 1- ‘the position of the persons’, 2- ‘The roles such persons play, through acts 
or omissions, when the State entities, organisations or armed groups to which they belong 
commit systematic or large-scale crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court., and 3- the role 
played by such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall commission of 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’752 On these bases and unlike the case against 
Lubanga, the Chamber found that Ntaganda was not among these senior leaders and, therefore, 
his case was inadmissible.753 
As can be seen, the Chamber had set a very high threshold for determining that the case 
was of ‘sufficient gravity’ to justify further action by the Court under Article 17 (1)(d). 
Although some of these factors were developed as a policy consideration by the OTP, such as 
the focus of the prosecution on the most responsible people for the most serious crimes,754 yet 
in this judgment, the Chamber rendered them legal requirements, with no place for discretion. 
Under such a decision, the Prosecutor would not then be able to exercise legal interpretive 
                                                          
750 Ibid, Para. 46. 
751 Ibid, Para. 50. 
752 Ibid, Paras. 51-2. 
753 Ibid, Para. 89. 
754 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013, Para. 42, ‘the Office will assess complementarity and 
gravity in relation to the most serious crimes alleged to have been committed and those most responsible for 
those crimes’. 
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discretion having received these legal specifications, (however the decision was reversed, as 
will be explained below). This decision however was harshly criticised by commentators. For 
example, Schabas argues that in creating the factor of ‘the social alarm’, PTC I ‘assessed 
gravity in vacuum.’755 He says that the Chamber did not consider the mass atrocities that 
resulted from the American and British invasion of Iraq to assess the gravity of the Lubanga 
case. He ‘was comparing Apples with nothing.’756 Schabas then clearly opposes deGuzman’s 
opinion in that the comparative approach could be a relevant method to determine legal 
gravity.757  
The decision, however, was reversed in 2006 by the Appeal Chamber, following a 
Prosecutor’s application.758 The Appeal Chamber found PTC I erred in law, and that its 
decision was unfounded, and subjective; and that the application of an extremely high threshold 
would reduce the deterrence effect of the Court.759 In his application to appeal the PTC I’s 
decision, the Prosecutor argued that the three prongs PTC I developed for the interpretation of 
the threshold gravity would go against the ordinary meaning of Article 17 (1)(d) and also the 
intent of the drafters.760 For further explanation, he argued that ‘the social alarm’ test cannot 
even be found within the Statute.761 Also, the teleological interpretation would not further the 
deterrent effect of the Court, as the future criminals would not fear the Court. More importantly, 
                                                          
755 Schabas, supra n. 258, P. 743. 
756 Schabas, supra n. 258, P. 743. 
757 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1429, stated in footnote 142 ‘criticizing the Lubanga Pre-trial Chamber for 
"assess[ing] gravity in a vacuum" rather than employing a relative gravity analysis of the gravity threshold for 
admissibility’. 
758 ICC, Appeal Chamber, Situation in the Democratic of the Congo: Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal 
against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of 
Arrest,” Art. 58, No.: ICC-01/04-169 (13th July 2006) (hereinafter: Congo, Appeal Chamber, July 2006). 
759 Specifically, the Appeal Chamber found that the systematic and large scale conditions are not applicable to 
the crimes against humanity, and that ‘social alarm’ test is too subjective and based on nothing, and also 
confining the admissibility of the Court only to those most responsible for crimes in question would affect the 
deterrence of the Court, since other perpetrators would avoid the jurisdiction of the Court. See Congo, Appeal 
Chamber, July 2006, supra n. 758, Paras. 68- 82. 
760 Congo, Appeal Chamber, July 2006, ibid, Para. 66. 
761 Ibid, Para. 66. 
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the Prosecutor argued that such a decision would limit ‘prosecutorial discretion’762, as it 
enforces the Prosecutor to focus his prosecution only on top leaders. The Appeal Chamber 
agreed with the Prosecutor and concluded that the Chamber’s test was incorrect.763 It rejected 
the three prongs. For example, and in relation to the test of the most senior suspects being most 
responsible, the Appeal Chamber held ‘the deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category 
of perpetrators is per se excluded from potentially being brought before the Court.’764 The 
Appeal Chamber then rejected every aspect that PTC I came up with. 
Although the Appeal Chamber did not offer an explanation for the preferred meaning 
of ‘sufficient gravity’, in rejecting these criteria as elements of the threshold test, the Court 
adopted a lower threshold for gravity, thus expanding the reach of the Court. However, Judge 
Giorgos Pikis provided a separate dissenting opinion, arguing for a very low threshold, in 
which ‘sufficient gravity’ should be construed very narrowly, such that only trivial crimes 
become excluded.765  
As can be seen now, the Appeal Chamber’s decision has opened the door again for the 
prosecutor to exercise a discretionary leeway when interpreting gravity to choose among the 
different interpretations that the term may involve. The Court endorsed, in this case, the low 
level of the required threshold for determining the term ‘sufficient gravity’. Moreno-Ocampo 
and, later on, Bensouda have continued to interpret ‘sufficient gravity’ in a discretionary 
fashion.  
4.4.5. Kenya (2010) and Cote d’Ivoire Situations (2011) 
                                                          
762 Ibid, Para. 66. 
763 Ibid, Paras. 68- 82. 
764 Ibid, Para. 73. 
765 See G. Pikis, The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010). 
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Having published already in June 2006 the four factors of the assessment of gravity, 
the OTP has, for the first time, given details about how the assessment of legal gravity were 
applied, and that was in the context of the Kenya and, more recently, the Mali situations.766 
The Kenya situation was the first proprio motu investigation where the prosecutor sought to 
proceed from preliminary examination to open an investigation (by contrast to the Iraq 
situation, also via the communications channel/proprio motu (under Article 15), where the 
prosecutor declined to proceed to an investigation). The Statute requires the prosecutor to gain 
authorisation from the Court to open proprio motu investigations. Hence, this was also the first 
time that Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) was required to consider the Prosecutor’s application 
of Article 17 (1)(d) in relation to situational gravity as a part of the assessment of admissibility.  
PTC II has made great progress towards identifying the meaning of gravity. The 
Chamber confirmed that ‘sufficient gravity’ must be read as an additional gravity that aims at 
preventing the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over ‘peripheral cases.’767 PTC II then set 
a low level of threshold for assessing ‘sufficient gravity’, and considered the proposition of the 
Prosecutor of determining gravity in accordance with ‘a concrete case’ as irrelevant. Instead, 
it asked the Prosecutor to examine gravity ‘against the backdrop of the likely set of cases.’768 
                                                          
766 See ICC, Presidency, Decision Assigning the Situation in the Republic of Mali to Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-
01/12-1 (19th July, 2012), available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0112/court%20records/presidency/Pages/1.as
px>. Oddly, between these two situations, the OTP opened investigation into two situations in two countries 
without providing any detail about these factors. See the Libya and Cote d’Ivoire situations’ decisions: No.: ICC-
01/11 (26, February 2011), and No.: ICC-02/11 (22nd February 2012), respectively. The OTP seems again 
inconsistent in relation to clarification of those factors. However, one possible interpretation to the 
inconsistent strategy of prosecution the OTP exercises can be attributed to the prevalence of the common law 
system over the civil law system in shaping the prosecutorial discretion. Whilst ‘[t]he common law system is 
characterised by the almost unlimited discretion’, the civil system is stricter and requires the prosecutor to be 
consistent when exercising a prosecutorial discretion. Kai Ambos, Comparative Summary of the National 
Reports, in Louise Arbour, Albin Eser, Kai Ambos, Andrew Sanders (eds.), the Prosecutor of Permanent 
International Criminal Court (Freiburg im Breisgau: 2000), p. 505. In the two situations in question, the OTP is 
inclined more to adopt the civil law system, and the opposite in relation to the other situations. The current 
result of this strategy is that the legitimacy of the Court is at risk. 
767 Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II 2010, supra n. 615, Para. 56. 
768 Ibid, Para. 58. 
202 
 
In defining these cases, PTC II provided two requirements that the Prosecutor needs to 
examine. The first one relates to potential crimes that might be prosecuted. Here, the 
quantitative and qualitative approach are required to examine ‘sufficient gravity’.769 The 
second one is concerned with potential perpetrators. Here, the assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’ 
must concentrate on ‘those who may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes 
committed.’770 Although these legal requirements may slightly reduce the discretion of the 
prosecutor in interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’, nonetheless deGuzman states that this is only a 
limitation on ‘the prosecution’s freedom to shape investigation’.771 The prosecutor then still 
has broad discretionary leeway to interpret ‘sufficient gravity’, as this assessment is ‘general 
in nature.’772  
In applying for authorisation, the Prosecutor did not discuss the issue of discretion. This 
time, he did not use the comparative method, as he moved to treat ‘sufficient gravity’ as a 
threshold, where he employed the four factors to conclude the gravity of the situation. In 
interpreting gravity, the Prosecutor used the four factors jointly to make the decision, without 
establishing any hierarchy among these factors. For example, in relation to scale, the Prosecutor 
stated that the acts of nearly 1133 killings of civilians, 900 rapes, the displacement of 350000 
people, 3561 reported acts of serious injury and other acts are enough to satisfy this factor.773 
In contrast to the previous situations, the Prosecutor now used the full range of factors for 
assessing gravity so he could make the decision to open an investigation. She used the four 
factors together (quantitative and qualitative measures) to reach the decision. 
                                                          
769 Ibid, Para. 62. 
770 Ibid, Para. 60. 
771 Margret M. deGuzman, The International Criminal Court’s Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten, Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 12 (2013), P. 483 
772 Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber II 2010, supra n. 615, Para. 60. 
773 In relation to the impact of the crimes, the Prosecutor concluded these crimes have devastating nature on 
victims, in particular sexual-related crimes. In terms of the manner of the commission of the crimes, he 
described the acts as brutally committed, such as cutting off body parts. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya 
2009, supra n. 230, Paras. 56-9. 
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The other proprio motu investigation launched offers a significant contrast that the 
Prosecutor instead used only two factors to make a decision concerning the gravity of the Cote 
d’Ivoire situation, the quantitative factor of scale and the qualitative factor manner of 
commission of the crimes to reach her decision.774 In interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’ of this 
situation, the Prosecutor considered the satisfaction of only two factors of both quantitative and 
qualitative characters. This is rather a discretionary leeway in finding as what ‘sufficient 
gravity’ was meant for. In the Kenya situation, the Prosecutor picked an interpretation that 
involved four factors to assess legal gravity. The different assessment of the term ‘sufficient 
gravity’ implicitly allowed the Prosecutor to exercise a broad legal interpretive discretion to 
make a decision.   
4.4.6. Mohammed Hussein Ali Case (2011) 
In this case, a confirmation of charges, Ali disputed the charges issued against him, 
arguing that the conduct with which he was charged (police inaction) was not sufficiently grave 
to be admissible, and that he was not one of the senior or principal perpetrators and thus fell 
below the requirement of the gravity threshold.775 Upon ruling on these arguments, PTC II held 
that the Statute does not exclude conviction for inactions; and it further held that such 
interpretation of the gravity threshold that limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court is 
contrary to the aims and purposes of the Rome Statute, the claim that only senior perpetrators 
justify further action by the Court is ‘legally unfounded’.776 Then, The Chamber used the four 
factors to confirm ‘sufficient gravity’ of this case and found all of them satisfied.777 Logically 
                                                          
774 ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber III, situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation Pursuant to Article, No.: ICC-02/11, 23 June 2011, 15 Paras. 63 (scale) and 58 (scale and manner), 
available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1097345.pdf>.  
775 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. 
ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute (23rd January, 2012), Para. 41 available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf>.  
776 Ibid, Paras. 46-7. 
777 Ibid, Paras. 49- 50. 
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speaking, when the Court tends to set a low threshold for gravity to be considered by the 
prosecutor, this opens the door for more cases to be admissible before the Court. This means 
that the exercise of the discretionary fashion, whether prosecutorial or legal interpretive would 
be wider.  
4.4.7. Mali Situation (2012)  
In the Mali situation, the Prosecutor’s report on the decision to open an investigation 
was more detailed than any other decision.778 Bensouda stated that six types of alleged war 
crimes have been committed by the conflicted parties.779 She explained the application of all 
gravity factors in a sequenced way for each type of crime and related incident, identifying five 
main incidents.780 With regard to the scale of the crimes, Bensouda’s quantitative methodology 
was used to identify the number of incidents and victims in each, as well as particular buildings 
that were destroyed. Regarding the nature of the crimes, this reflected the recognition that 
crimes against humans can include actions directed against the cultural and spiritual heritage 
of the given country. As far as the manner of commission of these crimes is concerned, she 
identified the fact that those crimes were committed in an unusually cruel way, such as stoning, 
amputation, flogging, disemboweling, and other methods, makes a particular incident 
                                                          
778 Upon receiving ‘credible information’ via communications and referral source, Bensouda decided that there 
was ‘a reasonable basis’ to believe that the alleged crimes committed in Mali are under the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Further to this, she also decided that the situation is admissible, as the Government of Mali explicitly 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court following its referral, see Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2013, Para. 231. The OTP, then, moved on to decide that the situation in Mali ‘appears to be of sufficient 
gravity to justify further action by the Court, based on an assessment of their scale, nature, manner of 
commission and impact.’ See, ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali: Article 53 (1) Report 16 (January 
2013), Para. 11. Indeed, the OTP already in some earlier documents declared that the situation meets ‘the 
threshold of gravity set out in article 17 (1) (d)’ that renders a situation admissible before the Court. The 
Prosecutor found out the gravity of the situation according to the aforementioned factors: ‘the scale, nature, 
manner and impact of the alleged crimes committed’. As a consequence, Bensouda decided, formally, to open 
the investigation in Mali based on ‘the gravity threshold’ assessment, see Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2013, P. 232. 
779 Situation in Mali, ibid, Para. 7. 
780 Situation in Mali, ibid, Paras. 144- 170. 
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sufficiently grave. The evaluation of the impact of the alleged crimes was mainly based on the 
terrible situation of victims and other members of civil society in this situation.  
With the Mali situation, the current Prosecutor has made a great advance in terms of 
being more transparent, concrete, and detailed about what makes a situation sufficiently grave 
(legal gravity). This clarification can enable all actors and observers to predict how the OTP 
might behave in a future situation. If the prosecutor fails to open investigation against a certain 
situation that looks as grave, or graver than the Mali situation, based on the above clarification 
of the concept of gravity, the perception and legitimacy of the Court may be undermined. 
Again, the Prosecutor treated gravity as a legal threshold. However, she required four factors 
jointly to assess the satisfaction of legal gravity. This also indicates that the prosecutor has a 
broad legal interceptive discretion to determine legal gravity.  
Before we analyse the last development of the assessment of gravity in the Comoros 
situation, we can see so far that the Prosecutor has significantly deployed strong discretion to 
interpret ‘sufficient gravity’ in an open-way. As opposed to the arguments of the commentators, 
‘sufficient gravity’ did not have an absolute legal sense. The term itself is indeterminate and 
the Court has already set a low level for its threshold. The different use of the factorial analysis 
of the term ‘sufficient gravity’ has allowed the Prosecutor to come up with different 
interpretations of the term ‘sufficient gravity’. These all contributed to the broad discretionary 
determination of the term. The Prosecutor has used two different methods to interpret 
‘sufficient gravity’. 1- The comparative method, 2- the judgment method (threshold). In using 
these two methods, the Prosecutor was considering different factors to determine the issue of 
‘sufficient gravity’. For example, in using the comparative approach, the Prosecutor heavily 
depended on the quantitative measure, namely the number of victims. In using the threshold 
judgment, the Prosecutor sometimes used one factor to reject a situation, two factors to satisfy 
‘sufficient gravity’, and on another occasion she recalled four of them jointly to conclude the 
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gravity threshold. In using these methods and factors, it was shown that the Prosecutor has 
given weight to several extra-legal considerations, such as the limited capacity of the Court, 
and also to political considerations.   
4.5. Remarks on Relative Gravity 
In the Uganda situation, the Prosecutor was heavily criticised for following a one-sided 
approach to achieve justice. This criticism gives rise to how gravity should be applied. In this 
situation, Moreno-Ocampo selected the rebels and rejected the Government’s members on the 
ground of ‘relative gravity’. One immediate dilemma that can be raised here is how can the 
Prosecutor justify her reluctance to deliver justice to those victims who have been considered 
less victimized (the victims of the Government, as their crimes were not investigated)? In 
particular, that in such a situation, those victims will not receive any sort of justice, as the Court 
is only concerned to deliver justice to the other side to the conflict. As Alana Tiemessen argues, 
is this not a sort of an affront to victims?781 Worse than this are the reports that some 
commentators, NGOs, human rights advocates deliver confirming the high seriousness of the 
offences that were allegedly committed against those victims by the Government.782 These 
reports, at least, indicate that there are a considerable numbers of victims who did not receive 
any justice. It was submitted that the ‘continuing internment of over a million people without 
military necessity and without adequate protection and aid constitutes a grave violation of the 
laws of war and certainly falls within the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction.’783  
This picture strongly suggests that the Court (judges) or even the ASP is to reconsider 
as to how ‘relative gravity’ should be applied, when selecting among legally worthy cases. The 
implication requires the prosecutor to consider ‘relative gravity’ in accordance with crimes that 
                                                          
781 Supra n. 611. 
782 See more discussion about this issue in Chapter Five.  
783 Supra n. 721, Pp. 181- 2. 
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are committed by each side in a conflict and then to choose among the legally admissible cases 
from both sides. Therefore, instead of selecting the most serious crimes from within the whole 
situation, she is advised to select gravest crimes from within each side to the conflict in 
question. It is often normal to see a conflict in which one side commits more crimes, which are 
more serious than the other side. Therefore, if the Court decides to proceed the prosecution 
with only one side whose crimes are more serious, then the other side will totally go free of 
any charge. Needless to say that the victims of this group are not respected and totally ignored.  
This gap appears more anchored, in particular if the given state is not willing or able to 
pursue the alleged crimes committed by all sides. In the Uganda situation, the Prosecutor could 
choose the gravest crimes from the rebel side and also the gravest of those from the 
Government’s side. This does not just secure the fairness of the strategy of prosecution, it also 
promotes the legitimacy of the Court, as it could stop all criticisms directed against the 
Prosecutor. In one of its reports, HRW argued that the strategy of balance is desirable.784 They 
invoked that what is at stake here is to deliver justice to all sides to the conflict, rather than 
only considering the political ramifications of such balance. This corresponds with what has 
been argued throughout this thesis. As long as any position the prosecutor takes will be 
criticised of being political anyway, it seems more desirable for the prosecutor to acknowledge 
the importance of having choice. The Prosecutor emphasised several times that not all 
admissible cases will be selected. Therefore, as the prosecutor has the choice, the application 
of this choice should consider the balance approach.  
The balance strategy may instead play a role in the alleviation of this tension. This 
suggestion corresponds with the principle of impartiality that the OTP developed in selecting 
decisions. It is quite impartial to bring to the Court potential perpetrators from all sides of the 
                                                          
784 Unfinished Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, Human Rights Watch (2011), available at 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/icc0911webwcover.pdf>, P. 5. 
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conflict, whenever a domestic judicial system is not able or willing to proceed with any case. 
This is how this principle can be promoted. In fact, adopting a high degree of gravity at the 
admissibility level would make it difficult for the prosecutor to avoid such severe criticisms. 
Therefore, the prosecutor could consider ‘relative gravity’, based on her prosecutorial 
discretion to make such balance, as the latter consideration is not a requirement of legal gravity 
under Article 17 (1)(d). That is meant to show that the current Prosecutor, based on her 
prosecutorial discretion, can play multi-roles to deliver. The satisfaction of the need of the 
neglected community, and avoiding the persistent criticisms as much as possible are some gaps 
that the prosecutor could cover by utilising her prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, this what we 
call a multi-functional role that can be played by the ICC prosecutor.  
4.6. Quantitative ‘versus’ Qualitative Factors 
As was seen above, in interpreting gravity, the Prosecutor used different methods to 
reach a conclusion regarding the seriousness of situations and cases. The Prosecutor was not 
consistent in the use of these methods. Sometimes, she only used the comparative approach 
associated usually with the relative number of victims (the early uses), and sometimes she 
mixed it with the qualitative measures. In so doing, she does not make clear as ‘relative gravity’ 
or legal gravity was considered. Yet, and as was partly shown in the above analysis of the 
situations and cases, and will be shown below, in assessing relative or legal gravity, the 
Prosecutor was heavily relying on one fundamental factor, which is ‘the scale of the crimes’. 
As Stahn states, ‘[t]he criteria outlined in the Statute contain the various loopholes and open, 
in fact, a wide scope of interpretation to the Prosecutor, since they do not provide much 
guidance on the substantive content of the criteria governing the decision whether or not to 
initiate an investigation or to proceed with a prosecution.’785 As gravity is one of these uncertain 
                                                          
785 Supra n. 61, P. 267. 
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criteria, then this may interpret why the Prosecutor has chosen predominantly one factor to 
determine the content of gravity. This strategy somehow leads to the perception of the 
prosecutor of prosecuting only manageable situations and cases.786  
This section will conclude that the strict commitment to this particular factor might be 
one of the major causes of the current doubt about the legitimacy of the Court, and the 
accusation that the Prosecutor is following a politically driven strategy. Heller has made a 
major contribution on this question, arguing that ‘in practice, the number of victims is the only 
factor that has played a significant role in the OTP’s situational gravity determinations’.787 In 
fact, the OTP has made clear several times that its main orientation is to concentrate on 
situations where large numbers of victims are involved.788 
On the situational level, almost all situations where the Court is currently exercising 
jurisdiction involve a significant number of crimes, victims, and perpetrators. In particular, 
Uganda, Sudan, DRC, CRA, and Mali involve a massive number of crimes. In the DRC, the 
early statement by the OTP about the referral of this situation to the Court was about the large 
numbers of people, who were killed: it says ‘millions of civilians have died as a result of 
conflict in the DRC.’789 Also, in the Darfur situation, Moreno-Ocampo characterised the 
gravity of this situation by reference to the large number of crimes, victims, and perpetrators.790 
                                                          
786 Supra n. 739, P. 5, Schabas criticised this particular strategy and stated that ‘[t]his confirmed the consensual 
nature of the prosecutions, although there were some concerns that these might be one-sided investigations 
directed at insurgents rather than government officials.’ 
787 Supra n. 647, Chapter 9, P. 3. 
788 See supra n. 686. ‘Experience shows that the situations faced by the Court tend to involve large-scale 
commission of crimes.’ 
789 Press Release, ICC - The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens its first 
investigation, ICC-OTP-20040623-59, available at <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=the+office+of+the+prosecutor+of+the+international+criminal+court+opens+its
+first+investigation>. 
790 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, First Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC to the Security Council pursuant to 
UNSC 1593 (2005), 29.06.2005, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20
statements/statement/Pages/report%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20icc_%20mr_%20luis%20m
oreno%20ocampo%20to%20the%20security%20coun.aspx>. 
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The Uganda situation also involved a significant number of victims. Moreno-Ocampo stated 
that ‘between July 2002 and July 2004, the period that was the focus of our investigation, the 
killings and abductions numbered in the thousands, often reaching into the hundreds within 
single months.’791 ‘The scale of the crimes’ committed in each situation is a factor that the OTP 
evidently relied on, as the main basis for the selection of situations. Heller argues that the 
quantitative approach has not only dominated, but also has been taken as ‘a principled approach 
to determining the gravity of different situations.’792 This has been defended by the OTP on the 
ground of the limited capacity of the Court that requires it to focus on situations of mass 
atrocities, that such a focus will be seen as more legitimate by the international community, 
and that the number of victims is a more objective factor to be assessed.793 
In terms of prosecuting cases, the OTP has been primarily oriented towards prosecuting 
those who are responsible for the commission of the vast violations of international criminal 
law. Almost all of the Court’s indictees are responsible for committing crimes that involved a 
considerable number of victims. For example, the Prosecutor stated that Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo is responsible for the attack against civilians that ‘was carried out on a large scale and 
targeted a significant number of civilian victims.’794 However, in another case and in the 
confirmation of charges process in the 2008 case against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda in the Darfur 
situation, the Court noted that the Prosecutor had specifically identified crimes committed 
against the UN peace-keepers as ‘sufficiently grave’,795 on the basis of the impact of the crime. 
                                                          
791 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Press Release, Press Conference on the Uganda Arrest Warrants, ICC-OTP-
20051014-109, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%2
00204%200105/press%20releases/Pages/press%20conference%20on%20the%20uganda%20arrest%20warran
ts.aspx>. 
792 Supra n. 647, P. 3. 
793 Ibid, P. 3. 
794 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 (14th November, 2014) 
795 ICC-02/05-02/09-21, Para. 7, quoted in The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09. 
at para  33: ’The Chamber notes the Prosecution’s contention that, as a result of the alleged attack, killings and 
pillaging in the MGS Haskanita, “AMIS operations were severely disrupted, thus affecting its mandated 
protective roles with respect to millions of Darfurian civilians in need of humanitarian aid and security” The 
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Earlier at the stage of initiating the investigation, he had said that ‘the gravity of such attacks 
is heightened by their over-all impact on the delivery of vital humanitarian aid to over two 
million individuals living in an already extremely vulnerable situation.’796 The expansion of 
the determining factors to assess gravity would also maximise the deterrent effect797 that the 
Court seeks to achieve.798 However, the prosecutor is still using scale as a fundamental factor 
for all other cases.  
By analysing the situations and cases, indeed there is a clear link between these 
situations and cases and ‘the scale of the crimes’. The Prosecutor has mainly prioritised this 
particular factor over the other factors.  
What can be understood from this implicit strategy of prosecution are two main points. 
First, the OTP has developed its methodology of prosecution mainly on the factor of scale, 
consequently prioritising only those situations and cases that comprise a vast number of crimes 
and victims. This gives the impression that the fundamental orientation of the OTP is to 
investigate situations that involve basically mass atrocities. In effect, the factor of ‘the scale of 
the crimes’ functions as a fundamental factor within the decision-making process, whilst the 
other factors are complementary to that process and not even necessary. Second, the OTP’s 
policy of investigation and prosecution is based on the fact that the Court is a big court that 
exercises a criminal jurisdiction only over giant situations and cases. Is the Court mandated for 
this trend the OTP is developing? Was the Court established to prosecute only the vast 
                                                          
Prosecution further states that AMIS initially suspended and then reduced its activities in the area, and that 
this left a large number of civilians without AMIS protection, on which they had allegedly relied before the 
attack..’ 
796 Supra n. 790, P. 3. 
797 Supra n. 647, P. 17. 
798 See The Preamble of the Rome Statute, ‘Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’. Also the OTP confirmed the importance of 
deterrence to maximise the impact of its proceedings. See, ICC, OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009- 2012 (1st 
February, 2010), Para. 23. ‘The fourth principle guiding the Prosecutorial Strategy is to maximize the impact of 
the activities of the Office.’  
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situations and cases? The international character that the drafters of the Statute of the Court 
sought to emphasise is meant to show the global nature of the Court. It is the grave character 
of each situation and case, considered from a rounded perspective and not just the volume of 
victims in each that should determine the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. Although 
‘the scale of the crimes’ is a key factor; when selecting situations and cases that does not at all 
mean that the OTP should link this particular factor to all its decisions, and thereafter dealing 
with it as a rule in its approach. Accordingly, the current policy of investigation and prosecution 
indicates that the Court is a Big Criminal Court (BCC), but not ICC, as it was warranted. By 
following this implicit strategy, the OTP loses sight of the main mandate on which the Court 
is based, which is to prosecute the most serious crimes and not only the biggest situations and 
cases (situations with a large number of victims). The last section of this chapter will suggests 
a solution to this persistent problem.  
4.7. Case Law: The Gaza (Comoros) Situation- Recent Development (2013) 
The Court and the Prosecutor’s decisions about the Gaza (Comoros) situation represent 
the latest development in relation to the question of discretion in the context of applying, and 
the way by which they assess ‘sufficient gravity’. The next paragraphs will examine the two 
main issues that this chapter has examined. First, it will concentrate on the most recent 
development the Court and the Prosecutor has made in relation to the question of discretion. 
Second, the discussion will extend to address the factors that the Prosecutor used to determine 
the ‘sufficient gravity’ test of this situation. Before we embark on these two issues, reference 
will be made to the factual and legal background of this situation. 
In relation to the background of this situation, on 31st May 2013, eight vessels shipped 
to the Gaza Strip to deliver humanitarian aid, in a response to the blockade imposed on the 
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Strip by Israeli Authorities.799 Upon a request by the Secretary General of the United Nations 
to conduct an investigation on the incident, the Turkish Commission provided several grounds 
on which they found that the Israeli blockade was illegal under international law. For example, 
the blockade was illegal under international humanitarian law and therefore does not constitute 
‘a legal basis for them to board the vessels.’800 Six of these vessels were attacked by the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF).801 The referral, in particular, emphasised MV Mavi Marmara, a vessel 
owned by a Turkish charity organisation and registered in the Union of the Comoros, as most 
of the crimes were committed onboard this vessel.802 In their responses, Israel claimed that they 
issued four warnings, before they boarded the vessels.803 The Israeli National Investigation, as 
requested by the Secretary General, however, reported that their naval blockade was lawful 
under international law, citing several legal resources,804 to confront the prevailing security 
threat due to thousands of rockets and mortars fired from the Strip.805 The interception resulted 
in nine Turkish people killed, a dozen seriously wounded civilians, and a hundred allegedly 
detained.806  
In May 2013, the OTP received referral from the authorities of the Union of the 
Comoros about this specific situation, i.e. the Israeli raid on the humanitarian aid flotilla.807 
                                                          
799 See the text of the referral at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Referral-from-Comoros.pdf>. 
800 UN, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (September, 
2011), Para. 37 (c). Also, they claimed that ‘[t]he force used to take over the vessels was unnecessary, 
disproportionate and failed to take account of the fact that those on board the vessels were civilians.’ See 
Para. 37 (e). 
801 See ICC, the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor receives referral by the authorities of the Union of the 
Comoros in relation to the events of May 2010 on the vessel ‘MAVI MARMARA’, 14/05/2013, available at 
<http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/re
ports%20and%20statements/statement/Pages/otp-statement-14-05-2013.aspx>. See also, Q&A: Israeli deadly 
raid on aid flotilla, BBC (22nd March, 2013), available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10203726> (Last Access: 
13th September, 2013). 
802 See supra n. 799.  
803 UN Report, supra n. 799, Paras. 45-5. 
804 UN Report, ibid, Para. 47 (a), ‘the Commission relies upon decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel and 
statements by various United Nations organizations and humanitarian and human rights organizations.’ 
805 UN Report, ibid, Para. 46. 
806 Referral, supra n. 801. 
807 Referral, supra n. 801. 
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The OTP opened a preliminary examination to examine whether the criteria for opening an 
investigation were met.808 In the UN Human Rights Council report, the UN had concluded that 
there was clear evidence that crimes within Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention had 
been committed, including willful killing, torture, and wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health.809 The OTP then decided that the jurisdictional criteria of the 
Court was met and concluded that ‘[t]he information available indicates that there is a 
reasonable basis to believe that war crimes have been committed’.810 Bensouda then examined 
whether the gravity threshold was met and decided ‘that the potential case(s) that would likely 
arise from an investigation into the situation would not be of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court and would, therefore, be inadmissible pursuant to articles 17(1)(d) and 
53(1)(b) of the Statute.’811 In so deciding, the Prosecutor considered ‘(i) whether the individuals 
or groups of persons that are likely to be the object of an investigation, include those who may 
bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes committed; and (ii) the gravity of the 
crimes committed within the incidents which are likely to be the focus of an investigation.’812 
In respect to the question of discretion, Bensouda decided the inadmissibility of the 
‘Flotilla Incident’ on the ground of insufficient gravity, under Article 17 (1)(d).813 In so 
                                                          
808 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement: Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, on concluding the preliminary examination of the situation referred by the Union of 
Comoros: “Rome Statute legal requirements have not been met” (6th November, 2014), available at 
<http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20
statements/statement/Pages/otp-statement-06-11-2014.aspx>. 
809 United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the international fact-finding mission 
to investigate violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, 
resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance, A/HRC/15/21 (27th 
September, 2012), Para. 265. 
810 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53 
(1) Report (6th November, 2014), Para. 132 (hereinafter: Comoros, OTP, November 2014), available at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_53(1)-Report-06Nov2014Eng.pdf>. Based on Article 12 
(2) (a) of the Statute, as the alleged crimes committed on board a vessel, which is registered in a state that is a 
party to the ICC, then the personal jurisdiction is met. With regard to the subject jurisdiction, the referral 
indicates that the alleged interception by the IDF amounts to level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
811 Comoros, OTP, November 2014, supra n. 810, Para. 150. 
812 Ibid, Para. 135. 
813 Ibid, Para. 148. 
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deciding, she looked at ‘the scale of the crimes, the nature of the crimes, the manner of the 
commission of the crimes, and the impacts of the crimes.’814 Following the Comoros’ appeal,815 
the PTC has decided that the Prosecutor is to review her decision.816 The PTC disagreed with 
every aspect of the application of gravity, namely the four factors.817 What is relevant to show 
in this situation is that the Court for the first time has made clear that apart from the 
discretionary power not to proceed under the ‘interests of justice’ provisions, the prosecutor 
has no discretion in relation to the selection of situations, as far as the interpretation of Article 
17 (1)(d) is concerned. Further to this, the Chamber consistently adopted a lower level for the 
satisfaction of ‘sufficient gravity’. This is the first judicial pronouncement of the Court on 
matters connected to gravity in relation to investigating situations. The Chamber has, for the 
first time, ruled on the Prosecutor’s interpretation of ‘sufficient gravity’; Article 17(1)(d). The 
PTC held that  
The Chamber recognises that the Prosecutor has discretion to open an investigation but, 
as mandated by article 53(1) of the Statute, that discretion expresses itself only in 
paragraph (c), i.e. in the Prosecutor’s evaluation of whether the opening of an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice. Conversely, paragraphs (a) and 
(b) require the application of exacting legal requirements. [emphasis added]818 
As deGuzman points out, this judicial decision constrains the prosecutor’s discretion.819 
The Chamber’s decision now states that the jurisdictional and admissible criteria laid down in 
Article 53 (1)(a) and (b) ‘require an application of exacting legal requirements.’820 Notably, it 
                                                          
814 Ibid, Paras. 138- 141. 
815 For full information about the decisions of the Prosecutor and the Court, see <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/comoros>.  
816 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621. 
817 Ibid, Paras. 23- 48. 
818 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 14.  
819 Margret M. deGuzman, What is the Gravity Threshold for an ICC Investigation? Lessons from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber Decision in the Comoros Situation, American Society of International Law, Vo. 19, Issue: 19 (2015).   
820 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 14. 
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held that the Prosecutor, in considering the persons likely to be the objects of the investigation, 
concentrated on their leadership roles rather than those most responsible for the crimes.821 The 
Chamber reversed the Prosecutor’s evaluation of ‘sufficient gravity’; and set a low-level 
threshold for the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’, as it did not stipulate a high-ranking level of 
potential perpetrators, but instead those who are most responsible for the crimes.  
The Chamber’s decision then is similar to Stegmiller’s analysis of the distinction 
between ‘relative gravity’ and legal gravity, as was presented earlier this chapter. In addition, 
the Court seems now to decree that the comparative method is relevant when assessing 
‘sufficient gravity’. The Chamber held 
In the view of the Chamber, ten killings, 50-55 injuries, and possibly hundreds of 
instances of outrages upon personal dignity, or torture or inhuman treatment, which 
would be the scale of the crimes prosecuted in the potential case(s) arising from the 
referred situation, in addition to exceeding the number of casualties in actual cases that 
were previously not only investigated but even prosecuted by the Prosecutor (e.g. the 
cases against Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and Abdallah Banda), are a compelling indicator 
of sufficient, and not of insufficient gravity.822 
On the merit of the PTC’s decision, Heller was surprised by this decision. He argues 
that the Prosecutor’s approach to interpret the ‘potential perpetrators’ gravity is better than the 
PTC’s one. In so claiming, he presents several defending points. He first describes the PTC’s 
decision as ‘a frontal assault on the OTP’s prosecutorial discretion’.823 He argues that the 
Chamber was clearly comparing a situation with a case without noting that there is a difference 
                                                          
821 Ibid, Para. 23. 
822 Ibid, Para. 26. 
823 Keven Jon Heller, The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Dangerous Comoros Review Decision, Opinio Juris, (17th July, 
2015), available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/17/the-pre-trial-chambers-problematic-comoros-review-
decision/> (Last Access: 15th January, 2016).  
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between them. He says that ‘the issue is whether the Comoros situation is sufficiently grave 
relative to other situations to justify a formal investigation.’824 Now, apart from the Chamber’s 
authorisation in making a comparison, the question here is how fair is this comparison as it 
compares a situation whose crimes were committed on a ship, with other situations that occur 
throughout a massive space of a state? How can the Chamber compare this ship (situation) 
with, for example, the DRC situation that involves thousands and thousands of crimes? The 
argument of Heller about ‘the scale of the crimes’ indicates as if a large number of victims 
‘scale’ should be first satisfied (the quantitative approach).  
Lastly, he fears that the decision of the PTC would lower the required threshold for 
‘sufficient gravity’ the matter that would result in making the Court overwhelmed with 
investigations. DeGuzman replies to such a fear by arguing that ‘[s]uch an outcome could be 
averted if the ICC follows the suggestion of the majority and allows the Prosecutor significant 
discretion to decide when investigations are in the interests of justice.’825 The prosecutor would 
still have prosecutorial discretion to choose among admissible situations, by weighting ‘relative 
gravity’ under Article 53 (1)(c) against other extra-factors, such as the resources of the Court.  
However, the OTP appealed the PTC’s decision before the Appeal Chamber.826 The 
potential response of the Appeal Chamber will be decisive in this regard if they endorse the 
PTC’s decision. With such a potential, the prosecutor would have very limited legal interpretive 
discretion to decide which situation meets ‘sufficient gravity’, at least, when this is referred. 
However, it is not clear how such a decision would reduce the discretionary leeway when 
assessing ‘sufficient gravity’. As Alex Whiting argues, ‘the application of exacting legal 
                                                          
824 Ibid. 
825 Supra n. 819. 
826 ICC, Appeal Chamber,  Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic of 
Greece and the Kingdom of Cambodia: Notice of Appeal of ‘’ Decision on the Request of the Union of the 
Comoros to Review the Prosecutor’s Decision not to Initiate an Investigation’’ (ICC-01/13-34), No.: ICC-01/13 
(27th July, 2015). 
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requirements’ would still involve substantial evaluation to be made by the prosecutor.827 He 
opines that the approach of the majority is ‘mechanical’ and does not consider the reasons for 
which the prosecutor was granted some margin of discretion, in particular that the prosecutor 
is the best one to assess gravity given ‘her perspective on all of these cases before the Court’.828 
In this regard, Judge Peter Kovacs disagreed with the majority, asserting that Article 53 (1) still 
‘provides the Prosecutor with some margin of discretion in deciding not to initiate an 
investigation into a particular situation.’829 Thus, according to this view, the prosecutor is still 
able to exercise legal interpretive discretion to determine which situation is sufficiently grave. 
This argument seems to have, to a large extent, merit, in particular if the Prosecutor keeps using 
her wide range of methods and the factors for interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’, in the same way 
as was explained above. In particular, that we can notice with this situation, the Prosecutor 
examined jointly four factors to dismiss this situation, compared with only one factor to dismiss 
the British situation in Iraq. The Prosecutor is still not consistent in her method and factorial 
analysis of interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’.  
Currently, the Appeal Chamber, by three votes to two, dismissed the admissibility of 
the Prosecutor’s appeal against the PTC’s decision on the ground that the PTC’s decision was 
not a decision on admissibility.830 Although this decision does not rule on the assessment of 
gravity itself in the context of the exercise of discretion, yet the endorsement of the 
inapplicability of the Prosecutor’s decision makes it clear now that the Pre-Trial Chamber 
cannot force the Prosecutor to re-open an investigation of referred situations (when the 
                                                          
827 Alex Whiting, The ICC Prosecutor should Reject Judges’ Decision in Mavi Marmara, Just Security (20th July, 
2015), available at <https://www.justsecurity.org/24778/icc-prosecutor-reject-judges-decision-mavi-
marmara/?print/> (Last Access: 29th March, 2016).  
828 Ibid. 
829 Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic, and the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, Case No. ICC-01/13, Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros to Review the 
Prosecutor’s Decision not to Initiate an Investigation, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Peter Kovacs, Para. 8. 
830 Comoros, Appeal Chamber, November 2015, supra n. 629, Para. 66.  
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dismissal decision is based on Article 53 (1)(b)). The Appeal Chamber holds that ‘under article 
53 (3)(a) of the Statute, the Prosecutor is obliged to reconsider her decision not to investigate, 
but retains ultimate discretion over how to proceed.’831 As Giulia Pecorella argues, ‘the 
Prosecutor obtained the express recognition that, under article 53(3)(a), the Prosecutor retains 
the ultimate discretionary power to decide whether or not to proceed with an investigation of a 
situation referred to the Court by either a state party or the UN Security Council’.832 It is then 
up to the prosecutor again to see whether or not to re-open the investigation, without any 
enforcement imposed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecutor could reply to the PTC’s 
request, saying ‘thanks, but no.’833 Therefore, Bensouda may still come out with the same 
conclusion and decide not to open the investigation, but this time it should be on a different 
basis. Otherwise, she must either open the decision, or dismiss it on the basis of ‘the interests 
of justice’. 
With regard to the question of the factors that the Prosecutor used to assess ‘sufficient 
gravity’, the PTC I found that the Prosecutor rightly considered appropriate factors for 
determining gravity, however, it ‘committed a material error.’834 PTC I then turned to consider 
the Prosecutor’s assessment of gravity in terms of scale.835 It concluded that the numbers of 
victims identified by the Prosecutor are a convincing signal of sufficiency, and hence the 
Prosecutor should have used scale ‘as militating in favour of sufficient gravity,’ rather than the 
term ‘sufficient’.836 PTC I opined that ‘the scale of the crimes’ met the gravity threshold, as 
                                                          
831 Ibid, Para. 59. 
832 Giulia Pecorella, The Comoros situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor: the Rome Statute’s 
system of checks and balances is in good health, International Law Blog (30th November, 2015), available at 
<https://aninternationallawblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/the-comoros-situation-the-pre-trial-chamber-
and-the-prosecutor-the-rome-statutes-system-of-checks-and-balances-is-in-good-health/> (Last Access: 30th 
March, 2016).  
833 Kevin Jon Heller, What Happens if Comoros Appeals? (Answer: Not Much.), Opinio Juris (9th May, 2016), 
available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/07/happens-comoros-appeals/> (Last Access: 09th May, 2016).  
834 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 26. 
835 Ibid, Paras. 25-6. 
836 Ibid, Para. 26. 
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‘ten killings, 50-55 injuries, and possibly hundreds of instances of outrages upon personal 
dignity, or torture or inhumane treatment’ is in favor of ‘sufficient gravity’.837 In relation to the 
nature of the crimes, the PTC noted that the Prosecutor did not dispute the information that 
asserted the existence of mistreatment on board the vessels, including several conducts (war 
crime of torture or inhuman treatment) such as ‘seawater spray and wind gusts from helicopters, 
various physical and verbal harassment’838 and others. 
In relation to the manner of commission, the PTC presented several points to conclude 
that the Prosecutor erred in her conclusions. For example, the PTC held that the Prosecutor 
decided, ‘based on the totality of the evidence’ [emphasis added], that there was no sufficient 
evidence confirmed that the alleged crimes were systematic or the result of a deliberate plan or 
policy to attack civilians.839 In contrast to the Prosecutor’s approach, the PTC, based on some 
evidence, held that the Prosecutor did not dispute this part of the evidence that indicated that 
there was already an intent by the IDF to launch the attack prior to the boarding of the vessels. 
This conclusion was criticised by Whiting, arguing that ‘the PTC should have given deference 
to this considered judgment over its own speculative analysis of selective pieces of 
information.’840 [emphasis added]. Making a decision on the basis of selective sources of 
evidence, Whiting argues, is out of context and does not establish that a deliberate plan or 
policy was existed.841 He adds, ‘[w]hile the Prosecutor assessed all of the available evidence 
to determine what it reasonably shows, and whether gravity would then be satisfied, the 
majority of the PTC cherry picks pieces of evidence here and there to insist that, because the 
evidence is disputed, an investigation is required.’842 In relation to the impact of the crimes, the 
                                                          
837 Ibid, Para. 26. 
838 Ibid, Para. 29. 
839 Ibid, Para. 33. 
840 Supra n. 827. 
841 Ibid. 
842 Ibid. 
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PTC held that the Prosecutor underestimates the impact of the alleged crimes on the direct 
victims of the vessels as well as the overall impacts on Gaza, depending on the Comoros’ 
argument.843 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the blockade was 
‘devastating’844 and might affect the humanitarian conditions in Gaza. However, in making her 
refusal decision, the Prosecutor relied on the report of the Israeli National Investigation that 
stated that ‘[i]srael is complying with its humanitarian obligations, including the prohibition 
on starving the civilian population or preventing the supply of objects essential for the survival 
of the civilian population and medical supplies, and the requirement that the damage to the 
civilian population is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from the blockade.’845  
In deciding on the gravity of this situation, the Prosecutor declined to open the 
investigation on the basis that ‘the potential case(s) that would likely arise from an investigation 
of the flotilla incident would not be of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court 
(i.e. Article 17 (1)(d)).846 She added, ‘the potential case(s) that could be pursued is inherently 
limited to an event encompassing a small number of victims of the alleged ICC crimes, with 
limited countervailing qualitative considerations.’847 In her decision, Bensouda followed the 
established pattern of privileging ‘the scale of the crimes’ over any other factors. Overall, she 
concluded on the question of scale, that ‘while the Office regrets and deplores the loss of life 
and injury, it has to be acknowledged that the total number of victims of the flotilla incident 
reached relatively limited proportions as compared, generally, to other cases investigated by 
                                                          
843 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Paras. 46-7. 
844 Supra n. 809, Para. 38, ‘[i]n a public statement issued on 14 June 2010, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) described the impact of the closure on the situation in Gaza as “devastating” for the 1.5 
million people living there, emphasizing that “the closure constitutes a collective punishment imposed in clear 
violation of Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law”, saying the only sustainable solution was 
a lifting of the closure.’ 
845 Supra n. 800, Para. 47 (d). 
846 Comoros, OTP, November 2014, supra n. 810. 
847 Ibid, Para. 25. 
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the Office.’848 What is striking in her report is that whilst Bensouda was satisfied to a certain 
extent with the other factors, the nature, manner of commission, and impact, of the crimes, she 
clearly had a problem with ‘the scale of the crimes’. The OTP is not oriented to prosecute a 
small situation or case, the big cases are its target. It seems as if it is the BCC but not ICC. It 
can be seen now that the criterion of scale to assess the satisfaction of ‘sufficient gravity’ is 
playing a fundamental role in making a decision.  
However, Judge Kovacs disagreed with the majority stating that the Prosecutor was 
right in his decision. In his several defending points, he said that the assessment of scale was 
not carried out, as was previously acknowledged by the Chambers, and as understood by the 
Statute.849 Having cited several decisions taken by the Chambers, he said that gravity should 
be assessed ‘in such a manner as to achieve the ultimate goal for its inclusion, namely to focus 
on those situations/cases which are indisputably grave and deserve the attentional of the 
international community.’850 The Chamber’s assessment of scale fell short of this purpose. He 
used a comparative method between this situation and Kenya to support his opinion.851 
4.7.1 Implications 
Based on the above analysis, several implications can be drawn from this chapter. First, 
there is a need that the OTP should acknowledge the importance of not limiting the evaluation 
of gravity to one factor. For example, the nature of the crime might appear so grievous that its 
importance outweighs its scale. In talking about the definition of genocide, Micol Sirkin states 
‘a single isolated act could qualify as genocide’.852 As the genocide crime constitutes ‘the crime 
                                                          
848 Ibid, Para. 138. 
849 Dissenting Opinion supra n. 829. 
850 Ibid, Para. 18. 
851 Ibid, Para. 19. 
852 Micol Sirkin, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: a Return to Established 
Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2010), P. 
489.  
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of crimes’, then the quantitative approach of the evaluation of the seriousness of the offence 
might look less significant.853 The strict commitment to, and consistent link between, the 
gravity and ‘the scale of the crimes’ that the OTP has developed might render some acts of 
genocide involving small number of victims inadmissible. It would seem odd if the prosecutor 
decides that the crime of genocide that does not involve a large scale of victims in a certain 
situation is not sufficiently grave.  
In addition, the consistent quantitative orientation of the OTP may fall short of 
protecting minorities, as it keeps them away from the reach of the Court. For example, 
according to several reports, it was submitted that a few crimes, which involved a small number 
of victims were committed (displacement) against Armenians when the Syrian regime and the 
Free Syrian Army started to fight in Kessab, an area that is mainly inhabited by nearly 2000 
Armenians.854 Arguably, if these accusations are true, then the question is how will the OTP 
be able to open the Armenian case and protect their victims as long as the numbers of victims 
is very low, compared to the vast crimes committed in other potential cases within the Syrian 
situation? Of course, crimes committed against minorities are often conducted in the context 
of less widespread violence. Therefore, perpetrators are usually less fearful of the ICC 
prosecution.855 There is then a need for the OTP to operationalise the other factors to assess 
gravity and not to make his policy as ‘rules’, because the discretionary power should be dealt 
with as a process, as Rosalyn Higgins demonstrates in her widely cited book.856  
                                                          
853 See William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
854 See Christians Flee Syria’s Kessab, Twitter Cries Atrocities, Armenia Accuses Turkey, Russia Today (31st 
March, 2014), available at <http://rt.com/news/armenians-kessab-syria-attack-381/> (Last Access: 28th April, 
2014). 
855 See the opinion of Heller about the small situations, supra n. 647, P 22.  
856 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and how We Use it (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), Chapter 1. 
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Dealing with the law as rules does not often lead to the achievement of justice for all 
affected societies or victims.857 This particular discussion also suggests an important point for 
the OTP to consider when using ‘the scale of the crime’ to assess gravity. It acknowledges the 
‘relative quantitative approach’. In order for the Court to keep protecting minorities, the OTP 
should calculate ‘the scale of the crimes’ according to the number of minority victims as a 
proportion (or even percentage) of the total number of the given minority itself and not the 
other cases that might involve thousands of victims. This argument can be used as a reply to 
Heller’s argument in the context of the Comoros situation when he argues that the PTC should 
have compared the Comoros situation with equivalent standards, which are situations.   
Second, consistent with the Court’s trend,858 it is desirable for the OTP not to set a high 
threshold for gravity and not to connect it to the mandatory satisfaction of ‘the scale of crimes’. 
A lower threshold may seem more desirable. However, the determination that the Kenya 
situation was sufficiently grave to justify further action by the Court is a great development 
made by the OTP.859 In this decision, the Prosecutor has opposed to her main orientation that 
focuses only on big situations and cases. In this situation, the number of victims is far less than 
any other situations, currently under the investigation of the Court.860 It is true that several 
people have criticised the prosecutor for making this decision – and indeed in the Court 
authorisation hearing – as one of the ICC judges dissented from the Court’s decision.861 
                                                          
857 Ibid, Pp. 5-10. 
858 As was explored in this chapter, the Court tends to adopt a low threshold for gravity to determine the 
admissibility of situations and cases. The decision of the Appeal Chamber in relation to the Ntganda case, the 
PTC’s decision to relation to the Prosecutor’s determination of insufficient gravity of the Palestine-Israel 
situation are two examples.  
859 Situation in the Republic of Kenya 2009, supra n. 230. 
860 Situation in the Republic of Kenya 2009, supra n. 230, Para. 56 that states that ‘the post­election violence 
resulted in a reported 1,133 to 1,220 killings of civilians, more than nine hundred documented acts of rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, with many more unreported, the internal displacement of 350,000 persons, 
and 3,561 reported acts causing serious injury’. 
861 See for example, Michelle Nichols, AU's Zuma asks U.N. Security Council about Kenya ICC deferral, Reuters 
(8th October, 2013), available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/08/us-kenya-icc-un-
idUSBRE9970Z120131008> (Last Access: 15th January, 2015), and see ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua 
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Nonetheless, the picture is still bright from the perspective of those who wish to see the 
threshold kept as low as possible and to maximise potential investigations and prosecutions. 
This decision, indeed, keeps pace with the current fundamental trend that international criminal 
law is expanding more and more, deGuzman argues.862 It does not have to concentrate only on 
crimes such as the Holocaust and the Srebrenica’s massacre or the Rwandan genocide to claim 
an international criminal adjudication. Today, a single incident could be grave enough to 
invoke an international legal action, such as the Al-Hariri Tribunal.863 
Third, the practice of the Court and the Prosecutor in applying gravity has shown a 
tension between the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber. The intra-institutional conflict 
between them is a healthy phenomenon, as it makes the Statute clearer. The conflict occurred 
in the Lubanga and Ntaganda case and the Comoros situation. In these two instances, the 
Appeal Chamber had to intervene ‘to interpret the Statute so as to fill a legislative lacuna.’864 
Fourth, it was noticed that the Prosecutor was highly inconsistent in interpreting the 
term ‘sufficient gravity’, the matter that allows her to use a strong sense of legal interpretive 
discretion. The Prosecutor, therefore, is required to be more consistent as to how and which 
methods and factors should be considered when interpreting ‘sufficient gravity’, bearing in 
mind the above observations. This wide scope of legal interpretive discretion may explain the 
causes of the criticisms that the Prosecutor is facing, in particular the anti-African Court’s 
criticism. The causes of these criticisms are not associated with the exercise of prosecutorial 
                                                          
Arap Sang, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II's "Decision on the Prosecutor's 
Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang", 
No.: ICC-01/09-01/11 (15th March, 2011).  
862 Supra n. 819. 
863 UN Security Council, Press Release, Security Council Authorizes Establishment of Special Tribunal to Try 
Suspects in Assassination of Rafiq Hariri, SC Resolution 1757 (2007), 5685th Meeting (PM), available at 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9029.doc.htm>. ‘[I]f the court finds that other attacks that occurred in 
Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties, and with 
the consent of the Council, are connected in […] and are of a nature and gravity similar to the attack on Mr. 
Hariri, the Tribunal “shall also have jurisdiction over persons responsible for such attacks”.’  
864 Supra n. 832. 
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discretion, as most of the literature tries to show. Instead, it is the very application of the legal 
categories, where a strong sense of discretion was exercised.    
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CHAPTER FIVE: IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 
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5.1. Introduction 
The ‘interests of justice’ provisions of Article 53 of the ICC Statute have been the 
subject of intense debate. Subparagraphs (1)(c) and (2)(c) provide the prosecutor with 
prosecutorial discretion to decline to launch an investigation or to proceed to prosecution if 
doing so would conflict with ‘the interests of justice’.865 This means that, even though 
investigation or prosecution satisfy the admissibility criteria: gravity and complementarity,866 
nonetheless the prosecutor is empowered to cease proceedings on the basis of ‘the interests of 
justice’.867 If the prosecutor makes such a decision, i.e. solely on the basis of ‘the interests of 
justice’, this will come under a strict judicial oversight.868 The Pre-Trial Chamber can exercise 
a proprio motu power of review.869 If the Chamber dismisses the prosecutor’s decision, the 
latter then must proceed with the investigation or prosecution.870 Yet, what is the exact meaning 
and scope of the term ‘the interests of justice’?  
It is a striking fact that the Prosecutor has never invoked the Article 53 ‘interests of 
justice’ provisions as a basis not to initiate an investigation or proceed with a prosecution. Since 
the operation of the ICC began in 2002, the Prosecutor has not once used her discretion to 
decline any investigation or prosecution in ‘the interests of justice’.871 Accordingly, there has 
been much speculation within the literature about the scope and interpretation of ‘the interests 
of justice’. In particular whether, in considering ‘the interests of justice’ the prosecutor may 
and should take into account the non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms, and also the potential 
                                                          
865 Meester, supra n. 212. 
866 Article 17 (1) (a)-(c) and (2) of the ICC Statute. 
867 Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesty, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14. No. 3 (2003), P. 486. 
868 Article 53 (3). 
869 Article 53 (3) (b) provides that ‘the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the 
Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the 
Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.’ 
870 Supra n. 61. 
871 Supra n. 694, P. 216. 
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impact of the ICC’s proceedings on peace-related issues.872 This issue has made Article 53 
open to different interpretations and readings. ‘The interests of justice’ provisions of Article 53 
are the focus of the most heated debates surrounding the Rome Statute; the breadth of the 
discretionary power of the prosecutor, and how it should be exercised. Current scholarship by 
academics and NGOs offer strongly differing legal interpretations of the potential scope of 
these provisions as well as conflicting views from a policy perspective on what stance the 
prosecutor should take. Such controversy is a result of the lack of definitive clarification from 
the Prosecutor, despite a policy paper devoted to the meaning and potential application of ‘the 
interests of justice’ provisions873 in Article 53.874 In fact, the term is still not definitely defined. 
The issue of which mechanisms could be acceptable, as an alternative is, in particular, 
the central point of the discussion of the Article. National truth commissions, national 
amnesties, and peace process are the most common mechanisms, which may replace the ICC, 
as the latter’s proceedings may not serve ‘the interests of justice’. Here, it is quite important to 
clarify that there are two types of amnesties. One is usually associated with truth commissions 
and is called a conditional amnesty. It is already associated with a non-prosecutorial justice 
mechanism. Another is called blanket amnesty, which does not accompany any sort of justice 
mechanisms. Amnesty allows all perpetrators go free of any charge or any sort of 
accountability. A peace process as a sole possible alternative, which is supposed to pave the 
way for a transition, is also another way of providing a blanket amnesty. The chapter will 
concentrate on non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms such as truth commissions – whether or 
                                                          
872 The peace-related process is one of the most debated issues when it comes to determine the scope of ‘the 
interests of justice’. See Rodman, supra n. 21. 
873 See supra n. 179, Pp. 1151- 1158. 
874 Goldston, supra n. 18, P. 292, stating that ‘there has been much debate about its meaning [Article 53]’. 
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not associated with amnesty. It also focuses on peace processes whether or not associated with 
blanket amnesty,875 as these two approaches do not accompany any sort of justice mechanisms.     
The current discussions of Article 53 ‘the interests of justice’ provisions in the literature 
tend to focus on a fundamental question, which is how these provisions should be read. There 
are two different views. The first view, which constitutes the majority, reads the Article in a 
narrow way.876 The proponents of this view tend to give priority to the criminal justice 
avenue.877 This particular concern is raised in the context of the potential effect of the ICC’s 
proceedings on national developments, such as truth commission processes, and ongoing 
peace-related talks.878 HRW’s argument, for example, suggests that justice ‘is a precondition 
for meaningful peace.’879 Therefore, this view suggests that the potential of ceasing the ICC’s 
proceedings should be limited to a criminal justice response.  
The second view, which constitutes the minority, reads ‘the interests of justice’ in a 
broad way so it allows the prosecutor to defer to non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms.880 The 
                                                          
875 Several peace processes that were signed to put an end to armed conflicts provided amnesty, as the 
situations were in France-Algeria (1962), Haiti (1994), and Algeria (1999). See Douglas Cassel, Lessons from 
Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vo. 59, No. 4 (1996), P. 197- 230. 
876 Supra n. 30, arguing in favor of committing to criminal justice. See also Martin Macpherson, Open letter to 
the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: Comments on the concept of the interests of justice, 
Amnesty International, June 2005, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/023/2005>. 
see also Richard J. Goldstone and Nicole Fritz, ‘In the Interests of Justice’ and Independent Referral: The ICC 
Prosecutor's Unprecedented Powers, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, Issue 03 (2000), 655- 667. 
See also Dražan Djukić, Transitional Justice and the ICC: in the ‘Interests of Justice’, Centre Universitaire de 
Droit International Humanitaire (2006), P. 1- 69, see Robinson, supra n. 867, the author gave a priority for the 
criminal prosecution, when interpreting the Article, see also Kate Allan, Prosecution and Peace: a Role for 
Amnesty before the ICC? Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 39 (2011), 239- 301, arguing for a 
restrictive approach, when interpreting Article 53, see supra n. 720, Pp. 17- 18, arguing in favour of criminal 
proceedings. 
877 Supra n. 30, P. 2, It stated that ‘HRW believes the OTP should adopt a strict construction of the term 
“interests of justice” in order to adhere to the context of the Rome Statute, its object and purpose, and to the 
requirements of international law.’ See also, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: 
The Need for Accountability, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1996), 9-28.  
878 Allan, supra n. 876. 
879 Supra n. 30, P. 2.  
880 See, Henry M. Lovat, Delineating the Interests of Justice: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, bepress Legal Series, Paper, 1435 (2006). See also Brubacher, supra n. 22. And 
see Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Does Justice Always Requires Prosecution? The International Criminal Court and 
Transitional Justice Measures, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 45 (2013), arguing for a 
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extent to which national developments, such as alternative justice mechanisms are relevant to 
the consideration of the prosecutor when assessing ‘the interests of justice’ is a main concern 
of this debate. Specifically, the ICC Statute, and the OTP’s policy document about the 
interpretation of ‘the interests of justice’ do not provide a specific position about such 
developments, although it was the main discussion during the Rome Diplomatic Conference.881 
This was intentionally left vague to provide the prosecutor with a broad power to decide on 
situations and cases. The latter concern also opens another discussion about whether or not 
‘peace processes’ come within the scope of Article 53.882 The dilemma between justice and 
peace raised heated debates in the context of the Uganda situation, where several local people 
argued that the provisions of ‘the interests of justice’ could have been applied to cease the 
ICC’s proceedings in favour of the ongoing peace talks.883  
This chapter will analyse prosecutorial discretion under the Article 53 ‘interests of 
justice’. It aims at showing the importance of undertaking extra-legal factors, including the 
political circumstances, associated with making a decision in ‘the interests of justice’. In the 
first part of this chapter, my discussion will seek to discuss, and reply to those who raised the 
narrow reading. I shall offer my own opinion to that debate, as well. Before this discussion 
takes place, this section will explore the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’ provisions. It will 
explore the general scene of the power of the prosecutor under this Article and the preparatory 
discussion of the meaning of the term ‘the interests of justice’ during the Rome Conference. 
Then, my discussion will massively concentrate on the relevance of non-prosecutorial justice 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions and its conformity to the classical theories of justice.  
                                                          
deferral at the accomplishment of certain conditions. See Also Rodman, supra n. 21, arguing for a broader 
interpretation of the Article, including peace process, as an alternative.  
881 Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, Cornell 
International Law Journal, vol. 32 (1999), Pp. 507 and 521-22. 
882 Rodman, supra n. 21. 
883 Cited in Courting History: the Landmark International Criminal Court’s Five Years, Human Rights Watch 
(2008), Pp. 34, also available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/07/10/courting-history>. 
232 
 
As set out earlier in Chapters One and Two, the ICC prosecutor is exercising her power 
within unusual circumstances, where the Court totally relies on the voluntary cooperation of 
states and international organisations to enforce its decisions.884 The international community 
has pushed the prosecutor into a political role, where unfamiliar values, such as security, peace, 
and stability become indispensable to be considered when the prosecutor delivers justice.885 
Although the prosecutor as a body within a judicial institution is only responsible to deliver 
justice, it is the lack of several crucial means886 that the Court does not possess that urges the 
prosecutor to pay attention to those values. International criminal justice, as Bassiouni points 
out, ‘cannot be viewed as a system that functions entirely without consideration for other 
broader concerns such as peace and reconciliation. ICJ must, therefore, be viewed within the 
broader goals of justice in response to the needs of certain societies at a given time and 
place’.887 The term ‘the interests of justice’ is not just ‘a creative ambiguity’ that provides the 
prosecutor with a broad power, as Philippe Kirsch states.888 Indeed, it does also provide her 
with a creative mandate to exercise her prosecutorial function in a way that may help to make 
the achievement of justice, which is the main aim of the Court, more effective and 
meaningful.889 With the establishment of such a permanent court, which lacks the most critical 
means for its success, the role of the prosecutor with such a generation of prosecution is more 
functional.  
                                                          
884 See more discussion about this in Chapter One. 
885 Rodman, supra n. 21, Pp. 120- 123, identifying that the prosecutor has a new role to play as being diplomat 
or a lawyer who needs to consider the impact of investigations and prosecution on ongoing conflict and 
political transitions. 
886 The Court has no enforcing agents and no police to work under its commands. Also, all states whether 
parties to the Court or not, and also international organisations are not obliged to cooperate with the Court. 
That was opposed to those crucial means that were available under the services of the Military Tribunals 
Prosecutors.  
887 Supra n. 539, P. 239. 
888 Quoted in Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 
Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 32 (1999), P. 521-2. 
889 See Chapter One about the idea of meaningful justice. 
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The second part of this chapter will concentrate on the position of peace processes 
within the scope of ‘the interests of justice’. In so doing, I shall argue that due to the above 
circumstances, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is multi-functional where the prosecutor 
now is more responsible to consider other values that accompany ongoing and post conflicts. 
The Prosecutor does not seem to acknowledge this new role. The Prosecutor on several 
occasions made it clear that there is no place for any political considerations or peace-related 
issues within her decision-making process, as her prosecution’s strategy is only based on 
law.890 She is strictly committed to the rules. Greenawalt also observed this status.891 He 
submits that the insistence of the prosecutor on legalism is to ensure to the international 
community that the ICC is not a political court.892 It is unlike the early predecessor international 
tribunals in that it tries to represent itself as a normal international court.893 However, this 
chapter will argue that the ICC is far from being normal. The rhetorical denial strategy both 
Prosecutors are following and the strict commitment to the rule approach do not actually help 
avoid the classical accusation of the prosecutor being political894 or following a one-sided 
policy.895 The prosecutor is required to address several concerns that a prosecutor of a normal 
court would not.  
In order to answer these questions, the analysis of Article 53 (1)(c) and (2)(c) will 
mainly draw on the current literature, policy papers of the OTP, some lessons from the ICTY, 
ICTR, and where relevant, from the Nuremberg Tribunal as well, in the context of the 
theoretical and historical chapters developed earlier in this thesis. The current literature will be 
more engaged throughout the following discussion, as Article 53 has not been applied. In 
                                                          
890 See the full discussion of this issue in the introduction of this thesis. 
891 Supra n. 23. 
892 Ibid. 
893 Ibid. 
894 See the allegation of being political in introduction of this thesis 
895 Supra n. 718, P 42. Clark argued that the OTP failed to explain its strategy in Uganda in a way that help to 
remove the common perception that the Court is a ‘one-sided and heavily politicised’. 
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addition, I undertook qualitative research at The Hague, the city where the OTP is situated. I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with both Prosecutors and several staff members of the 
OTP. The latter is used as an inductive source, to which reference will be made, when 
appropriate.  
5.2. Exploring the Article 53 Provisions on ‘the Interests of Justice’ 
The ICC Statute was built on the basis of putting ‘an end to impunity’, to ensure that 
those who are most responsible for committing serious international crimes face justice, and to 
complement national judicial proceedings.896 In its first policy document, the OTP 
‘encourage[s] national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or 
work with the international community to ensure that the offenders are brought to justice by 
some other means.’897 This policy was meant to avoid an ‘impunity gap’ that may result from 
the non-involvement of national judicial authorities in pursuing other perpetrators that the 
Court does not follow. This is called a complementarity regime, based on Article 17 of the 
Statute.898 This is one avenue provided by the Statute, by which national judicial authorities 
may take the initiative. It may completely replace the ICC, if the national judicial system is 
genuinely willing and able to pursue potential perpetrators. Or, it could only complement the 
work of the Court by concentrating on other cases that the Court did not investigate.899 This 
avenue opened a massive debate about the non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms as possible 
alternatives to the ICC.900 It is not the focus of this chapter to address this problem. It is to 
emphasise that the discussion of the position of these alternatives will be in the light of the 
                                                          
896 Paragraph 4, 5, and 10 of the ICC Statute. See also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Conference on an 
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 
1 (1999), P. 24. 
897 Supra n. 187, P. 3. 
898 See generally, Jann K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and national criminal jurisdictions 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). 
899 See generally, ibid. 
900 Supra n. 135, P. 77, arguing that truth commission or other non-prosecutorial alternative may not replace 
the ICC, as they may not meet the criminal investigative requirement. 
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potential of the assessment of ‘the interests of justice’ stage. In addition, it is worth bearing in 
mind that the stage of the assessment of ‘the interests of justice’ is preceded by a positive 
decision on the admissibility of a situation or a case. This means that the given situation or case 
is already determined admissible. Therefore, the decision not to open an investigation or not to 
proceed with the prosecution, according to the FIDH, ‘would contradict the Statute’s most 
fundamental aim’.901 
There is also another avenue where those alternatives may replace the ICC. Under 
Article 16, the SC may ask the prosecutor not to commence or stop an investigation or 
prosecution for 12 months. This avenue may allow those alternatives to take the initiative until 
values such as stability or peace are settled. This chapter’s focus is intensively on the potential 
of ceasing an investigation or prosecution on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’ provisions of 
Article 53.       
During the preparatory discussion of the Rome Statute, the question of how to deal with 
non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms was highly debated, but largely avoided within the 
Statute itself. This potential of the consideration of non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms was 
a matter of debate during the designation of Article 17, but more extensively in the context of 
Article 53. Articles 17 and 53 are two possible avenues, which are left open for discretion of 
the prosecutor to decide on this particular question. These provisions provide a leeway that 
may enable the prosecutor to give national authorities a chance to tackle the given atrocities 
through different types of accountability. Several participants in the Rome negotiations opined 
that states should be given an opportunity to determine what sort of justice should be delivered 
to violators of mass international atrocities. Imposing the ICC’s approach on all situations and 
                                                          
901 Comments on the Office of the Prosecutor's draft policy paper on « The interest of Justice », FIDH 
(November, 2005), P. 2. 
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cases may not suit the cultures of punishment of some states,902 it may also have adverse effects 
on transitions from violent status to stable one.903 Therefore, alternatives such as truth 
commissions could be an ideal solution for some situations and should be given the priority to 
tackle the given conflict. Others were quite opposed and insisted on prosecution as an 
appropriate response to atrocities.904 
At the conclusion of these discussions, the drafters did not reach any agreement on 
those difficult questions and preferred to be diplomatic and left the door open for the prosecutor 
(and the Court) to deal with the question of the relevance of other alternatives. It was left to the 
discretionary power of the prosecutor to assess potential impacts of the Court’s proceedings on 
national developments such as truth commissions, amnesty, and peace process. What is meant 
to show in this discussion is that the background negotiations of ‘the interests of justice’ 
provisions of Article 53 was mainly about the potential adverse impact of the ICC’s 
proceedings on national initiatives to tackle atrocities. Therefore, the term ‘justice’ was 
intentionally left open for different interpretations, guided by several factors the prosecutor 
may consider when using her discretion.  
In relation to ‘the interests of justice’, Article 53 (1) and (2) deal with the investigation 
and prosecution stages respectively.905 Subparagraph (1)(c) deals with the investigation stage 
and provides the prosecutor with a power not to open an investigation on the basis of ‘the 
interests of justice’, if the following conditions are met: ‘Taking into account the gravity of the 
                                                          
902 Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
903 Charles Villa-Vicencio, why Perpetrators should not always be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal 
Court and Truth Commission Meet, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 49 (2000), P. 222, a speech given by Kofi Annan 
arguing that truth commissions should not be completely set aside. 
904 Madeline H. Morris, Foreword, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 59 (1996), 1-3, see also Michael P. 
Scharf, From the Exile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 63, 
Issue: 1 (2006), P. 367. 
905 See generally, William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: a Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. 655- 671. See Also, supra n. 179, Pp. 1153- 1158.  
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crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice’. Obviously, the prosecutor is not required 
to prove that the investigation would serve ‘the interests of justice’. It is only when it comes to 
deciding not to initiate an investigation that the prosecutor is required to prove the 
incompatibility of the investigation with ‘the interests of justice’. The subparagraph provides 
two criteria that the prosecutor should consider when making a negative decision: ‘the gravity 
of the crime and the interests of victims’. The interpretation of the term justice is balanced 
against these factors, as the Paragraph uses the term ‘nonetheless’ having placed those factors 
in first instance.906  
If the prosecutor decides to initiate an investigation, she, then, will move on to the 
prosecution stage and decide whether or not to prosecute. At this stage, the prosecutor is 
entitled to select cases within the given situation which is being investigated. Subparagraph (2) 
(c) of Article 53 provides the prosecutor with a power not to prosecute if the following 
conditions are met: 
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age 
or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; the 
Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral under 
article 14 or the Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her 
conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion.  
Like the investigation provision, here too ‘the gravity of the crime’ and ‘the interests of 
victims’ are to be considered, and in addition there are two more criteria that the prosecutor is 
required to consider: ‘the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’, and ‘his or her role in the 
                                                          
906 DeGuzman, supra n. 13, P. 1413.  
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alleged crime.’ As Drazan Djukic points out, the factors explicitly listed are not exclusive as 
‘the article speaks of “all the circumstances, including…” (emphasis added) which renders the 
list of factors illustrative instead of exhaustive.’907 This is critical, as it empowers the 
prosecutor to consider factors other than those explicitly named. The wording of the text 
implies that the prosecutor can utilise a broad meaning of justice, when making a decision not 
to proceed, as the Statute adds two more factors to be considered. The Statute is quite specific 
at this stage, as it deals with the cases stage and, therefore, the identity of the perpetrators is 
often known at this advanced stage. Therefore, it suggests that age-related problems or health-
related problems of perpetrators can constitute an excuse for not proceeding with the 
prosecution.908  
5.3. Interpreting ‘the Interests of Justice’     
As articulated earlier, the debates about ‘the interests of justice’ in Article 53 focus on 
the question of whether or not the prosecutor can and should use her discretionary power to 
respect other alternative justice mechanisms (non-prosecutorial ones such as truth 
commissions), associated/not associated with amnesty or peace-related approach. One view 
interprets ‘the interests of justice’ in a narrow way so it gives criminal justice proceedings the 
priority to address international mass atrocities. Most of them909 conclude that the prosecutor 
should strictly commit to a criminal prosecution and ignore any possible alternative justice 
mechanisms, which is based on non-prosecutorial processes such as truth commissions, 
amnesty, or peace processes.910 Only a few people read ‘the interests of justice’ in a broad way 
so it allows the prosecutor to take these processes into account as part of considering ‘the 
                                                          
907 Djukić, supra n. 876, P. 26. 
908 For more information about the judicial review of discretionary prosecution, see supra n. 61, P. 247. 
909 See for example, Martin Macpherson, supra n. 876. 
910 This is a widely view due to the fact that the prosecutor is a body within a judicial institution, whose main 
mandate is only to deliver a criminal justice. 
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interests of justice’.911 They mainly justified this view by depending on different bases, 
according to which justice has different meanings to different communities and in different 
situations.912 In principle, the view is based on the idea that the international criminal law 
regime can be reconciled with other alternative justice mechanisms and peace processes, as the 
two latter can achieve justice, stability, peace, and smooth transitions.913  
I will first present, and analyse their arguments, before I offer my reply. I will argue 
that as the Court is working within unusual circumstances,914 where the prosecutor is left with 
no effective means to promote ‘the interests of justice’ and pushed into a political role, it could 
be desirable for the prosecutor to waive her proceedings and allow other sorts of non-
prosecutorial justice alternatives, associated/not associated with amnesty or a peace process. 
Whilst this section will evaluate the conformity of those alternatives with the term justice, the 
second part of this chapter will concentrate on the relevance of peace processes within the 
scope of ‘the interests of justice’ and in light of the justice theories. The assessment of the 
relevance of peace processes is also applicable to amnesty.  
HRW is among those who rigorously asks the prosecutor to interpret the phrase of ‘the 
interests of justice’ in a narrow way; in the sense that only a criminal justice mechanism is to 
be considered.915 The proponents of the narrow interpretation build their arguments on the fact 
that the phrase ‘the interests of justice’ in Article 53 is not determinate, in the sense that it does 
                                                          
911 Rodman, supra n. 21. See also Brubacher, supra n. 22, P. 94, he opined that when the prosecutor exercises 
her prosecutorial discretion, she can consider ‘the political factors pertaining to the maintenance of 
international peace and security’. See also Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms 
of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 3, Issue: 3 (2005), Pp. 697-8, arguing that the interpretation of term justice may embody a broader 
meaning. 
912 Goldstone and Fritz, supra n. 876, P. 662. 
913 Josefine Volqvartz, ICC under Fire over Uganda Probe, Global Policy Forum (23rd February, 2005), available 
at <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28501.html> (Last Access: 21st August, 
2015) argues that the OTP’s indictments against the LRA’s members could have adverse effects on the ongoing 
peace efforts that were taking place at the time. 
914 See Chapter One of this thesis. 
915 Supra n. 30. 
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not contain an exact meaning916 and, therefore, requires interpretation by reference to the 
methods of interpretation Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides.917 On that basis, they provide several legal justifications for their argument. Article 
31 provides that a term should be first interpreted according to its ordinary meaning. But HRW 
argues, since this is not clear ‘in isolation’, one must consider the term in the context of the 
Statute more widely and in light of the treaty’s objects and purposes. HRW then notes that no 
definitional agreement was reached at Rome.918 There is no indication of ‘any agreement that 
the phrase “the interests of justice” permits the prosecutor to consider the existence of a national 
amnesty or truth commission process, or ongoing peace negotiations as factors to be 
evaluated.’919 Therefore, it seems that, in considering ‘the interests of justice’ within the 
context of the treaty itself, the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty, as a second focus of 
interpretation is relevant in this regard. Accordingly, they turn to the Preamble as a relevant 
source.920 According to the Preamble of the ICC Statute, the preeminent object of the Statute 
as summarised by HRW, ‘is to prosecute the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community.’921 On this basis they reach their narrow construction of ‘the interests of justice’ 
as excluding consideration of on-ground developments ‘such as truth commissions, national 
amnesties, or the implementation of traditional reconciliation methods, or concerns regarding 
an ongoing peace process.’922 As a consequence, the prosecutor should ignore any mechanism 
that does not ensure a criminal justice. This conforms to the ICC’s raison d’être, which is as 
read from the Preamble, according to HRW ‘the goal of putting an end to impunity of the 
perpetrators of [genocide, aggression, crimes against humanity, and systematic or large-scale 
                                                          
916 Ibid. See also supra n. 909. See also, Robinson, supra n. 867, P. 488. See also Lovat, supra n. 880. See also 
Richard J. Goldstone and Nicole Fritz, supra n. 876. 
917 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (entered into force on 27th January, 1980). 
918 Supra n. 30. 
919 Ibid, P. 4. 
920 Ibid, Pp. 3- 4. 
921 Ibid, P.6. 
922 Ibid, P.21 . 
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war crimes] is the main reason for the creation of the ICC.’923 As Martin Macpherson expresses 
on behalf of Amnesty International, ‘[a] suspension by the Prosecutor of an investigation on 
the political ground that it might facilitate negotiations to end an armed conflict would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the Court’.924 
The next interpretation presented by the adherents of the narrow construction concerns 
Article 16.925 HRW submits that Article 16 allows the UNSC to postpone an investigation or 
prosecution for a 12 month period, ‘because it may interfere with international peace and 
security.’926 Therefore, they argue that this clearly indicates that it is for the UNSC, not the 
OTP prosecutor, to take such political decisions.927 They present several citations to support 
this view, such as that ‘Article 16 is “the vehicle for resolving conflicts between the 
requirements of peace and justice where the Council assesses that the peace efforts need to be 
given priority over international criminal justice’928. HRW concludes then that the only means 
that the Statute allows for non-prosecutorial mechanisms, in particular a peace process to 
‘trump’ the Court’s proceedings, is through Article 16.929 Providing such a broad power for the 
ICC prosecutor would undermine the fair and non-discriminatory character the prosecutor 
should enjoy. It would further undermine the legal legitimacy of the court, if it was exercised 
wrongly.930 For these reasons, the drafters of the Statute were aware that the OTP as a body 
                                                          
923 Ibid, P.6. 
924 Supra n. 909, P. 4. 
925 See mainly the discussion of HRW about article 16 at supra n. 30. Article 16: Deferral of investigation or 
prosecution: No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the 
same conditions. 
926 Supra n. 30, P.7. 
927 Supra n. 30. See also, supra n. 909. See also Webb, supra n. 17, see also, Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace 
with Justice: the International Criminal Court and Uganda Alternative Justice Mechanisms, Connecticut Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 23 (2008), P. 239. 
928 Supra n. 177, P. 378, cited in supra n. 30. 
929 Supra n. 30, P.8. 
930 Danner, supra n. 14, P. 536. 
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within a judicial institution has no any political legitimacy to examine the issue of the stability 
and security of a certain situation.931   
Indeed, the strict legal justifications of HRW seem problematic. Although the reading 
of the language of the Statute and its Preamble emphasises the prosecutorial approach as a rule 
to address conflict situations, however that does not mean at all that the criminal justice 
response is the sole approach to which those means refer. For example, they concentrate on the 
idea ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished.’932 The next section will show that punishment is wide and may involve 
some forms that may be inflicted from non-prosecutorial mechanisms. In addition, it is not true 
that the aims and purposes of the Statute only emphasis the criminal justice value as the only 
target for the Court. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble, which even precedes the punishment aim, 
provides that the peace and security values are also to be taken into account. In addition, 
Paragraph 7 also reaffirms ‘the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
The latter’s main principle and mandate is to secure peace and stability in the world. Therefore, 
the strict interpretation of the HRW does not seem coherent, as the aims of the Statute do not 
provide one certain goal.933  
The key concern of HRW is that the involvement of the prosecutor in the question of 
peace, security, and stability, which have political repercussions, may raise serious legal 
concerns about the legal legitimacy of the prosecutor as a body within a judicial institution. 
Therefore, it is the SC, the principal body, whose mandate is to concentrate on national political 
developments, such as peace processes, transitions, and stability, who is to take responsibility 
                                                          
931 See supra n. 179, P. 1142. 
932 See the Preamble of the Statute, Para. 4. 
933 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (2nd ed.) (Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1984), P. 130. He points out ‘most treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose but a variety of 
differing and possibly conflicting objects and purposes.’ 
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for those values. However, to what extent are these allegations are workable? Does the 
prosecutor have any role or even choice to read ‘the interests of justice’ in a broad way that 
may cover the non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms as well as peace-process related issues?  
As was discussed in Chapter One, the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms at the 
international level is still weak.934 The ICC, in particular, has no police who work under its 
command. The Court was created with no normal means of making the operation of the Court 
effective. The prosecutor of a permanent court has to face questions of the adverse impacts of 
her proceedings on any potential conflicts, although, in principal, she is not responsible to 
address such questions. The Court totally relies on the political decision of states for 
cooperation and enforcement and can only report to The ASP in case those states failed to 
comply with the Court’s requests.935 The ASP has no effective power by which to force states 
to enforce any decision the prosecutor makes.936 The insistence on the ICC’s approach requires 
effective enforcement mechanisms, which the Court and the prosecutor lack. The same 
argument can be applied to the SC, as the latter has failed on several occasions to intervene, as 
an enforcement tool to administrate justice, as in the situation Syria.937 The exclusive allocation 
of the articulation of the assessment of the scope of justice by the SC does not seem logical. 
                                                          
934 See the arguments advanced by, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books: 1977). See also the argument addressed by Cherif Bassiouni about the 
importance of having effective enforcement mechanisms at the international level, M Cherif Bassiouni, Justice 
and Peace: the Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpolitic, Case Western Reserve Law Journal, Vol. 
35 (2003), Pp. 202-4. 
935 See Articles 87 and 112 of the ICC Statute. 
936 Most recently, Chad has refused to arrest Defense Minister of Sudan Abdel-Rahim Hussein who travelled to 
Chad, although the latter is a party to the ICC and under an obligation to arrest him, see Chad Welcomes 
Hussein and Violates its International Legal Obligations Yet Again, International Justice Project (April, 2013), 
available at <http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/chad-welcomes-hussein-and-violates-its-
international-legal-obligations-yet-again-2/> (Last Access: 15th May, 2013). 
937 The failure of the SC in putting an end to the violence in Syria and therefore to bring justice to both victims 
and perpetrators is another example of the lack of a stable and effective mechanism of enforcing justice, see a 
report by: Jane Cown, UN Slams Security Council’s Syria Failure, ABC News (August 2012), available at < 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-04/un-chief-warns-battle-for-aleppo-imminent/4176616> (Last Access: 
7th November, 2012). 
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There is no guarantee that the SC will always intervene to prevent or terminate an investigation 
or prosecution.938   
Accordingly, so long as ‘justice’ could be achieved in different ways, as will be 
discussed below, that the current enforcement mechanisms are not always effective, and that 
some conflicts cannot be solved by criminal justice (whether international or international), 
then it seems that other mechanisms would be desirable. This, at least, should be the case until 
the international community resolves the enforcement problem.939 The idea then is not which 
body should possess the interpretation of ‘the interests of justice’. It is, indeed, how to ensure 
the protection of these interests. This interpretation indicates that the prosecutor of the 
permanent international criminal court has multifunctional roles to play. The prosecutor is left 
in a position that forces her to consider values, which are not normal within a body that is 
supposed to deliver a sole judicial mandate that is to say justice. This discussion further implies 
that the broad reading of ‘the interests of justice’ accordingly seems necessary let alone 
desirable.   
5.3.1. The General Orientation of the OTP and the Prosecutors on ‘the Interests of 
Justice’ 
Before we proceed in discussing the relevance of the non-prosecutorial mechanisms, it 
is important firstly to explore the policy of the OTP in relation to the meaning of ‘the interests 
of justice’, and also the view of both Prosecutors about its potential scope. In 2007, the OTP 
issued a policy document regarding ‘the interests of justice’ clauses of Article 53.940 In this 
paper, the OTP tried to interpret the meaning of the concept and also, in small part, referred to 
other justice mechanisms. Generally, the paper does not offer a specific meaning of justice and 
                                                          
938 Lovat, supra n. 880, Pp. 5-6. 
939 See generally, M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: Enforcement (Transitional Publishers, 1987), 
Vol. 3.  
940 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007. 
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the relevance of any other alternatives that could replace the Court.941 The paper made it clear 
that the OTP is ‘bound to offer only limited clarification in the abstract’, ‘as the Statute itself 
does not try to elaborate on the specific factors or circumstances that should be taken into 
account in consideration of the interests of justice issue.’942 The paper rather provides three 
general principles for dealing with a decision not to proceed in ‘the interests of justice’. 
First, the paper insists on the investigation and prosecution, and that the decision not to 
proceed with the proceedings in ‘the interests of justice’ would be exceptional in nature.943 
Secondly, the paper, further, emphasises that the interpretation of ‘the interests of justice’ will 
be undertaken in light of the objects, aims and purposes of the Statute, ‘namely the prevention 
of serious crimes of concern to the international community through ending impunity.’944 This 
reiterates the Prosecutor’s position that the use of his discretionary power will be guided in 
particular by the aim, which points to the criminal justice approach. Thirdly, it states that the 
concept of ‘the interests of justice’ is not the same as ‘the interests of peace’, and that the latter 
falls within the mandates of other bodies.945  
The policy document thus strongly emphasises that the prosecutor will place first 
priority on a criminal justice approach to any situation or case that is under the jurisdiction of 
the Court. However, the paper also refers to ‘some justice mechanisms’ such as ‘domestic 
prosecutions, truth seeking, reparation programmes, institutional reform and traditional justice 
mechanisms’ as another approach ‘in the pursuit of a broader justice.’946 The latter are 
mentioned as complementary mechanisms that can go alongside with the ICC approach. In 
other words, the Prosecutor intends that whilst the Court focuses on the gravest crimes and 
                                                          
941 See Linda M. Keller, Comparing the ‘Interests of Justice’: What the International Criminal Court can Learn 
from New York Law, Washington University Global Studies, Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2012), Pp. 9- 10.  
942 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007, P. 1. 
943 Ibid, P. 1. 
944 Ibid, P. 1. 
945 Ibid. 
946 Ibid, P. 8. 
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those who bear the most responsibility for crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, the other 
alternatives can complement the work of the Court on the national level.947 The wider meaning 
of ‘the interests of justice’ seems to be taken only when those prosecutorial and non-
prosecutorial justice mechanisms are complementing the main task of the Court, whose focus 
is on the most responsible people.   
In relation to the question of peace processes, the paper first intends to limit the scope 
of justice in the sense that it does not encompass ‘all issues related to peace and security’.948 It 
says that ‘[a]ny political or security initiative must be compatible with the new legal 
framework’, which has anyway influences on ‘conflict management efforts’.949 Nonetheless, 
the paper explicitly suggests that the OTP may consider the protection of victims when 
assessing ‘the interests of justice’. It cites Article 68 (1) of the Statute which provides that ‘[t]he 
Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-
being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.’ Rodman opines that this suggestion could 
be a touchstone in ‘factoring peace processes into prosecutorial discretion since their 
destabilization would almost inevitably lead to further victimization.’950 Indeed, it is not clear 
how and why peace processes as such have been a possible alternative to Rodman. The paper 
does not make any reference to peace-related issues in the context of analysing the interests of 
victims. It repeatedly emphasises the importance of taking into account the opinions of victims 
and says nothing about the potential of peace-related processes. The latter as such does not 
conform to the objects and aims of the Statute that seeks to end impunity. This approach does 
not involve any sort of justice, if it is presented alone without any other justice mechanisms 
with which to associate. In addition, the paper asserts that the legal missions of the Court have 
                                                          
947 Ibid. 
948 Ibid, P. 8. 
949 Ibid, P. 4. 
950 Rodman, supra n. 21, P. 122. 
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inevitable impacts on ‘conflict management efforts’. So far, there is no strong indication within 
this paper nor in the statements of the Prosecutors (as will be explored now) that implies that 
peace processes as such could purely replace the ICC. 
In relation to the view of both ICC Prosecutors about the scope ‘the interests of justice’, 
they are generally not clear enough though they mainly follow one main orientation, which 
focuses on prosecution. It becomes controversial when it comes to set their opinion about the 
non-prosecutorial justice mechanisms and peace processes. Generally, the Prosecutors tend to 
concentrate on the criminal prosecution as a basis for articulating justice. For example, 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has made clear on several occasions that the criminal justice 
response is his top priority.951 He stated that other non-prosecutorial and prosecutorial justice 
alternatives can work together with the criminal justice’s response in handling particular 
atrocities.952 On the question of peace processes, he again insisted on his role and rejected peace 
processes to replace the Court, as such. For example, in a webcast interview I asked Moreno-
Ocampo: you said in 2005 that you followed the various national and international efforts to 
achieve peace and security when considering ‘interests of justice’. What part do “peace and 
security” concerns play when deciding what cases to investigate? He answered: ‘I cannot adjust 
the law to the political interests. Those who manage political agenda have to respect the law.’953 
I also conducted several interviews with the staff of the OTP at The Hague, in March 2012, 
where they confirmed that the criminal justice approach of the ICC is the basic option when 
considering ‘the interest of justice’ provisions of Article 53, and that other justice mechanisms 
                                                          
951 See Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007. 
952 Ibid, P. 8, ‘[a]s such, it fully endorses the complementary role that can be played by domestic prosecutions, 
truth seeking, reparations programs, institutional reform and traditional justice mechanisms in the pursuit of a 
broader justice’. In the context of the Uganda conflict, he urges that ‘this case in Uganda is to show how 
traditional mechanisms to reconcile people can work together with investigation and prosecution.’ See, Felix 
Osike, ICC Prosecutor Louis Ocampo in his Office at The Hague [interview] (July, 2007), HighBeam Business, 
available at <http://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-166422590/icc-prosecutor-louis-ocampo-his-
office-hague-interview> (Last Access: 14th April, 2013).   
953 See an Ocampo’s interview at International Bar Association supra n. 28. Also see an Ocampo’s interview at 
Global Observatory, supra n. 28. Also see an Ocampo’s interview at the Africa Report, supra n. 28. 
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would play a complementary role in this regard. Bensouda also made clear that ‘[t]he prospect 
of peace negotiations is therefore not a factor that forms part of the Office’s determination on 
the interests of justice.’954 However, in one of his reports to the SC about the Darfur situation, 
Moreno-Ocampo showed his readiness to ‘follow the various national and international efforts 
to achieve peace and security, as w ell as the views of witnesses and victims of the crimes.’955 
Current Prosecutor Bensouda also confirmed to me in one public lecture that she would 
consider national efforts when she was assessing ‘the interests of justice’, however, without 
specifying which exact national activities would be relevant.956 
However, it appears that the Prosecutor’s base-line policy is criminal prosecution as the 
sole response by the ICC to any atrocity.957 They seek to adopt a zero-tolerance policy against 
perpetrators of serious crimes of concern to the international community and, therefore, put an 
end to the era of impunity. This indicates that the OTP is far from accepting broader meanings 
of justice that might involve approaches other than the ICC. Whilst it seems that such a policy 
has merit, many commentators have queried there is a doubt regarding its success, since in 
practice, these tribunals and the ICC itself work within a political environment, and exercise 
their jurisdiction over crimes that also have, to a large extent, political dimensions. The next 
two sections will analyse the relevance of those alternatives as well as a peace process and 
concludes as to whether or not the zero-tolerance policy is desirable and effective.     
5.3.2. General Guidelines for the Deferral Decision under ‘the Interests of Justice’ 
                                                          
954 ICC, OTP, Seminar Institute for Security Studies (ISS): Setting the record straight: the ICC’s new Prosecutor 
responds to African concerns (10th October, 2010), P. 5. 
955 Supra n. 712, P. 6. 
956 This was Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s answer to my question about the prospects of the application of 
Article 53, where she stated that if the current works of the Court disturbed national activities of the given 
situation, she would reconsider her proceedings and apply Article 53. This was during a lecture run by 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda at Birkbeck College on 29 November, 2012. 
957 See Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007, Pp. 7- 8. Moreno-Ocampo confirmed that the broad 
justice through the other types of justice mechanisms can be completed by the domestic authorities alongside 
with the ICC that only provides justice in its narrow scope, which is criminal justice. 
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Thus far, this chapter explored the provisions of ‘the interests of justice’ of Article 53, 
and discussed the different views of the reading of the term ‘the interests of justice’. It shows 
that the broad reading of the term may be relevant based on several weakness of the Court’s 
system, and the new role of the prosecutor, which has to play in international law’s arena. It 
then explored the opinion of the prosecutor as well as her office’s policy towards the scope of 
the term justice. The following sections will proceed to examine the potential of non-
prosecutorial justice mechanisms as well as peace process associated/not associated with 
amnesty to replace the ICC under ‘the interests of justice’ provisions of Article 53. The 
discussion will not cover a prosecutorial-mechanism such as national trials, as this situation 
comes under the discussion of the complementarity regime, given by Article 17 of the Statute, 
and will only concentrate on truth commissions, as a most common alternative. The classical 
theories of justice will be used to examine the suitability of such a replacement. It then will 
investigate the Uganda situation as a brief case study to verify these theoretical examinations 
and explore the new role that the ICC prosecutor could play.   
The first section of this chapter concludes that there is a possibility that the term ‘the 
interests of justice’ may be read in a broad way as encompasses non-prosecutorial justice 
mechanisms associated/not associated with peace processes or amnesty. The latter are both 
suggested to be linked to one of alternative justice mechanisms. This section will, therefore, 
examine the conformity of these mechanisms to the most common goals that the ICC seeks to 
achieve, which are retribution, deterrence, restoration, and expressivism.958 It is highly likely 
that the invocation of the provisions of ‘the interests of justice’ of Article 53 will be raised 
whenever there is clash between the Court and other sorts of justice mechanisms and/or peace 
                                                          
958 See generally, Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in Antonio Cassese, The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). See also Jean 
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 31, (2009), 79-  
143.   
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processes that could also serve ‘the interests of justice’ (the ICC vs. other alternatives).959 The 
ICC cannot always be the sole option to serve justice. There are always other mechanisms that 
may better fit the given situations and replace the ICC. Rodman points to this possibility when 
he says the prosecutor can utilise Article 53 as ‘a means of holding back from criminal 
proceedings or considering alternative justice mechanisms when demanding prosecution might 
prolong an armed conflict or dissuade a tyrant from stepping down.’960 This is simply because 
one size never fits all.961 Article 53 genuinely covers this gap and provides the prosecutor with 
an opportunity to examine the suitability and appropriateness of the ICC as a solution to most 
complicated situations and cases.962  
5.4. Theories of Justice 
The retribution theory is mainly based on the idea of desert.963 A criminal should 
receive a sort of punishment because he or she deserves it. It is a sort of a justification of the 
punishment. This theory aims to secure that a sort of punishment inflicted on a criminal is 
proportional. As this rationale could be noticeably achievable on the national level, however, 
it seems quite difficult to achieve on the international level. The aim of the ICC Statute is to 
‘put an end to impunity’. The Preamble specifies that only ‘those most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’. According to the 
aim of retribution and the ICC Statute, it seems that this particular aim is far from its aspiration. 
                                                          
959 Teitel, supra n. 66. See also Pierre Hazan, Measuring the Impact of Punishment and Forgiveness: a 
Framework for Evaluating Transnational Justice, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, No. 861 (2006), 
19- 47, Hazan identified seven categories of transitional justice mechanisms: criminal justice, public apologies, 
reparatory justice, National Remembrance Day, administrative justice, constitutional justice, and historical 
justice. Also, Hayner did mention various ways by which countries can respond to past atrocities, such as: 
holding trials, truth commission, providing individuals access to security files, reparations, building memorials, 
lustration, making comprehensive reforms in all section of a state, see Hayner, supra n. 66, P. 12. 
960 Rodman, supra n. 21, P. 104. 
961 Ludwin supra n. 880, P. 92. 
962 Supra n. 867. 
963 See, Janet Dine and James J Gobert, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law (4th ed.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), about the forms of justice theories. See also, Paragraph 4 of the ICC preamble asserts 
‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished’. 
See also supra n. 532, P. 301. 
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The ICC Prosecutors’ practice shows that the Court is not able to provide punishment for all 
international perpetrators due to its selection-based system of prosecution. Nor did it show a 
comprehensive strategy of prosecution in which all those who committed the most serious 
international crimes and supposed to be prosecuted are punished. As Mark A. Drumbl points 
out, the achievement of the ambition of retribution by international criminal justice is 
challengeable due to the selectivity-based system of international tribunals as well as ‘political 
reasons’.964 Therefore, one notices here that international criminal justice, through the 
international criminal tribunals, can limitedly achieve this ambition, and at best further it.     
With regard to non-prosecutorial alternatives, such as a truth commission, one can say 
that the retribution’s aim could be highly placed. As was explored, retribution is based on two 
basic pillars, namely the establishment of individual culpability and punishment. Obviously, 
the main concern of truth commissions is to disclose all offences committed. This in turn results 
in identifying nearly all offenders as well a matter that the ICC itself cannot do it. If such 
alternatives are, therefore, mandated to undertake a full investigative process that discloses the 
responsibility of the accused, and the crimes that were committed, then we can say that such 
alternatives, to a large extent, meet the first pillar.965 In relation to the second pillar, the idea of 
punishment is not exclusively linked to the idea of incarceration. Most truth commissions 
provide sorts of punishments that may take different forms. Reparations, compensation, 
removal from office, and public services may all satisfy this requirement. Therefore, such an 
alternative may satisfy the aims of retribution.   
                                                          
964 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), P. 151. 
965 The South Africa situation is an example to this argument, as the truth and reconciliation model in that 
country conducted and covered these requirements, see Andreas O Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International 
Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, 2002), Pp. 333-4.  
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The deterrence theory is a consequentialist-based idea.966 It aims to deter or to prevent 
future crimes.967 Punishment is inflicted here to have a deterrent effect, aimed at preventing 
further criminals. This seems to be the ultimate goal that the Court seeks to achieve through its 
criminal prosecutorial method, at least, on the theoretical level.968 Putting an end to the era of 
impunity as a main goal of the Statute, is meant to put the deterrent effect in place. It is not 
clear to what extent the ICC can achieve this rationale, in particular the Court imposes its 
punishments on only a few perpetrators.969 The prosecutor has to exercise selective justice that 
is difficult to justify by this theory, as the latter supposes that all perpetrators should be 
punished.970 In addition, because of the lack of police or enforcement agent and the weak 
cooperation system, the future criminals may not fear the ICC prosecution and punishment. 
The Darfur-like situations for example may not prevent the others from fearing the reach of the 
Court, as the situation in Syria. The achievement of this aim is more difficult by other 
alternatives, as it is based on the existence of a certain punishment. Nonetheless, they may still 
reach this aim through different threats they provide. For example, other non-prosecutorial 
alternatives, such as truth telling, might also reach that level, as they disclose a large number 
of offences, perpetrators, and crimes.971 The stigma of the disclosure of those factors may in a 
way help to achieve the deterrent aim.972 The outcomes of this disclosure should be published 
as copiously as possible in order to maximise the potential deterrent effect. However, as 
deGuzman states, this particular aim seems extremely difficult to achieve, as we still find the 
                                                          
966 See generally, Stephen L. Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence Theory and Application (New 
York Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
967 Supra n. 964, P. 169. 
968 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble of the ICC Statute, ‘Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.’ 
969 Supra n. 539, P. 294, asserting that the achievement of retribution and deterrence’s goals are ‘impossible to 
assess’, and ‘untested’. 
970 Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, Washington University Law Review, Vol. 85. Issue: 4 
(2007), P. 826. 
971 Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 15 (2002), 39- 96, arguing that some types of alternatives, such as a truth 
telling can achieve a deterrent aim. 
972 Ibid, P. 69. 
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resurgence of new crimes, not just in new areas of the world, but even within situations that 
are already under criminal prosecution.973 In short, as the situation with the retributive theory, 
the deterrent goal cannot be achieved by those alternatives, they could only further it.   
Restorative justice is based on the idea of restoring offenders, victims, and the societies 
in which all parties to the given situation live.974 This particular form of justice does not 
concentrate on the penalisation process of the perpetrators, but it mainly emphasises the 
reparation of the damage caused by perpetrators.975 Although the ICC is not built on a 
restorative basis, however, several goals have been asserted by the Court that aims at 
contributing to the restorations. The participation of the victims within all the criminal 
proceedings, and the compensation system976 within the ICC system are broadly emphasised 
by the Statute and the OTP.977 The role that the ICC plays in conflicts has a prominent effect 
on reconciliation and peace, as the latter are both usually furthered by imposing a criminal 
accountability.978 Other alternative mechanisms, in particular a truth commission, can best 
further this particular aim.979 The prosecutor will not face a difficulty, as to whether or not 
other alternatives have the capability to achieve this particular aim. It is even supposed that the 
potential to achieve this aim can be best achieved through other alternatives that do not involve 
a prosecutorial approach. The reconciliation process via truth telling between the offenders and 
                                                          
973 Supra n. 532, P.306. 
974 Supra n. 964, P. 53- 124. 
975 Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' Reparations, Thomas Jefferson 
Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2006), 189- 217. 
976 Article 75 of the ICC Statute. 
977 See, Articles, 53, 68, and 82 of the Statute. See also, ICC, Office of Prosecution, Policy Paper on Victims’ 
Participation, April, 2010, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-ST-V-M.1-
ENG.pdf>.  
978 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2nd October, 1995), Para. 39, asserting that the establishment of the ICTY 
was an appropriate measure to achieve its objectives: ‘the restoration of peace.’ 
979 See, generally, Luna, Erik, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative 
Justice, Utah Law Review, Vol. 1 (2003), 205-302. 
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victims is more likely to restore them within the given situation, once an agreement is reached 
among them.  
Expressivism theory, to some extent, overlaps with retribution and deterrence 
theories.980 It means that a certain institution, which exercises a certain policy, has several 
messages that the relevant audience should receive. These messages are part of the societal 
values that each community seeks to sustain and develop.981 The expressive aim of the ICC is 
to teach the audience how to understand fully that the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court 
are not allowed and should be punished.982 This is a message that the audience should receive 
and learn. Whilst other prosecutorial alternatives have the same aim, the non-prosecutorial ones 
might also involve the same messages to be delivered to the audience. The effect of the 
reconciliation process on a certain society can send a clear message to the next generation that 
no atrocities can go without disclosure and condemnation. This might play a role in asserting 
for those generations that wrong deeds will be no longer tolerated. These sorts of mechanisms 
have long experience in creating history records about the past atrocities and acquiring the full 
stories about these atrocities. Thereafter, these mechanisms are highly likely to further this 
particular aim of justice.983 
Having presented, briefly, the potential mechanisms, such as truth commissions for 
delivering justice, the question now is how will the prosecutor employ her prosecutorial 
discretion, when considering the question of peace-related issues and alike (amnesty)? 
Obviously, the goals of justice, in light of the above analysis, cannot be achieved or furthered 
by means of peace or pure amnesties, as it is out of the question. Under the current 
characterisation of the ICC, as an institution working within unusual circumstances, would 
                                                          
980 Supra n. 964, P. 52. See also Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 
International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002), P. 117. See also supra n. 532. 
981 Keller, supra n. 927, Pp. 273-5. 
982 Amann, supra n. 980, Pp. 117- 224. 
983 Supra n. 903. 
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peace processes be a relevant approach that may come within the scope of ‘the interests of 
justice’? 
5.5. Is Peace Process within the Scope of ‘the Interests of Justice?’  
The critical question at this point is whether or not a peace process (national political 
arrangements) can be a relevant mechanism that the prosecutor may take into account in 
considering whether to stop criminal proceedings, whether at the investigation stage or the 
decision to prosecute.984 In other words, can a peace process figure in relation to the factors 
considered as covered by Article 53 ‘the interests of justice’? This part of the chapter will try 
to understand the relevance of the peace process within the decision-making process, and 
whether this sole process as such can be a reason to cease the Court’s criminal proceedings. 
Most commentators, authors and, generally, the OTP answered with no.985 This is part of the 
classical theory of legalism that is based on the idea of the independence of international law 
from international politics.986 It is a strict view that puts peace considerations outside the scope 
of judicial mandates. However, history has shown that this is not always the case, as the peace 
considerations have been adopted, as an approach to handling several atrocities, and to deliver 
justice.987 During the last three decades, the international community has experienced several 
occasions, where peace processes were used to handle several atrocities, and different kinds of 
impunities were granted to the leaders of the abusive regimes.988  
                                                          
984 Rodman, supra n. 21, P. 100. Rodman raised a similar question, questioning ‘[s]hould the Prosecutor hold 
back from criminal proceedings if he is persuaded that prosecution could interfere with negotiated 
transitions?’ 
985 See Moreno-Ocampo’s Statement, supra n. 27.  
986 See generally, supra n. 473, part two: Law and politics: P. 111- 222. 
987 See generally, Jonathan Tonge, Comparative Peace Processes (Malden, Polity Press, 2014), discussing the 
most successful peace processes and those which failed during history. And also see Priscilla B. Hayner, supra 
n. 66. 
988 Mozambique, El Salvador, and Haiti are examples of those countries, see Cynthia L. Arnson, Comparative 
Peace Processes in Latin American (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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To find whether peace considerations come within the confines of justice, we need to 
look at Article 53, the policy paper on the interests of justice, and several responses I collected 
interviewing members of the staff of the OTP. Obviously, the wording of the text of Article 53 
does not make any explicit reference to peace processes. However, the balancing test that 
Article 53 provides might merit an examination of the position of peace within the scope of the 
Article. Among the factors that the Article suggests are ‘the role of the alleged perpetrators’ 
and ‘the interests of victims’. These factors may play a role in illustrating the place of the peace 
negotiations within the parameters of Article 53. Having looked at history, one might see that 
these factors were taken into consideration when dealing with certain situations.989 It can be 
noticed that the peace negotiations within those situations drew on the policy of prosecution 
followed by international prosecutors. The failure of the ICC Prosecutor to indict former 
Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki could be a result of the peace-related concern, as Kenya was 
at an unstable status due to the then conflict. It was really surprising that former Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo ignored and omitted the then sitting head of state in the list of charges he 
made against three persons who were under the command of the President,990 although the 
Court’s confirmation of charge decision referred repeatedly to the involvement of State House 
(and the presence of Kibaki) in the alleged preparing and planning meeting that prefaced the 
Mungiki attacks on members of the Luo ethnic group, which took place in the Rift Valley.991 
If these allegations are true, then the Prosecutor started to play an extra-role, where the value 
of peace was taken into account. This then constitutes a clear development of the policy of 
prosecution that the OTP has started to acknowledge.   
In order to discuss this point in more detail, we need first to distinguish between stable 
and unstable situations, whether be it during ongoing conflicts or post-conflicts. During stable 
                                                          
989 Ibid. 
990 See supra n. 775.  
991 Ibid. 
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situations, a criminal prosecution may be a desirable option. This happens, essentially, in 
situations where the alleged perpetrators no longer hold power and can be apprehended without 
fear of the renewed explosion of violence, and have no further role in the society concerned. 
The prosecutor might not then consider the ‘the role of the alleged perpetrators’, and, therefore, 
proceed with the investigation or prosecution.  ‘The interests of justice’ during the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals were best promoted by simply delivering criminal justice to the 
perpetrators, who were no longer in power.992 The same can be applied to the Rwanda situation, 
where the defeat of the genocidaires made the criminal justice response an ideal mechanism to 
deal with the post-conflict transition without fear about ‘the interests of justice’.993  
Matters look different in unstable situations, however. Having looked at history, one 
could notice that different justice mechanisms (criminal or non-criminal mechanisms) have 
been applied to these sorts of situations.994 However, one common shared feature shaped such 
situations. It was a political and military strategy articulated to end the violence or to boost the 
fragile peace processes, which played an essential role in the eventuality of prosecution on 
peaceful transitions. In other words, the articulation of ‘the interests of justice’ was, to a large 
extent, affected by the accompanying political and military circumstances, in particular in 
ongoing conflict. For example, one of the worst atrocities committed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Srebrenica massacre by Mladic, happened only two years after the 
establishment of the ICTY.995 When the perpetrators of this massacre and those of other crimes, 
                                                          
992 Supra n. 273. 
993 Rodman, supra n. 21, P. 109. 
994 El Salvador and Haiti adopted non-criminal mechanisms, while Uganda, Sierra Leone and Rwanda and 
Former Yugoslavia adopted a criminal approach. 
995 Supra n. 273. Here, I am linking the crimes committed in Balkan wars to the establishment of the tribunal, 
as this was not all the time a case. Hazan said that ‘[t]he UN peacekeeping forces present in the former 
Yugoslavia reported that the warring parties took account of the legal risk during the first few weeks after the 
creation of the ICTY in 1993. They later realized that the Tribunal was weak and, confident of impunity, 
committed the Srebrenica massacres.’ According to this statement, there was a link between the crimes 
committed and the establishment of the tribunal, at least, at the beginning of the conflict, see Hazan, supra n. 
959, P. 35. 
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such as Karadzic, no longer held power, Goldstone developed his strategy and accordingly 
decided to indict those perpetrators, as there would be no further atrocity or threat to the 
ongoing peace talks.996 It is a process in which Goldstone took account of the political 
circumstances to bring justice to those perpetrators. This happened on the eve of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement, when Goldstone indicted only Karadzic and Mladic, and totally ignored 
Milosevic,997 who was still needed for the Dayton talks.998 Here, Goldstone took those concrete 
factors to bring justice later on when the situation would have become ready to complete the 
process of making the decision. The mere indictment of those perpetrators helped to restore 
peace, as the fight stopped in 1995.999 This was done by getting those defendants out of the 
political life, in particular from the government in Bosnia.1000 Thus, the indictment decisions 
of Goldstone did involve political considerations, as it contributed to identify perpetrators, 
under the Agreement, whose text was opaque in terms of sorting out the war criminals. The 
interests of justice that Goldstone sought to secure, in fact, did serve the interests of peace and 
went side by side with the Dayton Peace Agreement. It was a remarkable policy that showed 
that indicting Karadzic and Mladic were part of the peace process rather than part of an obstacle 
to it. 
It was only after the NATO intervention in Kosovo that Milosevic was rendered no 
longer capable of any violent backlash (interests of victims).1001 The latter environment, which 
obviously had political overtones, provided an ideal opportunity for ‘the hunter to hunt his 
                                                          
996 Bass, supra n. 273, Pp. 227-30. 
997 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 
71 (2000), P. 419, arguing that ‘[w]orse yet, Milosevic was given de facto immunity in exchange for his 
signature on the Dayton Accord in 1994.’ 
998 Supra n. 273, P.237. 
999 Supra n. 432, P. 47. 
1000 Supra n. 273, P. 246.  
1001 The NATO war in Kosovo changed the priorities of the war strategies, where Milosevic was considered to 
be an obstacle to the stability of the region, as he began to lose his power. Then, the political and military 
environment was ideal for the Prosecutor to indict him as “the interests of justice” were not at risk any more. 
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prey’.1002 In these cases, the peace process was taken into account without fully replacing the 
prosecution’s fate. It just delayed it. These critical cases demonstrate that the consideration of 
political circumstances were needed for a meaningful strategy and effective prosecutorial 
strategy, based on prosecutorial discretion. Further, considering these factors was apparently a 
part of the decision-making process that provided the Prosecutor with more meaningful choices 
without prejudice to the independence of the Prosecutor, as a body within a judicial institution.  
The same argument can be applied to the Darfur situation, where prosecution might 
result in increasing the level of suffering (interests of victims), and those who had been indicted 
by the ICC and were still in power, were still committing war crimes.1003 However, there is a 
significant difference between Darfur and Yugoslavia, in relation to the enforcement 
problem.1004 In the Darfur situation, the enforcement mechanisms are not effective, and the 
political environment is not helpful for the OTP, as most African states are against the policy 
of the OTP, in particular in the Darfur situation.1005 Further, all indictees of the Sudanese 
Government are still at large. Nonetheless, the first Prosecutor decided not to take any national 
political arrangements into his consideration, and indicted those most responsible for 
                                                          
1002 Supra n. 38, P. 178, stating that the political factors are also taken by Goldstone although the latter denied 
it, saying: ‘the ‘timing’ of some important indictments seems to indicate otherwise.’ 
1003 When the President of Sudan was indicted by the Prosecutor, who ignored calls by the Arab League, the 
AU, several African States, and China not to indict him, Omer Al-Bashir responded to this indictment by 
suspending the operation of aid groups, which left thousands of people in Darfur, including IDPs with no life 
services, see Allan, supra n. 876, Pp. 275-6.  
1004 In the ICTY situation, despite the fact that the Prosecutor used his discretion to select his targets in the 
most relevant circumstances, the Prosecutor was acting within an environment where effective enforcement 
mechanisms were available. This, first, pushed the decision-makers to insist on the criminal prosecution 
mechanism, as a de facto approach to address the conflict. Second, it allowed the Prosecutor to use his 
discretion in a more convenient way, as the prospects of arresting the potential indictees were relatively high.   
See generally, supra n. 939. See also Goldston, supra n. 18, P. 395, stating that ‘the prospect for arresting the 
suspect’ is a proper factor to be weighed.’ The existence of NATO, and the effective supports that were given 
to the ICTY by the then Governments of the fighting states were some available tools at the time, see more 
Bass supra n. 273.  
1005 Most recently, the Chad Government refused to arrest the President of Sudan, who visited the country 
recently, although Chad is party to the ICC and has an obligation to transfer the President to the ICC, see Chad: 
Hosting Once again President al-Bashir would be a Further Insult to the Victims of Darfur, No Peace Without 
Justice (8th April, 2013), available at <http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Chad-should-stand-justice-and-not-grant-
impunity-President-al-Bashir.html-0> (Last Access: 12th May, 2013). 
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committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, including the President of Sudan; although 
an effective enforcement mechanism is not available.1006 The SC’s resolution referring the 
Darfur situation to the ICC did not provide any effective mechanisms for forcing the 
decision.1007 In addition, the ICC depends on the political will of states in enforcing its 
decisions.1008 The consequences of this strategy were the failure of any peace process taken to 
end the conflict and a noticeable growth in the level of violence since the prosecution and 
indictment decisions against Sudan and those who are still in power, respectively.1009  
This does not mean at all that the Prosecutor should not have indicted the President; 
instead he could have exercised a more meaningful strategy, if he had considered these extra-
legal factors, associated with further political repercussions/effects. It is true that the 
consideration of these accounts does not necessarily guarantee the capture of the alleged 
perpetrators. However, such a strategy, at least, gives a better chance for arresting the fugitives. 
For example, Moreno-Ocampo could consider the strong role and position of the President, 
and, therefore, decide not to prosecute him until he has built the case against him. Thus, the 
reference to political repercussions/effects does not necessarily prevent the prosecutor from 
making a decision to prosecute a certain perpetrator at all. Instead, it provides her with more 
options, so she can exercise a more meaningful prosecutorial strategy, based on the available 
                                                          
1006 There are huge concerns about the public nature, benefit, seriousness, and time of the indictment of 
President Omar Al-Bashir, as such indictment has only accelerate the rhythm of the violence in Darfur, where 
people are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance as a consequence of the indictment, see Conor Foley, 
This Darfur Prosecution is Deadly, The Guardian (27th May, 2009), available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/may/27/hay-festival-icc-darfur-sudan> (Last Access: 24th 
November, 2012). See also, Goldston, supra n. 18, P. 385. Regarding these political arrangements, see the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
1007 UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005). 
1008 Haydar Karman, The Paradox and the ICC, Strategic Outlook (November, 2012). 
1009 Hazan, supra n. 959, P. 35, talking about how the warring parties to the Darfur conflict took the ICC’s 
prosecution into account when committing further crimes. This argument was also asserted by a participant to 
a Regional Consultation Conference held in South-Africa, see Tim Murithi and Allan Ngari, The ICC and 
Community-Level Reconciliation: In-country Perspectives Regional Consultation Report, Institute for Justice 
and Reconciliation Transitional Justice in Africa Programme, (21st and 22nd February, 2011), available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/IJR_ICC_Regional_Consultation_Report_Final_2011.pdf> (Last Access: 
25th July, 2015). 
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options. This is how Rodman states the importance of the political repercussions/effects by 
saying ‘those episodes demonstrate that political factors – most notably the power of the 
perpetrators relative to the forces arrayed against them and the political strategies of the latter 
to address the conflict – determine when a criminal law approach is effective and whether it 
contributes to peace.’1010  
As can be seen, during stable situations, the deference to the peace process, as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution, or even a tool for delaying the prosecutorial approach, 
seems irrelevant and out of the question. The peace process, as an alternative, does not replace 
the criminal justice procedures, nor is it considered for any particular strategy. It has simply 
been ignored. During unstable situations, the peace process was sometimes considered, but 
does not as such replace criminal prosecution, as an alternative, either. However, the effect of 
the peace process on the Yugoslavia situation was apparently significant, as it was considered 
by the Prosecutor, when the latter decided not to indict the perpetrator in question, who was 
needed for the advancement of the peace process. The policy of delay is one strategy, which 
was used for this operation. The peace process, then, does not purely seem to replace criminal 
prosecution, and, therefore, it might not purely come within the confines of ‘the interests of 
justice’, either. It only delays the criminal prosecution, at best. Does this mean, then, that the 
peace process cannot replace criminal prosecution at all? The following case study suggests 
that there are basic conditions that the prosecutor may need to consider, before replacing 
criminal prosecutorial procedures with the peace process.  
5.5.1. The Ugandan Application 
The Uganda situation was among the first to raise the issue of whether or not the peace 
process should be taken into account in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in particular 
                                                          
1010 Rodman, supra n. 21, P. 101. 
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under the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’.1011 The following discussion will examine the past 
massive violation of international criminal law that took place over the last few decades in 
Uganda. Following the acceptance of the Ugandan Government’s referral in 2005,1012 some 
people, including Betty Bigombe,1013 a former Uganda minister, some NGOs, and the Acholi 
community, criticised this referral, as they believed that it would disturb the peace talks.1014 
The Court decided to indict five alleged perpetrators from only the rebels’ side (LRA), 
including Joseph Kony who was mainly responsible for serious crimes committed against the 
Acholi community.1015 Since that time, the Court has to deal with rigorous claims as to its 
blatant failure to bring these alleged perpetrators to the Court, letting Tim Allen describes the 
Court as ‘just one more example of end-of-millennium wishful thinking’. 1016 Indeed, it took 
ten years for the Court to make its first arrest against one of the LRA’s indictees.1017 The 
Government of Uganda has led several procedures to end the conflict by entering into peace 
                                                          
1011 The Situation of Uganda was referred to the Court in 2004 by the state of Uganda. See ICC, Press Release, 
ICC - Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Northern Uganda, ICC-OTP-
20040729-65, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor%20of%20the%20int
ernational%20criminal%20court%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda.aspx>.  
1012 ICC, Press, Release, ICC - President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/president%20of%20uganda%20r
efers%20situation%20concerning%20the%20lord_s%20resistance%20army%20_lra_%20to%20the%20icc.aspx
>.  
1013 Will Ross, Attacks Mark End of Uganda Truce, BBC (23rd February, 2005), available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4292363.stm> (Last Access: 31st May, 2015), Betty Bigombe 
warranted that the potential of issuing an arrest warrant against the LRA would ‘call the whole peace process 
off.’ 
1014 See generally, Kathrine Southwick, Investigating War in Northern Uganda: Dilemmas for the International 
Criminal Court, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1 (2005), 105- 119. 
1015 See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, the rest of the alleged 
perpetrators are Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, and Dominic Ongwen, available at 
<http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/Pages/situation%20ind
ex.aspx>.     
1016 Supra n. 46, P. 2. 
1017 ICC, Press Release, Dominic Ongwen makes first appearance before the ICC, ICC-CPI-20150126-PR1085 
(26th January, 2015), available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1085.aspx> (Last Access: 4th April, 
2015).  
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negotiations with Kony.1018 It has provided a variety of alternatives to all perpetrators, ranging 
from blanket amnesty1019 to punishment procedures against only those who committed the most 
serious crimes, without clarifying what kinds of punishments are envisaged.1020 Kony has 
refused several times to sign any peace talks until the ICC withdraws the arrest warrant issued 
against him, however.1021  
These efforts have resulted in the cease-fire in Uganda, and the situation has become 
more stable and peaceful.1022 Currently, ‘the LRA is largely decimated and does not have the 
ability to wage major offensives anymore. It has few troops left and has hardly any access to 
the territory of Uganda.1023 However, the few attacks of the LRA still continue outside Uganda, 
as currently they have spread into three more countries, namely into the DRC, the CAR, and 
Southern Sudan.1024 Further, the dilemma of justice and peace in the context of the Uganda 
situation is still unclear, as the Kony group is still fighting on the one hand whilst claiming to 
seek a peaceful resolution on the other.1025 A UN report released in 2013 submitted that there 
                                                          
1018 Situation in Uganda, The Hague Justice Portal, available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6175> (Last Access: 2nd April, 2013). 
1019 For more recent information about the amnesty given in Uganda, see Jeremy Sarkin, The Interrelationship 
and Interconnectedness of Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in Uganda: Pursuing Justice, Truth, 
Guarantees of Non-Repetition, Reconciliation and Reparations for Past Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2015), 111- 139. 
1020 See Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and the Lord's Resistance Army/ Movement, Juba Sudan, ICC-02/04-01/05-352-AnxA 18-11-2008 2/12 CB PT, 
available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589232.pdf>. See also another agreement in 2008 about 
cease-fire, Uganda and Rebels Sign Cease-Fire, The New York Times (24th Feb, 2008), available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/world/africa/24uganda.html?_r=0> (Last Access: 26th March 2013). 
1021 Mark Kersten, Between Skepticism and Reality: LRA Leader Joseph Kony in “Surrender Talks”, Justice in 
Conflict (21st November, 2013), available at <http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/11/21/between-skepticism-and-
reality-lra-leader-joseph-kony-in-surrender-talks/>.  
1022 Uganda Country Profile, BBC (21st May, 2015), available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
14107906> (Last Access: 30th August, 2015). 
1023 Supra n. 1019, P. 122. 
1024 See Martin Plaut, On the Trial of Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Martinplaut (20th February, 
2015), available at <https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2015/02/20/on-the-trail-of-joseph-kony-and-the-
lords-resistance-army/> (Last Access: 4th April, 2015). 
1025 Both sides also signed another agreement on 2009; see Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring 
Mechanisms, Juba, Sudan, available at <http://northernuganda.usvpp.gov/uploads/images/vy0hCC-
lHclHmwkfQyIbPQ/agendaitem6signed.pdf>. See also, Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, Uganda: Impact of 
the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, International Center for Transitional Justice (May, 
2010), available at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Uganda-Impact-ICC-2010-English.pdf>, P. 2.    
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was still a significant number of attacks launched by the LRA.1026 Indeed, the violent activities 
of the LRA are increasing in the region, as they are fighting now in the aforementioned 
countries.1027 It was widely believed that the ICC indictments are a major obstacle towards a 
comprehensive peace in not just Uganda, but also in the whole region.1028 The question how 
the Prosecutor should respond to this situation is highly controversial. Should she respect the 
national political efforts that seek the demands of peace ahead of justice and, therefore, stop 
the prosecution, and defer to the peace process?1029    
As was discussed elsewhere, if the prosecutor decides to stop the proceedings on the 
basis of ‘the interests of justice’ and defers to the current peace process in lieu of the ICC’s 
criminal proceedings, she would be criticised for being political, because of her political 
calculation.1030 Therefore, a potential of taking political considerations into account ahead of 
normative ones would be criticised (considerations such as putting an end to the conflict, 
retaining stability, and providing peace). This would be an apology critique.1031 If the 
prosecutor insists on the ICC’s proceedings, she would be again criticised of being political, as 
she is seeking to prove a point that the Court is able to do justice. She is omitting the fact that 
the ICC has done nothing for the victims, and appears to do nothing in the near future. This is 
a utopian critique. Joseph Hoover summarises the dyadic problem in the Uganda situation, 
                                                          
1026 See UN: Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Regional 
Office for Central Africa and on the Lord’s Resistance Army-affected areas, S/2013/671 (14th November, 2013), 
Pp. 35- 42. 
1027 See supra n. 1024. 
1028 See Nick Grono and Adam O'Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and Peace Processes, in Nicholas Waddell 
and Phil Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, Issue 3 (2008), P. 19, (as the peace talks progress, it is clear that the ICC remains a 
very real obstacle to achieving an end to the conflict). See also Michael Drexler, Whither Justice? Uganda and 
Five Years of the International Criminal Court, Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law, Vol. 5 (2011), P. 
98.   
1029 Keller, supra n. 927, Keller is arguing that both justice and peace could be achieved together. 
1030 Supra n. 30, P. 14. HRW argued that any decision whether to initiate an investigation, based on political 
calculation is not acceptable and may undermine the legitimacy of the Court. 
1031 Supra n. 30, P. 14. HRW refused those considerations to be taken by the prosecutor when evaluating the 
meaning of ‘the interests of justice’, as it would appear political and urged the prosecutor ‘to steer clear of 
such politicization of his role.’ 
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when he says that the ICC’s involvement in Uganda ‘has been shown to be too deferential to 
the interests of states and too inattentive to the victims of violence’.1032 It is a persistent dyad 
of arguments that the prosecutor faces. The question is then, is there any chance to escape this 
dyad?  
If we deeply examine the problem of this dyad, we would notice that the non-
achievement of the higher normative demand of the situation is a reason on which the both 
sides of the arguments raise their criticisms. The demand is meant here to be the achievement 
of justice. Therefore, if justice was delivered in this situation, we would ease, if not escape, 
these criticisms. Based on her discretion, the prosecutor is then required either to achieve 
justice through her institution, or seek to do it through other alternatives when she cannot do it 
on her own.  
Obviously, the Court is not isolated from the world, in which it operates. The ICC has 
specific mandates and goals it seeks to deliver.1033 In so doing, the Court needs to maintain its 
legitimacy and consider how best to achieve its mandates without any prejudice to its 
legitimacy. The aforementioned criticisms are linked with internal and external standards 
respectively. Avoiding these sorts of criticisms would promote the legitimacy of the Court. The 
prosecutor seems then to consider these two standards when exercising her power. The internal 
ones are manifested in the legal tools of the Court (utopian), whilst the external are extra-legal 
ones (apologist), but also are derived initially from the Statute of the Court.1034 It is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor, via the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion, to decide how 
best to reintegrate these two concerns. Higgins states that the decision-making process cannot 
                                                          
1032 Joseph Hoover, Moral Practices: Assigning Responsibility in the International Criminal Court, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 76 (2013,), P. 285. 
1033 See, the Preamble of the ICC Statute. 
1034 The utopian critique means that the given position is too close to principles, common interests, justice, or 
similar ideas, and that it is highly divorced from the states’ interests, wills, and policies. The apology critique is 
that the position is too connected to the interests and policies of states, and that it is too far from the common 
interests and principles. See Chapter Three of this thesis and supra n. 72, Pp. 16, 66, 67, and 70. 
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be separated from extra-legal factors that are essential when making a choice.1035 The social, 
humanitarian, moral, and political factors are interlaced with the legal rules that the decision-
making process involves, as ‘law cannot alone achieve justice’.1036 She argues that such a 
process makes the supposed decision more preferable (effective).  
The following section will briefly explain these issues in the context of Ugandan peace 
talks, and show that the peace process may come within the scope of ‘the interests of justice’, 
subject to certain requirements. Here, the peace process is suggested to be accompanied by 
another sort of alternative justice mechanism, in order to come within the scope of ‘the interests 
of justice’, based on the utopian and apologist justifications.  
The internal standards are, generally, the legal tools of the Court, such as the Statute; 
and the policy papers. Both Prosecutors of the ICC have shown a rigid commitment to the legal 
tools of the Court, as a fundamental orientation of their tasks.1037 ‘We have to respect our legal 
limits’,1038 Bensouda confirmed. Following pre-set rules plays an important role in the 
enhancement of the legitimacy of the Court, as they help the Court to be more predictable, 
certain, and accurate in terms of the exercise of a certain discretionary strategy of prosecution. 
However, are the rigid commitment to these standards workable enough to address the Uganda 
situation, in the sense that the prosecutor is able to achieve justice, and, therefore, apply the 
best mechanism to the given situation? Does it help to avoid or at least reduce the current 
criticisms the OTP faces?1039  
Both the Statute and the policy paper do not provide concrete standard as to what, if 
anything, might justify the deferral of the situation to the domestic peace efforts, which might 
                                                          
1035 Supra n. 856, P. 9. 
1036 Ibid, P. 9. 
1037 See ‘The General Orientation of the OTP and the Prosecutor on ‘the Interests of Justice’ in this chapter to 
follow the full statements of the Prosecutors and the associated arguments. 
1038 Supra n. 954, P. 5. 
1039 See the above arguments about being apologist or utopian. 
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grant amnesty to the perpetrators in the Uganda situation. Although ‘the alleged role of the 
perpetrators’ can be a relevant criterion for deferring the situation to an alternative, as Kony is 
still playing a significant role in the direction of the conflict in Uganda, nonetheless, it seems 
that the prosecutor will not use this criterion to stop criminal procedures. The Prosecutor has 
made it clear on several occasions that the national alternatives could be relevant except for the 
four individuals currently accused before the Court, who should face criminal justice.1040 
Further to this, the Prosecutor also recognised in the policy paper that ‘the best guidance on the 
Office's approach to these issues can be gathered from the way it has dealt with real situations. 
The Office will not speculate on abstract scenarios.’1041 Accordingly, in the current formulation 
of the Statute,1042 the policy paper,1043 the views of some members of staff of the OTP,1044 and 
the Prosecutor1045, there would be no scope for factoring in the peace process. The inability of 
the OTP to arrest the perpetrators, bring justice to them as well as the victims, and the fact that 
the OTP’s proceedings are highly likely to disturb the ongoing negotiations might raise a 
question regarding the legal legitimacy of the Court.  
In the context of the Uganda situation, it seems difficult to apply these standards (the 
Statute and policy papers), as they do not make explicit reference to national political efforts 
in placing peace in the country that the OTP should respect. Even from a theoretical 
perspective, it seems quite difficult to apply the same standards to all situations and cases, 
which often have different circumstances that render any such standards inapplicable to them. 
For example, both the Uganda1046 and Darfur1047 situations have raised the issue of the transfer 
                                                          
1040  Moreno-Ocampo confirms that the national efforts can complement his criminal efforts together, see 
Osike, supra n. 952. 
1041 See Policy paper on the Interests of Justice 2007, P. 9. 
1042 See Article 53 of the ICC Statute. 
1043 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007. 
1044 Several interviews I conducted at The Hague between 12th and 14th March, 2013. 
1045 My question to the Prosecutor during her lecture at LSE, London. 
1046 Drexler, supra n. 1028. 
1047 Dapo Akande, The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get 
another Immunity Case? Blog of the European Journal of International Law (8th February, 2012), available at 
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of these situations to other mechanisms, and the necessity for withdrawal of the arrest warrants. 
However, these situations are totally different from each other in terms of the balance of power 
between the fighting groups, the available alternative justice mechanisms and the political 
atmosphere. The Prosecutor does not seem able to apply the same legal standards to two 
different situations and obtain similar outcomes. As Greenawalt argues, dealing with countries 
experiencing transitional justice processes should be ‘contingent upon case-by-case 
assessments.’1048 Further to this, the OTP on several occasions, including my interviews with 
members of staff of the OTP,1049 have been more inclined to consider peace negotiations as an 
irrelevant strategy to the Office.1050  
Based on the formulation of Article 53, the policy paper on ‘the interests of justice’,1051 
and the nature of the peaceful resolution in each situation, the prosecutor might not be able to 
make a wise decision that is consistent with the given example. Additionally, the consistent 
denial policy that the Prosecutor keeps following also may render her unable to address the 
situation in question. The insistence of the OTP to achieve the Court’s aim through rigid rules, 
and the total denial of political considerations might undermine the legal and legitimacy 
authority of the Court.1052 The Prosecutor needs to be aware that she does make political 
decisions. The political dimensions are strongly linked to her decisions.1053 What is required at 
this stage is that the Prosecutor is advised to utilise these factors to achieve the Court’s ends. 
The ICC is like a fish which swims within a political sea. The pure normative way (legal 
standards) to deal with a certain situation without considering the prevailing environment often 
                                                          
<http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-unions-response-to-the-iccs-decisions-on-bashirs-immunity-will-the-icj-
get-another-immunity-case/>.  
1048 Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International 
Criminal Court, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2010), P. 137. 
1049 Several interviews I conducted at The Hague between 12th and 14th March, 2013. 
1050 Ibid.  
1051 Policy Paper on the Interests of justice 2007. 
1052 See generally supra n. 856. 
1053 See generally, M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Documentary History 
(Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 1998), P. 408. 
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does not help to address the problem or promote the legitimacy of the Court. Therefore, it seems 
that the prosecutor is advised to acknowledge the importance of several external factors, which 
are associated with political effects to make the Court more effective. The enumeration of these 
factors cannot be confined to one single list, as they are too connected to the specific 
circumstances of each situation. Therefore, the next discussion will try to identify those which 
are more connected to the Uganda situation and similar. These factors are in nature apologist 
and represent ‘the political, instrumental or “process” aspect of the law.’1054  
One of these external factors is the demands of people, in particular the needs of 
victims. It may require the prosecutor to stop the prosecutorial approach of the Court and defer 
to what best suits the demands of people. It is not only the voice of victims, but those of all 
segments of the whole affected society should be heard.1055 However, the demands of victims 
should be given priority, as, naturally, this segment is the most affected side of the given 
society, because the achievement of the demands of victims is the achievement of justice.1056  
This consideration is also inherently driven from the Statute, which seeks to bring 
justice to the victims.1057 Our justice is determined in accordance to what victims ask for. The 
ICC Statute,1058 the RPE,1059 and the policy paper on victims’ participation in 2010 have all 
emphasised the importance of the role of victims before and during the criminal 
proceedings.1060 The UN document about the rights of victims emphasised the rights of victims 
                                                          
1054 Supra n. 72, P. 19. 
1055 This should include victims, representatives of all communities, religious and tribal leaders. 
1056 This is the main aim that also all transitional justice mechanisms should involve when addressing certain 
atrocities of a conflict. A report, submitted by the United Nations, asserted the latter idea by providing ‘that 
transitional justice mechanisms reflect the needs of conflict-affected communities, including victims.’, see, The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary- General, 
UN Doc. S /2011/634, 12 October 2011, at P. 18. 
1057 Article 53 (1) (c) and (2) (c) of the ICC Statute provides that ‘the interests of victims’ to be considered when 
evaluating ‘the interests of justice’. 
1058 See, the ICC Statute, Articles 15, 19, 53, and 68. 
1059 See, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rules: 89- 93. 
1060 See, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation 2010, supra n. 977.  
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not only to an effective judicial remedy, but also to have access to other domestic criminal and 
administrative mechanisms, which meet their needs.1061 The latter emphasis refers clearly to 
the idea that victims’ rights and needs may be met via myriad mechanisms. If the international 
justice response (ICC prosecution) is a real obstacle to achieve justice in some situations, then, 
the deferral to another alternative can be justified on that basis.1062 Criminal justice is not the 
sole mechanism to meet the demands of victims. What, for example, if the victims seek and 
favour the demands of peace ahead of the demands of justice? Further, if the international 
community is unable to stop the violence in question, and the ICC’s approach is not effective, 
either to stop the violence or to apprehend the alleged perpetrators, shall we keep insisting on 
the ICC justice at the cost of seeing more victims? Or, should we listen to the victims who are 
more interested in a peace settlement? These are obviously critical questions that the OTP is 
facing in the context of several situations under its jurisdiction. These problems can be 
attributed to the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms on the international level and the 
dependence of the Court on the political will of states, which are usually driven by their own 
interests.1063  
Indeed, the OTP has organised many missions to discern the demands of victims in the 
countries that are under its investigation. It has conducted more than 25 missions in Uganda 
for the purpose of listening to the demands of victims and other representatives of local 
                                                          
1061 See Article 14 of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
C.H.R. res. 2005/35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/ L.10/Add.11 (19th April 2005).  
1062 See ‘the scope of the interests of justice’ in this chapter. However, there is a difference between the 
demands of victims and ‘the interests of victims’, as laid down in Article 53. Whilst the first is evaluated 
according to the opinions of the victims themselves, the latter is evaluated by the prosecutor. See also Carsten 
Stahn, Justice civilisatrice? The ICC, post-colonial theory, and faces of ‘the local’, in Christian de Vos, Sara 
Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), P. 64, he sheds light on the importance of ‘the 
local’ and in particular the interests and voices of victims in the articulation of a given conflict. He says that the 
OTP, in its 2007 policy paper, failed to acknowledge the interests of victims as ‘a bar to the ICC proceedings’. 
1063 See generally, supra n. 939. 
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communities.1064 However, it is not known to what extent the Prosecutor effectively considered 
these voices within her decision-making process, as we cannot see any of these demands have 
been met, as we will see now. Then, what are the demands of Ugandans? How could justice 
have been achieved according to Ugandans?  
In fact, over the last eight years, several surveys conducted by different groups have 
provided no definitive answer, as to what the victims in Uganda prefer. However, there is a 
tendency to think that a need for peace is placed ahead of justice. For example, two surveys 
conducted in 2005 and 2007 showed that the responses of the affected societies are far from 
uniform. Whilst the earlier one demonstrated that most of the respondents supported criminal 
prosecution rather than peace talks, the second survey showed the reverse.1065 The majority of 
the respondents of the second survey preferred ‘soft options’, such as forgiveness, 
reconciliation, and reintegration.1066 In particular, the majority of the respondents preferred 
peace requirements to any other priorities. Only three percent favoured justice, as the main 
priority. Moreover, the figures showed that the majority of the respondents preferred peace 
with amnesty, as long as it achieved peace. The significant feature of this change comes from 
the fact that those respondents ‘changed their minds upon learning that the Court could not 
conduct its own arrests.’1067 It is within this background Jeremy Sarkin ‘argues that while 
prosecutions are not favoured in Uganda, in any case, they will be difficult to carry out because 
of the extensive amnesties already granted, and because of the political resistance and lack of 
political will to carry out prosecutions, especially against those employed by the state or in the 
                                                          
1064 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice 2007, P. 6. 
1065 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Marieke Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di Giovanni, Forgotten Voices: A 
Population-Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda, International Centre for 
Transitional Justice (July, 2005), available at <http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-HRC-Uganda-Voices-2005-
English.pdf>. See also, Phuong Pham, Patrick Vink, Eric Stover, Marieke Wierda, Andrew Moss, and Richard 
Bailey, When the War Ends: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice, and Social 
Reconstruction in Northern Uganda, Human Rights Center: UC Berkeley (January, 2007), available at 
<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8m56w3jj#page-2>. 
1066 Otim and Wierda, supra n. 1025, P. 6. 
1067 Ibid, P. 5. 
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Ugandan political arena.’ 1068 These figures demonstrate that the ICC is not still well placed to 
be an ideal response to any conflict. Hence, other alternative justice mechanisms are still 
needed, given that the ICC has no effective enforcement mechanisms, as it totally depends on 
the political will of states.1069 Further, it means also that the legitimacy of the Court might be 
undermined, if the Court is only interested in building its strategy and existence at the cost of 
victims’ suffering.  
Thus, what is the preferred alternative the victims seek?1070 The 2007 survey showed 
that the majority of the respondents preferred traditional justice mechanisms. Later in the same 
year, both sides to the conflict signed an Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, as 
consequence to that effect.1071 Although, the formulation of the provisions of the Agreement 
was loose, nonetheless, it referred to a truth telling body, a reparation system, and a traditional 
justice ceremony, called mato oput.1072 It was agreed that these alternatives should be applied 
to all perpetrators, including those responsible for committing the most heinous crimes. As was 
discussed elsewhere, no alternative can replace the ICC approach without putting this 
alternative under a careful examination. If the prosecutor is to take these considerations into 
account, she needs to examine the basic conformity of the given alternatives with ‘the interests 
of justice’, as understood by the theories of justice.1073 As was explained, it seems that those 
alternatives can, to a large extent, achieve the aims of international criminal justice (retributive, 
                                                          
1068 Supra n. 1019, P. 113. 
1069 Stephen Krug, ICC Effectiveness Depends on Member State Cooperation, Jurist (3rd January, 2012), 
available at <http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/01/eric-leonard-icc-effectiveness.php> (Last Access: 1st June, 
2015).  
1070 For more information about this issue, see Janet McKnight, Accountability in northern Uganda: 
Understanding the Conflict, the Parties and the False Dichotomies in International Criminal Law and 
Transitional Justice, Journal of African Law, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2015), Pp.204-5. 
1071 See, Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (Juba, Sudan), 2007, Pp. 4, 7-8, available at 
<www.fides.org/eng/documents/uganda_agreement_290607.doc> (Last Access: 19th November, 2013). 
1072 ‘Mato Oput refers to the traditional ritual performed by the Acholi after full accountability and 
reconciliation has been attained between parties formerly in conflict, after full accountability’, see ibid, P.2. 
1073 These conditions are the conformity of the alternatives to the justice’s theories, necessity, and legitimacy 
of the alternatives. 
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deterrent, restorative, and expressive justice). However, there might be a doubt about as how 
these alternatives; in particular the peace process achieves retributive justice. Elizabeth Ludwin 
King suggests that retributive justice can be delivered by means other than through criminal 
punishments.1074 She states that retributive justice can take several forms, such as lustration.1075 
Also, naming and shaming the offenders is another form of this sort of justice.1076 Community 
service, as a sort of punishment can be a form of retributive justice.1077 Therefore, if the 
conclusion of the peace agreement were to involve one of these forms, one could say that the 
conformity of alternatives to the international criminal justice theories would be met.  
Another external factor is necessity.1078 This appears to be the most critical verification 
that the prosecutor needs to evaluate.1079 The prosecutor should make a deferral decision when 
there is an urgent need for the deferral. For example, if there is a need in a certain situation for 
a non-prosecutorial alternative other than the ICC approach to be applied to the given situation, 
then the prosecutor may defer to that method. The justification of this argument lies in the fact 
that the ICC is not always an ideal solution to all conflicts, as an international criminal 
response.1080 The achievement of those basic aims can be reached through other alternatives 
that can also or better serve ‘the interests of justice’. In addition, the call for non-prosecutorial 
justice mechanisms is often invoked when the criminal prosecution constitutes a major obstacle 
to peace and, therefore, to putting an end to conflicts. In particular, when the proposed 
alternative is able to suffice justice, as understood by the above justice theories. This can be 
                                                          
1074 Ludwin supra n. 880. 
1075 Ibid, P. 32. 
1076 Ibid, P. 32. 
1077 Ibid, P. 32. 
1078 Supra n. 867, P. 497. Robinson argued that necessity could be a measure on which to give a way for other 
alternatives to take a role. 
1079 Ibid. 
1080 Otim and Wierda, supra n. 1025, 1- 8, the author is emphasizing the importance of the other mechanisms 
to address atrocities, using Uganda as a case study. 
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verified, for example, if the Court and other international institutions, such as the SC are unable 
or unwilling to apprehend the supposed perpetrators who are still committing further crimes.1081  
In the Uganda situation, all circumstances indicate the existence of this particular 
condition. Kony, on several occasions, has made it clear that he will not sign any peace deal, 
until the ICC withdraws the arrest warrant against him and his friends. In her important book, 
Sarah M. H. Nouwen also shows how the complementarity concerns has not appeared an issue 
before the ICC was viewed as hampering peace in Uganda.1082 Based on the political dynamics 
of the situation in Uganda, in particular the political arrangements of the peace process, it is 
not only ‘the interests of justice’ becomes a concern to this situation, it is even the 
complementarity principle that has been also invoked, as stated by Sarah. In other words, the 
political arrangements often have a particular effect on the way how the legal principles can be 
applied. Following the political scene in Uganda, the Ugandan government showed its 
readiness to call the Court to withdraw them upon signing the peace agreement.1083 As the ICC 
is not able to arrest those fugitives, the LRA is still committing crimes, and the end of this 
tragedy is contingent on the withdrawal of the arrest warrants, it appears that the necessity 
condition is highly required to be taken into account. As Janet McKnight wonders, ‘[t]he 
increase in atrocities seemed to confirm that putting justice first would only lead to the 
impossibility of peace, as Kony then felt he had to fight not only Museveni's government, but 
                                                          
1081  In the Uganda situation, Kony’s group has shown a consistent and continuous threat to the ongoing peace 
talks, and a continuous capability to commit further abuses of human rights, as long as the Court sustains its 
warrants. The Ugandan authorities, accordingly, have asked the OTP to withdraw warrants, as they believe 
that there is an urgent need to move on to its alternatives. For more information about the LRA, see supra n. 
46. 
1082 Nouwen, supra n. 132 
1083 Uganda to Ask ICC to Retract War Crimes Indictments for LRA Rebels, Jurist (31st August, 2006), available at 
<http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/08/uganda-to-ask-icc-to-retract-war.php> (Last Access: 2nd September, 
2015).  
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also the entire international community.’1084 Therefore, if the above argument is valid, the 
prosecutor can defer to the given alternatives.  
The third factor, as Rodman and Greenawalt have identified, is the role of the civil 
society groups.1085 This is called a local support. In the context of the Uganda situation, those 
units have favoured the amnesty approach in exchange for ending the conflict and having peace 
talks. This was the response of several civil societies within the Acholi community and also of 
former Ugandan minister Betty Bigombe to several missions sent by Moreno-Ocampo to 
Uganda.1086 The International Crisis Group has also joined this voice and asked for a better 
strategy from the OTP.1087 It says that if the withdrawal of the arrest warrants were to lead to 
peaceful settlement, then the OTP should forego them as a strategy. ‘The international 
community should continue to provide strong support for prosecution and only consider asking 
the court to suspend its activity when and if the LRA leaders begin to implement a fair 
settlement.’1088   
In response to these views, the OTP depended on several NGOs and international actors 
to maintain its current attitude to the Uganda situation. It maintained that the arrest warrant had 
had a positive effect in forcing the LRA leaders to come to the negotiation table. The current 
warrants have forced them to sit at the negotiation table, and also left them with no safe place 
to stay, as all neighbouring states have joined the AU’s mission to arrest Kony and his 
friends.1089 Yet, whilst such pressure may lead the rebels into peace talks, by the same token, 
                                                          
1084 Supra n. 1070, P. 207. See also supra n. 1018. 
1085 Rodman, supra n. 21. 
1086 For more information about this, see Rodman, supra n. 21, P.104. 
1087 See Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, African Report No. 124, International Crisis Group 
(26th April 2007), at <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/3975/uploads> (Last Access: 14th September, 
2015). 
1088 Ibid, P. 15. 
1089 Rodney Muhumuza, Joseph Kony Hunt: African Union will Send 5,000 Soldiers to Find Ugandan Rebel 
Leader, Huff Post: World (March, 2012), available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/23/joseph-
kony-hunt_n_1375284.html> (Last Access: 2nd April, 2013). 
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it is quite unclear how the maintenance of the warrants will eventually lead to the surrender of 
these indictees. ‘To the extent the warrants have incentivised the LRA to negotiate, that must 
be because the LRA expects the negotiations will lead precisely to that sort of alternative to 
international prosecution.’1090 This means that the main justification that the OTP is using to 
retain its position does not seem strong.  
The fourth factor is stability. This is an essential factor that the prosecutor needs to 
examine. It suggests that the continuous relevance of the ICC, as a solution to a country that 
has experienced mass violation of human rights supposes the stability of the situation in that 
country1091. If the situation is not stable, in the sense that the ICC looks like a real obstacle to 
maintaining stability, then this is a strong indication towards favouring a peace concern. 
Therefore, the prosecutor may be required to step away to give a chance for other mechanisms, 
which have the ability to retain that stability and achieve justice. In Uganda, the situation is not 
stable, as Kony has made clear that he will not sign any cease-fire agreement until the 
Prosecutor withdraws her warrants. In such a circumstance, such a political repercussion 
indicates that the peace process needs to be taken into account, when deciding which 
mechanism can best serve justice and retains stability. This factor, alongside the above 
pragmatic factors, supposes that a peace process accompanied by a local justice mechanism 
may be a relevant basis on which the prosecutor can apply the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’.    
In short, this chapter showed that the rigid application of the rules often does not help 
the prosecutor achieve the ends of the Statute of the Court. What makes this problem worse is 
the denial rhetoric strategy the prosecutor declares now and then as if she were a ‘captive of 
some objective legal will.’ It is only the law that makes her direct the Court to a certain end. 
The surrounding circumstances of a situation are part of the decision-making process. 
                                                          
1090 Supra n. 1048, Pp. 146-7. 
1091 See generally, Ludwin supra n. 880. 
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Otherwise, the decision that keeps distance between itself and those circumstances may fail to 
achieve the aim for which it is issued. This is a process, in which consideration of the internal 
and external standards together can help give the prosecutor more understanding about a certain 
situation or case when considering alternative justice mechanisms, associated with peace 
negotiations. Article 53 allows the prosecutor to play more effective roles that can best enhance 
the legitimacy and the aims of the Court. The other values that are not covered by the legal 
rules can be promoted by the new role that is given to an international prosecutor. The success 
of the ICC in Uganda is not contingent on the regular argument of the Court that justice and 
peace can be achieved through its criminal justice avenue. A broader consideration of all the 
internal standards and external factors should be weighed together in order to achieve peace 
and justice. Also, the chapter argues that peace talks cannot come within the scope of ‘the 
interests of justice’ as such. The latter cannot be served without activating some form of justice 
mechanisms. It was argued that the peace process can only be a reason for ceasing the ICC’s 
approach, when it is accompanied by another form of justice mechanism, regardless of the type 
of this alternative.  
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6.1. Darfur Conflict 
The indictment of the President is the central debate within the Darfur situation. It is 
also linked to the dilemma of justice versus peace. It also raises the same dyadic criticisms the 
Prosecutor faces. The classical tension between justice and peace has divided the current 
arguments about the indictment’s decision into two main views. Adherents of the decision 
relied on the classical tone that granting impunity for hideous crimes would encourage 
perpetrators of the given situation and other situations to commit further atrocities.1092 
Therefore, it is only the criminal justice approach that must be undertaken regardless of other 
extra-legal considerations, such as peace and stability-related issues. This argument seems, 
however, too utopian. However, the opponents of this view believed that the criminal 
prosecution taken against the sitting head of state is likely to miss all chances of fostering peace 
talks to end the conflict.1093 The Prosecutor is focusing on a too high profile, who cannot be 
arrested. As Davenport criticises, ‘[i]n Sudan, the prosecutor indicted President Omar al-
Bashir, but he has been sufficiently protected by his allies and friends that the Court can’t even 
reach him; whereas some lesser figures could have been targeted, captured and prosecuted.’1094 
He argues that the Prosecutor should concentrate on manageable cases and avoid ‘highly visible 
and politicized cases’.1095 However, this argument seems too apologist. Moreno-Ocampo 
                                                          
1092 Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, HRW (July, 2009), at 
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/07/07/selling-justice-short/why-accountability-matters-peace> (Last 
Access: 12th July, 2013), providing that the criminal justice approach for handling atrocities and that such an 
approach would uphold peace at the same time. Goran Sluiter, Using the Genocide Convention to Strengthen 
Cooperation with the ICC in the Al Bashir Case, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 8 (2010), P. 365- 
382. Also, see Christopher Gosnell, The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al- Bashir: Idealistic Posturing or 
Calculated Plan? Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 6 (2008), P. 841- 851, Mary T. Reynolds, 
Legitimizing the ICC: Supporting the Court’s Prosecution of those Responsible in Darfur, Boston College Third 
World Law Journal, Vol. 30 (2010), P. 197- 206.  
1093 The International Criminal Court: Sudan’s Leader is Accused, but others can Expect to Follow, The 
Economist (July, 2008), available at <http://www.economist.com/node/11751353> (Last Access: 31st July, 
2013), also the AU in some of its declaration, asked the SC to defer President Al-Bashir’s case.  
1094 Supra n. 112. 
1095 Ibid. 
280 
 
already decided to take the first choice by, first, endorsing the Security Council’s referral,1096 
and second by indicting several people from all sides to the conflict, including the President.1097 
According to the above arguments, the Prosecutor seems too utopian.  
This Chapter will discuss the potential of the local mechanism – considering political 
impacts/factors – to cease cases before the Court on the basis of a broader understanding of the 
term ‘the interests of justice’. In particular, the discussion will focus on the analysis of the case 
of the President of Sudan. As was already emphasised, the concept of justice does not 
exclusively a criminal accountability delivered by trial. This could encompass different 
measures and aims. As Michael A. Newton states, ‘[c]ommunity-based dispute mechanisms 
can thus have a central role alongside formalised trials, to the extent that localised processes 
embody a culturally meaningful blend of restorative and retributive elements.’1098 He further 
emphasises that the term ‘justice’ becomes more meaningful when it responds ‘to the demand 
of the local population.’1099 Therefore, the chapter will conclude that the term justice should be 
read in a broad way so it includes any sort of local mechanism that is supported by the locals.  
The Darfur conflict started in 2003.1100 The conflict first originates from late 2002 when 
the two main rebels groups: the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) attacked several government bases, such as police stations.1101 
They justified their attacks by accusing the Government of discriminatorily neglecting them, 
                                                          
1096 See the referral’s decision: UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005). 
1097 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09. 
1098 Michael A. Newton, A Synthesis of Community-Based Justice and Complementarity, in Christian de Vos, 
Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal 
Court Interventions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), P. 123. 
1099 Ibid, P. 128. 
1100 See the United Nations and Darfur, at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/fact_sheet.pdf> (Last 
Access: 6th June, 2016).  
1101 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General: 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25th January, 2005, Pp. 61- 72. 
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in terms of economic marginalization and a power-sharing deal.1102 When these groups started 
to organise and consolidate their power, the Government in Sudan declared the existence of 
the status of uprising in the region.1103 They decided, first, to arm the Arab Militia, known as 
Janjaweed to fight those groups, and, second, to launch an armed attack against them.1104 Six 
years later, after an intense fight between these groups, massive destruction and violence 
resulted from the Government and Janjaweed’s attacks.  
By 2013, more than 300,000 people were killed, more than 3 million people were 
internally displaced, and more than 200,000 others sought refuge in the neighbouring states, in 
Chad in particular.1105 The conflict resulted in further humanitarian crisis, leaving more than 3 
million people with no basic necessities of life as well as security.1106 The situation has been 
more mutated and developed for worse status.1107 As a consequence, the level of violence has 
increased and become unpredictable and spread over other parts of the country and the region. 
This led to new conflicts in other areas of Sudan, which are Kordofan and Blue Nile.1108 The 
same rebel groups in Darfur are also engaged with the rebels groups in these two areas in 
                                                          
1102 See more details about the background of the conflict in, Chandara Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and 
Johanna Herman, War, Conflict, and Human Rights: Theory and Practice (2nd ed.) (New York, Routledge, 2014), 
Pp. 142-5.  
1103 Darfur: Background to The Conflict, Darfur Australia Network, available at 
<http://www.darfuraustralia.org/darfur/background> (Last Access: 1st June, 2015).  
1104 Ibid. 
1105 Glenys Kinnock and Michael E Capuano, A Decade on, Sudan Threatens to Repeat the Tragedy of Darfur, 
The Guardian (10th March 2013), available at 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/10/decade-on-sudan-tragedy-darfur> (Last Access: 
30th July, 2013). See also Darfur Situation Marked by Insecurity, Limited Progress on Peace Front, Security 
Council told, UN News Centre (23rd October, 2013), available at 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/h%3Cspan%20class='pullme'%3EIn%20short,%20when%20you%20
empower%20a%20woman,%20you%20change%20the%20world%3C/span%3Ettp://www.unfpa.org/story.asp?
NewsID=46315&Cr=darfur&Cr1=#.UvICdWJ_vZE> (Last Access: 28th January, 2014).  
1106 Kinnock and Capuano, supra n. 1105. 
1107 See Eric Reeves, Humanitarian Conditions in Darfur: A Climate of Violence and Extreme Insecurity, Sudan 
Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan (4th August, 2013), available at 
<http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47542> (Last Access: 6th August, 2013).   
1108 Kinnock and Capuano, supra n. 1105. 
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fighting the Government.1109 Since the beginning of 2015, a quarter of a million of people were 
displaced, thousands of people fled the country, and dozens of people were killed, as the fight 
intensified between the fighting groups, mostly by the Rapid Support Forces, a government-
backed force.1110      
Although all sides to the conflict have been involved in several peace talks beginning 
from 2004, none of these talks have ever succeeded. In early 2004, the Sudanese army entered 
into a ceasefire that lasted only for one month, before an attack was launched over a village.1111 
Two more peace talks failed in 2005, when both sides met in Abuja, Nigeria, as the 
representatives to these talks were not comprehensive.1112 In 2006, a faction of SLA and the 
Government signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, although the agreement, in large part, was 
not implemented.1113 More than a decade after the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur and despite 
these peace efforts taken, one can say that the international community has achieved a blatant 
failure (as we will see later) in not only preventing the violation of human rights in the region, 
but also in mitigating the hideous subhuman conditions. In short, the situation in Darfur today 
is ‘a man-made humanitarian catastrophe’.1114        
6.2. The UNSC and ICC’s Response  
                                                          
1109 Najeeb Bin Mohammed al-Nauimi, Darfur and Sudan: Visionary Approach Needed – and Qatar can Help, 
The Guardian (5th April, 2013), available at <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2013/apr/05/darfur-sudan-visionary-approach-qatar> (Last Access: 30th July, 2013). 
1110 See, World Report 2016: Sudan Events of 2015, Human Rights Watch, P. 535, available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf>. See also A Joint 
Statement by the Deputy Head of the UNA-African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur and the UN Resident 
Coordinator in Sudan, Reported at Alarm Raised over Violence in Sudan's Darfur, Aljazeera, (28th March, 2014), 
at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/03/un-raises-alarm-over-growing-darfur-violence-
201432723314421433.html>, (Last Access: 18th June, 2014).  
1111 High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, 
delivered to the Chairperson of the Commission of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3, May 7, 2004. 
1112 In Depth: Sudan The Crisis in Darfur, a Timeline, CBC News (July, 2008), available at 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/sudan/darfur.html> (Last Access: 30th July, 2013). 
1113 The Janjaweed militia was not disarmed as was supposed to be, for example, the agreement is available at 
<http://www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf>.   
1114 Kinnock and Capuano, supra n. 1105. 
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In response to a report submitted by an international commission of inquiry1115, the SC 
issued Resolution 1593 in 2005 referring the Darfur situation to the ICC Prosecutor according 
to Article 13 (b) of the Statute.1116 The Resolution provides that all parties to the conflict are 
under an international obligation to ‘cooperate fully with, and provide any necessary assistance 
to the Court and the Prosecutor.’1117 In his first response, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo issued 
a report in late 2005 urging several countries and NGOs to provide all necessary assistance to 
the Court.1118 The OTP conducted a rather inductive and slow investigation into the alleged 
crimes committed in Darfur and, accordingly, asked the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue two arrest 
warrants against: Ahmad Muhammad Harun, senior government official, and Ali Muhammad 
Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, known as Ali Kushayb, a militia leader.1119  
Consequently, it took more than two years, since the Darfur referral1120 to the Court, 
for the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue the first two arrest warrants against the two Sudanese leaders 
for alleged crimes of crimes against humanity and war crimes.1121 Over the next year, as the 
OTP failed to get assistance from the international community, including the SC and Sudan, to 
arrest the alleged perpetrators, Moreno-Ocampo submitted a request for arrest warrant this time 
against President Omar Al-Bashir in July 2008.1122 In so doing, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
decided that there was evidence to add the crime of genocide against him. That was a first ever 
decision taken by an international tribunal against a sitting head of state. In March 2009, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber approved the Prosecutor’s request and issued the first arrest warrant against 
                                                          
1115 UN Report, supra n. 1101, the commission was established according to UNSC Resolution 1564 (2004), for 
information about this resolution. See also Schabas, supra n. 4, P. 50. 
1116 UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005). 
1117 UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005), P. 2. 
1118 This report is issued regularly pursuant to the Security Council Resolution referring the situation to the 
Court, see supra n. 790.  
1119 The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun ("Ahmad Harun") and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman ("Ali 
Kushayb"), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07. 
1120 Resolution 1593 (2005): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005, United 
Nations Security Council,  S/RES/1593 (2005). 
1121 Supra n. 1119. 
1122 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,Case No.  ICC-02/05-01/09. 
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the President for counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes.1123 However, 
the Chamber did not agree with Moreno-Ocampo that there were grounds for indicting him for 
acts of genocide, based on insufficient evidence that held the president liable for such a crime. 
The Chamber said ‘if the existence of a GoS's genocidal intent is only one of several reasonable 
conclusions available on the materials provided by the Prosecution, the Prosecution application 
in relation to genocide must be rejected as the evidentiary standard provided for in article 58 
of the Statute would not have been met.’1124 
However, the Prosecutor appealed the decision before the Appeal Chamber. The latter, 
in turn, ordered the Pre-trial Chamber to reconsider its decision with regard to the genocide 
charges based on an erroneous standard of proof for determining genocidal intent.1125 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, successfully, managed to obtain approval from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for the issuance of an arrest warrant for the President for three counts of genocide.1126 
However, none of these arrests have been executed at the time of writing this work. To expand 
his policy of prosecution, Moreno-Ocampo, further, indicted three rebel leaders, who are all at 
the custody of the Court.1127   
6.3 The AU’s Response  
The ICC Prosecutor’s decision of indicting the Sudanese President has provoked a 
sharp response by the AU against the Court. The AU has sharply assailed the Prosecutor’s 
                                                          
1123 Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC, In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Al Bashir: Situation in Darfur, No.: 
ICC-02/05-01/09 (4th March, 2009), available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF>  
1124 Ibid, Para. 159. 
1125 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir", ICC-02/05-01/09, Pp. 33-9, the counts are: Killing, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm, and inflicting on each target group conditions of calculated to bring 
about the group’s physical destruction. 
1126 See, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09. 
1127 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Case No. ICC-
02/05-03/09, The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09. 
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strategy of indicting, in particular, a sitting head of state.1128 In its 13th summit held in Sirte, 
Libya 2009, the AU completely rejected the indictment of President Al- Bashir and refused to 
cooperate with the Court to arrest the President.1129 The AU continues requesting that the SC 
defer the proceedings initiated against the President in all its meetings. The request was totally 
ignored by the Security Council. This position of the AU is mainly based on two main legal 
reasons, which render it uncooperative with the Court.  
First, two weeks before the Prosecutor issued the arrest warrant, the AU, in its ordinary 
session 2008, declared its objection to any extraterritorial prosecution of the leaders of Africa’ 
states.1130 The Assembly of the Union justified the declaration by adopting a decision on the 
‘abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction’.1131 The Assembly provided that abusing the 
latter principle is a violation of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of African 
countries.1132 It constitutes a clear violation of international law, and endangers security and 
peace in the region. According to this development, the AU decided not to cooperate with the 
Court to execute the arrest warrant of the President of Sudan.  
Another legal basis is the new reform the AU made, in which the Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) was created.1133 The latter has a right to intervene into any African country 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in regard to any grave international crimes, in pursuance 
to Article 14 (h) of the Constitutive Act. The PSC also criticised the indictment’s decision, and 
                                                          
1128 Surabhi Ranganathan, Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), Chapter five. 
1129 The AU’s Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC)– Doc. Assembly/AU/13 (XIII), Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) 
Rev.1, Assembly of the African Union, 13th Ordinary Session, 1- 3 July, 2009, Sirte, Great Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
1130 The AU’s Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal  Jurisdiction  
Doc. Assembly/aU/14 (XI), Assembly of the African Union, 11th Ordinary Session, 30 June – 1 July, 2008, Sharm 
El Sheikh, Egypt. 
1131 Ibid, Pp. 1 -2. 
1132 Ibid. 
1133 Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (2003), at 
<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf>.      
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asserted that the pursuit of justice should not derail efforts sought to promote lasting peace.1134 
It further requested the SC to operate Article 16 of the ICC Statute and defer the situation for 
one year taking into consideration the necessity not to impede the ongoing peace talks. This 
reform was not meant to grant the President immunity, but rather reiterated the right of the AU 
to resolve its grave problems.  
As a consequence, the AU established the High-Level Panel on Darfur to examine the 
situation and suggest recommendations on best approaches to address accountability and 
peace.1135 In 2009, the Panel submitted ambitious recommendations, in which it tried to balance 
peace and justice.1136 It recommended the creation of a hybrid tribunal, new legislation that 
removes all immunities of potential suspects in Darfur, and the creation of a truth and 
reconciliation commission.1137 The ICC Prosecutor ignored these efforts and made no 
communication about such steps, taken by an important body in the region. Hence, Moreno-
Ocampo insisted on his request, and as a consequence, and two weeks before the Panel started 
its mission, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the warrant of arrest against the President.1138 
Accordingly, the AU decided not to cooperate with the Court having ignored its efforts in 
sorting the problem out.1139 It further refused the ICC’s request to open an office for 
communication in Ethiopia.1140 In addition, in its recent response to the Prosecutor’s decision, 
the AU invited President Al-Bashir to attend a special session of the AU on HIV/AIDS, held 
                                                          
1134 Peace and Security Council, Press Statement, PSC/PR/BR(CXLI), 11 July, 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
1135 Comfort Ero, Understanding Africa’s Position on the International Criminal Court, March 2010, in Debating 
International Justice in Africa, Oxford Transitional Justice Research (2008- 2010), Pp. 11-4 
1136 Peace and Security Council, Report of the African Union: High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), 
PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), October, 2009, Abuja, Nigeria, available at 
<file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/Report_of_the_African_Union_High_Level_Panel_on_Darfur_The_Quest_for_
Peace_Justice_and_Reconcilation_October_2009.pdf>. 
1137 Ibid, Pp. 25-6. 
1138 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Al Bashir: Situation in Darfur, No.: ICC-02/05-01/09 (4th March, 2009). 
1139 Supra n. 1129, P. 10.   
1140 See African Union, 15th AU Summit- Press Release N. 104 (29, July, 2010). 
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in Nigeria, in July 2013, despite the arrest warrant issued against him.1141 The AU’s responses 
reflect how resistant the AU is to the arrest warrant. This was a first sign of the start of tension 
between the AU and the ICC, in general, and the Prosecutor, in particular.   
The total disregard of these AU steps by the Court and the Prosecutor ‘add fuel to the 
flame’, as the Court is already challenged by being a new colonial intervention into Africa.1142 
The AU tried to take a part in resolving its own disputes, and decided to create their own legal 
tools to avoid such an intervention. However, the AU failed to impose its own criminal 
jurisdiction over the African conflicts. In addition to the hybrid tribunal, the AU also requested 
the AU Commission, in all its regular meetings since its 12th Ordinary session, to ensure the 
ability of empowering the African Court on Human and People’s Rights with a criminal 
jurisdictional mandate.1143 However, it is worth noted here that the failure of the AU to take 
the initiative to tackle its own problems is not only due to the intervention of the ICC in Africa, 
but also the weak and ineffective mechanisms offered by the AU to provide its own 
alternatives.1144 The response of the ICC prosecutor to these African efforts, by using 
discretionary power, is highly vital in reshaping the form of the relationship between the Court 
and Africa, as was seen in Chapter Four. It is true that the problem appears to be between the 
AU and the Security Council, however, it is time now for the prosecutor to intervene and play 
a role in mitigating the AU’s criticisms that are ultimately directed against the Court. 
                                                          
1141 Although Nigeria first did not accept the attendance of President Al Bashir, however, the latter did 
participate under the auspices of the AU, and Nigeria complied with the AU Assembly decision, adopted in at 
the 13th Ordinary Session, in Libya. See Ogbole Amedu Ode, African Union Special Summit Reviews Successes 
on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Modern Ghana (16th July, 2013), available at 
<http://www.modernghana.com/news/475480/1/african-union-special-summit-reviews-successes-on-.html> 
(Last Access: 9th April, 2015).  
1142 See the following debate about this issue in, The Africa Issue: is the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Targeting Africa Inappropriately? Office of the Prosecutor: ICC Forum (March, 2013), at 
<http://iccforum.com/africa>.  
1143 The AU has kept requesting such a mandate in all its ordinary sessions, since 2009. 
1144 See generally, B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, International 
Community Law Review, Vol. 8 (2006), 3- 27. 
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6.4. African States and Sudan’s Response 
The responses of the individual African countries are varied. Nigeria, for example, 
refused to take action regarding the attendance of Al-Bashir, during the AIDs/HIV session, 
claiming ‘its commitment to African Union position on the issue.’1145 The same action was 
taken by the majority of African states, when several of them, such as Mali, and Chad, refused 
to arrest the President during his visit to those countries.1146 Other countries, such as Malawi, 
Zambia, and Botswana have declared their readiness to arrest the President of Sudan.1147 
Malawi, in particular, was against the ICC’s decision against the President, before the newly 
arrived President changed the political attitude of the policy of the country and decided to arrest 
President Al-Bashir.1148 
With regard to the Sudanese response to the President’s indictment, The Sudanese 
government declared a complete opposition to steps taken by the Court.1149 They initially pre-
empted the potential decision of the arrest warrant and declared threats of violence. The 
Sudanese army attacked civilians in a village using air and ground weapons.1150 Also, when the 
Court issued the decision, the Sudanese government retaliated, expelling nearly all aid 
                                                          
1145 Agency Reporter, Al-Bashir: AU Position Superior to ICC Warrant – Ashiru, The Nation (18th July, 2013), 
available at <http://thenationonlineng.net/new/al-bashir-au-position-superior-to-icc-warrant-ashiru/> (Last 
Access: 2nd August, 2013).  
1146 Stephen A. Lamony, Nigeria was Wrong to Host Omar Al-Bashir at AU Summit, African Arguments (2nd 
August, 2013), available at <http://africanarguments.org/2013/08/02/nigeria-was-wrong-to-host-omar-al-
bashir-at-au-summit-by-stephen-a-lamony/>, (Last Access: 2nd August, 2013).   
1147 Ibid. 
1148 They changed their position due to the conditions imposed on them, before they receive any aid, see 
Malawi Cancels AU Summit over Sudan's Bashir, Aljazeera (9th June, 2012), available at 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/06/20126974132905285.html>, (Last Access: 2nd August, 2013). 
1149 Sudanese President Tells International Criminal Court to 'Eat' Arrest Warrant, The Guardian (4th March, 
2009), available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/04/sudan-al-bashir-war-crimes> (Last 
Access: 1st June, 2015).  
1150 UN Says Sudan Targeted Civilians in Darfur, Reuters (20th March, 2008), available at 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/03/20/idUKL20508924._CH_.242020080320> (Last Access: 28th July, 
2013). 
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organisations.1151 The alleged action immediately affected the lives of more than one million 
people, who already live at risk.1152 It was only a few hours between the latter action and the 
time of the issuance of the arrest warrant. ‘It happened right after the announcement. The 
connection was clear,’ said one aid official.1153 The connection was clear, since the Sudanese 
government has accused the ‘aid organisations of collaborating with the court by providing 
data and testimony used to build cases against Sudanese officials.’1154 They further alerted that 
the arrest warrant would undermine the peace talks within not only Darfur, but also throughout 
the country, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This is exactly what the 
Sudanese government has continued doing over the last ten years since the Darfur crisis.  
In February 2013, the Sudanese government and JEM signed a ceasefire deal in Doha, 
Qatar.1155 This deal appeared to end a decade-old conflict in Darfur, and represented one of the 
most important steps taken to end the conflict. However, the Sudanese government did not 
show any real political will to implement the deal in good faith.1156 For example, no real 
progress was taken to articulate the issues of immunity, accountability, compensations, and 
security. It was apparent that the ICC’s decisions are influencing the developments in the 
region. The results of security and stability have remained elusive, and worse than that the 
violence persisted, as the aforementioned two areas (Kordofan and Blue Nile) are also involved 
in the crisis. The continuous violence and the ignorance of the peace talks by both sides, 
                                                          
1151 Sudan: Expelling Aid Agencies Harms Victims: Government Action Endangers 1 Million Civilians, Human 
Rights Watch (5th March, 2009), available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/03/05/sudan-expelling-aid-
agencies-harms-victims> (Last Access: 3rd July, 2013).  
1152 Ibid. 
1153 Marlise Simons and Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan’s Leader, The New York 
Times (4th March, 2009), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/world/africa/05court.html?_r=0> 
(Last Access: 3rd August, 2013).     
1154 Ibid. 
1155 The government of Sudan has signed a ceasefire deal in Qatar with a Darfur rebel group in a fresh bid to 
end a decade-old conflict in western Sudan, Qatar's state news agency QNA reported late on Sunday, Reuters 
(11th February, 2013), available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/11/us-sudan-darfur-ceasfire-
idUSBRE91A04120130211> (Last Access: 3rd August, 2013).  
1156 Supra n. 1109.  
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particularly by the Sudanese government, stimulated the classical debate, within international 
criminal justice, between justice and peace. The following section will concentrate on this 
particular dilemma and discuss how best Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo could have exercised his 
strategy of prosecution and what options the new Prosecutor has.    
6.5. Justice v. Peace 
The above positions of the AU, most of the African States and other international 
actors1157 are mainly based on political exigencies by using legal instruments. Although several 
legal tools were used for justifying the irrelevant steps taken by the Prosecutor against the 
President, as discussed above, nonetheless, it appears that several political considerations were 
also associated with the above legal justifications the AU presented.  
For example, the sole and consistent target of the Court on Africa is one account (nine 
situations under the Court jurisdiction are from the African continent). As was discussed 
throughout the thesis, the problem does not mainly lie in the legal assessment of the African 
situations that are under the jurisdiction of the Court. The problem appears in the discretionary 
fashion of determining the legal requirements of initiating an investigation, as was discussed 
in Chapter Four. It is indeed the broad discretion that allows the prosecutor either to stay in, or 
to go beyond Africa.1158 It is the discretionary use that has undermined the institutional ties, 
and its relationship with Africa, in a way that the ability of the Court to continue its mission is 
under serious threats.  
The key justification that the Prosecutor uses to validate its focus on Africa is her 
serious concern about the vast number of African victims in each situation that urged her to 
                                                          
1157 For example, the Islamic Conference, China, and most Arab countries are against the ICC’s decision, see 
China must Arrest Sudanese President, Amnesty International (16th June, 2011), available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/china-must-arrest-sudanese-president-2011-06-16>, (Last 
Access: 2nd August, 2013).  
1158 Supra n. 261. See also Chapter Three for more details about the nature of the concept of discretion. 
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open all these situations.1159 However, if the victims’ arguments is the sensitive chord the 
Prosecutor is using, then what about the other victims who are long waiting for the Court’s 
justice? There are vast numbers of victims in countries for whom the Court has done nothing 
so far. Colombia, in particular, is one of those countries that is still under the preliminary 
examination stage.1160 Obviously, there is no doubt about the gravity of the Colombian situation 
that is sufficient enough to be under the investigation of the Court.1161 The OTP declared that 
it is still assessing the complementarity test and does not reach the stage of the assessment of 
gravity.1162 In its regular Reports on Preliminary Examination Activities, the OTP asserted that 
the Colombian authorities have conducted vast proceedings against those who are allegedly 
accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.1163 It is only that the OTP 
needs some further information about the genuine nature of the national proceedings that are 
taken so far before it can conclude its formal decision.1164  
These reports give a clear impression that the Colombian authority is conducting fair 
and effective investigations against all sides to the conflict. However, one may easily raise 
several concerns about these reports and the prosecutor’s discretion. If the national proceedings 
are fair and successful as these reports indicate, then why has the OTP not yet gathered the 
required information to make its decision? This situation has been under the preliminary 
                                                          
1159 ‘We say that the ICC is targeting Africans, but all of the victims in our cases in Africa are African victims’, 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said, in a joint interview with Reuters and France’s TV5, see Tim Cocks, Interview-
ICC Says Protecting Africans, not Targeting them, Reuters (29th June, 2011), available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/29/icc-africa-idAFLDE75S1S220110629> (Last Access: 9th April, 
2015).  
1160 See, ICC, OTP, Report: Situation in Colombia - Interim Report, 14/11/2012, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20
statements/statement/Pages/Situation-in-Colombia-Interim-Report.aspx> (Last Access: 2nd June, 2015). 
1161 See the OTP’s regular reports of its preliminary examination activities, since 2011, at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20r
ef/reports/Pages/default.aspx>.  
1162 See for example, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, Paras. 112- 131. 
1163 See the official website of the Court at, <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20r
ef/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx>.  
1164 See Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, Para. 128. 
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examination stage for more than nine years, and the good progress that the national apparatus 
has taken has started for nearly five years, as indicated in the above reports. Apparently, if the 
OTP concluded the admissibility of this situation, the gravity test would be endorsed, in 
particular that ‘the scale of the crimes’ appears to be met in this situation.1165 These arguments 
raise doubt about the independence of the Prosecutor. She is not interested in pursuing this 
situation independently enough, so she does not reach the gravity test, with which she would 
determine the admissibility of the situation. If the contradictory statements the OTP declared 
in these reports are true in the sense that the prosecutor is not dealing with the situation in a 
good faith, this means the independence of the prosecutor is broken. This strategy, accordingly, 
gives the impression that the prosecutor is happy to stay in Africa and endorses the current 
accusation that the Court is an African test of the new international criminal regime.  
Another pragmatic argument is the timing of the issuance of the arrest warrant. In fact, 
the time at which the prosecutor decided to issue an unsealed arrest warrant against the 
President synchronised with two critical events that were taking place in Africa. The first event 
was the indictment of a former head of state of Liberia: Charles Taylor.1166 The ICC’s decision 
against the Sudanese President came as a second historic decision that targeted again the head 
of an African state. These international decisions witnessed the emergence of signs of 
worsening the relationship between the African states alongside the AU and the ICC. As a 
consequence, most African leaders have become cautious when dealing with the Court, 
especially with respect to the importance of cooperation with the Court.  
The second event was the peace talks that were taking place in Darfur and the protection 
of further potential victims, having issued the decision. The AU puts the peace agenda as its 
                                                          
1165 The AU is concerned about this sole approach that the prosecutor uses to evaluate the existence of the 
threshold gravity when appraising situations and cases. See, Simon M. Weldehaimanot, Arresting Al-Bashir: 
the African Union's opposition and the legalities, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 
19, No. 2 (2011), P. 208- 235. 
1166 The Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-7-3-2003. 
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top agenda as a common strategy, when dealing with any conflict in the continent.1167 In one 
of its meetings, the AU submitted that the step taken by the ICC Prosecutor might cause further 
instability in the region.1168 Thus, reference should be given first to the peace needs before 
reaching justice. This is a critical scenario that the Prosecutor seemed not to calculate, when 
deciding to indict the President even before managing to secure the arrest of the two other 
suspects (Harun and Kushayb).1169 The Prosecutor was well aware that the Court is toothless 
in terms of the enforcement of any decision it makes. He was also aware that Sudan will not 
cooperate with the Court, as the Government made it clear that they are against the Court’s 
intervention into the internal affairs of the state at the time of the indictments of the above two 
other suspects.1170 Therefore, the question that can be raised now is, did the disregard of those 
political considerations help the Prosecutor bring justice to those perpetrators and the victims? 
The answer is no.  
The Sudanese government has escalated the level of violence since the Court’s 
intervention in the country. For example, it has persisted, first, not to cooperate with the Court, 
second, to abort every peace negotiation that has been initiated between both sides of the 
conflict. Worse than that, the Sudanese government has increased the level of violence since 
the indictment of the President, not just against the locals, but also against the UN and the 
African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). For example, on 13th 
July 2013, seven UN peacekeepers were killed, and seventeen military and personnel from the 
UNAMID were injured.1171 Although there is no confirmation on who committed this attack, 
                                                          
1167 See, the Communique of the Peace and Security Council (International Criminal Court (ICC)), 142nd PSC 
Meeting PSC/MIN/Comm (CXLII) (21st July, 2008). 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 Supra n. 1119. 
1170 Claudia Parsons, ICC Prosecutor to Open Two New Darfur, Cases Global Policy Forum (4th December, 2007), 
available at <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28587.html> (Last Access: 2nd 
June, 2015), stating that ‘Sudan denies the court has jurisdiction over the cases.’ 
1171 Press Release, ICC Prosecutor: Attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes, 19/07/2013, 
available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-
statement-19-07-2013.aspx> (Last Access: 4th August, 2013).  
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‘suggestions from local sources [confirmed] that the attack appeared to have been planned and 
carried out by government-linked forces.’1172 Obviously, the reactions of both sides indicate 
that the Court will not be able to enforce a single arrest warrant, having known also that some 
powerful states support the Khartoum regime, such as China. It is not an easy hypothesis to 
connect the level of violence and the failure of the peace process in Darfur with the decision of 
the Prosecutor to arrest the President. However, it is undeniable that the strategy of Khartoum 
in light of the aforementioned discussion of Sudan, African states, and the AU’s response to 
this decision is, to a large extent, linked. The President of Senegal, in particular, described the 
Court’s decision as a ‘poor judgment’, which lacks any political sensitivity.1173 The AU has 
made it clear over time that they are against this particular decision against the Sudanese 
President. They accused former Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo of selective justice having 
targeted only African states. ‘Frankly speaking, we are not against the ICC. What we are against 
is Ocampo's justice," AU commission chairman Jean Ping said in 2011.1174  
Another pragmatic factor that was ignored by the Prosecutor is the fact that international 
justice is sometimes ineffective and powerless.1175 The Prosecutor did not take any of these 
concrete considerations within his decision-making process and was rigid in terms of applying 
the rules of the Court. As a consequence of this policy, the Prosecutor now is left with no choice 
but to deal with the crisis in Sudan, the ongoing violence, and alleged perpetrators. The strict 
commitment to the rules of the Court does not seem helpful in building a more effective strategy 
of prosecution in Sudan. As was discussed and established throughout this thesis, the 
achievement of justice cannot be completed without dealing with the making of legal decisions 
                                                          
1172 Agencies in Khartoum, Seven Tanzanian Peacekeepers with United Nations Die in Darfur Ambush, South 
China Morning Post, (15th July, 2013), available at 
<http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1282365/seven-un-peacekeepers-killed-darfur-ambush> (Last 
Access: 4th August, 2013). 
1173 Supra n. 1135, P. 12.  
1174 Supra n. 43. 
1175 Supra n. 939. 
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as a process in which reference should be made to the social and political context of the 
situation. The Prosecutor can do nothing towards the crisis in Sudan, based on the current view 
of the rules of the Court and the OTP. The Prosecutor should be encouraged then to use other 
strategies that can make, at least, the prospects of obtaining more effective policy of 
prosecution higher than what she has obtained so far. It appears that the prosecutor is advised 
to take account of these considerations before making a certain decision, in particular, the ones 
that target high-profile officials. The endeavour for achieving justice by bringing cases to a 
court at the cost of the emergence of new violence, victims, and other kinds of atrocities seems 
amoral. It is true that this could be politically problematic, as some culpable regimes might use 
this to avoid justice. However, the absence of effective enforcement mechanisms and genuine 
will of states to obey international criminal justice norms require decision-makers (the 
prosecutor) to balance between the normative and pragmatic exigencies before delivering 
justice.1176 Within such an environment, a calculated strategy of prosecution is needed based 
on both considerations.1177 This might require the prosecutor, for example, to postpone issuing 
certain decisions, sealing decisions, or deferring situations or cases to local alternatives. The 
following section seeks to provide a framework in which the tension between peace and justice, 
or between the above dyadic arguments are reduced.  
6.6. Discretionary Policy: Flexibility and Calculation   
What should the Prosecutor have done in the situation at question? And what should 
the new Prosecutor do? Of the nineteen arrest warrants that have been issued so far, ten were 
issued sealed and nine were made public immediately. Of the ten sealed arrest warrants, six 
have been arrested (60% was successful), whilst of those that were issued unsealed; only two 
                                                          
1176 Ibid. 
1177 Stephen Oola, Bashir and the ICC: The Aura or Audition of International Justice in Africa? 15th October, 
2008, in Debating International Justice in Africa, Oxford Transitional Justice Research (2008- 2010), P. 64.   
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have been arrested (20% was successful).1178 These figures show that the prospects of arresting 
the perpetrators under sealed warrants are higher than the unsealed ones. The prosecutor is 
apparently advised to follow this strategy before making any decision public. Although the 
unsealed policy is well anchored within domestic and international prosecutorial norms, which 
aim at providing a more open and just system of the judicial body, nonetheless, the sealed 
strategy is also popular.1179 In the Darfur situation, the Prosecutor made four unsealed arrest 
warrants, and none have been executed so far. It was really an odd strategy that Prosecutor 
Moreno-Ocampo did not seal, at least, the one against the President. He should have waited for 
a period of time, first, to secure executing his arrest at a certain point, and more importantly, to 
build a concrete and strong case against him. The Prosecutor, instead, decided to indict the 
President only one year after the first two warrants, without giving any chance for advancing 
the cases before the Court. Cassese criticised Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo for such a strategy 
stating that if he ‘intended to pursue the goal of having Al-Bashir arrested, he might have issued 
a sealed request and asked the ICC’s judges to issue a sealed arrest warrant, to be made public 
only once Al-Bashir travelled abroad.’1180 Moreno-Ocampo thought that making such a public 
decision would increase pressures and political responsibilities over Sudan and other states that 
might be required to arrest him to cooperate with the Court.1181 Cassese’s suggestion asks the 
prosecutor to consider the political dimension of the case to be utilised later to achieve the 
higher normative end of the process.  
                                                          
1178 These figures are up to 2015. It was only on last 17th January 2015, when the Court managed to arrest one 
more accused: Dominic Ongwen who is under the custody of the Court, see the ICC website at 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1084.aspx>.  
1179 The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, (2000), chapter 3, at 
<http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/fpd/index.html> (Last Access: 24th February, 2008). 
1180 Antonio Cassese, Flawed International Justice for Sudan, Project Syndicate: the World’s Opinion Page (15th 
July, 2008), available at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/flawed-international-justice-for-
sudan> (Last Access: 7th April, 2015).   
1181 Gosnell, supra n. 1092. 
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Although it is too late, Cassese’s suggestion would have provided a solution for the two 
sides of the criticisms that the Prosecutor faces because of the indictment’s decision. The 
decision against the Sudanese President is often criticised of being utopian in the sense that the 
prosecutor is unable to enforce it.1182 The Prosecutor was only trying to prove a point that the 
Court is in operation and its mission is to put an end to the era of impunity whoever the accused 
is. The Prosecutor is approaching too high cases (indictees who are too high profile). It is an 
unsupported or anchored case.1183 It is too utopian.  
The decision is also harshly criticised of being apologist in the sense that the Prosecutor 
is focusing too much on a highly politicised case. Davenport criticises the Prosecutor of doing 
so when he argued that ‘[t]he new prosecutor should spend less time on highly visible and 
politicized cases.’1184 The decision is also accused of being politically transferred to the Court, 
as it was referred by the Security Council.1185 Such a referral appears ‘to be used to advance 
the political objectives of powerful states.’1186 The Prosecutor was pleasing those states and 
made her progress with the head of the state. The decision against a sitting head of an African 
state represents an array of the classical tension between the North-South debates.1187 It is only 
directed against African cases, which are already highly politicised cases. The decision appears 
unprincipled and uninspiring. In either case, the prosecutor is doing a political calculation and, 
                                                          
1182 The decision is too utopian, as it is too disconnected to the policies and interests of states. See supra n. 72. 
1183 Most of the African states, Arab states, the AU, and the Arab League are against the policy of the 
Prosecutor in Darfur, particularly to the decision of the indictment against the Sudanese President. It is not just 
that those actors have opposed the indictment’s decision issued against the President; it is also their full 
refusal to the decision of opening the investigation against the Darfur situation, whereby a regular call is raised 
by them to defer the given situation. 
1184 Supra n. 112. 
1185 Richard Dicker, A Flawed Court in Need of Credibility, The New York Times (21st May, 2012), available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/opinion/a-flawed-court-in-need-of-credibility.html> (Last Access: 11th 
April, 2015), arguing that ‘the court’s problems are compounded by the dominance of the council’s five 
permanent members’.  
1186 Ibid. 
1187 See in general the arguments of Schabas about the main concerns of the SC in its relationship to the ICC, 
‘The International Criminal Court has failed to live up to its own expectations.’ Supra n. 739, Pp. 1- 7. 
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therefore, she appears to be political, seeking to achieve aims, which are not warranted by the 
law.  
Cassese’s solution would help, to a large extent, to ease the above tension. The success 
of the Court of arresting the President would end the utopian criticisms and provide a chance 
to ease the severity of the argument of the apology criticisms. As has been explained before,1188 
the success of Goldstone of transferring Milosevic to the Tribunal helped decrease the level of 
violence, protect civilians and victims, and foster the peace process. This scenario may be 
reaped again in the context of the Sudan situation, if the Prosecutor could successfully have 
arrested the President.1189 As Kai Sheffield argues, ‘Moreno Ocampo would have better served 
the ICC’s legitimacy by following prosecutorial standards more in line with those practiced in 
earlier ICC cases involving State Parties and in the domestic context of State Parties like 
Canada, including the use of sealed warrants.’1190 Therefore, the apologist criticisms could be 
eased, if not disappear.   
Having already made the decision, what is the Prosecutor required to do at this stage, if 
she (the new Prosecutor) insists on prosecution? All the Prosecutor can do is concentrate on 
two main issues. First, she is required to indict new alleged perpetrators, as there are several 
reports indicated to the involvement of those alleged perpetrators.1191 Second, the prosecutor 
should apply for sealed warrants, so she avoids the failed strategy that the previous prosecutor 
obtained.1192 Drawing on this policy and the OTP’s regular statement, the Prosecutor should 
change the current policy that only targets those who bear the most responsibility of heinous 
                                                          
1188 See generally, Chapter Two of this thesis. 
1189 Kai Sheffield, Speak Softly and Carry a Sealed Warrant: Building the International Criminal Court’s 
Legitimacy in the Wake of Sudan, Appeal Review of Current Law and Law Reform, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013) P. 171. 
1190 Ibid, P. 171. 
1191 See, supra n. 784, P. 35. The report indicates that Second Vice-President Ali Othman Taha, and other senior 
officials, such as Maj. Gen. Abduraheem M. Hussein, Maj. Gen. Bakri Hassan Salih, Gen. Salah Abdallah Ghosh 
and Abbas Arabi should be all investigated. 
1192 Supra n. 1189. 
299 
 
crimes. These suggestions require the Prosecutor, further, to prosecute perpetrators lower down 
the chain of command to ‘build cases against senior officials.’1193 Although this policy appears 
complex, nonetheless, it could increase the likelihood of the successful strategy of the 
prosecution. The fact that President Al-Bashir is charged for massive crimes, committed under 
his full control and knowledge by using thousands of subordinates makes the issue of targeting 
those lower perpetrators necessary. Thus, if the Prosecutor manages to bring them to the trial 
and prove their criminal responsibilities, this would enhance the strategy of her prosecution in 
the eyes of the relevant actors. It would help also to build the factual basis, on which the 
Prosecutor can make a strong case against the President. However, both Prosecutors seem to 
ignore this suggestion that the OTP itself mentions, when it issued a policy paper asserting that 
the OTP might go down to investigate and prosecute those below high-ranking officers.1194  
As it appears, the above option, the insistence on the prosecution’s approach delivered 
particularly by the ICC, does not seem to succeed, at least in the near future.1195 The criminal 
justice approach through the ICC may not be an option. Therefore, the Prosecutor may be 
required to consider the peace-related issue. The unlikelihood of the arrest of the President, the 
Court’s lack of coercive capacity, and the unstable strategy that the prosecutor has pursued 
raise the questions of the place of peace talks under such circumstances. The arguments to stop 
justice in exchange for peace talks to end violence have been a heated debate in the Sudan 
situation. As has been argued throughout the thesis, the criminal justice that is delivered by the 
ICC appears to constitute a serious impediment to end violence and place peace in the region, 
                                                          
1193 Human Rights Watch, supra n. 883, Pp. 45. 
1194 Supra n. 187, P. 3. 
1195 The proponents of the view of the criminal prosecution that should be approached to end the violence 
opined that such an approach does not derail the peace process. They cited the experience of the ICTY and 
ICTR. Therefore, they insisted that the prosecutor should go ahead and indict all responsible people in the 
Darfur conflict, including the head of the state. For example, Philipp Kastner, in particular, expressed the 
benefits of the criminal prosecution on the attitude of the Sudanese government in changing its policy in 
Darfur. See, supra n. 527, the author provided several benefits of putting the Darfur situation under a criminal 
jurisdiction of the Court, such as weakening the Sudanese government, bringing all sides to the peace talks, 
pressuring the international community to act, and pressuring the government to stop supporting Janjaweed. 
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as the situation in Sudan shows. The indictment’s decision, in particular, against the Sudanese 
president has made the situation worse and put the life of civilians in Darfur at even greater 
risk. This is what happened when the level of violence increased on the eve of the indictment 
decisions. It was estimated that nearly 75% of the total humanitarian assistance delivered to 
the people in Darfur by some organisations were cut off by the Sudanese government.1196 Over 
time, the effectiveness of the work and the reach of the Court has been indeed more limited. It 
is not only about the extremely slow work that has been presented in terms of all aspects of the 
work of the Court, but also about the limited justice that has been delivered by the Court to 
victims and perpetrators. ‘One size does not fit all’ still seems applicable to the Court’s option. 
The findings of 20 years of research conducted by HRW endorsed the latter trend, as there are 
still several examples that showed that the ICC’s approach is not the case all the time. 1197  
Therefore, does the criminal approach through the ICC seem workable? One 
spokesperson of peace groups argued that ‘obviously, nobody can convince the leaders of a 
rebel movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same time tell them that they will 
appear in courts to be prosecuted.’1198 Six years later, the suggestion of the proponents of the 
criminal justice approach does not seem to be fruitful, as the humanitarian conditions and the 
human rights have deteriorated. However, there was no evidence that considering the political 
realities of the situation in Darfur would end the conflict either. The Sudanese government and 
some factions of other sides to the conflict have broken all peace efforts undertaken by the 
international community, and have not implemented the basic rules of these efforts aimed at 
ending the conflict. The conflict in Darfur seems to be extremely difficult for any potential 
                                                          
1196 See supra n. 1107. 
1197 In the Mozambique situation, the peace agreement that signed in 1992 totally replaced any form of a 
criminal justice approach and also stopped the civil war that was taking place in the country, and also the 
South Africa situation is another example, see HRW, supra n. 1092.  
1198 Cited in supra n. 527, P. 71. See also, Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice, Dissent Magazine 
(Summer, 2004). 
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solution either on the political level or prosecutorial one. In particular, the SC, as usual, does 
not seem willing or effective enough to support the Court, in apprehending the perpetrators, as 
China and Russia are in support of the Sudanese Government.1199         
The concept of peace and the concept of justice in the Darfur situation seem to be 
contradictory to each other. Although there is a need to apply criminal justice to all perpetrators 
to the conflict, however, the adverse effects of the Prosecutor’s decision should not be only 
ignored but also addressed. It seems, then, that the recommendation of the African Union High-
Level Panel on Darfur is workable under the above reasons. The Panel suggested a hybrid 
tribunal that will be under the auspices of the AU as one solution to the conflict in the region.1200 
Although such a solution could aim at salvaging the President, however, the AU provided 
several calls for the implementation of the Panel recommendation fairly.1201 It fully associated 
itself with, and confirmed the necessity of, the application of all recommendations of the Panel, 
which mainly address the issue of peace, justice, healing, and reconciliation.1202 It further 
proposed the establishment of truth, justice, and reconciliation commission that can work 
alongside the hybrid tribunal.1203 The panel envisaged that such a commission would deal with 
the root causes of the conflict and ‘would make an important contribution to healing the wounds 
of Darfur and the divisions in Sudan over Darfur.’1204 In fact, the decision of deferring the 
situation of Darfur to this alternative (national and regional solution) has merit. If the regional 
organisation, the AU, most African states, and more importantly the Sudanese people prefer 
this mechanism for handling the conflict (pragmatic demand), then, the hybrid tribunal should 
                                                          
1199 Sudan Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur, Amnesty International (8th May, 
2007), available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr54/019/2007/en/> (Last Access: 13th 
December, 2014).    
1200 See supra n. 1136, Para. 25.  
1201 Ibid. 
1202 Ibid, Chapter 3. 
1203 Ibid, Paras. 246- 51. 
1204 Ibid, Para. 269. 
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be the case (normative demand). The long-term results policy of addressing the atrocities that 
the ICC Prosecutor has kept mentioning over time does not appear to solve problems. It is 
extremely difficult to outweigh the commitment to one single mechanism of handling a certain 
conflict over other mechanisms that potentially could address the conflict, given the fact that 
the first mechanism only causes more victims. This also would boost any potential peace 
agreement between all sides to the conflict.   
In addition to the problem of enforcement that the Court lacks, the problem of timing 
is another.1205 The question of time in this situation identified two main problems. The first is 
the necessity of issuing a certain decision at the right time something Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo failed to achieve, in the case of the President. Kastner emphasises the importance of 
the right timing when making a choice, when he said that ‘[t]he question of the right timing in 
order to exercise a genuine threat while minimizing potential political risks will always be 
crucial.’1206 The second is the long-term results policy that the ICC Prosecutor is following. 
This looks problematic in terms of how long one should wait until the Court can manage to 
arrest all perpetrators, who are committing more crimes. There is a need for a wise and flexible 
strategy that the Prosecutor needs to apply, even if such a strategy will consider the political 
circumstances. As Kastner argues, ‘[t]he ICC’s commitment to bringing perpetrators of 
international crimes to justice does not hold the OTP back from postponing the publication of 
indictments a few weeks or months in order to show itself politically sensitive and in line with 
the requirements of article 53’.1207 Such a wise and flexible strategy that considers the given 
circumstances would also further the perception of the Court in the eyes of the given audience 
and, therefore, promote the sociological legitimacy of the Court. The calculation of 
accompanied circumstances of the given situation might increase the chance of a successful 
                                                          
1205 Supra n. 527. 
1206 Supra n. 527. Pp. 80-1. 
1207 Ibid, P. 81. 
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strategy of prosecution. This is how Christopher Gosnell opines when he said that ‘these kinds 
of political considerations are intrinsic to international justice.’1208 In another words, such 
discourse has, at least, political dimensions that requires the decision-maker to consider when 
using legal instruments. The use of prosecutorial discretion through applying the Article 53 
‘interests of justice’ is the discourse by which the above suggestion can be implemented.  
6.7. Applicability of Article 53 to the Darfur Situation  
Three main concerns can be invoked about the applicability of Article 53 to the situation 
in question. First, whether or not the Prosecutor is able to apply the Article. Second, to which 
potential and acceptable justice mechanism the Prosecutor would defer. Third, which factor the 
Prosecutor can consider to defer the situation or the case of the Darfur situation in light of 
Article 53. As it is known now, Article 53 is the most plausible avenue to defer to other 
alternative justice mechanisms, in the light of ongoing or future peace efforts. Alternative 
mechanisms include local criminal approaches, hybrid tribunal, truth commission accompanied 
with conditional or unconditional amnesty, or ongoing peace negotiations. Under the Article 
53 ‘interests of justice’, the prosecutor has prosecutorial discretion to decline an investigation 
or a prosecution on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’. Obviously, the Darfur situation has 
passed this progression, as Moreno-Ocampo already refused to use his power to decline either 
the investigation or prosecution.  
Given the decision of the initiation of the investigation in Darfur was made, this means 
that the Prosecutor decided that such an investigation is in ‘the interests of justice’. The 
prosecutor is not obliged to prove the compatibility of the investigation with ‘the interests of 
justice’. It is only when it comes to prove the reverse decision that the prosecutor is obliged to 
prove the incompatibility of the investigation with ‘the interests of justice’. With regard to the 
                                                          
1208 Gosnell, supra n. 1092, P. 845. 
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prosecution stage, Article 53 (2) empowers the prosecutor with a right to decline a prosecution 
at certain conditions, as discussed fully in Chapter Five.1209 In the Darfur situation, Moreno-
Ocampo did not make a decision not to prosecute any person on the basis of ‘the interests of 
justice’. Instead, he sought four arrest warrants and three summonses against all parties to the 
conflict. This means that the prosecution is compatible with ‘the interests of justice’, and, 
therefore, there is no need to prove such a finding. As Moreno-Ocampo already made the 
prosecution decisions, is the new Prosecutor still able to decline the prosecution decisions made 
so far? In other words, is Bensouda still able to decide that the prosecution decisions do not 
serve ‘the interests of justice’ now? As the situation of Darfur passed the stage of seeking the 
arrest warrants, and progressed to the stage of the Pre-Trial Chamber, it seems that Article 53 
is no longer applicable. However, Article 53 (4) provides an opportunity to reopen 
consideration of the prosecution’s decisions based on ‘the interests of justice’ test. The sub-
paragraph provides that ‘[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to 
initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or information.’1210 The text seems 
to allow the prosecutor to reopen the application of Article 53 for new consideration. The 
provision, first, refers to both the stages of investigation and prosecution, on which the 
prosecutor can reconsider her decision. The provision, further, does not specify what sort of 
decision the prosecutor might make. It appears that the provision covers both sorts of decision: 
the declination and affirmation of the prosecution. This means that upon finding new facts or 
information, the prosecutor may again decide to decline to prosecute those which the 
                                                          
1209 These condition are (a) there is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under 
article 58; (b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or (c) a prosecution is not in the interests of justice, 
taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the 
age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime; the Prosecutor shall inform 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council in a case under 
article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the conclusion. 
1210 Article 53 (4) of the Rome Statute. 
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prosecutor already prosecuted. The prosecutor, for instance, might find that a local justice 
mechanism is more effective than the Court’s approach to serve ‘the interests of justice’.  
In her report to the UN Security Council, dated on 5th June, 2013, Bensouda urged the 
SC and members of the states to the UN and the ICC to execute the outstanding arrest warrants 
issued against Sudanese alleged perpetrators.1211 Therefore, it appears that she will not likely 
invoke the application of the Article 53 ‘interests of justice’ to cease on-going proceedings. 
The new Prosecutor has kept urging states and other actors to cooperate with the Court to 
execute the arrest warrants issued against Sudanese perpetrators, including President Omar Al-
Bashir. During an event on the start of genocide awareness in April, 2013, Bensouda 
emphasised the importance of bringing the fugitives to the custody of the Court.1212 She stated 
that ‘[u]nfortunately for the victims in Darfur, their suffering continues because of lack of 
implementation of the arrest warrant’.1213 Thus, it is not likely that Prosecutor Bensouda will 
ever cease the prosecution against the fugitives and defer to any proposed justice alternative or 
peace talks, although she still has such a power, as concluded above.  
6.8. Applicability of Factors of Article 53 to the Darfur Cases 
The following discussion will examine the prospects of the applicability of the factors 
enumerated in Article 53 for the declination of the prosecution against the Sudanese President 
according to the recent development of the conflict in Darfur. As the arguments of those who 
are against the ICC Prosecutor’s policy are related to the decision of prosecuting the President, 
and that sub-paragraph 2 (c) enumerates all possible factors that the prosecutor can consider 
for ceasing a case, the focus will be only on the prosecution stage and not the investigation 
                                                          
1211 ICC, Office of the Prosecution, ICC Prosecutor Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the 
situation in Darfur, the Sudan, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 05/06/2013. 
1212 ICC/Sudan- Bensouda Calls for Bashir’s Arrest (2nd April, 2013), Hirondelle News Agency, available at 
<http://www.hirondellenews.com/icc/571-sudan/34148-20413-iccsudan--bensouda-calls-for-bashirs-arrest> 
(Last Access: 13th August, 2013). 
1213 Ibid.  
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stage. This is because the prosecutor can choose which cases will be dismissed, among worthy 
cases.  
The first factor is ‘the gravity of the crime’. Of course, the crimes that were allegedly 
committed by the perpetrators are grave in nature, especially in the case of genocide. Given the 
severity of the crimes that have been committed in Darfur, and that the conflict in Darfur has 
spread to other areas resulting in the explosion of a new conflict in Blue Nile and Kordofan, it 
seems that the Prosecutor might not decline any case under this particular factor.1214 This is 
what the experience of other international tribunals have told us,1215 when all Prosecutors of 
those tribunals have fought all crimes that have severe gravity, in particular, genocide.1216. 
According to several reports, there is an indication that the alleged perpetrators are also 
responsible for emerging these new crimes.1217 In particular, the Sudanese government seems 
mainly responsible for these crimes, as much of the violence is under Sudanese control. 
Therefore, this particular factor is not qualified for ceasing any case, in particular the one 
directed against the President, as he was charged for the crime of genocide.  
Before moving to the next two factors, which are worthy of a deeper analysis, I will 
move on to the third factor, as it seems also irrelevant to the consideration of the prosecutor. 
‘The age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator’ does not appear to be applicable to any case 
under the jurisdiction of the Court. There is no report or indication that the accused are so aged 
or infirm as to invoke the possibility of declining the prosecution. However, the next two 
factors might be taken into consideration by the prosecutor for the purposes of declining the 
prosecution of one or more cases in the Darfur situation.  
                                                          
1214 See supra 1107. 
1215 Webb, supra n. 17, P. 328, stating that the Prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR emphasized the importance of 
prosecuting serious crimes, where rape was considered as a war crimes, crimes against humanity, and even 
genocide. 
1216 See generally, Chapter Two and Four of the thesis. 
1217 Supra n. 1151. 
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‘The interest of victims’ is the most probable factor that can be evaluated, as a basis for 
declining the prosecution of one or more cases.1218 The use of a certain strategy of prosecution 
based on the interests of victims is well established under the jurisprudence of the ICTY. We 
explored in the last chapter, how Goldstone used the tactic of postponement of the indictment 
against Milosevic.1219 This criterion has a dual nature that enables the prosecutor either to insist 
on the prosecution or decline it. However, the absence of conditions, in which an effective 
criminal trial can be held, such as the lack or the unavailability of effective enforcement 
mechanisms, is a critical consideration to the situation of Darfur. This can be drawn from the 
position of most African states, Arab states, China, Russia, the AU, and the Arab League, who 
all have opposed the ICC Prosecutor’s strategy against the Sudanese president.1220 This 
opposition has led those actors not to cooperate with the Court, in terms of arresting the 
fugitives. Even the SC, the body, which referred the Darfur situation to the Court, has not taken 
any effective step towards arresting or putting an end to the horrific violence in the region.1221 
The Sudanese response to the Court activities has also resulted in causing more suffering to the 
victims when Khartoum’s government expelled nearly all the aid organisations.1222 Under all 
these circumstances, and the fact that the Court is toothless without any effective support from 
those actors, the interest of victims is at serious risk. As Giulio M. Gallarotti and Arik Y. Preis 
argue ‘ideals cannot alone impose justice in an anarchic world. History has taught us that while 
ideals may move the heart, it is only when ideals are backed by power that they become truly 
compelling.’1223 Therefore, the question here is shall the Prosecutor decline any case under its 
                                                          
1218 Webb, supra n. 17, P. 329. 
1219 See also Chapter Two of this thesis for more discussion about the strategy of Goldstone in this regard. 
1220 See the first section of this chapter. 
1221 Amid Growing Brutality in Darfur, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Urges Security Council to Rethink 
Tactics for Arresting War Crime Suspects, United Nations, SC/11696, 7337th Meeting (AM) (12th December, 
2012). 
1222 See the first section of this chapter. 
1223 Giulio M. Gallarotti and Arik Y. Preis, Politics, International Justice, and the United States: Toward a 
Permanent International Criminal Court, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4 (1999), 
P. 35. 
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jurisdiction based on these circumstances? Before we can answer this question, we need to 
explore the applicability of the fourth factor that is closely linked to the above factor.      
The fourth factor is ‘the role of the alleged perpetrator’.1224 This criterion also has a 
dual nature that can be either reasoned for proceeding with the prosecution or ceasing it. By a 
way of comparison, it seems that the three main cases under the ICTY jurisdiction have much 
in common with their counterparts in the Darfur situation. In both situations, there are one 
President and two main and senior leaders who all were charged by the tribunals (Milosovic, 
Mladic, Karadzic vs Al-Bashir, Harun, Hussein). Goldstone delivered great lessons that 
Moreno-Ocampo should have learned with respect to what extent Goldstone evaluated the 
importance of the role of those perpetrators to the stability and peace at the time of the given 
region. Whilst Goldstone played a significant strategy of prosecution by indicting some and 
delaying the prosecution of others depending on the role of those perpetrators and the time of 
issuing the indictments, Moreno-Ocampo was more concerned about the record of his 
Office.1225 Obviously, the role of the Sudanese President in the current conflict is extremely 
significant, as the whole situation is under his total control. In contrast, it seems also that the 
other perpetrators do not hold such a role, as they are under the control of the President. This 
political consideration suggests that the Prosecutor should be careful in seeking any arrest 
warrant against him, in particular that most of the aforementioned actors are against the 
indictment. The Prosecutor should have at least followed the same strategy that Goldstone used 
with regard to those major perpetrators. He should have, for example, delayed the pursuance 
for the arrest warrant or, at least, sealed the arrest warrant. However, as the Prosecutor 
                                                          
1224 See Webb, supra n. 17, P. 330. Also see supra n. 30, P. 16. 
1225 Some Sudanese analysts criticised Moreno-Ocampo’s zealous pursuit of indicting the biggest fish In Sudan, 
focusing on the arrogant way the Prosecutor dealt with in relation to the President of Sudan case, see Flint and 
Waal, supra n. 634.   
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proceeded with the prosecution, thus the important question is what should the new Prosecutor 
do?    
As explained above, the interests of victims are still dramatically at risk. Two different 
trends are shaping the situation in Darfur. The first is some political factors that conclude the 
necessity of declining the prosecution against the President. The second opposes and renders 
the first trend inutile. On the first side of the picture, the President of Sudan is still playing a 
significant role in all atrocities that are still taking place in the region. The level of violence is 
not only increasing, but also spreading to engage new areas in the conflict. There is a common 
trend that calls for the deferral of the situation of Darfur for one year, as many international 
and regional organisations oppose the particular decision issued against the President. All these 
political considerations refer to the necessity of withdrawing the arrest warrant issued against 
the President, as a first good will for the start of effective peace talks. However, on the other 
side of the conflict, no serious peace agreement has taken place. Instead, Khartoum’s 
government is still playing a significant role in breaking any peace deal. The Sudanese 
government does not provide genuine willingness and ability to conduct a fair trial against the 
alleged perpetrators either. The conflict is getting extremely complex, as too many groups are 
engaged in the war and that makes reaching a certain peace deal impossible.1226 How should 
the Prosecutor, then, respond?  
Three possible scenarios are available for the Darfur situation: insisting on the 
prosecution, declining a certain case under Article 53 (2) (c), and the Security Council’s 
deferral under Article 16. Only the two first scenarios are relevant to this discussion. Based on 
the idea that the Prosecutor, by virtue of Article 53, can play several roles and deliver several 
                                                          
1226 To understand the complex war of Darfur, see Ahmad Sikainga, The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis': 
Understanding the Darfur Conflict, Origins, Vol. 2, Issue: 5 (February, 2009), available at 
<http://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict> (Last Access: 
12th September, 2015). 
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values, it would be desirable that the Prosecutor should give due considerations to the fact that 
the conflict is still ongoing. As Gosnell argues, the Prosecutor should be aware that ‘[d]eciding 
which strategy to follow -- and when to switch from one to the other -- is an intensely political 
decision.’1227 He, further, adds that ‘once the decision is made to go public, the Prosecutor 
necessarily becomes engaged in a political strategy … He becomes a political actor.’1228 This 
opinion supports the idea that the Prosecutor is advised to consider political considerations, 
which accompany any situation. And the Prosecutor should not isolate herself from those 
factors. Therefore, the Prosecutor, based on her legal power situated in Article 53, may simply 
suspend the prosecution initiated only against the President. The Prosecutor, then, once the 
situation becomes conducive for the prosecution; can again reopen the prosecution against him. 
This is exactly what the American Non-Governmental Organisation suggested by stating that 
the prosecutor can suspend a prosecution, and, then reopen it ‘once certain stability in a peace 
agreement is reached or other political problems are eliminated.’1229 
However, as there is no indication on the ground that a genuine peace deal is in place, 
or will be in place in the foreseeable future, the Prosecutor is still able to decline the 
prosecution. The hybrid tribunal that was recommended by the AU Panel is another possible 
alternative to which the Prosecutor can defer. If this alternative is what victims need, then the 
Prosecutor should defer to such an alternative, even if the tribunal adds or removes some new 
names to the trial. However, given the fact that the Prosecutor has not used her discretion to 
decline an investigation or prosecution based on ‘the interests of justice’, it is highly likely that 
she will not reverse the decision of prosecution.  
                                                          
1227 Gosnell, supra n. 1092, P. 845. 
1228 Ibid. 
1229 John Washburn and Wasana Punyasena, Interests of Justice Proposals, Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court (1st May, 2005), available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/InterestofJustice_WashburnandPunyasena_May05.pdf>.  
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In short, the flexible strategy of prosecution, which considers the political 
repercussions/effects, aimed at achieving justice, through factoring them within the decision-
making process, can help to promote the perception of the Court in the eyes of those who 
perceive the Court being illegitimate. The above discussion of what the Prosecutor should have 
done and how the new Prosecutor should respond in the context of both considering either 
peace process or operating Article 53 of ‘interests of justice’ have shown the above short 
conclusion. By considering the accompanying circumstances (political accounts) of the Darfur 
situation via following a certain strategy of prosecution (sealing arrest warrants or the deferral 
to the local mechanism) would not lead those who are against the Prosecutor to perceive the 
Court as an illegitimate Court. Further, if the Prosecutor considered the regional demands that 
seek a hybrid tribunal and a truth and reconciliation commission (normative and concrete 
demands), the Court would again obtain more credit from the relevant audience. The 
calculation strategy also plays a vital role in easing or removing the amount of criticism that 
the prosecutor faces when using her discretion.  
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This thesis examined and analysed the exercise of discretion by the ICC Prosecutor. In 
particular, it focused on the places where the ICC Prosecutor exercised discretion in its two 
senses. This analysis was preceded by considering the historical and then theoretical framework 
of the concept of discretion. It aimed to discover the potential scope of discretion that the ICC 
Prosecutor may exercise. For this purpose, the thesis focused on the analysis of one legal 
requirement, namely ‘sufficient gravity’ – an admissible criterion – and the term ‘the interests 
of justice’, which provides the prosecutor with prosecutorial discretion. Having applied these 
historical and theoretical frameworks to the work of the Prosecutor, it was found that the 
Prosecutor has exercised a strong sense of discretion when interpreting the legal requirements 
of initiating an investigation or proceeding with a case. In addition to the conventional sense 
of discretion: prosecutorial discretion that can be exercised by the virtue of the Article 53 
‘interests of justice’, it was explored that the Prosecutor has also used a wide range of legal 
interpretive discretion to interpret ‘sufficient gravity’. Whilst the first sense of discretion is a 
power the Prosecutor can claim, the second sense of discretion is not a power and has been, in 
effect, exercised by the Prosecutor due to the strong indeterminate character of the term 
‘sufficient gravity’, the lack of a definition of the term, and the lack of a consistent method and 
factors for the assessment of the term.  
The exercise of discretion is analysed and discussed in the context of the common 
charge of politicisation of the work of the Prosecutor. It has been increasingly common for 
commentators, authors, officials, and other representatives of international bodies to discuss 
or, at least, make reference to the problem of politicisation, addressing several issues, such as 
the accusation of the Court as biased against African states. In so doing, the common focus was 
extensively about the idea of selective justice that was exercised by the Prosecutor. Selectivity 
here is seen in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The exercise of selectivity let those 
commentators and authors criticise the Prosecutor as politically-driven when making her 
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decision, or biased against Africa. On her part, the ICC Prosecutor also has pushed the Court 
to the arena of international politics, however, they also strongly left her Office with an 
impression of being really biased or politically-driven. In particular, the current situations that 
are under the jurisdiction of the Court are all from African continent.   
Although these criticisms have merits, however, in practice, the Prosecutor so far has 
made no decision on the basis of prosecutorial discretion to select the current situations. The 
African situations have been selected on the basis of the satisfaction of the legal requirements, 
but not prosecutorial discretion. Similarly, the situations that were rejected were dismissed on 
the basis of the non-satisfaction of the legal requirements. Accordingly, the focus of the current 
literature on the examination of the charges of politicisation, derived from the exercise of 
selective justice, in fact, informs us little, as technically the Prosecutor has not made any 
situational decision so far on the basis of prosecutorial discretion. For this reason, this study 
sought a different approach to analyse why the Prosecutor receives the charges of politisation, 
derived from the exercise of discretion. The thesis established that the problem may lie with 
the hidden sense of discretion that has been effectively and widely exercised by the Prosecutor 
when interpreting the legal requirements for initiating investigations or prosecuting cases. The 
thesis focused, in particular, on the term ‘sufficient gravity’ that constitutes the key legal 
admissible criterion for initiating investigations or prosecuting cases. The anti-African court 
and bias charges may result from this wide and strong sense of discretion that has been 
exercised in places where legal judgments are required instead of discretion. ‘Sufficient 
gravity’ is a legal admissible criterion and is supposed to be applied through a clear and 
consistent manner.  
The thesis examined the concept of gravity in its legal and relative senses, and also ‘the 
interests of justice’ test. Chapter Four of this thesis examined the term ‘sufficient gravity’ – the 
legal criterion under Article 17. It also examined relative gravity as a consideration that the 
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prosecutor may take into account, when examining ‘the interests of justice’. The chapter 
established that the Prosecutor, in effect, exercised a broad degree of discretion when 
interpreting the term ‘sufficient gravity’, as an admissible requirement. This requirement is 
legal and is supposed to be applied in a more determined way. Contrary to the majority of the 
literature, it was found that the term ‘sufficient gravity’ has no absolute sense, at least, when 
looking at the way by which the Prosecutor applied it. The Prosecutor exercised a broad 
discretion to find out different interpretations for the meaning of ‘sufficient gravity’ that all led 
the Court to target only the African countries. The open-ended way of the interpretation of this 
crucial term may construe why the Court has been harshly criticised of bias.  
However, the Court seems to cut off the broad leeway in its recent decision in the 
Comoros situation in the context of a referred situation.1230 The Court also endorsed a low level 
for the assessment of ‘sufficient gravity’, as the Appeal Chamber and the Pre-Trial Chamber 
decided in the Lubanga and Ntaganda cases and the Comoros situations respectively.1231 
Therefore, in examining the application of gravity by the Prosecutor, several findings and 
recommendations are found.  
First, this study found that the strategy of the prosecutor in relation to the evaluation of 
legal gravity is not consistent. The Prosecutor has used two different methods to interpret 
‘sufficient gravity’, 1- the comparative method, and 2- the judgment method (threshold). In 
using these two methods, the Prosecutor took account of a wide range of factorial analysis to 
determine the issue of ‘sufficient gravity’. The Prosecutor was picking from scale, impact, 
manner of commission, and nature of crimes. For example, in using the comparative approach, 
the Prosecutor heavily depended on the quantitative measure, namely the number of victims. 
In using the threshold judgment, the Prosecutor sometimes used one factor to reject a situation, 
                                                          
1230 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 14. 
1231 See Chapter Four of this thesis for more information.  
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two factors to satisfy ‘sufficient gravity’, and, on another occasion, she recalled four of them 
jointly to conclude the threshold gravity. In using these methods and factors, it was shown that 
the Prosecutor has given weight to several extra-legal considerations, such as the limited 
capacity of the Court, and also political considerations.   
This state of affairs may explain why the ICC Prosecutor faces the accusation of 
politicisiation and bias. It also may elucidate how the ICC Prosecutor focused the direction of 
the Court to only African states. On this basis, the thesis strongly recommends that the ICC 
Prosecutor follows a more consistent application of the term ‘sufficient gravity’. The wide 
range of arbitrariness in using different methods and factors to interpret any legal requirement, 
including ‘sufficient gravity’ has changed the legal status of how this legal requirement should 
be interpreted. It makes it as if the Prosecutor was exercising selective justice to choose among 
legal, but equally valid and admissible situations. Therefore, this thesis recommends further 
research to be done for addressing the question of the consistent application of ‘sufficient 
gravity’. This in turn may raise the same issues with the legal requirements for initiating 
investigations or prosecuting cases (the jurisdictional requirements).    
Second, and according to the above finding, it was established that the insistent use of 
the quantity measure to evaluate gravity does not only undermine the legitimacy of the Court, 
but also the global character of the Court. It also restricted the reach of the Court to only big 
situations and cases instead the gravest ones. Thereafter, the thesis recommends the OTP adopt 
a relative meaning of the term scale instead of using an absolute one. The relative meaning of 
scale provides that the OTP should conclude the percentage of ‘the scale of the crime’ 
according to the total number of the given society itself, compared to the total population of 
the country, and not to the other cases that might involve thousands of incidents and crimes. 
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This suggestion is important, as it provides an opportunity for minorities to be protected by the 
Court, as the situation with the Kessab case.1232    
Third, the OTP, followed by the Court’s adoption, developed four factors for the 
assessment of gravity in its relative and legal senses: the scale, manner, commission, and nature 
of the crimes. These also were considered at the stage of investigation and also prosecution.  
Four, in relation to the question of the scope of discretion, this thesis provides the 
following findings.  
1- In terms of referrals, the prosecutor has no discretion – whether prosecutorial 
discretion or legal interpretive discretion – to initiate admissible referred situations, 
according to the Comoros’s judgement.1233 According to the Comoros’s judgment, the 
prosecutor can exercise prosecutorial discretion only at the stage of the assessment of 
‘the interests of justice’.1234 In particular, gravity in its relative sense under the Article 
53 ‘interests of justice’ provisions can be considered by the prosecutor when exercising 
prosecutorial discretion. Before the PTC’s decision in the Comoros situation, it was 
established and emphasised that the prosecutor in effect exercised a broad discretion, 
which I called legal interpretive discretion. 2- In relation to the prosecutor’s proprio 
motu power, the extent of prosecutorial discretion the prosecutor can exercise is not 
clear. Article 15 (1) clearly authorises the prosecutor to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion. However, paragraph (3) of the same Article contains an obligatory language 
enforcing the prosecutor to proceed with the investigation. The Court has not made any 
clear judgment on this question, and the matter is still debated. 3- With respect to the 
selection of admissible cases, the Statute and the Court are silent. However, there is an 
                                                          
1232 See supra n. 854. And see, the discussion of this case in Chapter Four. 
1233 Comoros, Pre-Trial Chamber July, 2015, supra n. 621, Para. 14. 
1234 Ibid, Para. 14. 
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explicit and common consensus among commentators and authors that the prosecutor 
has an implicit power to reject any case on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’, in 
particular ‘relative gravity’, whatever the trigger mechanism is. The OTP has just 
published a new policy document on the selection of cases and confirmed that it has 
broad prosecutorial discretion when selecting among legally worthy admissible 
cases.1235 The paper particularly sets three criteria for this selection, namely ‘the gravity 
of the crimes’, ‘the degree of the responsibility of the alleged perpetrators’, and ‘the 
potential charges’.1236  
 
Five, it has been established throughout the thesis that the prosecutor sits at the critical 
juncture of the efficiency and sufficiency of the Court at furthering its institutional goals. 
Whilst the prosecutor is required to maintain the sufficiency of the Court as a legal body, which 
works independently without concrete prescriptions, she is required as well to make the work 
of the Court efficient and capable of achieving its institutional aims. Whilst the first stands for 
the value of independence, the latter refers to the value of discretion. It is two sides of the same 
coin, as was emphasized throughout the thesis. The strict commitment to the legal rules does 
not necessarily render the work of the Court efficient. It was established throughout this thesis 
that the ICC is not yet an ideal resort to address all sorts of atrocities, and that its ability to 
deliver justice is considerably limited. There are often legitimate political questions that are 
necessary for making the work of the Court efficient at furthering its institutional goals. We 
have seen how several extra-legal factors and political circumstances may require the 
prosecutor to take into account within her decision-making process to render the work of the 
Court more efficient. In discussing this scenario, the thesis emphasises that these set of 
                                                          
1235 Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 2016, Para. 4. 
1236 Ibid, Paras. 33- 45. 
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considerations to be taken into account only at the stage of exercising prosecutorial discretion, 
but not at the stage of assessing the legal thresholds, including ‘sufficient gravity’. 
The thesis strongly recommends that these set of considerations are vital to the success 
of the Court in furthering its institutional aims, including justice, peace and security, and it 
recommends the OTP to follow them, given the current circumstances in which the Court 
works. The decision to initiate investigations or proceed with prosecutions are not only 
contingent on the legal criteria of the Statute. There are always extra-legal factors and political 
circumstances necessary for the exercise of meaningful prosecutorial missions.1237 The 
engagement of the prosecutor in the particularities of situations and cases is very important for 
enforcing meaningful justice that the Court itself may not be able to do. As Goldston asserts, 
the consideration of extra-legal factors is essential for the ‘viability’, ‘efficacy’, ‘efficiency’, 
and ‘independence’ of the Court.1238 Gosnell also states that the consideration of these political 
circumstances within the decision making-process is because ‘these kinds of political 
considerations are intrinsic to international justice.’1239  
The policy of denial rhetoric has mainly prevented the Prosecutor from delivering 
justice on several occasions. Applying the law in its rigid formula has not helped the Prosecutor 
to do meaningful justice in Sudan or Uganda. Several pragmatic considerations in these 
situations required the prosecutor to use her discretion to stop the Court’s proceedings as an 
option and allow for other alternatives to replace the Court’s approach. The existence of these 
two poles established that the ICC is not yet an ideal approach to deal with all atrocities.1240 
After one decade, most situations under the ICC jurisdiction are still experiencing mass 
                                                          
1237 See generally, Brubacher, supra n. 22. 
1238 Goldston, supra n. 18, P. 402. 
1239 Gosnell, supra n. 1092, P. 845. 
1240 Supra n. 48, arguing that the ICC is not ideal institution to deliver justice all the time and to all potential 
situations. 
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violation of human rights. Some conflicts are still in progress.1241 The most wanted ones are 
still at large.1242 The peace-related problems in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya are, to a large extent, 
impeded by the policy of the Prosecutor.  
Based on above recommendations, it was also found that contemporary international 
prosecutors have more roles to deliver. The development of the international criminal law and 
the jurisprudence of international prosecutors all contributed to developing the role of an 
international prosecutor, as a new international player within the international legal arena and 
international politics. For instance, when the prosecutor stops the criminal proceedings, using 
her discretionary power, based on ‘the interests of justice’, the prosecutor, in fact, may be 
addressing other values, such as stability or peace-related considerations. This process 
confesses the prosecutor’s new roles to play alongside with her main mandate in delivering 
justice. Accordingly, this thesis also establishes that the current international Prosecutor 
can/should exercise a multifunction of roles in order to promote those values. With the 
establishment of the ICC, we have begun to see a dramatic development in the idea of the 
prosecution in terms of both the legal level and practical level. It is a multi-functional 
prosecution. The creation of the ICC witnessed a formal emergence of a new sense of 
prosecution, where the role of the prosecutor has been formally widened, accordingly. Article 
53 was a product of the historical development of the exercise of the discretionary power by 
the previous prosecutors. Although this form of power was not clear enough either theoretically 
or practically in the work of the Military Tribunals,1243 it was clear enough in the practice of 
the SC Tribunals.1244 The thesis showed several times how Goldstone used his discretionary 
                                                          
1241 The CAR, DRC, Darfur, Libya, and Côte d'Ivoire are for example still facing conflicts. 
1242 See the official website of the ICC about the current arrested perpetrators, at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/>.  
1243 I analysed several positions taken by the international Prosecutors of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
International Military Tribuanls, and found that the consideration of ‘the interests of justice’ was considered 
by those Prosecutors, before taking a certain decision. See generally the second part of Chapter Two, and 
Chapter Five. 
1244 See Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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power to consider the interests of justice before making his decisions.1245 With the arrival of 
the ICC, we have begun to see that these developments have been embedded in the law. 
However, in considering the political considerations, the prosecutor must aim at 
achieving justice. Chapter Five established, for example, that the consideration of peace 
processes (a political influence) on the basis of ‘the interests of justice’ can be accounted for 
only when such processes are associated with some sort of justice mechanisms. This is often 
the case when international justice of the ICC is not attainable due to some obstacles, then other 
justice mechanisms might be more meaningful and needed. Chapter Three offered a structured 
approach, which aimed at providing a framework in which the reference to political 
influences/repercussion may be justified. The use of the apologist considerations as a tool to 
achieve the utopian end, which is justice, in its broad sense, is the approach that may 
legitimately help justify the consideration of political factors. As the prosecutor is expected to 
be independent, respecting the rule of law when exercising her discretion, she is also expected 
to be flexible, as discretion is in nature a power that stands outside the law. The prosecutor may 
need to give weight to considerations that are not warranted in law. The ignorance of one of 
these premises posed the prosecutor in the dyadic criticisms.  
The long strife between the advocate of bringing criminal justice to perpetrators at any 
cost and those who call for the abandonment of criminal justice in favor of peace may just end 
with neither justice nor peace delivered to both victims and perpetrators. The tension between 
these two values is still yet to be sorted out. As Arbour raises, ‘[w]e all repeat the mantra that 
there can be no lasting peace without justice; and that’s true enough. But I don’t think that we 
have yet resolved the inevitable tensions between the two in a workable fashion.’1246 This 
                                                          
1245 See generally, supra n. 273. 
1246 Louise Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism's Uncertain Future, International Crisis Group (28th 
October, 2013), the Speech is available at you tube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYW6sWp6hCM>  
(Last Access: 15th May, 2016).  
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requires researchers to examine the potential impacts of the Court in conflicts where there is 
tension between the achievement of justice and maintaining peace. Kersten emphasises that 
‘[w]hat we need are more analytically nuanced and empirically rich accounts of how the ICC 
affects the conflicts in which it intervenes—as well as how it doesn't.’1247 However, the lack of 
several essential tools for the successful achievement of justice by the Court should not be 
ignored. The impotent enforcement mechanisms that the Court currently holds make the ability 
of the Court as a main international protector of victims highly questionable, in particular that 
the Court has achieved little since its operation in 2002. Of 23 cases, only 6 indictees were 
brought to the Court, where most of them voluntarily appeared.1248 Additionally, the strong 
political effects that surround the work of the ICC Prosecutor also makes the ICC justice 
difficult to attain. For these considerations, the above suggested approach offers a moderate 
solution where both values may be attained. Giving a pass for the peace process, associated 
with another mechanism of justice, including the local one through the use of prosecutorial 
discretion can be one way to end this dilemma. Chapter Five suggests, having presented the 
Uganda situation, that any sort of justice as long as the civil society and victims accept it, 
should be respected by the Prosecutor, when the ICC is not able to achieve justice and 
constitutes an obstacle for achieving peace.  
This is not to say that the ICC should abandon its proceedings whenever its ability to 
deliver its own justice is not possible. In fact, based on the practice of the Prosecutors of the ad 
hoc Tribunals, examined in Chapter Two, the ICC prosecutor is required to analytically and 
carefully examine potential effects and ability of the Court, before intervening in a certain 
situation. Although this is not an easy task, as the ICC prosecutor cannot predict every single 
                                                          
1247 Mark Kersten, The ICC and its Impact: more Known Unknowns, Open Democracy (5th November, 2014), 
available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mark-kersten/icc-and-its-impact-more-
known-unknowns> (Last Access: 15th May, 2016).  
1248 See the main page of the ICC website for more information and update. 
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circumstance of the future, however, there are still different strategies that the prosecutor can 
follow in case it appears that the Court’s approach is not workable. The strategy of delaying an 
investigatory or prosecutorial decision is one of the most effective, as we have seen with regard 
to the practice of the ICTY. We made a distinction between the strategy of the ICTY Prosecutor 
and the ICC Prosecutor in relation to the decision of indicting Milosevic and Al-Bashir, 
respectively, where the first was successfully brought to the Tribunal, whilst Al-Bashir remains 
at large. In the Darfur situation, Moreno-Ocampo was completely utopian when he made a 
decision of prosecuting head of Sudan: Omer Al-Bashir, because he did not give any attention 
to his role and power. Al-Bashir is still controlling the whole war that is taking place in the 
region. The results of the exercise of this strategy of prosecution were the blatant failure of the 
OTP to bring any alleged perpetrator to the Court, including the President, the refusal of many 
of African states, including those who are parties to the ICC, to cooperate with the Court to 
arrest Al-Bashir or to promote the fragile peace negotiations, and to put an end to humanitarian 
tragedy in Darfur. On the other hand, the Prosecutor of the ICTY did not initially make a 
decision against Milosevic, although he was responsible for many atrocities. The Prosecutor 
instead took several pragmatic considerations such as the fact that Milosevic was needed for 
the peace process at the time, and more importantly his power and role. However, four years 
later, when new pragmatic considerations emerged, such as the fact that the NATO countries 
were ready to arrest Milosevic and that was for political reasons, also the fact that he was not 
needed for any peace process, and the indictment decision would not destablise the region, the 
prosecutor made a decision to indict him. The outcomes of that strategy were arresting 
Milosevic, relatively decreasing the level of violence, and bringing justice to victims. Through 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, allowing enough time to build a strong case against a 
high ranking leader, by indicting lower indictees such as Karadzic and Mladic, and the others 
facilitated and paved the way for the Prosecutor to make the biggest decision. The ICC 
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Prosecutor did not follow such a strategy and did not give any attention to the peculiarities of 
the situation of Darfur and the potential impacts that may result from indicting the most high-
ranking official in Sudan – President Al-Bashir – in a rushed way. This simply ended with a 
zero achievement in Sudan.  
Therefore, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion offers the Prosecutor different 
options to get the most of her prosecution. The thesis has suggested that the consideration of 
the political peculiarities of situations and cases alongside the ability of the Court to deliver its 
justice would allow the ICC prosecutor to exploit more effectively the available resources of 
the Court in a way that allows a certain sort of justice to take place and also not to waste the 
Court’s resources for nothing. It was established several times throughout the thesis that the 
main rationale of the exercise of discretion is to be aware of peculiarities of situations and 
cases.1249 Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan also hold that prosecutorial discretion ‘can 
individualize the implementation of the law, softening the harshness or injustices that 
sometimes arise from rules dispassionately applied.’1250 The careful consideration of the ability 
of the Court to bring justice to all sides to a certain conflict is important, as the Court has only 
thought about justice to one side of several conflicts, such as Uganda. In fact, such intervention, 
even if successfully completed, would jeopardise the perception of the Court and make the 
Prosecutor biased. Justice cannot only be delivered to one side of the conflict. We have seen 
that there were several alternatives suggested by victims in Uganda that were acceptable to all 
sides to the conflict. The ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence emphasised the 
importance of the participation of victims in proceedings. Explicitly, Article 53 requires the 
prosecutor to consider the voices of victims before proceeding with her investigation or 
prosecution. This particular factor is highly crucial to changing the type of the decision the 
                                                          
1249 Nsereko, supra n. 13, P. 125. 
1250 Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan, The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), P. 330. 
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prosecutor may make. If the local voices of a certain conflict favor a certain form of alternative 
other than the ICC, then the prosecutor is highly likely required to respect this particular 
demand. The Uganda situation has shown a typical example, where the majority of voices 
favored the peace demands ahead of justice. Even more to the point, the majority of Ugandans 
sought the local justice mechanism to replace the ICC. In such a scenario, the Prosecutor should 
have stepped back and allowed for the local alternatives to take place. 
 Additionally, the prosecutor is required to be transparent and explain to the public that 
the aim of making such decisions is to achieve justice and not to make any political outcomes. 
Although the OTP is publishing more policy documents explaining how its decisions are 
formulated, it is indeed the decision itself that should be transparent. 
The thesis also broadly draws from Koskenniemi and Robinson’s thought to identify 
why the Prosecutor faces criticisms when making any decision. Based on the analysis of the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of her powers in the shadow of Koskenniemi’s thinking, it was found 
that the Prosecutor is in a persistent criticism whatever position she takes. Each position is 
vulnerable to two opposite criticisms and both raise one common charge.1251 It is a charge of 
politicisation. The prosecutor is either too utopian in the sense that her decision is too far from 
the interests and policies of states. It is just not supported by any political force and, therefore, 
is not capable of being enforceable. Or, she is too apologist in the sense that her decision is too 
connected to the latter’s policies and interests. It is just ignoring the higher normative demand 
that the decision is supposed to deliver. It is an unprincipled decision and appears to lack 
legitimacy. The fact that the prosecutor appears to be in such a persistent criticism does not 
reduce at all the importance, or the vital role of the ICC. International criminal law and 
particularly the Statute of the ICC are usually based on contradictory assignments that enable 
                                                          
1251 Supra n. 72, Pp. 16, 67, and 70. 
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observers easily to find a gap from which they attack any single position the prosecutor takes, 
based on their own legal or political orientations.1252 Any potential failure of the prosecutor, 
therefore, to respond to every side of the argument does not mean that the prosecutor is in a 
crisis. The persistent criticism is a healthy phenomenon and does not nullify the good mission 
that the Court, and, in particular, the prosecutor has conducted so far. On the contrary, the 
dyadic criticisms helped us to find why the prosecutor faces criticisms, and also pushed us to 
look for solutions for some dyadic arguments. It is true that some dyadicisms cannot be 
resolved due to the strong legal arguments that each side uses, however, there has often been 
means to reduce others.  
The ICC is the most important achievement in international criminal justice, where 
bringing perpetrators to justice and ending the era of impunity are the two critical purposes this 
Court seeks to deliver. However, it is yet an emerging institution, the creators of the Court 
could not build the Court on a solid ground. There are still several essential tools, without 
which the success of the Court in achieving the above institutional goals remains in doubt. 
Until the international community resolves these basic problems, the relevance of the political 
peculiarities of situations and cases, the achievement of justice through different mechanisms, 
and exercising a meaningful prosecution will remain decisive for achieving these goals. The 
tension between justice and peace would be better solved by a means of calculation not 
subtraction. The ICC prosecutor is the one who has a critical role to play in order to cover these 
deficiencies.   
                                                          
1252 For example and in the context of this thesis, Chapter Six showed that the value of peace could be under 
the confine of the values that are protected by Article 53. In addition, the Preamble of the Statute asserts that 
peace is one goal the Court seeks to achieve. Justice, however, is the fundamental aim of the Court. In 
practice, these two values may often contradict each other the matter that allows the observers open opposite 
criticisms and legal arguments to defend about one of these values, in case if the prosecutor fails to achieve 
both aims together when making a certain decision, as the situation was in Sudan and Uganda. See more 
discussion about this issue in Chapters Five and Six. See generally, Cassese, supra 958. 
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APPENDIX  
Here are some examples of the questions that were used to interview staff.  
 Do not you think that the Prosecutor considers concrete demands, including those that 
have political dimensions when evaluating the discretionary criteria (relative gravity 
and ‘interests of justice’)? 
 Under the current accusation of the Court of being an African Court, do you think that 
the geographical criterion should be a relevant factor for the assessment of the gravity 
threshold? If so, would not such criterion maximize the effectiveness of the Court as 
well as the reach of it? 
 Given the lack of effective enforcements mechanisms at the international level, would 
the OTP reconsider the indictments of Sudan’s President, as this indictment increased 
the level of the violence and caused more human rights violations? Would Article 53 
be applicable to such a case?   
 In other words, does the Prosecutor make any link between the political environment, 
where the Court works and her strategy of prosecution to deliver justice?  
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